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ABSTRACT

THE ROADMAP TO LIBERALIZATION: MYANMAR’S TRANSITION
FROM MILITARY TO CIVILIAN RULE

Nicole Loring, PhD
Department of Political Science
Northern Illinois University, 2019
Trude Jacobsen and Michael Clark, Co-Directors
How did Myanmar’s military embrace liberalization more during 2011-2015 than in the
1988-2002 period? Myanmar has long been treated as an outlying case by studies on
democratization, liberalization, and transitions from authoritarian regimes due to its longstanding
military regime. Protests in 1988 led to pressure on the regime to hold elections in 1990, leading
to an electoral victory for the opposition party the National League for Democracy (NLD), but
the results were ultimately overturned, and Myanmar’s military regime persisted. The period of
2011-2015 showed marked similarities with the earlier 1988-2002 period, including protests and
pressure for democratic elections. Despite the seemingly analogous events between these two
periods, when the NLD again won a majority of votes in the 2015 general elections, Myanmar’s
regime allowed the results to stand and opened the door for a process of liberalization and
democratization. This project explores how the political environment changed in Myanmar from
1988 to 2015. Through the use of interviews, a media content analysis, and process tracing, I find
that a series of institutional changes which took place during the 2003-2010 period contributed to
the regime’s sense of confidence in their ability to control a transition, ultimately creating an
opportunity for political change in one of the world’s most durable authoritarian regime.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Comparative politics scholars often grapple with the question of how authoritarian
regimes can peacefully transition to civilian rule. 1 It is an empirical puzzle; why would those in
power voluntarily step down and risk possible retribution by handing control to civilians? Such
questions are especially compelling in states which have experienced multiple transition attempts
– if a state fails to transition to civilian rule successfully, what necessary features were missing?
If the same state transitions at a different time, what conditions changed to make such a political
development possible? Although the impetus for change (splits between hard- and soft-liners,
domestic or international pressure, changes in institutions or structure of the regime, and so
forth) differs from case to case, much of the literature on authoritarian regime transitions
assumes that autocrats cling to power until they are forcibly removed or ejected from office by
changing political tides.2 Empirical studies of formerly authoritarian regimes, however, have
shown that autocrats, particularly military regimes, often play a role in their own removal from

1

Tachua and Heper 1983; Stepan 1988; Huntington 1996; Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster 2002;
Silva 2002; Croissant 2002; Slater 2003; Ottaway 2003; Croissant 2004; Bellin 2004; Callahan
2005; Smith 2005; Lai and Slater 2006; Geddes 2006; Hadenius and Teorell 2007; Greene 2007;
Brownlee 2008; Wright 2008; Slater 2008; Brownlee 2009; Pepinsky 2009; Levitsky and Way
2010; Slater 2010; Malesky and Schuler 2011; Case 2011; Albertus and Menaldo 2012.
2

Hedman 2001; Aspinall 2005; Lee 2015.

2
office.3 Interestingly, the literature on political liberalization4 suggests that this process of a
peaceful transition of power is not a linear one, but can include many steps forward and back as
political actors figure out their new roles and the potential for democratization (or something
else) takes hold.5
This project aims to refine the existing literature on political liberalization and develop a
framework that explains the puzzling case of Burma/Myanmar’s shift from a military regime to a
civilian-led democracy.6 As one of the longest-lasting military regimes in recent memory and
given the Burmese military’s history (as seen in their overturning of the 1990 elections), 7
observers were largely surprised by the transfer of power from the Tatmadaw8 to a civilian
government. The question, therefore, is “How did Myanmar’s military embrace liberalization
more during 2011-2015 than in the 1988-2002 period?”

3

Geddes 1999; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014.

4

O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Huntington 1991; Linz and Stepan 1996.

5

While political liberalization often precedes democratization or civilianization efforts, it does
not guarantee them or automatically lead in that direction. See the section on “Conceptual
Specifics” following the introduction for more clarity.
Albeit not a consolidated or a liberal democracy – again, see the “Conceptual Specifics” section
for more in-depth definitions of terms.
6

7

8

Callahan 2005; Geddes 1999.
(pronounced “dat-mah-daw-ji”) is Burmese for “armed forces.”

3
In the case of Myanmar, the initial goal of the military regime appeared not to be
democratization or political liberalization9 but rather focused on the preservation of the existing
regime’s interests – preventing domestic unrest, the removal of sanctions, or improved relations
with the international community. In pursuit of these goals, autocrats made small, seemingly
superficial choices, such as deciding whether to make token changes to electoral rules or holding
low-stakes elections. As the regime made these decisions, however, it became harder and harder
to backtrack from the promises they made,10 even if they did not initially intend for liberalization
to be the ultimate outcome. As the regime continued to take small steps in exchange for
perceived benefits or to appease challengers, a political liberalization process took hold despite
the regime’s initial intentions.
This project will compare three distinct time periods in modern Burmese politics to
understand how the transition process occurred, namely 1988-2002, 2003-2010, and 2011-2015.
I will show that, during the 1990 elections, the military maintained control because it had not
taken small steps along the path to liberalization before holding elections, so nulling the election
results was possible. The second process of political liberalization,11 which started roughly

9

Political liberalization refers not only to electoral changes and democratization but also a more
general opening-up of civil and political liberties, such as freedom of the press, freedom of civil
society, release of political prisoners, etc.
As O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) write, “…once some individuals and collective rights have
been granted, it becomes increasingly difficult to justify withholding others.” (O’Donnell and
Schmitter 1986, 10).
10

11

Political liberalization does not necessarily lead to democratization; however, in a number of
cases, liberalization precedes democratization, which may also be the case in Myanmar. My use
of the word “liberalization” is not meant to indicate that Myanmar now has a flawless liberal
democracy. Indeed, there are a myriad of institutional and procedural issues with Myanmar’s
fledgling civilian government, and many scholars disagree over whether the country can or

4
around 2003 with the announcement of the “7-Step Roadmap to Democracy”,12 began as a
disingenuous attempt by the military to appear as if it was open to democratization. As
Myanmar’s military took steps along the Roadmap it had laid out, it became more and more
difficult for them to renege on their transition promises. At some point in this transition process,
Myanmar’s government reached a threshold point, past which it became too difficult, costly, and
politically risky to turn back. Although many have tried to explain and describe the ongoing
political changes in Myanmar, 13 the specific puzzle that this project is focused on is why such
changes did not occur during the 1988-2002 time period, despite pressure for political changes
and elections in 1990. Myanmar is a valuable case to study with regards to political
liberalization, as it reveals how a deeply entrenched and durable regime is nonetheless capable of

should be considered a democracy. For instance, experts such as Taylor (2009) and Kyaw Yin
Hlaing (2005; 2014) see efforts during this time as steps toward democracy, while Turnell (2008;
2011) and Kramer (2012) are more pessimistic about the regime’s intentions.
This is the Myanmar military’s name for the seven-step plan announced by General Khin
Nyunt in state-run media August 30, 2003. The Burmese roughly translates to “Roadmap to a
Disciplined Democracy” (Arnott 2004). The first mention of the 7-Step Roadmap in the New
Light of Myanmar (government-run newspaper) was from September 5, 2003. On the last page of
the paper, an article with the headline “Roadmap of Myanmar to democracy explained in
Taninthayi Division” describes a ceremony held in Yangon to explain the roadmap to those in
attendance, who were “departmental officials, social organization members, businessmen,
townselders and teachers” (NLM 9/5/2003, 16). Additionally, a small poem titled “We’ll go
according to schedule” is featured. The author, Byan Hlwar (Trs), writes, “To the peaceful,
developed station/we shall march onwards/In marching on that route/We’ll pass seven
stations/With sturdy footfalls step by step/We’ll march on traversing them/On the journey we
traverse/Should there be impediments, difficulties/Should there be attempts change route
[sic]/Only those who do will tire/And be wearied…By doing so we shall get/Where we desire,
for sure/The developed and pleasant station/And throughout our nation/There shall be peace”
(Byan Hlwar in NLM 9/5/2013, 7). Such propagandistic poems were common in the New Light
of Myanmar during this time.
12

13

Croissant and Kamerling 2013, Slater 2014, Lee 2015, Egreteau 2016.

5
a peaceful (albeit unintentional and still-ongoing) transition to a more liberal14 civilian-led
government.
The empirical puzzle this project addresses is as follows; despite Myanmar being a highly
unlikely candidate for a voluntary and peaceful transition from military to civilian rule, the
military regime engineered a transition. This occurred despite limited resources and
infrastructural capability,15 high levels of nationalism, internal discontent and ethnic conflicts, 16
and low international support17 at the start of the transition. By examining the steps Myanmar’s
government took to transition, this project will go beyond a niche case study to contribute to the
broader literature on authoritarianism and democratization to suggest how other regimes might
do the same. If a peaceful transition to civilian rule is possible in an outlying case such as
Myanmar, perhaps the transition process that did occur can reveal under what conditions
transitions are likely to occur in other similarly durable regimes such as Indonesia 18 or Nigeria.19

14

As discussed later, indicators of political liberalization include freedom of the press, speech,
and assembly; the opening up of civil society; and increased political and civil rights. Such
improvements do not, however, automatically lead to democratic consolidation, and are
reversible.
15

International Trade Centre 2014.

16

Latt 2016.

17

Martin 2013.

18

According to Geddes (1999), Indonesia had a personalist authoritarian regime under Sukarno
from 1949-1965 and then a personalist/military/single party regime under Suharto’s New Order
regime from 1967-1998.
19

According to Geddes (1999), Nigerian experienced multiple military regimes from 1966-1979,
1983-1993, and a military/personalist regime under Abacha/Abubakar from 1993-1999.

6
This project seeks to contribute to the broader political science debate over the durability of
authoritarian regimes and their fate after the authoritarian regime ends and a new regime begins.

Conceptual Specifics: Liberalization, Democratization and Civilianization

Before engaging in the literature upon which this project is based, it is necessary to
establish the specific definitions of some relevant concepts – specifically liberalization,
democratic consolidation, and civilianization. Part of the difficulty in defining and fully
understanding these concepts is that they often overlap. For example, civilian supremacy over
the military is often cited as a crucial step in the process of democratic consolidation;20 however,
a process of civilianization does not necessarily mean that democratic consolidation will follow.
These concepts remain both intertwined and disparate, but defining and treating them separately
matters a great deal for the conceptual validity of studies such as this. Table 1 shows how each of
these concepts are applicable to the case of Myanmar.
Civilianization may be the first of these concepts to show up in regimes which are
transitioning from authoritarian rule to something else. Civilianization refers to the shifting of
political power from the hands of the military to civilians. This process may consist of different
stages, as the military members may wish to see how the civilian leadership can handle the
mantle of governance before fully handing over control. Civilianization may eventually lead to
further processes of liberalization, and farther down the line, democratic consolidation; as
Diamond states, “If the military is to be subordinated to civilian control, then civilian

20

Schedler 1998, 91.

7
institutional capacities to manage and oversee it must be strengthened in the executive and
legislative branches.”21 The Myanmar case is an example of partial civilianization – while the
new government is considered civilian-led, the quota for military members means that the
country’s politics are still not fully controlled by civilians.

Table 1: Civilianization, Liberalization and Democratic Consolidation in Myanmar
Concept
Present in
Evidence
Myanmar?
Civilianization
Partial
Government is now civilian-led, but the
existence of a quota for military members in
parliament shows that the government is not
fully civilianized
Liberalization
Yes, ongoing
Changes such as the opening up of civil
society, free speech, freedom of the press –
albeit with some caveats
Democratic Consolidation Too early to tell Institution-building is happening but military
still has veto power in the parliament –
government is not immune to an authoritarian
regression

Liberalization consists of more widespread changes than civilianization but is less “deep”
than the process of democratic consolidation. As Diamond describes it, liberal political systems
exist where “individual and group liberties are well protected and in which there exist
autonomous spheres of civil society and private life, insulated from state control.”22 Thus,
liberalization is a process in which individual and group liberties (e.g. civil society, freedom of
speech, freedom of the press, rights for minority groups) are developed and political institutions

21

Diamond 1999, 76.

22

Diamond 1999, 3.

8
which help to limit the overlap of the state with civil society and private life are established.
Liberalization may lead into a process of democratic consolidation, but it can also be reversed –
while democratic consolidation has occurred when democracy is no longer susceptible to
backtracking towards authoritarianism, liberalization has no such guarantee. Many of the
indicators of liberalization overlap with those of democratic consolidation and may even precede
consolidation. Importantly, however, while many of the features of liberalization and democratic
consolidation look similar, the difference between the two is in the reversibility of the process.
Liberalization is certainly taking place in Myanmar, but the changes that are occurring are by no
means irreversible.
Democratic consolidation, according to Schedler, refers to “the challenge of making new
democracies secure, of extending their life expectancy beyond the short term, of making them
immune against the threat of authoritarian regression.”23 Diamond likewise defines democratic
consolidation as “the process of achieving broad and deep legitimation, such that all significant
political actors, at both the elite and mass levels, believe that the democratic regime is the most
right and appropriate for their society, better than any other realistic alternative they can
imagine.”24 He suggests a number of crucial processes that must occur for consolidation to take
place, namely democratic deepening, political institutionalization, and regime performance.
Democratic deepening consists of increased executive/military accountability, a reduction in
barriers to political participation, more freedom for civil society, and the protection for political

23

Schedler 1998, 91.

24

Diamond 1999, 65.

9
and civil rights for all citizens. 25 Political institutionalization strengthens the rules of democracy
in order to promote trust and cooperation between political actors. 26 Finally, the performance of
the government will contribute to beliefs about its legitimacy. 27
As Schedler notes, Robert Dahl’s criteria for whether a country can be considered a
democracy are the most widely-used – these include civil and political rights as well as fair,
competitive, and inclusive elections.28 A country which achieves these criteria can be considered
a liberal democracy, but the road to that status is often fraught for countries which are new to
democratic practices. Schedler suggests the terms “electoral democracies” for those which hold
inclusive, fair, and competitive elections but fall short of the political and civil freedoms
protected in liberal democracies, as well as “advanced democracies” which may possess even
more positive democratic traits than what liberal democracies have achieved.29
Many countries fall somewhere in between the extremes of authoritarianism on one end
of the spectrum and advanced democracy on the other. The process of democratization, thus,
consists of a state’s attempts to move away from authoritarianism and towards liberal or
advanced democracy. This process often takes place after political liberalization or
civilianization attempts, as these changes set the stage for the larger political shifts necessary to

25

Diamond 1999, 75.

26

Diamond 1999, 75.

27

Diamond 1999, 76.

28

Dahl in Schedler 1998, 92.

29

Schedler 1998, 93.

10
establish democratic consolidation. The process of democratization is not, however, guaranteed
by liberalization or civilianization efforts. In the case of Myanmar, it is too early to tell if the
country is starting a process of democratization, and many of the political changes which may
indicate such a process, such as democratic institution building30 are still reversible. Democratic
consolidation is a long process, and Myanmar’s fledgling civilian-led government is still not
immune to the possibility of authoritarian regression.

Literature Review

Although authoritarian transitions are popular and widely-studied subjects within
political science, the explanations provided by existing literature do not satisfactorily answer the
research question for this study, “What conditions were necessary and sufficient for Myanmar’s
military regime to honor the results of free and fair elections?” In particular, the factors most
often cited in the literature as necessary and/or sufficient for a successful transition to civilian
rule (features inherent to specific regimes types, professionalization of the military, civil society
opposition, international pressure, and splits within the military hardliners and soft-liners) do not
explain the variation between Myanmar’s failed transition in 1990 and the ongoing transition
which started in 2010.31 Other variables (institutional design and regime confidence) appear to

30
31

Schedler 1998, 100.

See Appendix A for a timeline of events in Myanmar during 1948-2015, which provides some
detail as to the political changes and the evolution of political liberalization in the country.
Although the military has retained some political influence for themselves, such as a 25% quota
for military members in parliament, this project seeks to explain the change in political
liberalization from the non-transition in 1988-1990 to the ongoing transition in the 2011-2015

11
have played a role in the Myanmar case, but are not sufficient on their own to explain the
variation in political liberalization between the two time periods. Table 2 shows which factors
are present or applicable for the case of Myanmar.

Features of Specific Regime Types

Two common factors explored in the existing authoritarianism literature are the structure
and features inherent to specific regime types. According to this strain of literature, much of the
variation in the durability and behavior of authoritarian regimes can be explained by what type of
regime it is: personalist (often led by a strongman dictator, such as Suharto in Indonesia); singleparty (such as the Communist Party in Vietnam); and military regimes (as seen in Myanmar).
However, the argument that regime type alone is the sole or main explanatory factor for
transitions to civilian regimes does not explain variation among cases that belong to the same
category. Myanmar is often treated as an outlying case of an extremely durable military regime,
since the Tatmadaw’s influence in Burmese politics lasted many decades past the average
military regime.

period. Such efforts to protect their voice in parliament and other interests such as financial
investments are not unique to Myanmar – indeed, many authoritarian regimes facing a transition
away from power make an effort to leave behind some institutional protections. For instance,
before stepping down from power in Chile, Pinochet retained, among many other deals, the right
to name nine members of his choice to the senate; in Poland, the Communist Party was
guaranteed 35% of seats in parliament and their allies were granted an additional 30% of seats.
As Przeworski (1991) writes, “Extrications thus leave institutional traces” (78). Although some
may assert that such a transition is insincere because of the military’s continued role in politics,
the focus for this project is on the shifts that took place that can explain why the military allowed
and abided by free and fair elections in which a civilian government won the majority of seats.

Table 2: Presence of Explanatory Factors in Myanmar
Factor
Present?
Necessary/Sufficient to Explain
Temporal Variation?
Features inherent to Yes – during all
No - the features of the regime did
specific regime
periods
not change during the different
types
time periods

Professionalization
of the military

Somewhat – training
efforts were sporadic in
the 1988-2002 period
and were curtailed
during the 2003-2010
period.

No - training in countries that
would arguably instill democratic
values like the US, UK and
Australia during the 1980s failed
to lead to a transition in the 19882002 time period

Civil society
opposition

Yes – Took place in
first and second time
periods

Necessary but not sufficient protests in 1988 failed to produce
a transition during the following
elections.

International
pressure

Yes – during first two
time periods, but
pressure drastically
reduced in the third
time period (20112015)

Necessary but not sufficient –
economic sanctions, arms
sanctions, and diplomatic
measures by the international
community failed to change the
regime

Relevant Historical Detail
Myanmar's Tatmadaw has exhibited
typical behavior expected from a military
regime (e.g. citing security concerns for
intervention, exhibiting "Guardian"
attributes, etc.)
The Tatmadaw sent military officers
abroad for training - this number
fluctuated and the locations of training
changed. Additionally, practices such as
the rape of women in ethnic minority
areas by military members also calls into
question the professionalism of the
Tatmadaw
Civil society opposition/protests against
the military regime occurred in 1988 as
well as 1996 and 2007, but the 1990
elections (after the massive 1988 protests)
failed to produce a transition.
There was a wide variety of efforts that
the international community made to
pressure the Burmese regime, including
sanctions and the severing of diplomatic
relations in the wake of the 1988
crackdown. During the Obama
Administration, punitive measures were
reduced after the 2011 elections, and
diplomatic relations were reinvigorated.
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Table 2 (continued)
Factor

Present?

Splits between
military/party
hardliners and softliners

Yes - during all time
periods

Institutional design

Yes (starting 20032010, absent
beforehand)
Yes (starting 20032010, not applicable
beforehand)
Yes (starting 20032010, absent
beforehand)

Continued political
role of military
after transition
Regime confidence

Political
liberalization

Yes (starting 20112015, absent
beforehand)

Necessary/Sufficient to Explain
Temporal Variation?
Necessary but not sufficient splits took place at many times
throughout Myanmar's history,
including during times of nontransition.
Necessary but not sufficient institutional protections gave
confidence to regime
Necessary but not sufficient - must
have been guaranteed by
institutions and led to confidence
Necessary and sufficient - could
only be established by institutional
design that guaranteed the military
would have a continued role in
politics and protected their
interests
Took place as a result of a
confluence of factors - most
importantly, institution-building
and confidence

Relevant Historical Detail
Splits took place during the AFPFL period
of 1948-1958 as well as during the interim
(2003-2010) period.

The creation of a constitution, the
Roadmap to Democracy, and protections
for the military were established.
25% quota in parliament built into
constitution
Allowing free and fair general elections in
2015 indicated that the military had
stability and immunity confidence - even
if they couldn't win elections, their role in
politics and their interests were protected
Efforts such as the opening up of civil
society, free speech, freedom of the press
– albeit with some caveats
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Additionally, relying on regime type as a heuristic for explaining the occurrence of transitions is
insufficient to explain cases like Myanmar, in which there was a failed transition during one
period and then a successful transition later. Since both periods took place under military rule,
clearly there are factors other than regime type that explain the behavior of Myanmar’s regime.
According to the regime type literature, military regimes show a number of unique
features that explain their behavior. The nature of military regimes means they are particularly
concerned with state security, which explains why they might have intervened in politics in the
first place.32 Linz and Stepan33 argue that military regimes share one characteristic that is
potentially favorable to democratic transitions. Because the military officers consider themselves
to be a permanent part of the state apparatus, they have an enduring interest in the well-being of
the state. This means that the military may allow rule to return to the hands of civilians.
Part of the difficulty in literature which highlights regime type as the main explanatory
variable for understanding the behavior of regimes is the possibility for conflating concepts.
Debates within this body of literature have swirled around which regime types deserve to be
considered unique, when to consider a state a hybrid regime, and whether certain features of
regimes are shared among different regime types. Geddes34 asserts that different types of
authoritarian regimes react differently when their power is challenged; Personalist regimes cling
to power; single-party regimes attempt to co-opt the opposition; and military regimes tend to
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split. "This argument implies that military regimes are more likely to negotiate their own
withdrawal and to democratize."35
In Geddes’s view, the splits in militaries often fracture along the lines of rivalries and
relationships of officer corps, political parties, or cliques surrounding the military leader(s).
However, she admits that "most professional soldiers place a higher value on the survival and
efficacy of the military itself than on anything else."36 Because of the inherent nature of military
regimes that leads to this fracturing, military regimes are more likely than other kinds of
authoritarian regimes to both cooperate in regime transition and to democratize.
Military regimes are less likely to end in coups, popular uprising,
insurgency, rebellion or assassination than other forms of authoritarianism.
Military regimes tend to be followed by elected governments, though the
democracies that follow them are not necessarily stable or long-lived. 37
Clearly, Myanmar’s status as a military regime for six decades makes it an outlier in the universe
of cases of short-lived military regimes, and the abovementioned features are also insufficient to
explain the variation in the Burmese case between 1988-1990 and 2011-2015.
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Professionalization

One common reason that military regimes are treated differently from personalist, singleparty, or monarchic regimes is the idea that militaries require some level of professionalization
for their members. The logic behind this argument is that the hierarchical nature and professional
training required by militaries means that military members see their role in politics differently
from other authoritarian regimes that seize power. In terms of Nordlinger’s 38 typology,
professionalization within military regimes is believed to incline military members more toward
the guardian or moderator types, since they have been trained to understand the role of the
military with relation to governance and often see themselves as “protectors” of civilian rule.
The levels of professionalization can, however, certainly vary between different militaries.
Croissant39 identifies the concept of “democratic professionalism” or ideological coherence as a
vital factor for the enforcement of civilian control over the military. He notes that the two
necessary elements to reestablish civilian rule over the military are 1) direct retreat of the
military from rule, which he calls "a necessary condition for the transition from authoritarian rule
to democracy”40 and 2) institutionalization of civilian control and neutralization of the military's
political power.
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For the Myanmar case, however, professionalization is not a sufficient explanation for the
variation between the two time periods in question. In their discussion of Myanmar’s transition,
Croissant and Kamerling argue that “the high degree of professionalization of the Burmese
military creates the incentive to institutionalize power-sharing among the ruling elite.”41 The
mechanism behind this explanation is that highly-professional militaries suffer from fewer coup
attempts than less professional militaries, because militaries that focus on training and have a
strict hierarchical chain of command are less likely to have military members go rogue and risk
the consequences of their disobedience. Croissant and Kamerling point to the empirical fact that
during 50 years of military rule, Myanmar only experienced two coups d'état (in 1962 and 1988).
Thus, the current liberalization process in Myanmar is part of a survival strategy for the
Tatmadaw.42
Within the Tatmadaw, however, professionalization is an insufficient variable to fully
explain why civilianization failed in 1990 but succeeded later. Maung Aung Myoe43 details
military training and officer education in Myanmar, which experienced some upheaval in the
1980s. Starting in 1952, the Tatmadaw began sending military members broad for training
programs, and new facilities such as the Burma Army Non-Commissioned Officers School, the
Burma Army Combat Forces School, the Defence Services Academy, and the National Defence
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College were all opened in the mid- to late-1950s. 44 “Between 1948 and 1962, a total of 1,070
officers and those of 782 other ranks were sent abroad [for military training]. However, between
1963 and 1989, only 415 officers and eighty-three of those other ranks were sent.”45 During the
mid-1980s, the Tatmadaw ramped up efforts to modernize and expand its forces, which included
upgrading existing training schools and opening new ones as well as pushing to send more
Tatmadaw officers to foreign training schools, an effort that was obviously made more difficult
by the events of 1988. “After the military takeover of the state in September 1988, the places in
the military training schools of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia were lost
due to political developments in Myanmar and the subsequent termination of defence
cooperation programs.”46
This, however, did not mean that training and professionalization programs ceased after
1988. Instead, the Tatmadaw sent 389 army members, 98 navy personnel and 455 air force
officers to military training schools in Malaysia, Singapore, India, Pakistan, and the People’s
Republic of China between 1990 and 1999.47 Between 1990 and 2005, 665 Tatmadaw officers
and 249 members of other ranks were sent to China, and since 2000, over 1,500 Tatmadaw
officers have gone to Russia.48
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This raises a number of questions about whether professionalization is a satisfactory
explanatory variable for the variation in the Tatmadaw’s behavior in 1988-1990 versus 20112015. If professionalization was a missing factor in 1988, that can explain why a transition to
civilian rule failed and what changed between professionalization attempts in the two different
time periods. Certainly, the number of officers sent abroad dropped in the 1963-1988 period
when compared to the earlier 1948-1962 period. However, if higher rates of military members
being sent abroad for training are thought to lead to a more professionalized and democraticallyminded military, this certainly does not explain the military coup that occurred at the end of the
1948-1962 period. Another possible argument is that where the military training took place
makes a difference in professionalization. If military members were no longer sent to the U.S.,
the U.K., and Australia and were instead sent to military schools in states with less democratic
consolidation, one might argue that respect for civilian rule, which is often cited as part of
military professionalization in this realm of literature, would not be part of the curriculum in
more autocratic states. This argument, however, fails to explain the fact that before the military
took control in 1988, they were utilizing professionalization training from these aforementioned
democratic countries that, nonetheless, ended in a military coup. For professionalization to be a
sufficient factor to explain why a transition to civilian rule failed in 1988-1990 but succeeded
later, there would need to be either a demonstrable increase in the numbers of military members
being sent abroad for training or a shift in the domestic military training agenda toward
supporting civilian rule. Professionalization is thus insufficient for explaining the variation in the
Myanmar case.
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Civil Opposition/Support

Civil opposition against or support for the regime is another common factor pointed to in
the literature on authoritarianism as an explanation for when regime transitions occur. Support
for authoritarian regimes can provide resources or shield the regime from opposition. For
instance, Slater describes “protection pacts” in which elites (such as state officials, economic
elites, communal elites, and even the middle class) give resources to the authoritarian state to
bolster the state and prevent the threat of a coup that would threaten their interests. 49 He finds
three different pathways that nations have taken based on those categories and on the existence
of protection pacts: domination, in the case of Malaysia and Singapore; fragmentation in
Thailand, the Philippines, and South Vietnam; and militarization in Burma and Indonesia.50 His
work shows that civilian support for authoritarian regimes, whether through protection pacts or
supporting coalitions, can be extremely influential on a regime’s decision to withdraw from
power or in propping up a regime which is resisting a transition.
On the other side of the same coin is the influence of civil opposition against
authoritarian regimes. Many authors point to strong civilian opposition as a necessary variable
for changing the costs and benefits of rule. While being in power has many advantages, strong
opposition that threatens negative outcomes if authoritarianism continues may lead the military
to make a calculated retreat from rule on their own terms. Aspinall writes that "the urban unrest
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and the student mobilizations performed a fundamental role of opposition: raising the costs of
rule."51 Hedman suggests that four conditions have shaped the unique and varied nature of civil
society in the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia: “the nature of regimes, the
constellation of classes, the legacies of the Left, and the institutions of civil religion.”52 Both
Aspinall and Hedman emphasize the role of civil society opposition as an external factor
influencing non-democratic regimes to consider stepping down from power. Such opposition
may be one factor that plays into the cost-benefit analysis of regimes – if opposition movements
or civil society pressure make life difficult for a regime, it may prompt the regime to make
minute changes to keep civil society leaders happy, which then leads into larger changes down
the road. Lee takes a more cautious approach in his study of the influence of popular protests in
Southeast Asian military regimes, stating, “Social movements can lead to transitions from
authoritarian rule, but only when these mass movements work together with other political
forces.”53 To Lee, civil opposition needs to be partnered with high levels of personalism within
the regime for protests to lead to transitions because highly personalistic authoritarian regimes
(such as Indonesia and the Philippines) create more dissatisfaction within the military, making
military members more likely to defect when mass protests occurred. On the other extreme,
nonpersonalistic forms of authoritarian rule (as seen in China and Burma) are organized around
power-sharing institutions that mitigate personalism and make them more resistant to political
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challenges. In Lee’s view, people power movements in authoritarian regimes need the support of
defectors from the armed forces to succeed in overthrowing the regime, and defection from
members of the armed forces is more likely when those military members are dissatisfied with
the level of personalism within the regime. 54 This can be seen in the case of Burma, in which
popular protests in 1988 and elections in 1990 failed to liberalize the state. But when the military
was able to weaken and co-opt the opposition by creating a “disciplined democracy” in 2010, a
slow process of transition began to take place.55
Civil opposition on its own was not enough for a transition in Myanmar in 1988-1990,
but when matched with other factors (splits within the military, institutionalization, and regime
confidence), the costs and benefits calculation for the Tatmadaw changed. While domestic unrest
and civil society pressure have often been part of the narrative for authoritarian regimes that
eventually transitioned to civilian rule, I suggest that protests or domestic opposition is more
likely to cause a regime to make smaller, more manageable decisions, such as holding lowstakes elections in an effort to placate their challengers without compromising their power rather
than transitioning straight to a civilian-led democracy. This may help explain why widespread
protests in 1988 led to an election in 1990, but when the military were dissatisfied with the
results of said election, they annulled it. Lee’s discussion of cases of military regimes in
Southeast Asia56 views successful transitions as requiring two necessary factors: popular protests
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act as a catalyst for change, but that spark will only ignite if there are dissatisfied military
members willing to support the opposition. Splits within the military itself is another factor that,
while not sufficient, may be necessary for explaining the Myanmar case.

Military Cohesion/Splits Between Hard-Liners and Soft-Liners

Cohesiveness of the authoritarian regime is another commonly cited factor for
determining the likelihood of civilianization and/or political liberalization. Military regimes are
generally considered to have more inherent cohesiveness than other authoritarian regime types
because of professionalization training and the existence of a shared corporate goal or bond.
However, splits between hardliners and soft-liners do happen and are often seen as a critical
juncture or breaking point for a military regime that caves in to a democratic transition. Stepan
suggests that "splits in the state apparatus are often a precondition for the erosion of an
authoritarian regime."57 In Stepan’s estimation, shifts in military professionalism and the role of
civil and political society in monitoring and controlling the military are crucial during a
transition to civilian rule. He notes that a common antecedent variable for the failure of a
military regime is the split in the state apparatus and that changes in military professionalism as
well as the role of civil society in monitoring and controlling the military are vital for
transitions.58 Haggard and Kaufman agree that “except in cases of military defeat and foreign
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occupation, the proximate cause for the exit of authoritarian regimes can almost always be found
in splits within this elite.”59
Military cohesion and splits between different factions within the military have certainly
been common themes in the Tatmadaw’s modern history. Personality clashes and personnel
changes have played a role during a number of Myanmar’s transition periods. For instance,
during Myanmar’s constitutional period from 1948-1958, infighting within the governing AntiFascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) party led the AFPFL to break into two sections.60
When paired with other vulnerabilities such as civil war, general strikes, and economic issues,
this split led U Nu to voluntarily 61 hand power to General Ne Win in 1958. Although Ne Win
gave power back to U Nu 18 months later, these issues continued, leading to the military coup of
1962.62 Callahan’s research on the development of the Tatmadaw in Myanmar showed that the
military treated civilians as potential enemies of the state. The development of an “us vs. them”
mentality meant that the Burmese Tatmadaw was especially cohesive and therefore capable of
withstanding challenges to their power.
More recently, splits between hardline supporters of General Than Shwe and more
moderate military members during the interim (2003-2010) were often cited as a point of
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weakness for the Tatmadaw.63 Even as recently as 2015, the ousting of U Shwe Mann, the
chairman of the USDP and the former speaker of parliament, has commonly been viewed as a
result of a split between supporters of President Thein Sein and those who supported U Shwe
Mann to succeed him. 64
It appears that military cohesion and splits within the Tatmadaw have had some influence
on the likelihood of transitions. However, like professionalization and civil opposition, this
factor is not sufficient on its own to explain the variation in regime outcomes between 19881990 and 2011-2015. Military cohesion was a factor widely mentioned in scholarship focusing
on the non-transition of 1988. Perhaps splits between different military factions can explain why
the Tatmadaw gave in to widespread civilian pressure to hold elections in 1990, but the faction
supporting elections was not strong enough to prevent the Tatmadaw from annulling the results.
This project will treat splits within the military as a necessary, but not sufficient, factor for
explaining the initiation of transitions, which may lead to transition when paired with other
necessary factors. O’Donnell and Schmitter point to the overlapping of splits within the regime
and political liberalization, going so far as to assert that there have been no transitions from
authoritarian rule whose beginning was not based in a cleavage between hard-liners and softliners within the regime. 65 Such splits can lead to negotiated pacts in which soft-liners within the
regime who have a vested interest in controlling the outcome of the transition work with the
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opposition form “an agreement among a select set of actors which seeks to define…rules
governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the ‘vital interests’ of
those entering into it.”66 The next body of literature will examine this process of political
liberalization, which appears to be ongoing in Myanmar.

Political Liberalization

Political liberalization is a process of gradual democratic development in formerly
authoritarian or nondemocratic regimes. O’Donnell and Schmitter 67 write that liberalization often
occurs in authoritarian regimes when autocratic rulers believe that allowing some freedoms will
relieve opposition pressure without altering the regime’s authority.68 This so-called “tutelary
democracy” can start a snowball effect, leading to a continuation of the democratization process
beyond what the autocratic leaders had initially planned. According to them,
The process of redefining and extending rights we have labeled
“liberalization.” It is indicative of the beginning of the transition that
its emergence triggers a number of (often unintended) consequences
which play an important role in ultimately determining the scope
and extension of that process. By liberalization we mean the process
of making effective certain rights that protect both individuals and
social groups from arbitrary or illegal acts committed by the state or
third parties.69
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Although leaders will try to uphold restrictions on individuals and groups in the resulting
“limited democracy,” Once “some individuals and collective rights have been granted, it
becomes increasingly difficult to justify withholding others. Moreover, as liberalization
advances, so does the strength of demands for democratization.”70 Indeed, political liberalization
and political democratization tend to be conflated, but do not necessarily always occur
concurrently or in tandem. Brynen, Korany and Noble differentiate between them by describing
political liberalization as the expansion of civil and political liberties which allows citizens to
engage freely in political discourse and pursue common interests, as opposed to political
democratization, which expands political participation and gives citizens real influence over
public policy.71 In the Burmese case, as with many cases in the political liberalization literature,
it appears that liberalization blazes the trail upon which democratization might follow – but such
a process is by no means guaranteed or irreversible.
There is some debate in the literature over whether political liberalization is generally
initiated by political leaders. Samuel Huntington argued in The Third Wave: Democratization in
the Late Twentieth Century that the process of liberalization is initiated by authoritarian elites
and that only after the authoritarian leaders begin the process of transformation can negotiations
between the authoritarian government and opposition leaders take place, ultimately leading to
either peaceful removal or the overthrow of the authoritarian regime.72 Linz and Stepan, focusing
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on the factors of splits within the military and civilian opposition, emphasize the importance of
pacted transitions, which are useful in limiting hard-liners in both camps (authoritarian regime
and civilian opposition). 73 According to them, "Transitions are frequently seen as involving a
pact between the regime moderates and the opposition moderates who are both able to 'contain'
their respective hard-liners."74 Political liberalization has been observed in cases such as Brazil’s
evolution between 1974 and 1985, in which “the process of liberalization proceeded largely
within the control of an essentially military regime increasingly desirous of ridding itself of most
of its political power, but still afraid of the consequences of genuinely competitive and
responsive civilian governance.”75 In Brazil, the factors that led to this process appear to have
been an economic decline, a consensus within the military leadership, a lack of personalism, and
the possible future threat of splits within the military,76 quite similar to the factors that show up
in Myanmar. These two cases appear to follow similar political liberalization paths.
It appears that a number of these factors (a “tutelary” democracy followed by a
snowballing effect, a pacted transition prompted by splits in the military, and civilian opposition)
took place in the Myanmar case. The interim period of 2003-2010 appears to have begun as a
tutelary democracy as described by O’Donnell and Schmitter,77 wherein the regime could
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exercise new democratic practices without giving up its power right away. This newfound
liberalization, however, does not mean that the military ceased its influence in politics. Many
authors in the regime transitions literature point out the continuing role of militaries in politics
after a transition to civilian rule, and this is no different in Myanmar.

Continued Political Role of Military after the Transition

Empirically, militaries that seized political control are unlikely to quickly hand back
power, even if a process of political liberalization is underway. While political liberalization
does not necessarily include civilianization, some aspects of political liberalization (such as
freedom of the press, development of civil society, and the release of political prisoners) may
still challenge the security of a military which wishes to remain politically involved. In
O’Donnell and Schmitter’s discussion of tutelary democracy, their description of political
liberalization hinges on the former regime continuing to play an influential or guiding role
because the transition itself was initiated by the regime in order to relieve opposition pressure. 78
Huntington notes that voluntary withdrawals from politics may not mean that an outgoing
military regime completely leaves politics.79 He writes that “where military governments have
given up power more or less voluntarily, those militaries will continue to have substantial
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influence in their society after their withdrawal from power. Notable examples are Turkey, South
Korea, Nicaragua, Brazil, and Chile.”80 Indeed, the promise (or hint) of a continued role in
politics can be seen as a benefit to military regimes that are concerned about the state of the
nation if they withdraw entirely from politics, especially when considering the common view
militaries have of their role as the protector of the nation and as a permanent part of the state
apparatus.81
Although political liberalization might also include efforts toward democratization, such
an outcome is not guaranteed. Authoritarian states can create electoral institutions or other
features of democratic regimes without fully transitioning to democracy. Case argues that there is
an alternative outcome in some electoral authoritarian regimes; rather than either sustaining or
subverting the regime, “electoral authoritarianism neither persists nor democratizes but instead
descends into harder forms of authoritarian rule. In this trajectory, elites lose control over
electoral processes, but not state power, thus prompting them to change their regime, but not to
democratize.”82 More recently, Geddes, Wright and Frantz discussed the possible outcomes
when authoritarian leaders lose power: 1) a member of the incumbent group (such as the military
or party) replaces him, and the regime persists; 2) democratic leaders replace the incumbent
regime; or 3) a new authoritarian regime replaces the incumbent regime. In their dataset of 280
autocratic regimes that existed between 1946 and 2010, the authors found that only 45% of
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leadership changes in authoritarian regimes actually led to a regime change and more than half of
regime changes were merely transitions from one autocracy to another.83 As found in Geddes’s
previous work, military regimes were the only regimes more likely to experience non-coerced (or
cooperative) transitions than coerced transitions and were the only type of autocracy more likely
to transition to democracy than a subsequent autocracy. 84 In their discussion of Myanmar’s
transition, Croissant and Kamerling argue that “the high degree of professionalization of the
Burmese military creates the incentive to institutionalize power-sharing among the ruling elite” 85
as an intentional survival strategy. If political liberalization is a survival strategy for the
Tatmadaw, this raises the question of why the Tatmadaw (and other militaries in formerly
authoritarian regimes) play a continued role in politics and at what point they deem it safe to
withdraw more fully from politics (if ever). The next set of authors discusses confidence as a
crucial variable for understanding how militaries and former military regimes see the new
civilian regime and their role in it.

Confidence

Military confidence can refer to many things. After a military regime hands back political
power to civilians, military members have concerns about whether they will face punishments
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for crimes or abuses. The military as an institution may wish to protect their economic or
corporate interests. Additionally, because of their traditional role of protectors of the nation,
militaries are generally concerned with the ability of civilian regimes to deal with security
concerns that presumably prompted a military coup in the first place. Thus, transitions to civilian
rule often mean great insecurity and concern for militaries:
New democratic leaders upon coming to power often enact policies
designed to reduce the military’s domestic influence. In addition to
cuts in the military budget, such actions include curtailment of the
military’s autonomous economic activities, removal of military
elites from civilian positions, forced retirement of high-ranking
officers, and prosecution of military officials for human rights
abuses and criminal activities. 86
If confidence in the success of the transition (with regard to this varied issues) is
necessary for a case such as Myanmar, what sorts of factors feed into military confidence? The
earlier section on political liberalization pointed to pacted transitions as an important factor for
limiting hard-liners on both sides. As Linz and Stepan argue, if both the military and civilian
opposition participate in the transition process and negotiate the terms, they may build
confidence in the process.87 Albertus and Menaldo agree, writing:
Although there is frequently pressure from below for political reform,
concrete steps toward democracy, such as scheduling elections and
relinquishing control over the security apparatus, are often initiated by
elites. Moreover, a democratic transition is more likely if the elite manage
to negotiate constitutional frameworks that continue to protect their
interests after they exit or if they can increase the odds that they continue to
hold power under democracy by being elected to office.88
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Additionally, Silva argues that military cooperation in regime transition is an important factor for
improving civilian-military relations and that "the best way to obtain the military's subordination
is by cooperation with strong civilian leadership in strategic matters."89 He also notes that there
is a difference between "subordination" of the military to the new civilian government and
"engagement" with the military. 90 Perhaps a strategy using pacted transitions, wherein both
groups get a say in the transition and in the new regime, are more successful than transitions in
which the opposition seeks to subordinate the former authoritarian regime because the
cooperation between the two groups builds confidence in a successful outcome.
Slater and Wong also discuss the concept of how confidence and timing play a role in
regime transitions wherein the military negotiates from a position of strength rather than
weakness.91 According to them, such transitions take place in three steps. First, regimes will only
undertake democratization once they have sufficient victory confidence and stability confidence.
Next, there must be some signal to the ruling party that their power is waning. Finally, regime
leaders must allow democratic reforms. 92 “Specifically, the ruling party will most likely concede
democracy when it retains solid prospects to win majority support in a democratic election,
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partly thanks to authoritarian legacies of malapportionment.”93 They also write about a
“bittersweet spot,”94 a critical juncture in which regimes are facing declining capacity but an
increasing likelihood to concede democratic reforms. 95 In a related piece, Slater describes
“victory confidence” as the regime believing it can continue to hold onto power by winning
elections, “even under fully democratic conditions.”96 As he notes, it is likely that the Tatmadaw
was slowly building its victory confidence during the unfree elections in 2010 before allowing
more competitive by-elections in 2012. “Stability confidence” is the expectation that political
stability will continue under democratic conditions (a particular concern for military regimes that
often cite “stability” as their prime reason for interfering in politics in the first place), and
“immunity confidence” is the belief that even if the regime is removed from office, the members
will not face retribution for past crimes. 97 According to him, the current democratization process
in Myanmar
is inherently fragile because it rests on the current regime’s confidence that
democratization will produce neither serious instability nor even its own
decisive defeat. Events that shake the Tatmadaw’s ‘victory confidence’ and
‘stability confidence should thus pose the greatest risk that reforms will be
stalled or reversed. 98
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Such concerns are crucial for an authoritarian regime to allow a civilianization of politics. For
militaries such as the Tatmadaw to build confidence in such a transition, there is one more
crucial variable that needs to be examined – institutional design.

Institutional Design

Under what conditions do authoritarian regimes feel comfortable enough to hold
competitive elections? Is it a conscious choice on the part of the regime leaders, or is it more of a
slippery slope phenomenon wherein once they start down the path of paying lip service to
liberalization, they must continue or risk losing legitimacy and becoming vulnerable to a
coercive takeover? One factor discussed and debated at length in the regime transition literature
that might answer these questions is institutional design, or the development of democratic
political institutions as both a confidence-building measure and as a barrier against the regime
backtracking away from civilian rule. Institutional design99 is a phrase which refers to the
practice of creating democratic institutions (more specifically, what types of institutions? For
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Olsen (1997) suggests that certain factors make institutional design more likely: when those
who are in the position to establish institutions (such as the military) take advantage of
temporary favorable circumstances and shifting public opinion; when the designers are able to
stabilize attention over extended periods of time; and when the institutional design does not take
place as a one-time massive change, but instead triggers a series of changes and processes that
affect the new institutions (203). Other research on institutional design suggests that the type of
institutions that are created (such as presidential vs. parliamentary systems) affect democratic
outcomes in democratizing countries (Markowski 2006).
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what purpose? In what order?) in states that are undergoing some type of political transition. As
Przeworski describes it,
Some institutions under certain conditions offer to the relevant political
forces a prospect of eventually advancing their interests that is sufficient to
incite them to comply with immediately unfavorable outcomes. Political
forces comply with present defeats because they believe that the
institutional framework that organizes the democratic competition will
permit them to advance their interests in the future. 100
Such is the case in Myanmar and exploring the timing and factors that led to the Tatmadaw
making this decision will provide more information about a case that will add valuable insight to
the research on institutional design and political liberalization.
It appears that the development of institutional design is a crucial step for political
liberalization to succeed. Slater highlights the importance of “competitive elections amid robust
mass mobilization as a spur for state-building efforts.”101 He found that competitive elections
facilitated state-building in Southeast Asia when they helped form stronger political parties,
encouraged a state commitment to citizen registration, or imposed some form of centralized
authority over strongmen. 102 This indicates that rather than creating a direct challenge to the
interests of a regime, managed elections or other forms of proving institutional legitimacy can go
a long way to reinforcing and protecting the interests of authoritarian rule. As seen in the
imperfect elections held in Myanmar in 2010 and 2012, the process of regime transition is
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usually messy and regimes that are transitioning from authoritarianism may go through periods
of semi-authoritarian or competitive authoritarian features. Geddes hypothesized that there might
be a strategic reason for such competitive authoritarian regimes to allow elections, suggesting
that “dictators spend scarce resources on parties and elections, despite the risk of doing so,
because they help to solve intra-regime conflicts that might otherwise end their own rule and
possibly destabilize the regime as well.”103 Far from being a true electoral competition, elections
in authoritarian regimes can actually help prolong the regime’s survival. Geddes found that
nearly all single-party regimes and half of personalist regimes hold regular national elections,
and, on average, authoritarian regimes that hold elections lasted longer than those who do not.104
This shows that if autocratic regimes are able to manage forms of political contention, such as a
closely monitored and often manipulated elections, they are better able to withstand challenges
from their citizens. However, as the political liberalization literature suggests, these institutions
may develop beyond the military’s control, leading to an unexpected liberalization process.

Concluding Remarks on the Literature

This section described the many different variables commonly cited as crucial for
explaining transitions from military regimes to civilian regimes. Research on features specific to
military regimes often implies that military regimes tend to be short-lasting and result in the
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military negotiating its own transition due to its hierarchical nature and the extensive training
required. One of those military-specific features is professionalization. Civil society opposition is
a common catalyst for effecting change in all types of authoritarian regimes. Cohesion within the
ruling regime is considered important for regime durability, and splits between hard- and softliners can often portend a transition. The development of institutional design is a crucial part of
political liberalization, and this process generally feeds into the confidence of the former regime
in future outcomes.
In the case of Myanmar, some of these variables are more relevant than others, and there
are significant interactive effects to consider. In particular, the specific features of military
regimes and military professionalization are not sufficient independent variables for explaining
the variation in the Tatmadaw’s decision about whether to honor the results of free and fair
elections during three different time periods (1988-2002, 2003-2010, and 2011-2015) because
these factors stayed relatively constant throughout these time periods. These two variables
certainly interact with each other in that professionalization is considered one of the features
inherent to military regimes. However, the surprising durability of Myanmar’s military regime
calls into question its categorization as a typical military regime, and high levels of
professionalization throughout the time periods in question leads one to question whether these
variables are helpful in explaining the Myanmar case.
Civil opposition and military cohesion are variables that seem to have a middling-amount
of utility in explaining this case. Domestic protests leading to international furor took place in
1988, 1996, and 2007 and may serve as a catalyst for elections as a panacea the regime could use
to distract or deflect attention away from its rule. Such protests do not, however, appear to be
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sufficient for explaining when and why the regime would uphold the results of elections, or
whether the elections in question were free and fair (as in 1990) or not (as in 2010). Additionally,
while the 1988 protests appear to have been a driving reason for the military to hold the 1990
elections, the protests in 2007 did not start the transition process during the interim time period
since the Roadmap to Democracy had already been announced in 2003. Similarly, military
cohesion or splits within the military apparatus appear to have played a role in all three time
periods. While cohesion and/or splits may serve as a catalyst for change, much like civil
opposition, it does not appear that military cohesion or splits are sufficient for explaining
variation in regime outcomes in Myanmar. Civil opposition and splits within the military also
appear to have interactive effects because both serve as flashpoints or crises within the regime
that may prompt action (such as holding elections); however, they are insufficient for that action
to be lasting.
The final group of interactive variables appears to be the most relevant for this case. The
most important of these is institutional design. The development of political institutions,
particularly electoral and party institutions, is crucial for the creation of a more durable and
consolidated civilian/democratic regime. Without such institutions, the military regime would
have little confidence in what lay in store when they returned to the barracks. By developing
institutions (such as a constitution, new electoral laws, etc.), the Tatmadaw could build
confidence within its own ranks about the possibility of the success of the new civilian regime as
well as its continued role and safety within it. Only once these variables took place could the
process of political liberalization (which was necessary for the military to honor the results of
free and fair elections) take place within Myanmar.
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The next section will explain the hypotheses for this project and the operationalization of
the relevant independent and dependent variables.

Hypotheses

The Burmese case offers an excellent opportunity for a temporal comparison, as the
failed democratic transition after the 1988 protests and the 1990 elections provides a contrasting
case to the ongoing transition taking place from 2010 onward. I will examine three distinct time
periods in modern Burmese politics to explain how a transition that failed in 1990 succeeded 25
years later. The three time periods are 1) the failed transition starting in 1988 and the 1990
elections and its aftermath (1988-2002); 2) the “interim” period, dating roughly from 2003 to
2010, in which small steps to a transition began to take shape although genuine transition seemed
unlikely; and 3) the period of transition from 2011-2015, in which the steps the government took
were more concrete and binding than in the previous period. 105 This project seeks to demonstrate
how the initial moves toward liberalization arguably had been for show, but the effects of
changes made during these periods stacked, and as the government moved farther along its own
so-called Roadmap to Democracy, it became harder and less tempting to go backward, until the
transition reached a point of no return.
This project will explore several hypotheses to explain the variation in outcomes during
these time periods in Myanmar’s recent history:
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H1: International and domestic pressure for elections during 1988-1990 were
not sufficient to compel the military to respect election results due to
perceived domestic threats and lack of institutional design which can
protect the military’s interests. 106
H1A: The military held elections because of domestic/international
pressure and their confidence in their chances of victory; however,
they did not uphold the results of elections because the military
lost stability and immunity confidence.
H1B: Institutional design (in the form of developing a new
constitution) did not occur during this time period because the
military believed a constitution would be seen as more legitimate
after an electoral victory.

The chapter entitled “The Failed Transition: 1988-2002” will discuss the time period of 19882002 much more in depth. The key questions in that chapter are twofold; why did the military
regime hold elections in 1990, and why did they fail to establish a constitution (which could have
provided crucial institutional protections to them) prior to the elections? That chapter will show
that the military regime chose to hold elections because they had high victory confidence (belief
that their preferred National Unity Party would win a majority of seats). This belief that they
would easily win the elections made them more likely to hold the elections they promised in the
face of domestic and international pressure. The military regime, however, lacked immunity
confidence (the belief that they would not be held accountable for crimes during their rule) or
stability confidence (the belief that a transition to civilian rule will not result in chaos throughout
the country). The lack of immunity confidence and stability confidence once SLORC and the
NUP lost the 1990 elections explains why they did not uphold the results. The second question,
why the regime did not establish a new constitution before the elections which might have
provided them with more protections that would lead to immunity and stability confidence, will
also be explored in chapter 3. My hypothesis is that because the regime was so confident that
they would win the elections, they chose to wait until after the elections before establishing a
constitution because a constitution written by an elected government would have more
legitimacy in the eyes of both domestic groups as well as international observers.
106
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H2: Massive changes within the military regime and a reduction of domestic
threats during the 2003-2010 period led to efforts to develop institutional
design.
H2A: Changes during this time period were largely based on a
transition process that had been mapped out during the earlier
(1988-2002) time period but ultimately failed.
H2B: The military regime became more confident in their ability to
design institutions to protect their interests and the stability of the
nation due to improvements in relations with armed ethnic groups
as well as the promotion of more moderate military leaders.
H2C: The institutional design that took place during this time
period laid the groundwork for the more successful transition
process in 2011-2015.
H3: Institutional design during 2003-2010 laid the groundwork for steps
toward political liberalization from 2011-2015, which led to a
liberalization process that snowballed beyond the military’s initial intent.
H3A: The electoral results in 2011 and 2015 were upheld by the
military due to institutions (namely the constitution) which gave
them immunity confidence and stability confidence, crucial factors
which were absent during the failed transition of 1988-2002.
The dependent variables are 1) democratization, which I will operationalize as freely and
fairly-contested elections wherein opposition parties are able to contest with the military-backed
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parties on equal playing ground and wherein the results of elections are respected and upheld, 107
and 2) political liberalization, which consists of the opening of other civil and political liberties
such as freedom of the press, the release of political prisoners, and the legalization of civil
society associations and activities. As described in the previous section, the independent
variables I will use to explain democratization and political liberalization in Myanmar are civil
opposition, splits within the military, institutional design, and regime confidence/future role of
the military.
My hypotheses demonstrate the interactive effects of the independent variables in this
case. Some commonly cited independent variables in the literature (such as features specific to
military regimes and professionalization) were present throughout the time periods in question
and, as such, are not sufficient to explain temporal variation in the dependent variables. Other
variables occurred sporadically, such as civil society opposition and splits within the military,
which acted as catalysts for the regime holding unfair and unfree elections to placate demands.
True democratization and political liberalization, however, required a number of independent
variables to occur; namely, institutional design was necessary to increase the regime’s
confidence in the possible outcomes of free and fair elections. The independent variables are

I am aware of the issues with defining Myanmar’s elections as “free and fair,” as there
continue to be disenfranchisement of certain populations (such as ethnic minorities, members of
the Sangha, and prisoners) and inaccurate voter lists, as well as concerns over voter intimidation
and electoral fraud. My definition of “freely and fairly contested elections” focuses more on
institutional barriers to opposition parties and particularly to whether those opposition parties are
able to win (and hold) seats in the Hluttaw. Issues with disenfranchisement seem to be lessening,
but there were still reports of issues in the 2015 elections (The Economist 2015). For more
detailed information about defining free and fair elections, see Goodwin-Gill 2006.
107
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highly interactive, and the hypotheses for these different time periods demonstrate a layering
effect in which multiple independent variables needed to be present to push the civilianization
process further. This suggests a type of layering or ratcheting effect in which an increase in the
number of independent variables made the transition more likely, and more appealing, to the
Tatmadaw.108 Figure 1 shows an approximation of how the interactions between independent
variables opened the door for a political liberalization process, making such a process more
likely as time went on.
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Timing is crucial to political transitions and institutional design. Przeworski (1991) writes,
“Institutions adopted when the relation of forces is unknown or unclear are most likely to last
across a variety of conditions. Institutions adopted as temporizing solutions when the relation of
forces is known to be balanced and different groups have strong preferences over alternative
solutions may acquire the force of convention if they happen to survive for a sufficient period,
but they are not likely to last long enough. Finally, institutions that ratify a transitory advantage
are likely to be as durable as the conditions that generate them” (88). In this study too, timing
matters a great deal. The timing of challenges facing the regime in the different time periods may
have influenced the likelihood of certain institutions being established in the first place, as well
as affecting their durability. For instance, the presence of a constitution in the 2011-2015 time
period almost certainly made free and fair elections with upheld results more likely than in the
1988-2002 time period, wherein the regime had no constitution or institutional protections under
which to operate. The questions this project seeks to answer, therefore, involve not only what
and why Myanmar’s military regime changed its behavior from one time period to another, but
the when – when were institutions established? Which changes came first, and were those
changes critical for others to follow?
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Presence of Variables Over Time - 1988-2015
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International Pressure
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Regime Confidence/Role of Military

Political Liberalization
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Figure 1: The presence of variables over time 1988-2015.109
This project largely builds from the literature on political liberalization. Although
civilianization, democratic consolidation and political liberalization are well-tread areas of study
in political science and there are some excellent case studies describing how political
liberalization unfolded in Latin America 110 and the Middle East,111 more recent examples, as
well as cases from Asia, deserve a closer look. Additionally, Myanmar is often left out of the
literature due to its status as an outlier case or a pariah state.
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This is a stacked area effect graph. I approximated the presence or absence of independent
variables that I would expect in each year by coding them as dummy variables, 1 for presence
and 0 for absence. Some variables, such as civil society opposition, occur sporadically, while
others, like features of military regimes, stay constant. The stacking graph demonstrates the idea
that as the number of independent variables increase (largely due to their interactive effects and
path dependency), a transition to civilian led government is more likely.
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Operationalization of these independent variables is described in Table 3.
Table 3: Operationalization of Independent Variables
Variable
Operationalization
Professionalization

Number of military members sent abroad for training; education
requirements for promotion within the Tatmadaw

Civil opposition

Domestic protests, difficulties getting peace agreements with armed
ethnic militias

International pressure

Economic sanctions, arms sanctions, diplomatic measures (statements,
visits, etc.)

Splits within the
military

Firing or dismissing of military members, replacing generals or party
leaders, reports of disagreements or clashes

Institutional design

Development of electoral laws/constitution; development of a robust
party system – measured as “stability in the rules and nature of
interparty competition; parties having stable roots in society;
legitimacy of the electoral process and parties; and cohesive,
disciplined, and autonomous parties” 112

Regime confidence

Victory confidence – ways for regime to hold power “even under fully
democratic conditions” 113 such as holding unfair/unfree elections as a
test
Stability confidence – military keeping a role for itself in new regime
(role in political parties, parliament, presidency, etc.)
Immunity confidence – legal protections for military members so they
cannot be held accountable or lose business deals
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Even Hicken and Kuhonta’s 2015 book on party institutionalization in South and Southeast Asia
leave Myanmar out. 114 Of course, comparative studies of political liberalization must be careful
when applying theories to new cases – as Brynen, Korany and Noble state,
Analysts of liberalization and democratization must steer between two
dangerous shoals. On the one hand, there is much to be gained from
engaging in comparative study aimed at highlighting and explaining the
similarities and differences evident across different political systems. On
the other hand, scholars must avoid the ethnocentric dangers of reading
processes deriving from one specific set of historical and political
circumstances into other, very different, contexts. 115
By applying existing theories about political liberalization and institutional design to the
relatively understudied case of Myanmar, this project will show how the process of political
liberalization unfolded in Myanmar and explore whether it differed from other cases from
previous studies. This project will demonstrate that political liberalization, particularly in
obstinate regimes such as Myanmar, is an ever-changing process and the actions of an
authoritarian regime to control or shape the transition process can lead it further down the path of
liberalization than the regime initially anticipates. Before a regime reaches the point of no return,
it can resist an actual transition and simply take steps that appear to be aimed at liberalization.
These steps are often taken by authoritarian regimes to placate international or domestic
pressures to transition without real intent to follow through. Yet each step makes it more difficult
for regimes to backtrack, since doing so is costly in political capital and can increase risks to the

“We do not include those polities where elections are not regularly held or where autonomous
opposition parties are banned outright (e.g. Vietnam, Myanmar, China)” (Hicken and Kuhonta
2015, 10-11).
114
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regime’s survival. Eventually, the threshold point is reached, 116 and regimes must take a more
concrete step, such as holding competitive elections. As Tin Min Htut, Executive Director of
Trust Venture Partners, an advisory company for the Yangon Stock Exchange, put it with regard
to the Tatmadaw, “The train has left the station and they can’t pull it back anymore.”117

Methodology

The main research question I address is “How did Myanmar’s military embrace
liberalization more during 2011-2015 than in the 1988-2002 period?” Myanmar’s military
regime did not set out on its Roadmap to Democracy with the intention of losing control of the
government to the National League for Democracy by 2015. Instead, the initial steps toward
democracy were more symbolic, done with the intention of gaining advantages such as
international support and codifying domestic institutions that would protect their political and
economic interests. However, these symbolic steps began a “ratcheting effect,” wherein the
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The strange incident with Shwe Mann may be evidence that a transition threshold was
reached. Shwe Mann, the chairman of the USDP and former parliamentary speaker, was seen to
be the likely successor of President Thein Sein until August 13, 2015, when security forces
surrounded his home. According to the USDP, U Shwe Mann was ousted from his role as acting
chairman of the party because “he was too busy with his other role as the country’s influential
parliamentary speaker” (Radio Free Asia 2015a). Observers saw this dramatic move as President
Thein Sein trying to consolidate his power before the elections in an attempt to prevent his main
rival from becoming president. However, once the NLD won the elections, Shwe Mann was
nominated to head a key legal advisory council in the new government (South China Morning
Post 2016). This event indicates that the USDP tried to act with impunity, as it was accustomed –
however, democratic institutions had reached the point where even a persona non grata in the
USDP was appointed to a position in the new NLD-led government.
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symbolic changes made it harder and harder for Myanmar’s military to renege on the
liberalization process it had unintentionally started. This project is focused on developing a
framework to explain the important case of Myanmar’s recent liberalization.
By examining the specific steps that Myanmar’s military took during this transition
process (for example constitutional reform, electoral laws, specific policies) and conducting a
temporal comparison of different eras in modern Burmese political history, this project provides
a detailed analysis of what led to one widely unexpected transition to civilian rule. I used a range
of qualitative methods such as process tracing, interviews, and a media content analysis of the
government-run newspaper, the New Light of Myanmar, to look for evidence of this ratcheting
process in the case of Myanmar.
Process tracing formed the bulk of my research for exploring my hypothesis that
Myanmar’s democratization process initially began as an effort by the military to placate both
domestic forces and the international community by making largely symbolic (but ultimately,
difficult to reverse) political changes. George and Bennett define process tracing as a
methodology wherein “the researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview
transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies
in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case.”118
I paid particular attention to the context (both domestic and international) during the period of
political liberalization (2003-2010), such as where the idea of the negotiated exit came from,
whether there were regional spillover effects, and changes within the governing coalition. My
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sources for this project included archival documents, secondary sources, and interviews.119 My
archival research was mainly gathered from the Burma Peace Foundation’s Online Burma
Library at http://burmalibrary.org/, which provides access to full-text governmental reports as
well as secondary sources and interviews.120
In addition to the resources available from the Online Burma Library, I conducted my
own interviews. In June 2016, I traveled to Yangon, Myanmar, and conducted thirteen interviews
with a variety of participants. Interviews were semi-structured and pre-approved by Northern
Illinois University’s Institutional Review Board.121 Participants were contacted using snowball
sampling 122 and were provided with an IRB consent form in both English and Burmese. Most of
the interviews were conducted in English, although two were conducted in Burmese with the
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Seminal works in comparative politics which also utilize process tracing include Barrington
Moore’s Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (1966) and Theda Skocpol’s States and
Social Revolutions (1979), as well as more recent publications such as Dan Slater’s Ordering
Power (2010). Much of the sources used in these books are primary sources, including historical
accounts, biographies, and books and articles on economics and policy, as well as government
publications and reports.
For instance, in the Online Burma Library’s archival section on the Roadmap to Democracy,
their resources include proceedings, texts, and commentaries by SLORC/SPDC with regard to
the National Convention; articles in many English and Burmese-language newspapers;
statements and reports by international watchdog groups such as Amnesty International and
Human Rights Watch; reports by area experts and academics; letters from political party
representatives to international groups such as the U.N.; reports by governmental committees;
transcripts of speeches and statements; and full-text of the laws and constitution.
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Snowball sampling consists of asking research participants to assist researchers in identifying
other potential subjects. Interviewees were asked at the end of interviews for the names of
acquaintances who might be interested and willing to also participate in interviews.
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help of a Burmese translator. Interviewees had a variety of jobs: journalists and writers, NGO
workers, political science professors, and local NLD members.123 A list of sample interview
questions can be found in Appendix B.
Finally, I conducted a media content analysis of the government-run newspaper, The New
Light of Myanmar.124 This was useful for a few reasons. First, finding military members who are
willing to engage in interviews about this topic is extremely difficult. Even if military members
did consent to an interview, it is doubtful they would answer questions about the military’s
internal decision-making process regarding the regime transition. Thus, a proxy measure for the
military’s point of view is crucial. As the government mouthpiece publication, the NLM is a
valuable resource for tracking the changes in Myanmar’s government’s tone toward opposition
parties and the international community. As the democratic changes became more solidified, I
expected to see the newspaper’s tone toward these two groups becoming less antagonistic, with
fewer propagandistic ads and op-eds and more substantive news stories.
The second reason a media content analysis of the New Light of Myanmar is useful is as a
measure of Myanmar’s changing political liberalization process. Press freedom is often cited as
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Future iterations of this project may also necessitate interviews with local and international
election monitors/watchdog groups, who would have observed the changes in electoral practices
between 2010-2015 and would therefore provide an important perspective on this political
liberalization process.
There are many newspapers in Myanmar, both representing the government’s point of view
(NLM, Kyemin, Myanmar Alin) and the opposition (such as The Irrawaddy and Democratic
Voice of Burma). For this project, the content analysis is mainly intended to measure the
government’s point of view, and so a content analysis of opposition newspapers is outside the
scope of this project. NLM was selected for the availability of both English-language and
Burmese-language editions in archives.
124
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an important feature of civil liberties and is a key indicator in Freedom House’s annual
“Freedom in the World” report. 125 Content analyses of news media 126 have been used to measure
a myriad of governmental problems, such as corruption in Mexico,127 governance issues in
Cambodia, 128 and how the official newspapers in pre-revolution Egypt covered opposition parties
and former President Mubarak.129 The value of content analysis as a method is that it can serve
as a proxy measure for difficult-to-measure factors.130 For example, in Stanig’s study of media
coverage of corruption in Mexico, he found that local media outlets’ coverage of corruptionrelated stories varied widely, based on the repressiveness of each state’s defamation law.
Chivoin, Pin, and Sok focus on the development of the media as Cambodia’s “fourth estate,”
independent from the government. Finally, Elmasry examines three separate news sources in
Egypt: an official government newspaper, an independent newspaper, and an opposition
newspaper. His findings, that the government newspaper showed President Mubarak in the most
favorable light, while the independent and opposition sources were more balanced, although not
necessarily surprising, can nonetheless provide “an important Mubarak-era baseline for Egyptian
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journalism which can be used to compare and contrast with post-Mubarak era news performance
— [and] offer a democratic barometer of sorts.131 Content analysis is a versatile method that is
invaluable for providing insight into cases such as Myanmar, where accurate information about
sensitive government issues is prohibitively difficult to access or ascertain.
I used a content analysis of the New Light of Myanmar as a “democratic barometer”
similar to Elmasry’s study of Egypt. There are several indicators within the newspaper which,
tracked over time, may reveal when certain political changes developed throughout the different
periods I am studying. These indicators include simple counts on the number of articles written
on a certain topic (e.g. the Roadmap to Democracy, military or party personnel changes,
investigations of corruption, elections, protests, etc.) and how the number of articles on such
topics change over time; the tone of articles, such as looking at language used in articles and opeds to describe the opposition party or international leaders; the number of ghost-written op-eds
that express a pro-government or anti-opposition stance;132 even the placement of certain stories
can indicate the importance they hold to the military (i.e., whether a story about elections is
placed “above the fold” on the first page or buried within the newspaper). The New Light of
Myanmar is an excellent candidate for content analysis because it is a daily newspaper, meaning
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Ghost-written opinion articles in the New Light of Myanmar are quite apparent. Some do not
contain an author name at all. Others may provide an author name or pseudonym (such as “Mr.
Fish”), but often are categorized as “Perspectives” and contain titles which clearly denote them
as opinion pieces (e.g. “To those who daren’t show their faces,” or “The world does not accept
any form of foreign interference”). Many opinion pieces during the 2003-2010 time period focus
on the armed ethnic militia groups and on strained international relations, as well as domestic
protests.
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there is a large sample size of articles, and English-language versions are easily accessible
online.133 A content analysis of the government-run newspaper in Myanmar provided unique
insight into both the changing views of the military as the process of political liberalization took
place as well as providing a measure of a developing press, an important institution in the
democratization process.134
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Ideally, this project would also look at the Burmese equivalent of the New Light of Myanmar
in addition to the English version. This would strengthen the findings of this approach, as it is
possible that the English-version of the newspaper is aimed more at an international community
rather than a local one, and might contain more flattering stories about the regime and their
political development than a locally-focused Burmese-language version of the newspaper, which
could contain more threatening language towards opposition parties and be more dismissing of
liberalization/democratization. Due to financial and time constraints, this project will look at the
English-language versions only, but I am aware of the limitations of this approach and may try to
include a comparison with the Burmese-language version in future projects. Additionally, any
evidence of inflammatory language in the English-language version of the New Light of
Myanmar may be seen as the regime posturing to the international community, since they might
expect foreigners to be reading the English-language version of the paper. A marked decrease in
such language in the English-language version of the paper would still be useful as a measure of
confidence of the regime, because this arguably could indicate that the regime no longer felt the
need to justify or defend their political actions to the international community. While I did not
count the number of times inflammatory language was used for this project, I will consider doing
so in future iterations of this project. Therefore, while an ideal research agenda would include
both English-language and Burmese-language versions of the same paper, the use of only the
English-language version of the New Light of Myanmar for this stage of the project still has
merit.
Despite many changes, Myanmar still ranks as “Not Free” in Freedom House’s measure of
“Freedom of the Press in 2016” (https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press2016). Part of the problem is Telecommunications Law Article 66(d), which states that “anyone
found guilty of extorting, coercing, restraining wrongfully, defaming, disturbing, causing undue
influence or threatening any person by using any telecommunications network shall be punished
with a maximum three years in prison, a fine, or both” (Htet Naing Zaw 2016). It is widely
agreed upon that this law is undemocratic.
134
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Significance of the Study

While Myanmar is a single case, it is a valuable one for enhancing our understanding of
how authoritarian regimes can participate in transitions to civilian rule despite significant barriers
(lack of institutions, lack of resources, internal conflict, and so forth), especially when
considering the unusual length of the regime. Indeed, one of the country’s most infamous
characteristics is the remarkable durability of Myanmar’s military government. As Slater writes,
“no other regime on earth has been so intransigently authoritarian in the face of highly intense
and persistent internal and external pressures for political change.”135
Growing dissatisfaction and anger about the police and government throughout 1988136
led to widespread peaceful protests led by students (now known as the 8888 Uprising) swept
across Myanmar.
The underlying causes of these riots were economic ‘bread and butter’
issues which can be attributed to the previous 30 years of the Burmese War
to Socialism. Its stagnant economic policies saw earlier eruptions, but by
1988 they had crystallized in more recent events such as the demonetization
and the stigma of LDC [Least-Developed Country] status. To these largely
long-term economic factors must be added socio-cultural and administrative
ones, particularly the general arbitrariness of Government and its
unsympathetic bureaucracy. 137
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Problems began on March 12, 1988, when a fight broke out at a tea shop near Yangon
Institute of Technology between university students and a group of youths over the music on the
radio. The police arrested one of youths involved but released him due to his relation to a
Government official, leading to demonstrations protesting how the police handled the matter.
The police fired at the demonstrators and killed a protestor, causing the crisis to escalate (AungThwin and Aung-Thwin 2012, 256).
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On September 18, 1988, the military intervened in a bloody crackdown and announced a new
military junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). Two years later, on May
27, 1990, SLORC held elections. The National League for Democracy (NLD) – led by Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of the nationalist hero of Burmese independence, General Aung
San – won these in a landslide.138 Surprised by the outcome, SLORC annulled the results of the
election and placed Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest. The military junta went on to rule
Myanmar for two decades.
Yet, the strength of the military regime showed cracks during this period.139 In 2003, the
military junta, now renamed the “State Peace and Development Council” (SPDC), announced a
Roadmap to Democracy that critics viewed with skepticism. 140 General elections in 2010 did
little to encourage pro-democracy activists, as the National League for Democracy did not
contest the elections due to candidate restrictions. The elections were largely seen as unfair and
unfree. 141 However, an NLD landslide in the 2012 by-elections and, more importantly, an
overwhelming NLD victory in the 2015 general elections means that Myanmar is now, for the
first time since 1962, under a civilian government.142
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Myanmar’s military regime began with a coup led by General Ne Win in 1962 and ended
officially in 2010 with elections that were, by all accounts, undemocratic. Subsequent byelections in 2012 and general elections in 2015 seemed to continue the country’s democratization
trend. Geddes’ seminal work on authoritarian regimes found that military regimes last on average
just eight and a half years compared to 15 years for personalist and 24 years for single-party
regimes;143 however, Myanmar is a deviant case that Geddes explained by treating it as a hybrid
military/personalist/single party regime. In her words, “The best way to deal with these difficult
cases seemed to be to put them, along with the Suharto regime in Indonesia, the Stroessner
regime in Paraguay, and the Ne Win regime in Burma (now Myanmar), into a doubly hybrid
Personal/Military/Single-Party category.”144 Figure 2 shows a continuum of durability of
authoritarian regimes, with Myanmar standing out as one of the longest-lasting.
Finally, Myanmar’s surprising transition to civilian rule is a convincing reason for
political scientists to pay attention to this country for informing future foreign policy approaches
in democratizing countries. U.S. foreign policy toward Myanmar shifted dramatically under the
Obama Administration, including lifting of sanctions, increased engagement, and a presidential
visit in 2012.145
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Figure 2: Durability of military regimes.146

These drastic changes in American policy coincided with many of the recent political changes in
Myanmar as the country developed its democratic institutions and enjoyed trade and engagement
that had been absent for decades. In late 2016, President Obama issued an executive order lifting
the sanctions that had been in place for two decades.147 Studying one case of a country which
underwent both domestic political changes as well as changes to other states’ foreign policies
towards it may provide insight for foreign policy scholars in determining policies which may
help to influence similar positive changes in other liberalizing states in the future.
Interviews with politicians, scholars, and journalists within Myanmar produced a
common observation about the 2015 elections: Many people doubted whether the militarysupported Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) actually expected to win. Tharawon
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(Pyay), a prolific journalist and writer, said the results of the 2012 by-elections were a big
surprise for the government, which worried people who thought they might null the results.
“Some people said maybe we should let the USDP win the elections in 2010 and 2012 [to let the
military feel more secure], and then we can vote for the NLD in 2015.”148 Okka Oo, an editor
and journalist at News Watch newspaper in Yangon, stated that his newspaper conducted polls in
which the NLD won handily, even in polls conducted in USDP strongholds, but the journalists
still doubted whether the NLD would win the elections or whether the military would allow the
results to stand.
Before the 2015 elections, we thought the USDP will hold onto power by
hook or by crook. We thought they might jeopardize the domestic stability
or peace in order to grab onto power if they didn’t like the results of the
elections. We couldn’t believe they would let go of power so easily.149
Tin Min Htut expressed that, based on political polls, the USDP did not think they would
lose. Instead, “They thought the ethnic parties and the Farmer’s Party would vote with them.
[The USDP] didn’t expect the ethnic people to vote for the NLD. It’s like a sin of omission –
here, people are afraid to tell the truth [that they won’t vote for the USDP], so they lie and the
military doesn’t know.”150 Shine Zaw-Aung, Managing Director at Myanmar Financial, agreed,
stating, “The military was too incompetent to even stuff their own ballot boxes…. They thought
they would win elections, so they didn’t think they needed to stuff the ballot boxes.”151

148

Tharawon (Pyay). Interview with Nicole Loring. Personal Interview. Yangon, June 13, 2016.

149

Okka Oo. Interview with Nicole Loring. Personal Interview. Yangon, June 6, 2016.

150

Tin Min Htut. Interview with Nicole Loring. Personal Interview. Yangon, June 14, 2016.

151

Shine Zaw-Aung. Interview with Nicole Loring. Personal Interview. Yangon, June 14, 2016.

60

These quotations reveal the genuine surprise many Burmese citizens felt when, unlike in
the 1990 elections, an unsuspecting military lost the 2015 elections and yet allowed the results to
stand. While these citizens were not privy to the inner workings of the Tatmadaw, it is striking
how widespread this belief that the USDP would not allow themselves to lose the elections was
amongst the Burmese citizens I interviewed. This indicates an important shift in the
democratization process of Myanmar and points to a crucial change that has taken place since the
1990 elections. The current project seeks to explain what factors changed from 1990 to 2015 and
aims to contribute to the larger literature on transitions from authoritarian to civilian rule by
developing a new framework to understand how regime transitions can take place and comparing
a case of a failed transition and an ongoing transition in the same country. 152

Outline

Chapter 2, “The Making of Modern Myanmar (1948-2015)”, covers the relevant
historical background and events occurring in Myanmar between the years 1988-2015. Chapter
3, “The Failed Transition (1988-2002)” discusses the factors which led to the failed transition
period starting with the 1988 protests, the 1990 elections and their aftermath, the second wave of
protests in 1996, and the political climate up to 2002. Chapter 4, “Seven Steps and Eight Years
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of Changes (2003-2010)” and Chapter 5, “Media Content Analysis of The New Light of
Myanmar (2003-2010)”, look to the interim period of 2003-2010, during which the Roadmap to
Democracy began to take shape and important events such as the new constitution, constitutional
referendum, and 2010 general elections occurred, as well as the crises of the 2007 Saffron
Revolution and the 2008 Cyclone Nargis, which brought Myanmar back into the international
limelight and put additional pressure on the regime. Chapter 6, “Letting Go of the Tiger’s Tail?
(2011-2015)”153 and Chapter 7, “Media Content Analysis of The New Light of Myanmar (20112015)”, examine the time period of 2011-2015, during which more concrete steps (such as the
2012 by-elections and 2015 general elections) were taken and evidence of the transition
threshold appeared. Chapter 8, “Conclusion”, discusses future developments for Myanmar and
the insights the case can provide for the broader universe of cases. 154

Ne Win once said, with regard to the military’s role in politics, that the problem is how to “let
go of the tiger’s tail once you’ve seized it” (Silverstein 1981, 67).
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CHAPTER 2
THE MAKING OF MODERN MYANMAR (1948-2015)

1988-2002

The story of the failed transition in 1988 begins forty years earlier, when Myanmar
finally gained its independence after one-hundred and twenty-four years of British rule. The
Burmese military was intimately involved in the transition to independence, largely due to
General Aung San’s crucial role as the head of the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League
(AFPFL), the dominant political party during this era, and the military itself. 1 Aung San signed
an agreement with British Prime Minister Clement Attlee (known as the Aung San-Attlee
Agreement) on January 27, 1947 promising that Myanmar would earn its independence within
one year. However, the hero of Burmese independence would never see the fruit of his labor. On
July 19, 1947, Aung San and six other members of his Executive Council were gunned down by
assassins widely believed to have been hired by rival politician U Saw, who was ultimately
convicted for the murders and executed along with five others. 2 After the assassination, Deputy

1

Taylor 2009, 228-233.

2

Clymer 2015, 34-35.

63

Prime Minister U Nu was sworn in to lead the country, and Myanmar finally declared
independence on January 4, 1948.3
U Nu’s government almost immediately faced challenges for power by the Communists
as well as non-communist movements and political parties such as the Karen Central
Organisation (KCO). There were smaller but still contentious issues with defectors and political
discord in British-named Rangoon. 4 Part of the problem during this time, according to Dr. Khin
Maung Nyunt, former professor of international relations and joint secretary of Myanmar
Institute of Strategic and International Studies, was Chapter 10 of the new constitution, which
gave a number of ethnic groups the right to secede from the union after ten years. 5 This was
included in the constitution after the 1947 Panglong Agreement as an incentive to convince the
ethnic groups to join the new nation – however, Dr. Khin Maung Nyunt asserts that this was the
weakest point of the constitution, especially considering the insecure bipolar international system
at the time.
During this brief period of constitutional rule, the country held three national elections,
the first of which occurred in three stages from 1951-1952.6 Similar to the British system, the
elections used a single-member constituency and the government was based on a British
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Indeed, Silverstein concurs with Dr. Khin Maung Nyunt’s assessment, writing “Two of the
states – Shan and Kayah – were guaranteed the right to secede if, after ten years, they were
dissatisfied with the federal experiment (Silverstein 1981, 52).
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parliamentary model, wherein “the head of state was the president, who was elected indirectly by
parliament for a five-year term…[and] the two-house parliament was directly elected by the
people; the Chamber of Deputies consisted of 250 members, while the Chamber of Nationalities
was allotted 125 seats.”7 A similar parliamentary structure would eventually be utilized again in
the 2008 Myanmar constitution.
The final nail in the coffin of the U Nu Administration was when the AFPFL splintered
into two sections. 8 According to Silverstein,
The breakup of the AFPFL in 1958 came as a result of long personal
antagonisms, structural defects, and the changing political climate in
Burma. Personal rivalries and jealousies among the leaders had existed
since independence; because of the nation's difficulties and the political
responsibility of the AFPFL, the leaders had sought to keep their private
quarrels and differences from public view.... U Nu decided he no longer
could keep the factions together and would join one against the other and
split the party. A second and deeper cause of the split in the AFPFL lay in
the structure of the organization. Despite the theoretical and constitutional
basis for impersonal party and mass organizations, the AFPFL in fact was
overburdened with private followings attached to particular leaders. 9
U Nu decided to relinquish his position as the leader of Burma. Whether or not the transfer of
power was a true coup d’état or something else is often debated. Some Burmese believe “it was
not Ne Win, but actually U Nu who handed over the state because he was unable to control
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affairs of the state.” 10 Lintner (1990) writes that “The military takeover was at first not entirely
unwelcome….The military takeover, some people argued, would usher in a new era of stability,
and it was worth it, even if the price the people had to pay was to sacrifice the freedom they had
earlier enjoyed.”11 Others assert that the Tatmadaw did indeed stage a true military coup,12 and
that U Nu was simply obliged to agree to the fait accompli. As Taylor writes, “In order to
forestall armed conflict between [the regular army troops and the Union Military Police]…and
thus a new possibility of the Communists taking power, Maung Maung and Aung Gyi convinced
Nu to ‘invite’ General Ne Win to head a six-month ‘caretaker’ army government.”13
Additionally, in U Nu’s autobiography Saturday’s Son, he claims that he had heard rumors about
an imminent coup, and that knowledge pushed him to hand over power to the army “on condition
that the general election be held in six months.” 14
Regardless of which account is more accurate, U Nu publicly announced that he would
be handing over control to a “Caretaker Government” led by General Ne Win, which would
attempt to “‘clean up’ the country and its politics.”15 On October 31st, 1958, Ne Win gave a
speech explaining the takeover, stating that
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…the rebels were increasing their activities, and the political pillar was
collapsing. It was imperative that the Union should not drown in shallow
waters as it nearly did in 1948-1949. So it fell on the armed forces to
perform their bounden duty to take all security measures to forestall and
prevent a recurrence. 16
Under this caretaker government, the military tried to stamp out numerous armed ethnic groups
in the ethnic minority states 17 and published a statement on national ideology and the role of the
armed forces, which describes three objectives: “restoration of peace and the rule of law,
consolidation of democracy, and establishment of a socialist economy.” 18 By December 1960,
the strife which had plagued U Nu’s civilian government and created the need for the military to
step in had lessened enough for the army to return power back to civilian control in the form of
elections. The decision to hold elections in 1960 was puzzling, considering that the military’s
popularity was declining. Some suggest that elections were scheduled because “the army
leadership recognized how unpopular it had become and also recognized the structural limits to
the economic and social reforms it had initiated; hence military leaders wanted to get out of
office before the tatmadaw’s reputation was tarnished.” 19 U Nu and his Pyidaungsu (Union)
party won the 1960 elections and a civilian government was again in control. 20

16

Lintner 1990, 34.

17

Dr. Khin Maung Nyunt. Interview with Nicole Loring. Personal Interview. Yangon, June 22,
2016.
18

Silverstein 1977, 77.

19

Callahan 2005, 195.

20

Egreteau 2016, xviii.

67
The struggles of the U Nu government continued, however, with “political bickering and
factionalism, insurgency and banditry in the countryside and lawlessness in urban areas.” 21 The
failure of constitutional democracy period can be attributed to many reasons: lack of
commitment to the new party system and party institutions; infighting between members of the
ruling elite which led to a lack of confidence with the public; the government’s failure to address
issues with insurgency and bandits; lack of trust between the ethnic minorities, who feared the
loss of their cultures and identity in the face of Burmanization, and the military’s fears about
minority areas seceding from the state.22 Such challenges were ultimately too much for U Nu’s
constitutional government to overcome.
In 1962, U Nu called an emergency meeting about handing power to Ne Win. 23
According to Dr. Khin Maung Nyunt, who was on his way to teach a political science class at
Yangon University the morning of March 2, 1962, they announced the transition “very
peacefully over the radio…Ne Win said ‘I will introduce a new constitutional government. We
have experimented with the British constitutional system – it failed.”24 General Ne Win did send
delegates to other countries to learn about different constitutional forms; however, the delegates
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only went to Eastern European countries. “They came back and said, ‘use a one-party system.”25
The new government was thus modeled in the style of an Eastern European single-party
system.26
After the coup of 1962,27 General Ne Win and his commanders created a “Revolutionary
Council” of seventeen army officers that replaced the AFPFL-led civilian government.28
Brigadier Aung Gyi, a member of the Revolutionary Council, justified the coup by pointing to
“economic, religious and political crises with the issue of federalism as the most important
reason for the coup,”29 which reveals the military’s concerns about the potential for secession in
one or more states, which would pose a great security risk to the nation. 30 Indeed, the leaders of
the coup seemed to truly believe that the coup was legitimate; “Their publications and speeches
demonstrated their belief in the right of the military to intervene and alter the government in the
time of national crisis. From as far back as World War II, the army viewed itself as the driving
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force in the popular struggle for independence.”31 On July 4, 1962, the Burma Socialist
Programme Party (BSPP) was established, and “All other political parties were banned by the
1964 Law to Protect National Solidarity.” 32 The intention of the BSPP was to indoctrinate
members and move the country towards the goals of The Burmese Way to Socialism,33 the
military’s first publication of their political agenda. 34 In order to develop Myanmar’s lagging
economy, the BSPP leaders believed that all private enterprises should be replaced with stateowned investments. 35
In this new political landscape, Ne Win had a dual role as both head of state and head of
the military. As Dr. Khin Maung Nyunt remembers it,
There was economic failure, capitalism was stamped out. This was a
horrible time, but law and order was restored. No bribery and corruption,
but there was corruption inside the party. Ne Win wanted this to change, but
his supporters didn’t want to – very convenient for them. The country
became backward, backward, backward, backward, backward, backward,
backward…36
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Part of what pushed the country backwards were changes brought by the Revolutionary Council
in an attempt to change Burmese society. First, the Revolutionary Council wanted to further lock
down their control of the state and protect their status; second, they highlighted concerns about
socio-economic instability 37 and crime that was rampant throughout the country; third, dealing
with corruption and decentralization which hampered political efficacy; fourth, distancing the
state from foreign (more specifically, Western) values and culture; and fifth, promoting the use
of Burmese language script. 38 “All these policies were attempts to resurrect the ‘purity’ and glory
of Burmese culture and tradition and to reject (perhaps forget) the humiliating colonial past.” 39
However, despite their repudiation of Western political values and the regime’s decision to
forego the building of new factories in favor of developing the agriculture and forestry sectors, 40
the military expressed a desire for Myanmar to become a modern state.
Thus, it was necessary to establish a new constitution. This undertaking had been put off
because, as Silverstein describes it,
The men who seized power in 1962 did not see writing a new constitution
for Burma as an immediate issue. The military rulers justified having set
aside parliament and altered the courts, having arrested the elected
government, and having changed the administrative structure in their first
publication, The Burmese Way to Socialism, which stated that the original
37
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constitution was unacceptable because it had defects, weaknesses, and
loopholes that kept the nation from realizing its goals of socialism and
national unity among all the people. Seven years later, in 1969, General Ne
Win announced that the time was ripe for writing a new constitution and
criticized the old fundamental law by giving numerous examples of how he
thought it favored the private sector of the economy, foreign firms, lawyers,
and feudal leaders in the states. 41
In 1971 the BSPP began writing the new constitution, 42 which would ultimately formalize their
one-party rule43 and signal the changing role of the BSPP from a cadre party to a people’s
party.44 “The party nominated a State Constitution Drafting Committee, headed by Brigadier San
Yu, which included thirty-three military officers among the total membership of ninety-seven.
The remaining sixty-four represented the social classes, the ethnic groups, the political leaders
who had cooperated with the Revolutionary Council, and legal experts.”45 Although the
committee had a civilian majority, the military representatives held the leadership positions
within the committee and the new constitution largely reflected their interest. The guiding
principles for the new constitution were as follows: 1) the goal of the state is socialism; 2) a
socialist economy will be adopted and protected; 3) the state will be democratic; 4) there should
be racial equality and national unity at all times; 5) the people will have democratic and personal
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rights, as well as duties and obligations, within the framework of a socialist democracy; and 6)
any other provision that will help to build a socialist democratic state should be embraced. 46
During the constitution drafting process, the committee divided up into teams and visited
different parts of Myanmar to “obtain advice from the [Burmese] people.” 47 The first draft of the
constitution was then published in the press, and the committee again went out to solicit
criticisms of the document from the people, repeating the process for the second draft as well.
“In this way, the committee both led and listened to the people and concluded that it had
obtained the widest popular participation in carrying out its work.”48 The constitution was
completed in 1973, and was then approved by the second congress of the BSPP party and
submitted to the people for ratification.49 Despite the process which presumably took the
citizens’ needs and desires into account, however, the constitution was drafted during period of
economic distress.50 “Growing unemployment among the young people, rising food costs,
shrinking purchasing power, and shortages in essential commodities….[As well as] a drop in
external earnings, dwindling foreign exchange reserves, increase in external debts, and decline in
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imports of consumer goods”51 led to a rash of student demonstrations and labor strikes and riots
during May-June 1974. Additionally, the BSPP leaders held all the dominant positions in the
legislature and the executive and faced no legal opposition. In a “confusing and cumbersome”
electoral system, the 1974 constitution guaranteed that “the candidates were handpicked by the
party and the outcome of the election was never in doubt.”52 The consequences of this
constitution were clear - “As long as the constitution remains in effect, the military controlling
the party remain in power. The constitution therefore confirms the military dictatorship.”53 It was
under this constitution and in this political climate that the events of 1988 unfolded.

The 8888 Demonstrations

What began as a brawl in a local tea shop over whether traditional Burmese music or
modern rock music should be on the radio quickly spiraled into a national crisis in Myanmar.
The fight between a group of university students and local youths on March 21, 1988 in a tea
shop near the Yangon Institute of Technology took on a political edge when the police, who
arrested one of the youths for injuring a student, later released the suspect because of his
connection to the chairman of the local People's Council. Student protests over the police’s
handling of the incident dramatically escalated when police shot at the demonstrators, killing a
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student.54 Students from all over the city began joining the protests, while riot police entered the
campus of Yangon Institute of Technology and the army was dispatched around the city, with
unconfirmed reports of hundreds of people being killed. State-run media blamed the students for
the disorder, which fanned the flames of dissent and caused the protests to take on a decidedly
anti-government stance.55 As one participant in the demonstrations stated, “Everyone was trying
to overthrow – not overthrow, change – the government. Even kindergarteners!” 56
The reports of oppression and violence against protestors enraged the international
community. Relations between the United States and Myanmar were strained during the Ne Win
period, particularly after a disastrous visit to the United States by Ne Win and his wife, Daw
Khin May Than in 1960.57 The relationship between the two countries stabilized somewhat when
Ne Win came back for a visit in 1966,58 but the events of 1988 caused another setback for
bilateral relations. According to Clymer, while Americans had very little concrete interests in
Myanmar during the 1980s, “Human rights was what drove American policy, by and large, in
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good part because of Congressional and public pressure.”59 Throughout the 1980s and 1990s
there were multiple bills in the U.S. Congress to increase sanctions on the Burmese regime,
particularly with regard to releasing Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest and upholding the
results of the 1990 elections, about which more will be said presently.60 The following analysis
section will detail these efforts.
Many Burma experts point out, however, that the 1988 protests may have ended up as
pro-democracy demonstrations, but they did not begin that way. In the mid- to late-1980s, Ne
Win’s Burmese Way to Socialism was failing – the state’s economic policies were floundering,
and the government needed a way to raise revenue. In 1985, the government demonetized the
currency, which, coupled with toppling prices of exports and growing unemployment, greatly
harmed both rural and urban citizens. Finally, in an attempt to provide debt relief, the United
Nations gave the country Least Developed Country (LDC) status, another painful blow to
Myanmar’s economy and national pride. 61 The downfall of the BSPP was “a story of
developmental failure, brought about by self-imposed resource constraints and state over-reach,
compounded by the pathology of one-party authoritarian system.” 62
So, it was under the failing economics of the Burmese Way to Socialism, anger over the
government’s general mismanagement and police brutality, embarrassment on the international
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stage, and the escalating anarchy of riots and protests that the 8888 demonstrations took place.
Despite the varied and complicated reasons for the protests, however,
…nearly all Western media, anti-government members of the Burmese
public, some overseas communities and certain foreign governments not
only attributed the cause of the riots to political reasons…but to a specific
ideology: democracy. Thus most English-language media reports at the time
characterized the riots as a ‘pro-democracy’ movement, an oft-repeated
mantra at the time for virtually any protest against government in the nonWestern world…. In other words it was not the cause of the 1988 riots, but
a consequence – the riots were far more complicated, their underlying socioeconomic origins went back at least 30 years. 63
The protests had a profound impact on the BSPP and its civilian government. On July 23,
1988, General Ne Win gave a speech at the BSPP Extraordinary Congress in which he resigned
as the Party Chairman.64 In it, he stated that the protests and riots in March and June 1988 were
meant to “show lack of confidence in the Government and the Party leading the Government,”
and lays the groundwork for elections in the near future, saying:
If the majority want a multi-party system, the present Constitution's
provision under Chapter II, paragraph 11 for the sole political party leading
63

Aung-Thwin and Aung-Thwin 2012, 258. It should be noted that Michael Aung-Thwin is
well-known both for his expertise on early Burmese history and for his controversial comments
about Burmese democracy. In a 2001 article, Aung-Thwin criticizes "...the establishment of
democracy [which] has become, virtually, a sine qua non for legitimate government per se. It
now resembles a jihad, a holy war, backed by aggressive and confrontational rhetoric as well as
economic sanctions or support" (Aung-Thwin 2001, 494). His views reflect a dour opinion of the
neoliberal American foreign policy efforts to spread democracy in places such as Myanmar, and
he argues that such efforts are reminiscent of imperialism, Orientalism, and evangelism. While
he is an authoritative source on early Burmese history, his doubts about the democratization
efforts in Myanmar should be acknowledged when citing his account of the events of 1988, as
his view has caused some controversy among Burma scholars.
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the State will have to be substituted with wording in consonance with a
multi-party system. A suitable lapse of time would of course be needed for
convenient movement of the people, production of ballot cards and other
requirements.65
Ne Win, however, gave two important caveats to this offer of multi-party elections. First, he
suggested that the people might prefer a one-party system over a multi-party system and tasked
the BSPP with setting up a nationwide vote to decide whether the new system should be multiparty or one-party. Second, and more ominously, he describes the use of the Tatmadaw in
stopping some of the 1988 demonstrations, and warns that
I asked that the Tatmadaw be not used in trifling matters and that it be used
only when really necessary…. Although I said I would retire from politics,
we will have to maintain control to prevent the country from falling apart,
from disarray, till the future organizations can take full control. In
continuing to maintain control, I want the entire nation, the people, to know
that if in future there are mob disturbances, if the army shoots, it hits --there
is no firing into the air to scare. So, if in future there are such disturbances
and if the army is used, let it be known that those creating disturbances will
not get off lightly.66
San Yu, who had succeeded Ne Win as President in 1981, also retired during this time, 67 and
Brigadier-General Sein Lwin took over for a brief period – his short-lived presidency lasted only
17 days, from July 27 to August 12, 1988, largely due to his bungled response to the protests in
Yangon. 68 Sein Lwin was known as a military hard-liner and lived up to his reputation, earning
the moniker “The Butcher of Rangoon.” Street protests escalated during his reign despite the
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military’s violent responses and on August 4 Sein Lwin declared martial law.69 His violent
suppression of these protests and the anger felt by the Burmese people when 41 people
suffocated to death in a police van during his crackdown, 70 prompted his resignation and
replacement by the more moderate Dr. Maung Maung as the head of government. Meanwhile,
massive demonstrations continued despite Sein Lwin’s resignation, and “at a critical point when
military morale seemed on the verge of collapse, a coup was staged to support the regime.”71 On
18 September 1988, the 1974 Constitution was suspended and the BSPP government was
replaced with a new military government named the State Law and Order Restoration Council
(SLORC).72 Despite the challenges facing the military regime, however, they kept Ne Win’s
promise about holding elections. On May 27, 1990, Myanmar had its first elections since 1960.
The results, however, did not stand.
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Lead Up to the 1990 Elections

As Ne Win suggested in his resignation speech, although the BSPP had been replaced by
SLORC, multi-party elections would still be held. After the 1988 coup, the SLORC government
had four main goals: reasserting the military’s control; reform so as to avoid appearing to be
similar to the previous government; establishing internal and external legitimacy; and correcting
the country’s economic crisis.73 Elections would help the new government to differentiate itself
from the failed BSPP government and to gain legitimacy. However, in the aftermath of the 1988
demonstrations and the resulting crackdown, the 1974 constitution had been terminated, meaning
“there were no constitutional guidelines” for the elections in 1990.74 SLORC did set up an
election law and scheduled the elections for May 1990. By March 1, 1989, 233 political parties
had registered, although 26 of those parties dropped out by December 1989.75 Indeed, many of
the leaders of the main political parties were under house arrest at the time of the elections, and
the country was still under martial law.76
The General Election Commission was a five-person body heading by U Ba Htay and U
Saw Kyadoe, who were “ostensibly responsible for monitoring the polls but privately admitted
that they had little choice but to obey SLORC orders, including those which required the
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disqualification of many candidates.” 77 This included Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of
independence hero General Aung San, who had returned to Myanmar to aid her ailing mother
and become a popular leader during the 1988 demonstrations and, in September 1988, helped to
found the opposition party the National League for Democracy.78 Aung San Suu Kyi became a
political force to be reckoned with in her own right – she was placed under house arrest in July
of 1988 and in January 1990, the Election Commission banned her candidacy in the upcoming
elections on the grounds of “alleged ‘unlawful associations with insurgent organizations.’” 79
Interestingly, Tonkin suggests that if the “Big Four” rising political leaders (Aung San Suu Kyi,
Aung Gyi, Tin Oo, and U Nu) had agreed to Dr. Maung Maung’s 1988 offer to organize
multiparty elections within three months, “the 18 September 1988 coup might never have
happened.”80 Instead, the timeline for elections was pushed back. Finally, on May 31, 1989, the
People’s Assembly Law was established, although it was later amended. In it,
All political campaigning had to be conducted under Martial Law 3/90 of
23 February 1990 which decreed that all speeches, writings and publications
had to be approved by the local township authorities. Those deemed
derogatory to the SLORC, Defence Services, or ‘solidarity of national
races’ were punishable by prison terms of up to three years or fines of 5,000
kyats.81
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These laws were established largely with the intent of aiding the SLORC’s preferred
party, the National Union Party (NUP), “which had inherited all the property, membership lists
and assets of the BSPP. Campaigning on the slogan ‘Prevent the Re-enslavement of Myanmar,’
the NUP proudly admitted its BSPP past.”82 Although SLORC had planned the 1990 elections
largely as a strategy to grant itself political legitimacy, observers noted that “prevention of three
of the four leading candidates from participating in the elections poses serious questions about
the efficacy of the process and the value of the results. The destruction of the leadership of the
National League for Democracy has undercut the SLORC’s credibility and commitment, while
its wholesale arrests and intelligence network have created widespread fear.”83 As U Maung
Maung, Secretary of the National League for Democracy G Block and representative of his
district described it, campaigning in Yangon before the 1990 elections was a harrowing
experience. “I was going around for campaigns in North Okkala. Some elected representatives
tried to form a government themselves, most of them were arrested and detained, not many
escaped. I was worried about my safety when the other NLD party members were detained.” 84
Thus, it was under martial law, with opposition leaders imprisoned and no constitution in place,
that the 1990 elections were held.
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1990 Election Results

Despite SLORC’s best efforts, the National League for Democracy won a resounding
victory in the polls. Table 4 and Figures 3, 4, and 5 show the electoral results.
Table 4: 1990 Election Results85
No. of constituencies
No. of elections held

492
485 (7 constituencies suspended for security
reasons)
20,818,313
15,112,524
13,253,606
2,209, of whom 479 were elected
87, of whom 6 were elected
235
93

No. of eligible voters
No. of votes cast
No. of valid votes cast
No. of party candidates
No. of independent candidates
No. of registered political parties
No. of parties presenting candidates

Number of Candidates Running and Elected in
1990 Elections
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Figure 3: Number of candidates running and elected in the 1990 elections.
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Percentage of Parliamentary Seats Contested
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Figure 4: Percentage of parliamentary seats contested.

Percentage of Valid Votes Cast
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Figure 5: Percentage of valid votes cast.

From these results, it is clear that the National League for Democracy won a definitive
victory, securing 80.82% of the seats in the People’s Assembly and 59.87% of the valid votes

84

cast. The NUP, which was expected to do quite well by election observers, won only 2.06% of
the seats in the People’s Assembly, although they polled 21.16% of the valid votes cast. 86 As
Tonkin describes it, “The vote was an expression of overwhelming support for a change to
democratic politics and at the same time a rejection of old-style politicians like former Prime
Minister U Nu, whose League for Peace and Democracy, though fielding 309 candidates,
secured no seats at all.” 87 Indeed, as Tharawon (Pyay),88 a journalist in Yangon, described it,
“1990 was the first time I vote in my life…the people had shown their desire in the 1990
elections. There was a chance for the 8888 Demonstrations to be that push [for political change]
– but it was not good enough for a real transition to take place.”89 Tonkin notes, however, that
some “have rightly seen the elections as more of a popular referendum rather than as a
competition between political parties” 90 – instead, this viewpoint suggests that the majority of
voters supported “fully democratic government” while the minority were “in favour of powersharing with the military.”91
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hometown is Pyay.
89

Tharawon (Pyay). Interview with Nicole Loring. Personal Interview. Yangon, June 13, 2016.

90

Tonkin 2007, 35.

91

Tonkin 2007, 35.

85

Members of the NLD hit roadblocks in their attempts to take political control when
SLORC delayed the convention of the National Assembly. In October 1990, some elected
representatives met in secret in Mandalay to try to convene an Assembly, but SLORC cracked
down with extra security, forcing some elected representatives to flee to the insurgent-controlled
Karen state and establish “a National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB)
on 18 December 1990….The NLD, however, maintained its legal presence in Rangoon and in
the interests of its own survival formally disassociated itself from the NCGUB and those NLDelected representatives who fled.” 92 SLORC attempted to do damage control after the
establishment of the NCGUB, announcing on the state radio that
244 NLD MPs had signed statements renouncing any support for Dr. Sein
Win [the chairman of NCGUB and unofficial Prime Minister following the
elections]. With well over a hundred MPs known to be in jail, hiding, or
exile, the election result had effectively been quashed…. SLORC officials
promised to proceed along the road towards multi-party democracy by
holding the National Convention at some future stage, but continued to warn
of ‘political parties deceiving the nation. 93
In addition to detaining MPs, press laws were used to “stifle freedom of speech and
prevent the distribution of party news or literature.”94 Censorship under SLORC included
shutting down six State-run newspapers, leaving only the Working People’s Daily (WPD),
published in both Burmese and English, renamed the New Light of Myanmar (NLM) in 1993.
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Much of the news reporting in the newspaper were military press releases and eulogies of
SLORC leaders, and State-run radio and television reports generally copied the WPD verbatim. 95
The international backlash against SLORC for refusing to respect the results of the
elections were immediate, with the UN General Assembly passing annual Resolutions calling for
Myanmar to “restore democracy and respect the results of the 1990 elections.” 96 This
international criticism rankled the SLORC leaders and led to denouncements of foreign powers
that echoed the BSPP-era propaganda about Western states trying to “re-enslave” Myanmar.
Indeed, during SLORC’s post-election crackdown, “The foreign media has played a central part
as a prime target of the SLORC’s cultural revolution, and virulent attacks have been launched
against foreign journalists and agencies which monitor events in Burma.”97 The pressure from
the international community, as well as domestic fury over the SLORC’s failure to hand over
power to the NLD, continued throughout the 1990s.

After 1990

Following the 1990 elections, pressure mounted against the Burmese regime, both
domestically and abroad. In 1991, Aung San Suu Kyi was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for her
commitment to peaceful political change, a move which some historians suggest was clearly
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intended by the international community to compel the Tatmadaw to honor the results of the
elections. 98 SLORC continued to claim they would uphold the results of the elections on their
own timeline. In a statement given to the 46th session of the United Nations General Assembly in
New York on October 4, 1991, Myanmar’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, U Ohn Gyaw, asserted
that
Once the Election Commission has submitted its final report, the State Law
and Order Restoration Council will meet with the elected representatives to
discuss the holding of a national convention…which will form the basis for
framing a new constitution…. The State Law and Order Restoration
Council is above party politics. It is neither a political organization nor does
it have any intention of forming one. It will continue to shoulder its
responsibility to lead the nation til the time a strong government can be
formed on the basis of the new constitution. 99
The year 1992 saw the end of Saw Maung’s tenure as SLORC chairman, prime minister,
and defense minister as General Than Shwe took charge. While Than Shwe was the head of the
junta, however, domestic and international attention was still mainly focused on secret police
chief General Khin Nyunt and army chief General Maung Aye. 100 SLORC Declaration No. 11/92
announced that on April 24, 1992, the State Law and Order Restoration Council would convene
the National Convention in order to lay out the basic steps for drafting a new constitution, and
that political prisoners “whom there are no reasons to endanger the security of the state, will be
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released promptly.” 101 SLORC did release nineteen political prisoners on April 27, 1992 in
addition to allowing Aung San Suu Kyi’s family to visit her. 102
In 1995, international pressure again ramped up to convince SLORC to release Aung San
Suu Kyi from house arrest. Senator Mitch McConnell (R) sponsored the “Free Burma Act of
1995” to end all U.S. assistance and investments and stop imports from Burma. The legislation
was passed on September 21, 1995 with overwhelming bipartisan support, and the “Burma
earmark” was worked into the foreign assistance legislation that year. 103 Later that same year,
McConnell and other senators introduced Senate Bill 1511, “The Burma Freedom and
Democracy Act of 1995,” which “ended American investment in Burma and gave the president
authority to prohibit Burmese imports. It even banned most travel to Burma by American
citizens (perhaps a response to Burma's 'Visit Myanmar Year' in 1996), and it urged the president
to keep diplomatic relations at a low level.”104 Ultimately, Aung San Suu Kyi was released on
July 19, 1995, despite Khin Nyunt’s warning that “the rights of 45 million people are more
important than the rights of an individual.” 105 According to Callahan (1996), this decision was
made due to an increase in regime confidence thanks to a successful cooptation of the NLD’s
power and progress with addressing splits within the regime. Of the 702 members of the National
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Convention, only 86 members were NLD representatives. 106 During the 1990s, the power of the
NLD waned as “local branches and the national-level organization had been decimated by five
years of arrests, repression, and defections.” 107 Additionally, the regime improved their ability to
deal with possible splits by cabinet expansions that brought powerful regional commanders to
Rangoon “where they have taken on lucrative portfolios and where SLORC can tighten its
control over them.”108 While this confidence did not last indefinitely, SLORC was learning how
to address issues that would continue into later time periods.
While the United States was adopting new legislation in an attempt to push the Burmese
government towards bringing the National League for Democracy into the fold, the Tatmadaw
was busy increasing its capabilities. After the fallout of the 1988 protests, SLORC prioritized
expanding and modernizing the Tatmadaw, with the numbers of the armed forces rising to
270,000 by 1992 and anywhere from 300,000 to 400,000 troops by 1995.109 Regardless of the
exact numbers, by 1995 the Burmese Army was “one of the largest ground forces in Southeast
Asia...[and had] more direct experience of combat in the field than many comparable
countries.”110 In addition to expanding the military’s size and capabilities, SLORC spent the
mid-1990s developing a plan for the new constitution, which would require
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25% of the seats in each house of the future legislature must be reserved for
the armed forces; the future president must have long military experience
as a major qualification for office; the Minister for Defence must be a
member of the military and in times of emergency the head of the armed
forces will have power to declare a state emergency and take power; the
military budget will not be subject to approval by the elected/appointed
legislature.111
Importantly, these features would eventually appear in the 2008 constitution, indicating that the
Burmese military had been considering which constitutional protections would prevent the
painful outcomes of the 1990 elections in the future.
In 1997, Myanmar finally joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
membership of which had been denied to them in the fallout of the 1990 elections. 112
Additionally, SLORC was renamed the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), a move
seen by some as a calculated move to appeal to both ASEAN and to the international community
by signaling that the regime was changing. 113 Others believed that the change was more related
to domestic issues than courting international bodies. “The SPDC formed not to resolve the
country’s current political problems but just to resolve the military’s own internal conflicts”
stated Moe Thee Zun, vice chairman of the All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF) in a
1997 interview.114 The Irrawaddy Magazine editorial board argued that “by changing the current
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government, they can claim that they bear no responsibility for acting on the 1990 election
results.”115 As Aung Zaw described it, in 1997 the junta had five internal opponents – students,
monks, opposition parties, ethnic rebels, and the general public. 116 These domestic threats, when
paired with unfriendly relations with the West, put SLORC (now SPDC) in a defensive position.
In spite of the name change, little changed when SLORC became SPDC. There were still
no ministries run by civilians – even the ministries of health, tourism, and trade were headed by
military personnel. 117 A massive reshuffle took place within the Tatmadaw the same year, with
Generals Htun Kyi, Myint Aung, and Kyaw Ba losing positions of power. This reshuffle was
good news for General Khin Nyunt, who would become the Prime Minister in 2003, because the
generals who lost their jobs were widely seen as his opponents. 118 According to The Irrawaddy,
Interestingly, the tension that existed in the SLORC between the Maung
Aye/Tin Oo infantry faction and the Khin Nyunt military intelligence
faction, has not been resolved in the new government. Most of the members
of the SPDC, which consists of all the regional commanders, are more
sympathetic to Tin Oo and Maung Aye. However, the Cabinet members are
closer to Khin Nyunt.119
In 1998, the SPDC purged one of its most high-profile cabinet members, Foreign Minister Ohn
Gyaw, replacing him with Win Aung, a former army colonel, and reassigning or retiring two
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dozen senior officials. 120 Ohn Gyaw may have been replaced because Win Aung was preferred
as a military man, or possibly because Win Aung was known as a favorite of Khin Nyunt, whose
power within the SPDC was growing.121 Such reshuffles can be viewed as evidence of splits
within the military, as the reverberations of the 1988 protests had created long-lasting
vulnerabilities in the Tatmadaw.
By the year 2000, the junta had lifted some restrictions on the movements of the NLD
senior members, including Aung San Suu Kyi, who began secret talks with the ruling council. In
January 2001, Aung San Suu Kyi met with General Khin Nyunt. “Many observers believed that
the pressure of sanctions and international criticism led to this development, although there were
undoubtedly internal factors that figured in as well.”122 Such factors might have included the
influence of intelligence chief and prime minister Khin Nyunt, who made a concerted effort
between the years of 2001-2004 to “co-opt the NLD and re-engage with the international
community,”123 although Western nations were still dubious about the possibility of reform.
Pederson compares two possible windows of change, 1988-1990 and 2001-2004, arguing that
On each occasion, military leaders judged that transferring power to an
elected government (or to the NLD) constituted an unacceptable risk, and
simply pulled the plug. In 1988 and 1990, the non-compromising position
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adopted by domestic opposition forces was the main factor, while in 20012004 the lack of Western buy-in was a critical impediment. 124
In spite of Khin Nyunt’s efforts to make in-roads with the NLD and the West during the early
2000s, however, it seemed that both Than Shwe and his followers as well as the international
community were unwilling to cooperate. As Egreteau and Jagan describe it, “Nobody seemed to
be prepared to work on a genuine transitional process at that time, neither among the reclusive
leader’s trusted clans, nor the hardliner circles of the NLD.”125 In March 2002, it was reported
that there was an aborted coup against Than Shwe, Maung Aye, and Khin Nyunt, the top three
SPDC leaders. In response, the Burmese Military Intelligence Services purged all the members
of Ne Win’s family, effectively pushing Ne Win’s influence out of Burmese politics for good. 126
The aftermath of the 1988 protests and the 1990 elections reverberated throughout
Myanmar and the rest of the world. Chapter 3 will analyze the military’s decision to annul the
results of the 1990 elections and the aftermath of that decision.

2003-2010

The interim period of 2003-2010 was marked with many changes, some of which
appeared to be superficial at first, only to balloon into massive political shifts in later years. The
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changes started early in 2003, with a banking crisis that rocked the country. This crisis was
sparked by a number of triggers, including the collapse of so-called “private service companies,”
which some considered to be no more than Ponzi schemes taking advantage of Burmese
investors and possibly even Burmese banks. 127 In addition to the collapse of these companies, the
firing of Finance and Revenue Minister U Khin Maung Thein, well as the news that his
replacement was a military member with no financial expertise, shocked the Burmese markets.
Finally, rumors about the chairman of Asia Wealth Bank (AWB) losing $4 million USD
gambling in Macau prompted a run on the four main banks in Myanmar (AWB, Yoma Bank,
Mayflower Bank and Kanbawza Bank) in early February, as a customers tried to withdraw their
money. 128 In response, banks limited the amount any single customer could withdraw from their
account, and the Central Bank of Myanmar (CBM) ordered banks to stop all account transfer
transactions.129 “Daunting economic challenges may…have forced the country to revert to more
familiar inward-looking attitudes”130 during this period, and while data is sparse, “it would
appear that state spending in Burma is at least twice the magnitude of its tax collections.”131
During this time, it was common practice for CBM to simply print money whenever the state
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required more.132 The precarious financial situation in early 2003 set the stage for many changes
in the period to come.
On May 30, 2003, another unfortunate event set off a chain reaction. The previous year,
the junta had released Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest, a decision which some suggest was
made as part of a conciliatory gesture to the NLD leader in the wake of “tremendous pressure to
undertake certain measures toward democratic reform to gain international acceptance.” 133 Aung
San Suu Kyi was traveling around the country “gathering large crowds at every stop, urging
dialogue with the government and a peaceful transition to democracy”. 134 As she and her party
approached the town of Depayin near Mandalay,
…a group of perhaps five thousand soldiers and convicts released for the
task attacked their motorcade. Initial reports were that four or five persons
died (although it was much higher), and many others, including NLD vice
chairman U Tin Oo, were wounded. A report on the incident by the ASEAN
interparliamentary group concluded that it was 'essentially an
assassination attempt on Aung San Suu Kyi and members of the NLD.'
Aung San Suu Kyi's car was 'riddled with bullets'…. [and] she was arrested
and held in 'protective custody'. 135
The Depayin incident sparked outrage and anger with pro-democracy supporters in Myanmar
and in the international community. The event prompted the Bush Administration and Congress
to take stronger action against the military regime in Myanmar, and throughout the summer of
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2003, the U.S. government worked on a bill to increase pressure on the regime. The result, the
Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act, passed the House with a vote of 418-2 and passed the
Senate with a vote of 94-1.136 The bill required an array of changes to U.S. foreign policy
towards Myanmar, including a ban against trade that benefits members of the SPDC, freezing the
assets of regime members, the denial of loans at international financial institutions, expanding a
visa ban against regime members, public condemnation of the regime, providing resources to
support Burmese democracy activists, and continuing sanctions. 137 The bill was signed into law
by President George W. Bush on July 28, 2003.138
The final, and most important, event that year came on August 30, 2003, the day that
Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt announced the 7-Step Roadmap to Democracy. In his
statement, Khin Nyunt first summarized the progress that had been achieved under the
“Tatmadaw government,” including GDP growth, improvements in different sectors of the
economy and state infrastructure, and improved security in the border areas.139 His statement
also defended the Tatmadaw’s interference in politics during the 1988 period, blaming the
protests on “unscrupulous persons” who were “swayed by instigations and encouragement of
western countries,” as well as explaining the failure of the National Convention process in the
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1990s as being the work of the NLD.140 He explained the slow process of democratization by
pointing to the legacy of colonization, especially issues with security and development in the
border areas, stating that “Without trying to heal these own injuries and wounds it is very
difficult to change overnight into a democratic state.” 141 Finally, General Khin Nyunt got to the
important part of his speech – announcing the government’s plans for the future.
…the emergence of a new enduring State Constitution is the most important
key in building a new nation. Therefore, the government will be
implementing in a step-by-step and systematic manner the following
political program for building the nation.
1) Reconvening of the National Convention that has been adjourned since
1996.
2) After the successful holding of the National Convention, step by step
implementation of the process necessary for the emergence of a genuine
and disciplined democratic system.
3) Drafting of a new constitution in accordance with basic principles and
detailed basic principles laid down by the National Convention.
4) Adoption of the constitution through national referendum.
5) Holding of free and fair elections for Pyithu Hluttaws according to the
new constitution.
6) Convening of Hluttaws attended by Hluttaw members in accordance
with the new constitution.
7) Building a modern, developed, and democratic nation by the state
leaders elected by the Hluttaw; and the government and other central
organs formed by the Hluttaw.
This is the Road Map of Myanmar.142
The announcement of the Roadmap was quickly met with criticism by pro-democracy
activists and the international community, who doubted that this would lead to any real political
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changes. Others thought that the changes would only benefit the Tatmadaw and serve to solidify
their rule. Egreteau and Jagan suggest that this Roadmap was the “last political card” that Khin
Nyunt had to play after a disastrous year in 2003. In their view,
This political program was meant to be the Burmese military’s vision of the
future and it outlined the conditions for a praetorianist transition from a
direct military rule to a more civilian one, where the army still enjoyed
considerable influence over policymaking, yet within a more pluralist
politico-military landscape. The Tatmadaw was consequently to control its
path and predict its outcome. In Khin Nyunt’s eyes, if the military leaders
wanted to remain effectively involved in the country’s political affairs,
without being brutally toppled and persecuted afterward, they had to shape
the transitional process, which was essential after the Depayin gridlock. 143
Burmese citizens, for their part, largely viewed the Roadmap with skepticism. Tharawon (Pyay),
a journalist and political writer in Yangon, said “This was a map that was going towards change.
It is better to have a Roadmap than nothing. However, the weakness of the Roadmap was that it
had no timeframe.”144 U Maung Maung, the Secretary of the National League for Democracy G
Block and representative of his district in Yangon, stated that “When the Roadmap was
announced, I didn’t believe it would happen. The military is always doing something different
than they announced.” 145 Htay Htay Win, a Burmese interpreter for the EU and UN and a former
liaison officer for the French Embassy, believed that “The Roadmap seemed like a trick worked
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out by Khin Nyunt to prolong [military rule].”146 Regardless of the doubts, however, the SPDC
forged ahead with their Roadmap.
The National Convention convened again the following year. The year 2004 was marred
with more controversies, most notably purges within the government which threatened Khin
Nyunt’s grasp on power. In early 2004, there were rumors that Than Shwe had ordered Khin
Nyunt to give up his position as Chief of the Defence Services Intelligence Bureau. 147 On
September 18, 2004, Burmese Foreign Minister U Win Aung and his deputy Khin Maung Win
were fired, which “confirmed the decision of the army hardliners to withdraw Burma from the
regional diplomatic radar for awhile [sic].” 148 Some observers argued that this withdrawal from
foreign policy was a result of the “lack of Western buy-in”149 to the Burmese government’s
proposed political changes. Most shocking, however, was the firing and arrests of the circle of
Khin Nyunt supporters within the Military Intelligence Services on October 19, 2004, as well as
the arrest of Khin Nyunt himself.150 This purge came “from the very top of the Tatmadaw
hierarchy” and constitute a “wholesale ‘cleansing’ of Khin Nyunt’s intelligence
administration.”151 While the purge was shocking, “Interviews revealed that many Tatmadaw
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rank-and-file despised Khin Nyunt and his intelligence clique and were not unhappy to see him
go.”152 The events of October 2004 clearly indicated that one faction within the Tatmadaw had
seized control, at least for the time being.
Other notable changes during 2004 included the beginning of ceasefire talks with the
Karen National Union, one of the most powerful armed ethnic groups in the country 153, as well
as the release of 3,937 political prisoners in November. 154 In 2005, the Burmese government
announced that it would move the capital city from Yangon to an unbuilt city (later named
Naypyidaw) in the center of the country. The Burmese government was widely criticized by the
international community, as seen in statements by the U.S. Department of State which assert that
“This move farther isolated the regime from the Burmese people and the international
community; foreign diplomats have not been allowed officially to visit the new capital.” 155
Burma observers note that, while the reasons for the move seemed sparse, “a primary reason
seems to be to provide the security-obsessed regime with greater security and to present a more
dignified and impressive ‘front’ to the Burmese people and the outside world.”156 While building

152

Egreteau and Jagan 2013, 199.

153

Keenan 2012.

154

United Nations 2004.

155

U.S. Department of State 2006.

156

Skidmore and Wilson 2008, 1.

101

new capital cities is not unheard of in countries undergoing political changes, such an
undertaking can be extremely costly.157
2007 was perhaps the most tumultuous year for Myanmar since the 1988 protests. On
August 15, 2007, the SPDC announced that they would remove government subsidies from
diesel and natural gas, doubling the price of diesel fuel and causing the price of natural gas to
soar as much as 500 percent, as well as increasing the price of other commodities such as rice
and cooking oil.158 In response to this economic strain, activists from the 88 Students Generation
group as well as the National League for Democracy led marches of hundreds of people in
Yangon starting on August 19.159 On August 21, authorities arrested at least 13 members of the
88 Students Generation, and on August 24, pro-democracy protesters were arrested and beaten
by members of the government-organized Union Solidarity and Development Association
(USDA) and pro-government militia Pyithu Swan Ah/Arr Shin (SAS).160 In late August, Buddhist
monks began joining the protests and on September 5, a group of close to six hundred monks
were attacked by SAS in the town of Pakkoku.161 In response to the beating of these monks, the
All Burma Monks Alliance (ABMA) announced that they would boycott the government by
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refusing to accept alms from SPDC members (and therefore denying them from earning
Buddhist merit)162 unless the regime apologized for the violence by September 17.163 When this
deadline passed with no apology to the monks, the ABMA excommunicated SPDC leaders164
and tens of thousands of monks, surrounded by supportive citizens, marched through towns and
cities, chanting blessings for the people and even marching to the residence of Aung San Suu
Kyi in Yangon, who was under house arrest. 165 About 500 monks were allowed to enter her
compound and pray with her, which invigorated the protests and led to
…an estimated 20,000 protesters, including some 3,000 monks, [marching]
in Rangoon, shouting slogans for the release of political prisoners
and…Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and for the SPDC to relinquish its hold on
power. A day later, September 24, the Rangoon protests exploded in size,
to an estimated 150,000 people, including 30,000 to 50,000 monks. 166
The regime sent security forces with riot shields to these protests, 167 and on September
24, the SPDC began signaling they were preparing to crack down. State television broadcast a
message from the minister of religious affairs, who blamed the protests as the work of “internal
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and external destructionists.” 168 On September 25, USDA and local SPDC trucks drove around
making loudspeaker announcements warning people not to participate in protests, the SPDC
announced a curfew, and the regime began arresting high-profile supporters of the protests such
as comedian Zargana.169 Finally, on September 26, 2007, the first use of force against protesters
took place, as riot police and army troops fired into a crowd of protesters and reportedly killing
five monks and one civilian woman. 170 Over the next two days, security forces raided
monasteries, using tear gas and firing shots to round up monks and arrest them for participating
in the protests.171 Civilians tried to protect monks from being taken, and at least seven people
were killed in clashes with the security forces on September 27.
Around mid-day, a second clash took place around the Sule Pagoda [in
downtown Yangon], as soldiers, riot police, and the Swan Arr Shin
dispersed a large crowd of protesters, with the troops shooting first in the
air and then directly into the protesters. In scenes beamed around the world,
Kenji Nagai, a Japanese video-journalist, was deliberately shot and killed,
and eyewitnesses saw another man and a woman also shot and likely killed.
The riot police and Swan Arr Shin proceeded to beat and detain large
numbers of protesters. 172
Throughout the rest of September, the numbers of protesters dwindled as troops, riot police, and
militia members patrolled the streets of Yangon, firing live ammunition and rubber bullets at any
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demonstrators attempting to congregate.173 The regime cut off internet access and on September
30, the United Nations special envoy to Burma, Ibrahim Gambari, had separate meetings with
Aung San Suu Kyi and junta leader Senior-General Than Shwe and other generals to try to
negotiate a peaceful solution. 174 Than Shwe announced on October 4 that he would meet with
Aung San Suu Kyi if she agreed to meet certain preconditions, including “discontinue
confrontation with the government, stop devastating the economy and cease promoting economic
sanctions.”175 During late September and early October, over 50 monasteries were raided and
monks were arrested, as well as continued violence against protestors who attempted to gather.
Despite international outcry, the demonstrations were quashed. In all, about 6,000 people,
including up to 1,400 monks, were arrested for participating in the demonstrations. 176
Not all Burmese citizens thought that the 2007 demonstrations would effect change. Wai
Phyo Myint, Regional Outreach Manager at the Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business, felt
at the time that
Revolution was not a good idea. We would lose thousands of people [to
violence at the hands of the military] – it could be like a second 1988. I
didn’t agree with my friends who were calling for protests. Mass
movements are only good if the military won’t shoot people. We’ve been
[protesting] for decades, always been crushed down. The government can
definitely shoot people – what are other ways [we can effect change]? The
international policymakers and leaders were more thinking about mass
movements and sudden change, but destroying the military and institutions
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is not possible. We didn’t even have a civil society back then. Unless they
[the military] see the change will be beneficial, they won’t support
change…It is important to involve the oppressor as well as the oppressed in
the transition.177
Three things were especially notable about what became known as the Saffron
Revolution:178 first, that the protests bore a striking resemblance to the events of 1988; second,
that the movement was surprisingly well organized, with communication between protesters in
different cities that suggests an “extensive underground organization”;179 and third, that unlike
the 1988 protests, this time technology allowed for the entire world to watch videos taken on cell
phones and firsthand accounts from eyewitnesses. This whole world was watching the protests in
Myanmar, and some states responded more strongly than others. The UN Security Council
dispatched Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari, the United States announced new sanctions and
pressed China, India, Japan, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to do the
same, and the European Union also issued sanctions and condemnations. 180 While China did
pressure Myanmar to allow Special Envoy Gambari to visit the country, they also stated that they
were opposed to other UN Security Council action on Burma. In a similarly ambiguous manner,
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ASEAN released a statement expressing “revulsion” about the crackdown, but then circled the
wagons and uninvited Gambari from its summit meeting. Finally, Japan issued only a modest cut
in foreign aid to Myanmar, spurred by public outrage over the killing of Kenji Nagai.181
In 2008, Myanmar was still reeling from the events of the previous year, but much was to
be done in pursuit of progress along the Roadmap. In the fall of 2007, while the Saffron
Revolution was making headlines around the world, the National Convention concluded and a
“constitutional drafting commission was set up by the SPDC in October 2007, comprising 54
members nominated by the SPDC”.182 By February 2008, the SPDC announced that a national
referendum on the new constitution would be held in May, despite the fact that the new
constitution had not been shown to the public yet. 183 The constitution was published in April
2008, and immediately drew the ire of domestic and international observers. “The conventional
wisdom among commentators, analysts, and politicians was that the constitution was designed to
perpetuate decades of military rule, the 2010 general election would be a sham, and the hluttaw
[parliament] would be a rubber stamp for the new military-backed national government.”184
The three clauses which caused the most uproar were article 59(f), article 109(b), and
article 436. Article 59 discusses the qualifications of the president and vice-president, and clause
59(f) in particular states
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…shall he himself, one of the parents, the spouse, one of the legitimate
children or their spouses not owe allegiance to a foreign power, not be
subject of a foreign power or citizen of a foreign country. They shall not be
persons entitled to enjoy the rights and privileges of a subject of a foreign
government or citizen of a foreign country. 185
This clause was certainly aimed at preventing Aung San Suu Kyi from seeking the presidency, as
her late husband and two adult sons are both British citizens. The second article which created
alarm was article 109(b), which states that of the Pyithu Hluttaw’s 440 representatives, 330 of
those representatives will be “elected prescribing electorate” and 110 will be “Defence Services
personnel nominated by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services”,186 meaning that the
Tatmadaw had a twenty-five percent quota of representation in parliament. Tharawon (Pyay)
says this quota for military members was modeled after the Indonesian constitution. 187 Finally,
article 436 dealt with amendments to the new constitution, stating that an amendment can only
pass “with the prior approval of more than seventy-five percent of all the representatives of the
Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, after which in a nation-wide referendum only with the votes of more than
half of those who are eligible to vote.” 188 Considering the twenty-five percent quota for
Tatmadaw members in article 109(b), this requirement that constitutional amendments can only
be passed with the support of more than seventy-five percent of the parliament effectively gave
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the Tatmadaw veto-power over any possible changes to the constitution the SPDC
representatives had written.
In addition to the clauses giving constitutional protections to the military, the new
constitution also attempted to solve a problem that had been threatening internal cohesion and
domestic security since independence – the issue of armed ethnic groups. Many experts on
Burmese politics felt that “The 2008 Constitution is the army government’s attempt to cast these
issues in terms that will be politically resolvable and will avoid in the future both the severe
conflicts of the civil war and the popular upheaval of 1988”. 189 In an effort to avoid the
possibility of future civil wars with these ethnic groups, many of whom were still naming
federalism as their ultimate goal. The SPDC’s solution to the problem of conflict with these
groups was attempting to incorporate the insurgent groups into the Tatmadaw in a program
called the Border Guard Forces (BGF). The BGF was based on Article 338 of the constitution,
…which stipulates ‘All the armed forces in the Union shall be under the
command of the Defence Services.’ The objective was to have the BGF
under the command of tatmadaw officers, thereby bringing these forces
under the tatmadaw chain of command, while the forces of the BGF were
to be composed of insurgent groups that had reached cease-fire agreements
with the tatmadaw.190
In all, the constitution was released in Burmese and English (not in any minority ethnic group
languages)191 shortly ahead of the scheduled May 10, 2008 referendum. The text was not
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circulated widely, “and voters were expected to endorse it without seeing it.”192 A much larger
problem was approaching the country, however, and would make landfall just eight days before
voting was set to begin.
On May 2, 2008, Cyclone Nargis hit the Irrawaddy Delta, just north of Yangon, at full
force. The storm created a tidal surge up to 4 meters, flooding paddy fields with sea water and
ruining the crops.193 Official death toll figures counted 130,000 people dead and 2.4 million
affected, and the United Nations estimated that some 900,000 people were left homeless after the
Cyclone, which devastated towns and villages in the delta region. 194 Even after the initial damage
had been wreaked by the cyclone, the SPDC’s sluggish response 195 and “refusal to allow
international disaster-relief teams to provide emergency aid”196 exacerbated the situation.
Despite widespread human suffering,
The international focus and the proposed massive foreign assistance [after
Cyclone Nargis] therefore appeared to have revived the military leaders’ old
fears of invasions, especially by sea…. In their strategic thinking, the
xenophobic withdrawal of the Burmese top leadership in May 2008 was
quite logical. The SPDC’s reaction to the ‘marauding’ US and French navy
fleets near the Burmese waters was explicit. 197
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In addition to horror over the SPDC’s denial of emergency services for its citizens, the
international community and opposition groups also objected to the regime’s insistence on
holding the constitutional referendum soon after the cyclone hit. The vote in severely affected
areas was rescheduled from May 10 to May 24,198 but recovery from the cyclone was arduous
and slow. Even before Nargis, human rights groups and international observers were concerned
that the referendum would not be free or fair, due to reports that the SPDC “refused to allow any
meaningful public discussion and debate of the draft constitution, and has arrested and jailed
those who have expressed opposition to its contents”; that rights to assembly and free association
were outlawed; that opposition parties were regularly harassed and repressed by authorities; and
that the referendum process would not be monitored by any independent organizations. 199
Despite the ongoing humanitarian and environmental disaster that was caused by Cyclone
Nargis, the SPDC decided to press on with the referendum. On May 14, 2008, the regime
announced the results of the referendum that had been held in May 10 in less-affected parts of
the country, claiming that “‘more than 99 percent’ of the 22.7 million eligible voters…cast their
vote, with 92.4% voting in favor of the new constitution.” 200 Based on these figures, over 20
million people voted on May 10, despite the fact that almost five million of the country’s 22.7
million voters would not be voting until May 24.201 Despite these impossible numbers, and the
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fury of opposition groups who reported the regime had pre-marked ballots, intimidated and
threatened voters, and refused peoples’ right to vote,202 the SPDC announced the constitution had
been approved. To round out another difficult year, Aung San Suu Kyi remained under house
arrest, 203 and Myanmar signed an agreement with multiple firms to build natural gas and oil
pipelines into China,204 leaning to environmental and human rights concerns. 205
Unsurprisingly, the SPDC faced widespread criticism for the referendum, within the
country as well as from the international community. Okka Oo, editor and journalist at News
Watch in Yangon, said that this time was marked with “lots of pessimism – people in Burma felt
hopeless. There was lots of criticism about the constitution and the referendum after Nargis. So
many lives were lost, but they were trying to push their own agenda. Even if [their] intention was
good (I’m not sure it was), it was not right.” 206 Phyu Phyu Zin, a former journalist who also
worked at the Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business, stated that “When I was reporting on
the referendum, I had to do it really carefully. There was still censorship on the referendum.
Most people don’t believe in the referendum or in the results…. People were being arrested for
helping out [during Cyclone Nargis].”207
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Htay Htay Win noted that during the 2008 referendum, in addition to the suffering caused
by Nargis, “we saw a lot of cheating going on and a lack of regulations even in Yangon. [There
was a problem with] family lists – I can have double, triple votes in different townships. If I am
absent, they can use my vote. This is how the referendum was passed – they took advantage of
this loophole.”208 According to Wai Phyo Myint, “The referendum process and drafting of the
constitution was not transparent. Nobody was really feeling like we can trust [the SPDC]. The
whole process is such a joke, like North Korea. People were feeling like this country needs a
change, revolution, all citizens were very angry with government, but the military will crack
down violently.”209 She also noted that while Nargis was a disaster for Myanmar, “it did have a
positive outcome – the development of civil society. People formed groups to help each
other.”210
The following year was sandwiched in between the catastrophes in 2007 and 2008 and
the upcoming 2010 general elections. In January 2009, Thailand denied the entry of hundreds of
Muslim Rohingya refugees fleeing from Myanmar and forced their boats back into open waters,
creating an international outcry.211 Military attacks on civilians in Shan state displaced some
15,000 civilians into Thailand, in addition to an estimated 140,000 refugees living in camps
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along the Thai-Burma border and 28,000 Rohingya Muslims living in camps in Bangladesh. 212 In
an effort to limit the strength of the armed ethnic groups in the border states, “semi-official
ceasefire agreements increased during 2009 as the government instructed them to disarm and
transform into smaller ‘Border Security Guard’ forces ahead of the 2010 elections.”213 These
efforts did not go smoothly, however, as some groups resisted the orders. 214
In April 2009, the NLD announced that they would be willing to contest the 2010 general
elections if the SPDC met a number of their demands: namely, 1) the unconditional release of
political prisoners, especially NLD leaders Aung San Suu Kyi and Tin Oo; 2) amending certain
articles of the 2008 constitution “which are not in accord with the democratic principles”; 215 and
3) that the 2010 elections be inclusive, free and fair, and supervised by international observers. 216
In late 2009, construction started on a controversial hydroelectric dam project, known as the
Myitsone Dam. The dam was supposed to span the Irrawaddy River and drew the ire of both
environmentalists, for its harm to the river, fish populations, and risks of flooding, and
humanitarians, who were concerned about the safety and livelihoods of thousands of downstream
villagers who would be forcibly relocated from their homes. 217
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Myanmar continued to be sanctioned by the international community for their abysmal
efforts in humanitarian relief during Cyclone Nargis, the clearly undemocratic constitutional
referendum, and an odd incident in May 2009, wherein an American man named John Yettaw
swam across Inya Lake in Yangon to get to Aung San Suu Kyi’s home compound. Aung San
Suu Kyi was later arrested on charges that she breached the terms of her house arrest by allowing
him to enter. In August, she was found guilty and sentenced to three years’ hard labor, which
was immediately commuted to 18 months of additional house arrest, 218 which effectively
guaranteed she could not run in the 2010 general elections. 219 John Yettaw himself was
sentenced to seven years of hard labor but was released to US Senator Jim Webb a week later.220
The year 2009 also marked the beginning of the Obama Administration, which
approached Myanmar with a policy of “pragmatic engagement.”221 Early on in President
Obama’s tenure, U.S. policy towards Myanmar came under review, with Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton traveling to Asia in February 2009 and announcing an official review of U.S.
policy. This review “was perhaps the most thorough and far-reaching policy review of U.S.
relations with Burma that has been undertaken by the U.S. government in recent memory.” 222 In
October it was announced that new policy would be to retain the existing trade, investment, and
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financial sanctions while also starting “high-level diplomatic engagement with the SPDC”,223 an
approach that was absent from the policies of previous U.S. administrations.
2010 was a pivotal year for Myanmar and marked the culmination of the changes that
took place during this interim time period. In February 2010, NLD leader Tin Oo was released
from house arrest after over a decade of imprisonment. 224 In March, election laws were passed
by the election committee (which was made up of representatives chosen by the junta) for the
upcoming general elections. The U.S. State Department released a statement saying that the
election law “makes a mockery of the democratic process and ensures that the upcoming
elections [will] be devoid of credibility.” 225 These election laws were considered by many to
contain “draconian restrictions, notably one forbidding political parties from including members
currently serving prison terms.”226 This election rule was clearly aimed at the NLD, which
declined to remove the still-imprisoned Aung San Suu Kyi from the party and instead chose to
boycott the elections, although some in the party disagreed with the decision and split off. 227 The
decision of the NLD to not contest the 2010 elections was hotly contested by NLD supporters
and observers. “I think the NLD not participating in the 2010 elections was a mistake,” said Wai
Phyo Myint. “[The elections were] not free and fair. NLD was not participating, [so] we didn’t
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go vote for any party. I think that’s why the USDP won.”228 U Maung Maung stated that “I
believe the NLD was right not to run for elections in 2010. There was some dispute or debate
about whether to run amongst the members of the NLD. However, Aung San Suu Kyi’s
instruction [not to run] was very strong, so our decision improved [resolve strengthened].” 229
In November 2010, the first general elections in twenty years were held. Expectations of
these elections being free, fair, or democratic were nonexistent.
The conventional view leading up to the 2010 elections was that this was
purely a cosmetic move to shore up the existing regime and unlikely,
therefore, to result in significant change…. Early developments seemed to
support this pessimistic view. In its efforts to maintain control of the
transition, the military government made a mockery of democratic elections
and managed to secure, by hook and by crook, a landslide victory for its
own party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). 230
Indeed, without the NLD contesting the elections, the government backed USDP won handily.
The USDP contested all 1,154 seats in the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (parliament) and won 882 of
those seats (76.5%). In the Amyotha Hluttaw (House of Nationalities/Upper House), the USDP
won 120 seats (75%), and in the Pyithu Hluttaw (House of Representatives/Lower House),
USDP members won 259 seats (80%).231 The USDP won fewer seats in the State and Region
Hluttaws, but their huge majority, paired with the 25% of seats that had been set aside for
military members, meant that the regime continued to control the entirety of the state’s politics
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after the election. Figure 6 shows the number of seats won by each party that participated in the
2010 elections, out of a total of 1,542 seats.

Composition of Elected Officials in 2010 Elections
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Figure 6: Composition of elected representatives in 2010 elections.232

There were a number of international organizations which observed the elections and
published their findings, which included many flaws in the voting process, including: the
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coercion of advance votes, especially in ethnic states; civil servants voting multiple times;
advance votes being cast by ineligible voters; irregularities in voter rolls; confusion and
administrative issues with certain electoral procedures; threats, intimidation, and coercion of
voters at the polls; vote buying; and violence at the polls in some townships.233 Additionally,
widespread reports of voter disenfranchisement took place, particularly in ethnic states. The
Union Election Commission cancelled voting in over 3,400 villages across Kachin, Karenni,
Mon, and Shan state, effectively disenfranchising 1.5 million ethnic voters. 234 Voters certainly
felt the flaws in the electoral process. Htay Htay Win “had a 50/50 feeling about the 2010
elections. I didn’t trust the government at that time – it was all cheats.” 235 Okko Oo was in
Singapore during the elections but believed they “were just for show. I did not speak about the
elections with [my family in Myanmar]. Speaking about it on the phone would have been
dangerous.”236 Phyu Phyu Zin covered the elections in Karen State as a journalist and was
suspicious about the proceedings at the station she observed. “They let us go to a polling station,
we could sit down and watch them collecting ballots. They started counting, there were no votes
for the USDP, just for the ethnic parties. Then they made us go back to the office [because] the
Karen people got in a fight. Then the USDP won.”237
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Despite these issues, the 2010 elections did mark the start of substantial changes in
Myanmar and serves as a precursor for the more genuine changes that took place from 20112015. The regime certainly made an effort to showcase that the elections meant change. One
week after the elections took place, Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest. 238 As
election observers noted in one election observation report,
But to conclude simply that this election was not free and fair misses the
point. Those who voted and participated as candidates and parties knew this
even before the election took place. The more pertinent question is whether
this election represents an opportunity for those who wish for a more
democratic and plural Myanmar. Though parties not aligned with the
government faced several kinds of constraints during their campaigns, they
have begun to prise open the space for political debate in Myanmar. Their
representation in parliament may help this trend to continue. While the
USDP won almost 80 percent of seats in national legislatures, in four of the
state legislatures ethnic parties control more than 25% of the seats, enabling
them to exercise some influence on proceedings. In short, there are grounds
for very cautious optimism.239
Clearly, the interim time period ranging from 2003-2010 was rife with problems and with
developments in Myanmar, many of which set the stage for more robust political changes in
2011-2015. Chapters 4 and 5 will analyze the events of 2003-2010 in depth.
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2011-2015

The start of this period was marked with the dissolving of the State Peace and
Development Council240 and the inauguration of a new president of Myanmar, the former Prime
Minister Thein Sein. In his inaugural address on March 30, 2011, Thein Sein revealed his
moderate tendencies, calling for unity while also mentioning the possibility of amending the
constitution in the future and pledging to work towards democracy and protect the rights of
minority groups. As Clymer notes,
…he appeared to welcome the opposition into the electoral process; “If an
individual or organization stands for election in accordance with the
democratic practice to come to power in a justice [sic] way, that will be
acceptable to everyone. Therefore, I would say our government will keep
peace door open to welcome such individuals and organizations.”241
Throughout 2011, President Thein Sein continued to represent a more moderate approach to
ruling Myanmar than a military leader had previously taken. In August, he met with Aung San
Suu Kyi in the newly-built capital city of Naypyidaw,242 a significant step towards reaching out
to the National League for Democracy. Even more importantly, he suspended the construction of
the hydroelectric Myitsone Dam project, a highly controversial Chinese investment that would
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have had major environmental and human rights violations. 243 The halting of the Myitsone Dam
project was hugely significant in Myanmar; one Burmese citizen stated that “The moment I
know the change is real is when they stopped the [Myitsone] Dam. Before that they had just done
lots of PR exercises to show signal to investors that things are changing.” 244
Changes continued throughout August 2011 when President Thein Sein invited Burmese
exiles “who have not committed ‘serious crimes’ to return and help in rebuilding the country”, 245
although few exiles chose to return, most likely due to the government’s requirement that they
sign a document vowing “not to engage in actions and words that can harm national stability.”246
In October 2011, the government introduced a new policy of mass amnesty which led to the
eventual release of over 6,000 political prisoners.247 In November, Aung San Suu Kyi and the
National League for Democracy announced that they had “unanimously decided to reregister as a
political party” and that they would contest the upcoming by-elections in 2012.248 Shortly
thereafter, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Myanmar, meeting with both Aung San
Suu Kyi and President Thein Sein.249 Similar to the halting of the Myitsone project, this

243

Fuller 2011.

244

Shine Zaw-Aung. Interview with Nicole Loring. Personal Interview. Yangon, June 14, 2016.

245

Moe Thuzar 2012, 7.

246

Moe Thuzar 2012, 7.

247

Basu 2011.

248

Aye Aye Win 2011.

249

Myers 2011.

122
diplomatic visit was seen as a significant shift in foreign relations by Burmese citizens –
according to one informant, “When Hillary Clinton visited Myanmar, people often cite that as a
major turning point for more transparent changes.” 250 By the end of 2011, President Thein signed
new legislation allowing citizens to engage in peaceful protests, albeit with some stipulations, 251
and a truce deal between the Shan State Army and the Burmese government was reached.252 As
Pederson described it, “Compared to earlier periods, the situation at the start of 2011 was
uniquely conducive to reform. The threat to national security had been minimized and concerns
about economic development had moved to the forefront.”253 This was the start of a new era of
political changes in Myanmar.
The year 2012 began with a ceasefire between the Myanmar government and the Karen
rebels, ending a 62-year conflict.254 In April, by-elections were held and the National League for
Democracy won a huge victory. The elections were set to fill 48 vacant seats in the Hluttaw,
although the Union Election Commission postponed voting on three seats in Kachin State due to
security concerns, so a total of 45 seats were contested. 255 In a significant departure from the
2010 electoral practices, Myanmar invited foreign observers to be present to watch the
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elections. 256 “Though there was widespread expectation that the NLD would win a sizeable
portion of available seats, even the party itself was surprised by its virtually clean sweep of the
field, securing forty-three out of forty-four constituencies in which it completed”,257 even in
regions that were dominated by the military. 258 This victory for the NLD was more symbolic
than substantial, considering they only held forty-three seats out of the 664 seats in the entire
Hluttaw, but the ability of the opposition party to contest and win elections, without the
Tatmadaw interfering or preventing them from taking their seats, was seen by many as a
significant development.
The international response to the 2012 by-elections was largely positive. Shortly
following the elections, the European Union announced that they would be suspending sanctions
against Myanmar for one year.259 Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh also visited Myanmar
in May 2012 and met with both President Thein Sein and Aung San Suu Kyi, in the first official
visit by an Indian prime minister since 1987.260 Despite the positive international reactions,
however, the by-elections had not solved all of Myanmar’s domestic issues. Fighting continued
in Kachin State despite the existence of a ceasefire, possible due to the central government’s
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inability to exercise complete control over military operations in far-flung states.261 In the
summer of 2012, communal and sectarian violence, which had long simmered below the surface,
broke out between Arakanese Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State in western
Myanmar.262 In response to the violence, President Thein Sein issued an Executive Order on
August 17, 2012 in order to set up a Rakhine Inquiry Commission to “discover the root causes of
communal violence and provide recommendations for the prevention of violence in the future
and promotion of peaceful coexistence.” 263
In addition to addressing continued violence in parts of the country, the Thein Sein
government pursued a number of moderate policies. The development of the Press Scrutiny and
Registration Division (PRSD) led to the relaxing of pre-publication media censorship. The PRSD
started with allowing stories on entertainment, health, children, information technology, and
sports “to be published without prior submission of drafts” for approval by the government. 264
Later that year, the law expanded to allow stories about business and crimes to be published
without prior approval. “This left only stories on political news and religion subject to
scrutiny.”265 Despite this improvement in media censorship, however, “each time local
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journalists have bluntly criticized the army, as an institution or targeting only one of its
members, the reporters, bloggers and photographers were hunted down and brought to court.” 266
Thein Sein reshuffled his cabinet in August 2012, replacing hardliner Information
Minister Kyaw Hsan with more moderate and reform-minded Aung Kyi.267 The Myanmar
government also released over 650 political prisoners this year, including former Prime Minister
and intelligence chief Khin Nyunt,268 who had been in prison since 2004. In a move aimed at
gaining goodwill with both citizens and foreigners, the Myanmar government removed over 600
names from the official “no-entry” black list, including former U.S. Secretary of State Madeline
Albright, Aung San Suu Kyi’s two sons, infamous American amateur swimmer John Yettaw, and
investigative journalists such as John Pilger and Dan Rivers. 269 The year ended with more
positive news on the international front, as European Commission Chief Jose Manuel Barroso
offered over $100 million in development aid to Myanmar in a meeting with President Thein
Sein in November270. In the same month, U.S. President Barack Obama visited Myanmar,
becoming the first sitting president ever to visit the country. As Clymer notes,
Some observers thought this was premature: it would only reward 'Burma
for what they've already been rewarded for, and it wastes enormous political
capital which could have been saved up and used to reward future events.'
There was also the possible embarrassment if, after the visit, there was
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retrogression. On the other hand, Aung San Suu Kyi herself had encouraged
Obama to make the visit.271
The following years were marked with both domestic conflict and improvements in
Myanmar’s foreign relations. January and February 2013 saw standoffs between the Kachin
Independence Army and the Tatmadaw in Laiza despite the existence of a ceasefire agreement,
and China stepped in to moderate talks between the sides. 272 Continued ethnic violence between
Muslims and Buddhists in March 2013 left an undetermined number of people dead – estimates
range from ten to almost one-hundred people.273 In April, four new private daily newspapers
appeared in press, and 12 more would soon follow, breaking the state monopoly on news media
of almost 50 years.274 President Thein Sein visited Washington, DC in May 2013, the first time a
Burmese president had gone on a diplomatic mission to the White House in almost 50 years.275
In 2014, clashes between the Tatmadaw and Kachin rebels continued, as did the reports of deaths
and displaced people.276 Due in part to concerns about the ongoing conflicts, as well as human
rights abuses and the continuing political role of the military, the United States extended
sanctions on Myanmar for another year on May 2014, including “sanctions against persons who
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had repressed the democratic movement, and in October the United States froze the assets of U
Aung Thaung, minister of industry from 1997-2011.”277 The Thein Sein government continued
to pursue their goals of political reforms wherever possible, releasing 3,000 more political
prisoners in October 2014.278
The year 2015 was in many ways the culmination of years of reform efforts and pressure
by both the domestic and international communities, although it was not free from controversy.
In February, fighting between the Tatmadaw and ethnic Kokang rebels in Shan State, prompting
China to again get involved in pushing for peace talks. 279 In March, a draft ceasefire agreement
was negotiated between the Myanmar government and 16 different ethnic armed groups, and was
eventually signed in October.280 Most notably, Thein Sein’s administration withdrew the
temporary voting rights of Rohingya Muslims in February, ahead of the fall elections, after
Buddhist citizens took to the streets protesting the passage of a law allowing temporary residents
to vote. 281 This incident was indicative of the continued animosity felt by many Myanmar
citizens towards the Rohingyas, as was a crisis in May in which thousands of Rohingyas fled the
country in boats and became stranded in the Andaman Sea after neighboring states turned away
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some boats full of refugees, prompting the UN to get involved. 282 The continued inhumane
treatment of the Rohingya people in 2015 is a reminder that democratization and political
liberalization are two processes that do not always take place concurrently, and that free and fair
elections do not also guarantee equal rights for all.
Despite the ongoing Rohingya crisis, the general elections were held in November, and
were “nonetheless received far more positively than expected by the international community,
but more importantly by the Burmese themselves. Some 8,000 to 10,000 Burmese and
international observers were allowed to closely monitor the process in more than 40,000 polling
stations.” 283 A total of 1,171 seats were contested by the USDP, the NLD, and eighty-nine other
parties284 using a first-past-the-post electoral system with representatives chosen from singlemember constituencies. 285 In the run-up to the elections, many observers believed that “By
legalizing the NLD and granting it a national political platform, the government has all but
guaranteed that its own party, the USDP, will lose the 2015 elections.” 286 As one Myanmar
expert noted,
…the main performance deliverable that the USDP administration could
focus on was the achieving of a nationwide ceasefire agreement with ethnic
armed groups and starting political dialogue towards constitutional change.
The significance of the nationwide ceasefire agreement signed on 15
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October 2015 was diluted somewhat by the fact that only eight of the 16
armed ethnic groups came to the table as signatories.287
Indeed, compared to the USDP’s message of reform and successful ceasefires, the NLD’s slogan
of “It’s time (to change)” 288 resonated more with voters. Touted as a landslide victory, the NLD
walked away with almost 80 percent of the elected seats, which meant they would hold a
majority in both houses even after accounting for the 25 percent of seats reserved for Tatmadaw
members. 289 Figure 7 shows the 2015 election results.
In many ways, these elections ushered in the end of a long and fraught era of political
changes in Myanmar, starting with the protests in 1988 and ending with the first elected civilian
government in the country since 1962. The Roadmap to Democracy had brought a process of
democratization to Myanmar, despite some potholes. Chapters 6 and 7 will detail the political
changes which occurred from 2011-2015.
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CHAPTER 3
THE FAILED TRANSITION (1988-2002)

This chapter will focus on the events leading up the 8888 Demonstrations in Myanmar,
the 1990 elections, and the failed transition to democracy in this post-election period, including
protests in 1996, up to 2002. My hypotheses for this chapter are as follows:
H1: International and domestic pressure for elections during 1988-1990 were
not sufficient to compel the military to respect election results due to
perceived domestic threats and lack of institutional design which can
protect the military’s interests.
H1A: The military held elections because of domestic/international
pressure and their confidence in their chances of victory;
however, they did not uphold the results of elections because
the military lost stability and immunity confidence.
H1B: Institutional design (in the form of developing a new
constitution) did not occur during this time period because
the military believed a constitution would be seen as more
legitimate after an electoral victory.

132
In order to test these hypotheses, I explored the antecedent variables during the 1988-2002 time
frame which led to the Tatmadaw’s decision to hold elections and, ultimately, to overturn the
election results.
The dependent variables are 1) democratization, which I operationalize as freely and
fairly-contested elections wherein opposition parties are able to contest with the military-backed
parties on equal playing ground and wherein the results of elections are respected and upheld, 1
and 2) political liberalization, which consists of the opening of other civil and political liberties
such as freedom of the press, the release of political prisoners, and the legalization of civil
society associations and activities.2

Analysis

Why did SLORC annul the election results in the face of domestic and international
pressure? Burmese citizens who lived through the 8888 Demonstrations and the 1990 elections
have varied opinions about the SLORC’s reasoning. U Pe Tin, the Chairman of the North Okkala
G Block branch of the National League for Democracy, argued that “In 1990, the military wasn’t

I am aware of the issues with defining Myanmar’s elections as “free and fair,” as there continue
to be disenfranchisement of certain populations (such as ethnic minorities, members of the
Sangha, and prisoners) and inaccurate voter lists, as well as concerns over voter intimidation and
electoral fraud. My definition of “freely and fairly contested elections” focuses more on
institutional barriers to opposition parties and particularly to whether those opposition parties are
able to win (and hold) seats in the Hluttaw. For more detailed information about defining free
and fair elections, see Goodwin-Gill 2006.
1

2

See Table 3 for operationalization of independent variables.
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ready, they had to protect themselves. There were no protections for them being sued over
criminal things” 3 due to there being no constitution in place during the elections. Ma Htay Htay
Win, an interpreter for the EU and UN and former liaison officer for the French Embassy,
described her disappointment when she realized that SLORC would not honor the results of the
1990 elections.
We hoped that politics would change after the 1988 movement – we thought
that the 1990 elections would lead to the NLD winning. We were so upset
when the results were not recognized. We knew all their dirty tricks, but we
didn’t think the military would be that dirty. [The 1990 election] was a very
free or fair election – like the 2015 elections. The military gave all excuses
of not hanging over power to the NLD. Some military members seemed to
be genuine, like Soe Mann. Morally, they were still under the influence of
Ne Win, who was still alive and pulling strings. 4
How, then, to explain the SLORC’s decision to hold multi-party elections in 1990 without
establishing a constitution first? The SLORC was able to explain this outcome by framing the
elections as a constitutional writing assembly, an idea they had been discussing well before the
elections themselves. At the Extraordinary Session of the Burma Socialist Programme Party,
which was held from July 23-25, 1988 as a response to the growing domestic unrest, General Ne
Win gave a speech about the necessity of elections, although he notes that the necessary steps to
holding general elections will take time. Importantly, he asserted that “The Hluttaw5elected thus,
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can write the Constitution and other necessary laws according to its own wishes. I request the
organizations currently taking responsibility to assert control as much as possible to keep the
country from disarray till [sic] the organizations formed by the Hluttaw can take over.”6 On June
9, 1989, SLORC gave a press conference about the upcoming elections, stating:
We do not know as yet to whom and how the power would be transferred,
and we do not know who would win and in which manner we would transfer
power. We cannot transfer power as soon as the elections are held. The
government would be formed according to a constitution. If the state power
is hurriedly transferred, it would lead to a shaky and weak government. This
can be reasoned by any person with intelligence….Presently, we have two
constitutions in our country; that is, the 1947 Constitution and the 1974
Constitution….The elected representatives can choose one of the
constitutions to form a government, and we will transfer power to the
government formed by them…If they do not like the two existing
constitutions, they can draw [up] a new constitution. Neither the Defence
Forces nor the State Law and Order Restoration Council will draw up a new
constitution. The elected representatives are to draw up the constitution. If
the people approve that constitution, we will transfer power as soon as
possible to the government that emerged according to that constitution. 7
In the aftermath of the elections, on July 27, 1990, SLORC published a statement, 8 again
mentioning the 1947 and 1974 Constitutions and pointing out that the 1947 Constitution was
developed prior to independence and without the involvement of some ethnic groups. They go on
to say that “…the desire of the majority of the political parties which contested in the… [1990]
Election is to draw up a new constitution…. Today in Myanmar Naing-Ngan9 there are many
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national races who have awakened politically and it is obvious that it is especially necessary to
draw up a firm constitution after soliciting their wishes and views.”10 The declaration also warns
that SLORC will “in no way accept the drawing up of a temporary constitution for forming a
government” and that SLORC would take “effective action” to stop such a measure.
Was the purpose of the 1990 elections always to develop a new constitution, or was it a
way for the regime to twist the unexpected and unwelcome electoral results in their favor? While
voters thought the elections were to choose a new government, according to Derek Tonkin, who
observed that “over 99 percent of those eligible to vote really thought they were electing a new
parliament and a new government,” 11 the language used by the regime in the lead-up to the
elections seemed to indicate that they had begun to see the elections not as a referendum on who
should run government, but rather on who should write the next constitution.
Clearly the 8888 Demonstrations were a result of longstanding pent-up frustrations over
the failure of the BSPP government and its Burmese Way to Socialism. The events of 1988, and
the resulting elections in 1990, can be seen as a reaction to the catalyst of domestic civil
opposition.
The enormous scale of the pro-democracy demonstrations in August and
September 1988…left the regime badly shaken…. Even after the
demonstrations had been crushed, and most leading protestors killed,
imprisoned, or driven into exile, the SLORC feared the threat of violent and
more serious uprisings by urban-based dissidents.12
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In addition to the pressure of the 8888 demonstrations, however, there are a number of factors
which played a crucial role in determining the events of 1988, the decision to hold elections in
1990, and the failure of SLORC to transition according to the results of the election. Those
factors include external/international pressure, splits/cohesion within the Tatmadaw, and the
failure to develop confidence-building institutions.

External/International Pressure

The uncomfortable relationship between the Tatmadaw and foreign states dates back long
before the 1988 demonstrations. British colonialism had a profound effect on the Burmese
national psyche, with anti-West propaganda perpetuating both before and after Burmese
independence. 13 After the crackdown on the 1988 demonstrations, the sanctions and criticism
that came from the international community “were all interpreted as a new form of imperialism
by a Burmese leadership wary of seeing the colonial trauma being re-enacted less than a century
later.”14 The Tatmadaw used American actions in the region to justify their governmental
takeover in the face of “‘blatant [American] interference in the internal affairs of Burma.’” 15 This
“interference” included such moves as an American fleet and aircraft carrier entering Burma’s
territorial waters, in case American embassy staff needed to be evacuated. To the junta, however,
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the movement of American ships into Burmese waters was seen as a possible conspiracy in
which “‘traitors at home were conspiring with their masters abroad to enslave the country
again.’”16 In the wake of the 1988 protests and the subsequent crackdown and seizure of power,
The rhetoric against 'neo-colonialist' foreign powers that want to 'enslave'
and 'humiliate' Burma has been a constant refrain in Burmese military
propaganda, especially when Western diplomatic pressure, sanctions and
criticism grew stronger in the course of the 1990s. The increasing use of
anti-foreign xenophobic rhetoric by the SLORC was a direct response of the
international ostracism it became the object of, far more than during Ne
Win’s autarkical era. Thousands of signboards were spread across Burma
after 1988, all displaying slogans exhorting the Burmese people to resist
external influence and oppose foreigners.17
Such propaganda also made its way into state media such as The New Light of Myanmar. In
addition to the fear of a reprisal of Myanmar’s colonial past, SLORC was reacting to their
treatment by Western media and diplomats.
In the lead-up to Myanmar’s 1990 elections, American lawmakers were both encouraged
and concerned by the possibility of multiparty elections. In January of 1989, the U.S.
Ambassador to Burma, Burton Levin, met with the Burmese elections commission to discuss the
rules and procedures for the upcoming elections and expressed concern “that the rules would
prevent Aung San Suu Kyi from running.”18 Indeed, ahead of the elections, Americans were
convinced that the elections would not be free or fair, 19 and “Western media and politicians were
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unanimous that the forthcoming elections would not be free and fair….Yet when an
overwhelming victory for the NLD was announced, the elections were instantly acclaimed.” 20
Once it became clear the SLORC was not going to hand power over to the NLD immediately,
“pressure grew from the Congress and the interested general public [for the George H.W. Bush
Administration] to respond.”21 This pressure can be seen with the number of legislative attempts
during this time period. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, there were dozens of efforts to
introduce legislation on Myanmar. 22
During the interim period of 2003-2010, there were distinct differences in the foreign
policy objectives and approaches taken towards Myanmar between the George H.W. Bush, Bill
Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations, which consequently shaped the
types of legislation which were signed into law. The first Bush administration was quite reserved
in its policy towards pressuring the Burmese government. In 1991, Congress put increasing
amounts of pressure on the executive branch to make a stand against the Burmese junta by
urging the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and allowing the results of the 1990 elections to stand. 23
During this same time period, the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the Nobel Peace Prize
to Aung San Suu Kyi.24 Indeed, it appeared that George H.W. Bush was more cautious than the
U.S. Congress in its attempts to influence Myanmar politics;
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Congress, deeply impressed with Aung San Suu Kyi and angered at Burma's
military for its atrocious behavior, wanted a forceful American posture,
including encouragement of the opposition, the imposition of sanctions, and
keeping American diplomatic relations with Burma at the
charge d'affaires level, if not breaking them off entirely. The administration
was willing to criticize the Burmese regime in strong language, but its actual
policy was cautious, arguably even timid. It wanted to have an ambassador
in Burma, resumed cooperation on narcotics control, had no real interest in
encouraging the Coalition provisional government, and accepted limited
sanctions only in response to Congressional and public pressure. 25
President Clinton would prove to be marginally more willing than his predecessor to take
a firm stance with Myanmar’s government. On June 1 1995, sixty-one members of Congress, led
by Mitch McConnell (R-KY) wrote a letter to Clinton detailing human rights violations and
urging action.26 In 1996, Congress pushed for real sanctions under the Cohen-Feinstein
Amendment, which ended non humanitarian assistance to Burma, banned Burmese leaders from
entering the United States, and authorized the president to block American investments in Burma
if repression worsened. 27 On October 3, 1996, President Clinton issued Presidential Proclamation
6925, which banned Burmese leaders from the United States indefinitely. 28 This move was
“more symbolic than anything else, but it did represent a move toward stronger sanctions, the
first since 1991.”29 Soon thereafter, on May 20, 1997, President Clinton approved new sanctions,
including a ban on new investments by U.S. companies.
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Reflecting the fears about American fleet movements during 1988, increased sanctions
and criticism by the West after the 1990 elections led to fear within the Tatmadaw that a military
intervention was imminent.
News reports that the United States was sending naval vessels to evacuate
American nationals from Burma apparently sparked fears among the armed
forces leadership that a US invasion fleet was being sent to Burma, to assist
in efforts to topple the military regime. These fears grew after the fleet was
suddenly detected in Burmese waters. There were even stories in circulation
at the time that US ground troops had landed in Burma. Despite official US
denials of any hostile intent, these rumours appeared to have had a major
impact on the regime…. These fears may now appear ridiculous, but they
were genuinely held at the time and remained for a number of years. 30
Based on my operationalization of international pressure as including economic or arms
sanctions, as well as statements and visits by diplomats, the 1988-2002 period in Myanmar saw
widespread international pressure, particularly from the West. Clearly, the immediate response to
the events of 1988-1990 by the international community prompted a doubling down by the
regime as they sought to protect their own interests as well as protect their country against what
appeared to be an external threat. However, splits and a lack of cohesion within the Tatmadaw
could threaten this strategy during this period.

Splits/Cohesion

The Tatmadaw underwent a significant amount of changes during the second half of the
twentieth century. Throughout the 1950s, the Tatmadaw focused on modernization and
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technological development in addition to building a unified military with vested economic and
social interests. 31 During the late 1950s, the Tatmadaw sent officers on “shopping” expeditions
to learn about military practices in countries such as India, Pakistan, Australia, Yugoslavia,
France, Israel, Germany, and the People’s Republic of China. 32 Such missions had
…two important effects on the emerging corporate identity of the expanding
tatmadaw. First, the act of representing one’s country and military to
foreigners gave officers new bases for their commitment to careers in the
military….Second, in the military mission reports, military officers
exhibited a sophisticated form of comparative analysis as they tried to
decide who could teach Burma the most appropriate lessons about building
a national army….The model most frequently identified as suitable for the
tatmadaw of the 1950s was Yugoslavia. 33
The focus on obtaining new and better weapons and training in the face of separatist
challengers in the periphery of the country gained even more steam after the urban unrest of the
late 1980s.34 Part of the push during this time was an increased effort to build its ranks to better
combat the domestic security threats from both armed ethnic groups as well as the demonstrators
in the cities. However, a major increase in recruitment led to more problems, including strained
resources, troops being undertrained, and a shortage of qualified and experienced officers. This
led to military campaigns in the early 1990s being launched with very little intelligence and
training, with the Tatmadaw resorting to “human wave” tactics in which “Burmese officers
[forced] large numbers of young inexperienced and poorly trained soldiers to mount mass
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assaults against heavily fortified defensive positions manned by tough and resourceful
guerrillas….In these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that there have been persistent reports
of low morale and a lack of commitment in the army’s ranks.” 35 In addition to demoralizing
military tactics, during this time the Tatmadaw also engaged in activities such as the forced
recruitment of child soldiers 36 and the looting, rape, and torture of civilians by the Burmese
Army. “Quite apart from the obvious (and very serious) human rights issues raised, to most
professional observers this kind of leadership undermines the soldiers’ discipline and morale,
and thus detracts from their military efficiency.”37 Thus, while there were some efforts to send
military members abroad for professionalization training, poor training and lack of resources
meant that attempts to professionalize the military yielded mixed results during this time.
This leads to the question of whether the Tatmadaw was being threatened by splits within
its ranks during the 1988-1990 period. Splits in the military are operationalized as the firing or
dismissing of military members, the replacement of generals or party leaders, and reports of
disagreements or clashes between factions in the military. “Although to the outside world the
SLORC seems united, to insiders there appear to be difference among its leaders on press
treatment, external relations, elections, and internal dissent - differences that might prove
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important in the future.” 38 Throughout the BSPP period, there were rumours of dissatisfaction
and even outright dissent within the Tatmadaw.
Under Ne Win, purges of malcontents were frequent, with numerous senior
officers posted abroad or forced into early retirement. Such measures were
not always successful. In 1976, for example, the regime uncovered a plot
by a number of disillusioned young officers to overthrow President Ne Win
and take the army back to the barracks. In 1988 about 1000 servicemen
from all three services actually joined the pro-democracy demonstrations in
Rangoon, calling for a return to civilian rule. At the time, one former senior
Tatmadaw officer told the BBC that the pro-democracy movement had the
support of 60 per cent of the army. There was also considerable disquiet
reported on the part of many soldiers who were later ordered to shoot down
young demonstrators. Two years later, the NLD’s landslide victory in the
general elections was a severe shock to the regime, not least because the
overwhelming vote for the opposition forces (including in some military
cantonment districts) suggested a considerable sympathy for Aung San Suu
Kyi among the armed forces, and thus the potential for a serious difference
of view over the Tatmadaw’s future role in Burma. 39
Perhaps unsurprisingly, State Law and Order Restoration Council members publicly denied the
existence of splits within the military. In a speech given by General Saw Maung, the Chairman
of the SLORC on July 5, 1989, Saw Maung asserted, “I'm moderate. But some are hardliners.
There are some saying that there are discord and differences in opinion within our SLORC. We
hear this. We read this. Oh! What a difficult thing it is! These things make people waver. There
is no problem among us, we coordinate among ourselves. We hold discussions. But if there was
anything to decide, we have decided that matter by the wishes of the majority.”40 Despite his
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assurances, however, there continued to be evidence of issues within the Tatmadaw during this
period.
During 1988, a new generation of military officers were moving up the ranks, all of
whom had been trained during the Ne Win period of “military socialism and xenophobic
nationalism.”41 Despite the punishments for those who were disloyal, and the rewards for
military members who were steadfast, the 1988 demonstrations opened a rift within the
Tatmadaw as many younger military members viewed the demonstrators with sympathy and
found their orders to crack down on the protestors distasteful. About 1,000 mostly junior
members of the armed services even marched with protestors and “one former senior Tatmadaw
officer told the BBC that the pro-democracy movement had the support of 60% of the army.”42
Clearly, throughout the Ne Win period and especially during the turbulent events of 1988-1990,
the Tatmadaw did not enjoy an easy cohesion within its ranks. Instead, a massive increase in
recruitment and a lack of training and professionalization led to low morale and a lack of
cohesion. Additionally, while during the 1970s Tatmadaw officers could attend training in
countries such as the UK, US, West Germany, Israel and Australia, after 1988 “all traditional
sources of military instruction were denied to the Tatmadaw as the US, UK, Australia and the
other Western democracies broke off military relations.” 43 In an attempt to buy back the support
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of the rank and file military members in the face of these issues, in 1988 the Tatmadaw received
a 45% pay raise, and in 2000, another pay increase of up to 600%.44
In addition to concerns about splits along generational lines, there was also concern
within the Tatmadaw of rivalry between graduates of two different schools for officers – the
Defence Services Academy (DSA) and the Officer Training School (OTS). Some reports
indicate that senior Tatmadaw members favored one group or another in order to strengthen their
own base of support; for instance, “In 1999, 45 of the Tatmadaw’s 88 most senior commanders
were from the Academy. It has been suggested that this is part of a deliberate strategy by GEN
Maung Aye (a member of the DSA’s first intake) to outflank his rival, LTGEN Khin Nyunt (a
graduate of OTS class 25) before the regime’s most senior position is filled again.”45 Such
jockeying for position within the organization could certainly corrode military cohesion.
Callahan points to “four unintended consequences of the SLORC/SPDC state-building
process in the 1990s”46 which spelled significant problems for military cohesion: 1) a state
apparatus which was largely controlled by regional commanders; 2) major discipline and morale
problems within the Tatmadaw due to the military’s efforts to enlist 200,000 more soldiers; 3)
major experiential gaps between army leadership and younger soldiers, due to ceasefire
agreements with minority insurgent groups that mean younger military members have more
experience with state-building than fighting; and 4) agreements with minority groups mean that
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some “former ethnic insurgent groups [are allowed] to retain their arms [and] police their own
territory,”47 limiting the Tatmadaw’s influence in said regions. Thus, “the state-rebuilding project
undertaken in the1990s has created as many sources of weakness for the military as it has
strengths, and the weaknesses probably account as much for the regime’s unyielding behavior.” 48
While both internal and external pressures threatened the cohesion of the Tatmadaw, the military
as an organization proved to be quite resilient, stamping out threats (elections, protests,
discontent within the military ranks, insurgencies) throughout this period.
Considering the insular nature of the Tatmadaw as an organization, it is unsurprising that
my civilian informants had limited knowledge about the internal conflicts (or lack thereof)
within the military during this period. Some interviewees had general impressions of regime
infighting, such as U Pe Tin, who stated that the “new military generation is replacing the old
generation…. if there are clashes, conflicts, this may lead to coups.”49 Htay Htay Win noted that,
in the aftermath of the 1990 elections, “Some military members seemed to be genuine [such as]
Soe Mann. Morally, they [the Tatmadaw] were still under the influence of Ne Win, who was still
alive and pulling the strings.”50 Other than these limited outside observations, however, the
internal politics of the Tatmadaw during 1988-2002 were relatively unknown to the Burmese
citizens I interviewed. Indeed, while there is some evidence of splits within the military during
this time period, this antecedent variable is difficult to prove, and as later chapters will show,
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splits were a common topic of discussion for Burma observers throughout contemporary
Burmese history. Splits can therefore be seen as insufficient for explaining the difference in
democratization and liberalization between this time period and later ones.
The fissures within the Tatmadaw meant that, once the NLD won the 1990 elections, the
top brass were insecure about the future of the military and the country in the face of the
perceived internal and external threats, from separatist groups to threatening overtures by the
West to challengers from within their own ranks. This lack of confidence was exacerbated by a
failure to build political institutions, particularly a new constitution, which was the final straw for
SLORC’s decision to prevent a transfer of power to the NLD in 1990.

Lack of Confidence and Institutionalization

Why did the SLORC hold elections in 1990 if they did not plan to abide by the results?
By all accounts, it appears that they did plan to allow a transition, at least initially. In a speech
delivered on July 23, 1988, General Ne Win said that, after holding elections, “I request the
present organizations to hand over authority without delay, if the new Hluttaw or the
organizations formed by that Hluttaw say that they are no longer needed or continue assistance if
asked to do some for some time.”51 Additionally, on September 1, 1988, President Dr. Maung
Maung reiterated that “If a multi-party system is chosen, general elects will be held as soon as
possible under the supervision of free and independent elections commissions. The party which
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is strongest at the Hluttaw will form a government.” 52 He also noted, however, that “only the
Hluttaw is to be elected and the forthcoming Hluttaw is to form a government. The Constitution
is then to be amended as necessary.”53 Even at this early date, regime leaders were mentioning
amending or changing the constitution after the elections. Despite this caveat, their messaging
still seemed to revolve around assuring the people that the elections would be genuine. On
September 23, 1988, the SLORC chairman General Saw Maung assured the country of their
intent to eventually transition to civilian rule in a radio broadcast, stating, “The fact that we have
formed a government with very few people is evidence that we have absolutely no desire to hold
on to state power for a prolonged period….The long term reforms in social services…have to be
carried out by the government that comes to power after the democratic multi-party general
elections are held.”54
The following year, statements given by SLORC leaders contained more stipulations
regarding the promised elections. On March 27, 1989, General Saw Maung gave a speech on the
44th Armed Forces Day, wherein he reiterated the SLORC’s plans to hold “genuinely fair multiparty democratic elections”. His statements revealed more hesitancy about a transition than in
September – he gave stipulations such as “After the necessary work has been carried out
following the elections, a new government will be formed in accordance with the law by
members of the People’s Assembly elected by the people….As for members of our Defence
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Forces, we will return to the barracks.”55 Just three months later, however, at the 43rd SLORC
Press Conference on June 9, 1989, General Saw Maung stated
We cannot transfer power as soon as the elections are held…. If the state
power is hurriedly transferred, it would lead to a shaky and weak
government…The elected representatives are to draw up the constitution. If
the people approve that constitution, we will transfer power as soon as
possible…There should be no worry about the transfer of power. We are
ever ready to transfer power. We are just stressing systematic transfer of
power according to the law.56
The law under which such a transition would take place was nebulous during this time because
the SLORC had annulled the 1974 constitution and had not yet replaced it. In 1990, ahead of the
general elections, statements by regime leaders became even more cautionary with regard to the
immediate transfer of power. In April 1990, SLORC Secretary (1) Major-General Khin Nyunt
stated that
The party that wins in the 27 May elections will have to form a government.
Only if a firm Constitution can be drawn up and a government formed in
accordance with it that [sic] will the government be a strong one…The Law
and Order Restoration Council at different levels will continue to carry out
the responsibilities of the State while the Constitution is being drafted. So
we will continue to carry out the responsibilities even after the elections.
We will continue to do so till [sic] a strong government has been
formed.57
Clearly, these statements show that the SLORC leadership were losing their confidence
in the outcome of the upcoming 1990 elections. Short of worrying about whether their preferred
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party would win, it appears that SLORC’s biggest concern was with regards to the lack of
institutions, particularly the lack of a constitution. As Tonkin describes it,
Indeed, a study of the period from the SLORC assumption of power on 18
September 1988 to the elections on 27 May 1990 points to a slow but steady
erosion of their original intention to hand over power after the elections, and
a growing realization that elections in themselves were not a sure or
effective means to arrange a smooth and peaceful transition to multiparty
democracy. There was indeed no consensus on the way ahead. The elections
were held in a political vacuum without any previously agreed process
designed to lead to the transfer of power, or even a general understanding
of how best to proceed. It is right to allocate the blame for this to the
SLORC.58
This concern reflects the fact that, largely due to the delaying of the National Convention,
institutional design (operationalized as the development of electoral laws/constitution and the
development of a robust party system) did not take place prior to the 1990 elections. This made
the regime more vulnerable and led to a lack of regime confidence.
As Slater (2014) discusses, there are three different types of confidence that are crucial to
authoritarian regimes which are weighing the decision of whether to allow a transition to civilian
rule. The first is victory confidence, the confidence that the military’s preferred political party
would win the elections. The second is stability confidence, the belief that once a transition takes
place, the country will be safe from the domestic insecurities that may have caused the military
to take power in the first place. The third is immunity confidence, which refers to the military’s
concern about their members being tried for human rights abuses or other crimes once they step
down from power. It appears that the Tatmadaw and SLORC had victory confidence leading up
to the 1990 elections – it was expected that the National Unity Party would win. “The SLORC

58

Tonkin 2007, 37.

151
were taken aback (as were the NLD and most international observers) by the dramatic results of
the elections, but within 48 hours, in a radio broadcast on 30 May 1990, General Saw Maung
stated, ‘If someone asks us if our duties are over, we must say no, they are not over. Our duties
will not be over until a government has been formed in accordance with the law.’”59 The
meaning of his term “the law” here is unclear, but it most likely is referring to a (then unwritten)
constitution.
Stability confidence was certainly also a concern for SLORC. The elections were not held
in some outlying townships due to security concerns, and the failure of the state and armed
ethnic militias to come to an agreement about the federalism issue, as well as the ongoing
international outcry against the regime, indicates continuing problems with state security.
Between 1989 and 1997, the Burmese government held many ceasefire talks with different
insurgent or armed ethnic groups within the country, which ultimately led to seventeen major
ceasefire agreements.60 While these ceasefire agreements were major successes for the
Tatmadaw in its effort to combat state security issues, Taylor notes that “while a few small
groups eventually surrendered their arms, most insisted they would never do so. Part of the
unwritten ceasefire agreements was said to be an understanding that when a constitutional
settlement was reached between all the parties involved, the groups were to be disarmed.”61
Thus, the ceasefire agreements reached during this time period would not be enough to ease the
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Tatmadaw’s concerns about insurgent activity – they would need to develop a new constitution
as well.
Finally, immunity confidence seemed to be the biggest problem for SLORC in the wake
of the 1990 elections. There seemed to be a concern amongst the armed forces that, if a
democratically-elected civilian government were to gain control, “the armed forces would lose
the large share of the national budget which they have always enjoyed.” 62 More alarming than
the loss of their massive budget, however, was the fear that they would face some sort of
punishments by the new democratic government. Observers at the time suggested that the NLD
and other opposition parties saw the SLORC as an enemy, and General Saw Maung as
something of a buffoon, already exhibiting early signs of…mental
instability…This was a serious miscalculation on their part, compounded
when NLD Spokesman U Kyi Maung, flushed with the NLD’s landslide
election victory, observed to AsiaWeek…in July 1990 – ‘In actual fact, how
many Germans stood trial at Nuremberg.’ The SLORC saw the writing on
the wall. They knew what awaited them when power had been transferred.
They were not unlikely to let this happen. 63
After the 1990 elections, the government did hold a series of conferences intended to
discuss the formation of a new constitution, per SLORC’s assertion that such a document was a
necessity before any political shifts could take place. In a speech given on June 23, 1992, at the
opening of the coordination meeting for the National Convention, Major-General Khin Nyunt
gave a speech outlining the SLORC’s reasons for holding a National Convention and their goals
for the constitution. In it, he referenced the Tatmadaw’s discomfort with the international and
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domestic pressure on the regime, criticizing “destructive and disruptive elements inside and
outside the country” and claiming that “Declaration No 11/92 [which announced the intention to
hold a National Convention for the purpose of drafting a new constitution] was not prompted by
any kind of pressure, political or military, exerted upon the State Law and Order Restoration
Council.”64 Indeed, the proceedings of the National Convention, although irregular, would
eventually form the framework of the 2008 Constitutions. 65
As part of the SLORC’s pro-regime propaganda campaign, the newspaper the Working
People’s Daily (which would eventually be renamed the New Light of Myanmar) published
monthly updates about the progress achieved in the National Convention coordination meetings.
These reports would include such details as roll calls, proposals by different political parties in
attendance, and speech transcripts from those in attendance. These updates provide a valuable
log of the progress of these meetings, showing both the evolution of what would eventually
become the 2008 constitution as well as the justifications given by SLORC members for certain
constitutional rules. The six stated objectives of the National Convention, which were often
repeated in transcripts of the meetings and published in both the Working People’s Daily and
later in the New Light of Myanmar were
i) Non-disintegration of the Union; ii) Non-disintegration of
National Solidarity; iii) Consolidation and perpetuation of
Sovereignty; iv) Emergence of a genuine multi-party democratic
system; v) Development of eternal principles of justice, liberty and
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equality in the State; and vi) Participation of the Tatmadaw in the
leading role of national politics of the State in (the) future. 66
Clearly, the primary concerns of the Tatmadaw and SLORC during this time were related
to perceived threats to the state disintegrating due to either threats to national solidarity (namely,
the federalism debate that was taking place with a number of ethnic minority groups who were
threatening to leave the union) or threats to their state sovereignty (due to the perceived
meddling of the international community). The most brazen of the six objectives is undoubtedly
the sixth one, which guarantees a political role for the Defence Services without any promise of a
time limit. Again, the justification for this objective, like the others, was repeated and published
often. At the opening of the National Convention on January 9, 1993, Convening Chairman
Major-General Myo Nyunt summarized the Tatmadaw’s reasons for remaining in politics;
The Tatmadaw has had a long tradition and heritage of having confronted
and overcome all dangers which had threatened the nation and the people
and in so doing, has sacrificed many lives. The international situation as
well as the domestic, political, economic, social and military situations
are constantly changing. Under such fluctuating conditions it is timely to
bestow appropriate responsibilities to the Tatmadaw so that it will be able
to actively participate in the national political leadership role of the future
State and thereby be able to provide timely protection whenever the need
arises. To put it frankly, the maintenance of national stability, peace
and tranquillity without the participation of the Tatmadaw is extremely
risky and dangerous and it will not be at all easy at a time when internal and
external threats, interferences and dangers are confronting the nation. 67
Such speeches during this time often involved justifications of the importance of the
National Convention by the Steering Committee Chairman, Major-General Myo Nyunt, and
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revealed many of the concerns that SLORC had about the possibilities of political change in the
post-1990 landscape. On July 11, 1992, Myo Nyunt warned at one of the earliest meetings of the
Nation Convention that “the public will not permit the National Convention being used as a
forum for political capital, for instigating unrest, national races being set against each other
through opposition and hatred, be that perpetrated by an individual or an organization.”68
Remarks like this were aimed at those who criticized the proceedings of the National Convention
as not upholding the 1990 election results – Myo Nyunt’s reference to “an organization” is
almost certainly referring to the National League for Democracy in this context. These references
to unnamed nefarious political actors occurred frequently during this time period. On December
21, 1992, when addressing military officers under his command, Myo Nyunt referred to “powercrazy politicians and some who depended on foreign countries and selfish traders who sought for
their own benefit had ulterior motive for holding the National Convention.”69 Such statements
were published in the Working People’s Daily presumably as a warning to citizens who
disapproved of the National Convention proceedings. Additionally, on June 7, 1996, SLORC
released Law No. 5/96, aimed at stopping “disturbance of the functions of the National
Convention and acts such as incitement, delivering speeches, making oral and written statements
and disseminating in various ways to belittle the National Convention and to make the people
misunderstand.” 70 The language used in these laws, speeches, and meetings, as well as the fact
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that they were published for all to read in the government mouthpiece newspaper, indicate the
discomfort of the SLORC in the challenge they now faced to, in their minds, hold the nation
together while a myriad of challenges threatened to splinter it apart.
Indeed, although the National Convention adjourned after four years of meetings without
the establishment of a constitution on March 31, 1996, it was widely believed that the basic
principles of the future constitution, such as rules for the legislative, executive, judiciary, and
military, had been decided during these sessions. 71 In fact, The New Light of Myanmar published
the detailed basic principles of the formation of the executive, 72 legislative,73 and judicial74
branches after the final plenary session of the National Convention. Despite arriving at the basic
outline for the new constitution, SLORC stopped short of implementing a new law of the land.
Perhaps the reason for their hesitancy can be found in the aforementioned anti-subversion law
(SLORC Law No. 5/96) – with continued domestic resistance to the efforts of the National
Convention, as well as the legislative efforts by the United States to influence Myanmar’s
domestic policies, 1996 may have seemed like a dangerous time for the Tatmadaw to fully
implement the new constitution. Instead, they would wait for a more opportune time.
It appears that the SLORC’s waning confidence, flagging in the face of a transition with
no constitution or other institutions to guarantee their protection from a civilian government that
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was enlivened at the prospect of tribunals, or to protect the state from possible instability, was
exacerbated by the NLD’s gloating. Indeed, although “The old shibboleth that the ‘NLD won the
1990 elections, but the SLORC refused to hand over power’ implies that the SLORC had agreed
to the transfer of power unconditionally. The SLORC had…set conditions for the transfer of
power through the promulgation of a new constitution.” 75 In the face of perceived internal and
external threats, splits within the Tatmadaw, a failure to establish institutions that would protect
the Tatmadaw’s interests, and a lack of immunity confidence in the face of a newly elected party
that was calling for blood, it is clearer why the SLORC ended the transition that they themselves
had started.

Content Analysis

In order to provide more empirical evidence of how SLORC/SPDC viewed the changing
political landscape between 1988-2002, I conducted a content analysis of 100 editions of the
Working People’s Daily (renamed the New Light of Myanmar in 1993). In order to avoid the risk
of selectively choosing dates that might influence the types of articles therein, I used a random
date generator to randomly select 100 dates .76 The maximum number of dates the randomizer
can generate is 25, so I ran the randomizer 4 separate times to find 25 dates in each of these four
different time periods: Jan 1, 1988 to Dec 31, 1990; Jan 1, 1991 to Dec 31, 1994; Jan 1 1995 to
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Dec 31 1998; and Jan 1, 1999 to Dec 31, 2002. This also ensured that the randomly selected
dates were not too heavily grouped in one year of the 1988-2002 time period. If there was no
publication on the date chosen, I used the randomizer to select another random date.
In order to access the older editions of the Working People’s Daily (WPD) and New Light
of Myanmar (NLM), which are not available on the current official Myanmar government
archives of the newspaper,77 I used the resources available from the Online Burma Library. It is
especially difficult to gain access to archives of the Working People’s Daily articles, which ran
until 1992, when WPD became NLM. The Online Burma Library has a repository of daily
newspapers produced by the Myanmar government, including the New Light of Myanmar,
Myanmar Alin, and The Mirror. This repository includes a collection of editions of the Working
People’s Daily that dates back to 1987, which was categorized and organized by the Burma Press
Summary,78 an effort to collate the English-language stories in Myanmar’s official government
newspapers, as well as full-text of statements, speeches, and laws. This monumental task was
accomplished by compiler Hugh MacDougall, who served as a U.S. Foreign Service Officer in
the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon (now Yangon) from 1981-1984.79
The earliest available editions of WPD by the Burma Press Summary provided one
document of all WPD articles published in a single month, organized by topic. Each article was
labelled with the day of publication, so I was able to make a list of articles from the randomly
selected dates and analyze only articles from the relevant dates. This style of compilation,
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wherein all articles for the entire month were together in one document, was done for all WPD
and NLM editions from 1987-1996. After 1996, Burma Press Summary began compiling the
articles separately by day of publication. For the randomly-selected dates from 1997 on, there are
separate Burma Press Summary documents for each date of publication. 80
Once I gathered all the articles available from each randomly-selected date of
publication, I read them and coded each article based on nine different subjects: diplomacy
(which includes diplomatic calls, ambassadors, delegations, travel of high ranking officials,
funerals of high-ranking officials, foreign aid, etc.); elections, political parties, and the National
Convention; full-texts of speeches and notifications or laws; insurgency or protests; business,
industry, and construction (which includes agriculture and visits from foreign businesspeople and
tourists); editorials and letters to the editor; non-political crimes; religion (including building
new temples, visits by foreigners related to religion, and donations to monks/nuns/temples); and
miscellaneous (including sports, history, holidays, education, culture, arts, health, obituaries, ads,
engagements, etc.).
There are five subjects which were particularly relevant for this chapter - diplomacy,
elections/party news, speeches and laws, insurgencies/protests, and business. Diplomacy is
related to measuring international pressure on the regime from Hypothesis 1A. The subjects of
election/party news and speeches/laws are relevant both for examining the regime’s statements
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about the upcoming elections and seeing the justifications they gave for issues like the National
Convention and the timing of the constitution (H1B), as well as measuring the level of immunity
confidence/threat perception that the regime had with regards to opposition parties (H1A). The
topic of insurgencies/protests was important for determining the regime’s concerns about
stability confidence in the face of continuing domestic unrest (H1A). Finally, the business and
development articles were included because the economic issues of the BSPP era were a large
catalyst for the political issues of the 1980s-1990s, and the regime’s efforts to herald their
economic progress over time may show an increase in confidence and willingness to allow
democratization and liberalization.
For this time period, I coded a total of 886 articles. I then counted the number of articles
on each subject for each randomly-selected date and entered those numbers into an Excel table.
This then allowed me to create graphs of the number of articles on each subject by date from
1988-2002, to get a feel for trends in how often the government newspaper mentioned certain
topics. I created graphs for these five pertinent subjects. The graphs are shown below. Figure 8
shows diplomacy articles.
Articles about diplomacy were relatively straightforward, and the tone did not change
throughout the time period in question. The majority of articles were straightforward descriptions
of salutations and/or visits from international diplomats (e.g. “The Indian Minister called on
minister for Trade U Khin Maung Gyi and on Deputy Minister for Home and Religious Affairs
Col. Khin Maung Win” 81 or “A delegation headed by Minister for Trade Lt.-Gen Tun Kyi left for
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Bangladesh at the invitation of Bangladeshi Minister for Commerce M. Shamsul Islam” 82).
Criticisms of the policies of foreign states (such as calling out the United States on their
sanctions of Myanmar) were largely limited to full-text speeches of Tatmadaw or SLORC/SPDC
leaders which were printed in WPD or NLM and were quite rare. The spike in articles related to
diplomacy, international travel, foreign aid, etc. around 1995 and 1996 can most likely be
attributed to the SLORC’s tourism campaign of “Visit Myanmar Year 1996.”83
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Figure 8: Diplomacy articles 1988-2002.

Figure 9 shows articles about elections, political parties, and the National Convention.
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Elections/Political Parties/National Convention Articles
1988-2002
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Figure 9: Elections, political parties, and National Convention articles, 1988-2002.

For obvious reasons, articles related to elections, political parties, and the National
Convention changed tone dramatically throughout this time period. The spikes of mentions of
elections and political parties in 1990 and 1991 are easily explained by the lead up to the 1990
elections, which included many stories about political parties registering for the elections, and
then after the elections, articles about the election commission and their findings. Most political
party stories in the early 1990s were focused on the Union Solidarity and Development
Association/Party (USDA/USDP), which was backed by the government. Such stories generally
highlighted the support for the USDA/USDP (e.g. “Over 270,000 people attended the Pathein
mass rally for the Union Solidarity and Development Association” 84).
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Interestingly, following a dearth of stories about political parties, elections, and the
National Convention from 1997-1999, a second spike of stories on the topic occurred around
1999-2000. During this spike, the tone of articles had changed dramatically. Now, instead of
describing widespread support for government-backed party, this surge of articles were reporting
on chapters of the National League for Democracy (NLD) that had closed down or counting
numbers of voters who were disavowing the NLD. These articles were careful to assert that such
decisions were always the voters’ choice – e.g. “The Executive Committee members and all
members of Htantabin Township National League for Democracy, Bago Division, have tendered
their resignations and dissolved the Township NLD out of their own volition on 25 November
1998”,85 “Voters of YeU Township express no confidence in NLD rep-elect”,86 or “89 members
of Daneik Village NLD, Labutta Township resign of own accord….as they no longer wished to
participate in party politics of NLD.”87 While these articles seem to be quite transparent in their
attempts to undermine the legitimacy of the NLD, it may also indicate that the SLORC/SPDC
was somewhat successful in their cooptation of their main rival party. Certainly, the numbers of
voters or NLD members leaving the party may have been exaggerated or completely fabricated
in these articles. If, however, SLORC/SPDC and Tatmadaw members believed that the NLD was
losing membership and support because of these articles, this may have been the start of
increasing immunity confidence on the part of government members. If there was evidence that
support for the NLD, the party which threatened to hold tribunals for SLORC members in the
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run-up to the 1990 elections, was waning around the year 2000, this could have set the stage for
political changes in 2003-2010. Figure 10 shows speeches, notifications, and laws.

Speeches and Notifications/Laws, 1988-2002
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Figure 10: Speeches and notifications/laws, 1988-2002.88
Certainly, the longest articles were the full-texts of speeches given by SLORC/SPDC
leaders as well as occasional notifications and laws that were announced in their entirety in the
government newspaper. During the 1990s, these speeches often carried a threatening tone.
According to a speech about the closing of universities given by SLORC Secretary-1 Maj-Gen
Khin Nyunt,

88

It is worth noting that the number of speeches published each day was quite small, so this
figure is not particularly helpful for understanding trends in this regard. The length of speeches,
however, was often quite significant, as some speeches took up multiple pages and made up a
significant proportion of the newspaper for that day. The tone and message of the speeches,
therefore, is more important for my purposes than the actual number of speeches.
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The basic reason why the universities and colleges have had to remain
closed must be said to have begun with the fight that broke out between a
few students of the Institute of Technology and a few local youths on 12
March 1988. The incident was taken advantage of by certain unscrupulous
elements to exacerbate the situation through incitement and agitation so as
to create instability within the nation.... when re-opened...demonstrations
continued [and] when conditions proved beyond control the respective
universities and institutes had to be closed.89
Many of the full-text speeches in the Working People’s Daily during this time discussed the
ongoing National Conventions, including full texts of addresses given at the Conventions. 90 In a
threatening message to those who might wish to interrupt the National Convention proceedings,
Yangon Commander Maj-Gen Myo Nyunt warned that
Some power-crazy politicians and some who depended on foreign countries
and selfish traders who sought for their own benefit had ulterior motive for
holding the National Convention. With intention of disrupting the
Convention, they cooperated with above and underground destructive and
disruptive elements and their activities had been found out. In addition
terrorist organizations in the remote border areas were trying to disrupt the
Convention and some foreign broadcasting stations in collaboration with
axe-handlers91 were spreading rumours.92
Later during this time period, in the early 2000s, the tones of speeches being printed in the New
Light of Myanmar had a decidedly more positive tone with regard to political changes and
economic development. In a speech about political changes given by Minister for Foreign Affairs
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U Win Aung, he stated that “We are now overcoming many, many things of which we could not
reach consensus in the past because this is the first time in our country which we are trying to
have this sort of the government system or the parliamentary system and that’s why it’s taking a
long, long time.” 93 In a similarly positive statement regarding Myanmar’s economy, State Peace
and Development Council Secretary Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt said that “The State Peace and
Development Council is implementing economic policies and national economic plans which
contribute to development of the State and improvement of living standard of national people. In
view of the international situations, it can be found that science and technologies are advancing
at a blistering pace, and globalization is taking place.” 94 Towards the end of this period, the
state-run media were making renewed efforts to cast the regime’s efforts in a favorable light.
Not every announcement during this time period, however, was positive – a press release
given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in response to the U.S. State Department’s International
Religious Report in 2002 refuted the findings of the U.S. report that Myanmar was “a country of
particular concern,” asserting that
This classification does not in any way represent the true situation in the
country. It is obvious that some of the information come from insurgent
groups or unscrupulous persons with the aim of damaging the image of
Myanmar. In Myanmar, every citizen has the right to profess and practice
his/her belief…. Therefore, the allegations contained in US State
Department’s Report are groundless and they must be considered as being
politically motivated and represent an attempt to exert pressure and interfere
in the internal affairs of the country. 95
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Overall, the publications of the full texts of speeches and announcements by government leaders
in the WPD and NLM was a common practice throughout this time period. While the tone of
speeches and announcements did shift over time from threatening to generally more optimistic,
there remained stern words in print for those that the Burmese government deemed to be
undermining their efforts. Figure 11 shows articles relating to insurgency, protests, and
ceasefires.

Insurgency/Protest/Ceasefire Articles 1988-2002
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Figure 11: Insurgency/protest/ceasefire articles, 1988-2002.

Articles focusing on insurgent groups and protests were another category, similar to the
articles related to elections and political parties, where the tone of articles was more telling than
the overall numbers. The focus of stories during the 1988-1989 period was on describing
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“disorders”, 96 “disturbances”, 97 and “states of emergency”98 in sometimes surprising detail.
Considering the government’s efforts to shut down the pro-democracy, anti-government protests
that were taking place around the country, the decision to publish detailed accounts of protests
was unexpected. It is possible the decision to publish the specifics of protests was an effort to
cast protestors in a negative light and discourage others from joining, although this effort may
have been in vain. Such articles certainly used language that implied that protestors were simply
trouble-makers or opportunists looking to commit crimes; for instance, an article in August 1988
stated that
Some young students, who had been active on the Shwedagon Pagoda
platform since 28 July…up to yesterday making public speeches,
distributing propaganda leaflets and handing out oppositional and agitation
letters in order to disturb ordinary students wishing to pursue their studies
in peace and to harass the public in general, this morning joined forces with
unsavoury elements intent on creating disturbances in some townships of
Rangoon Division and carried out rowdy mob demonstration going from
one place to another. Beginning 8.45 am, some of these students and
unsavoury disturbance-makers gathered in front of the Bogyoke's bronze
statue at Kandawgyi. Then they commandeered passing motor vehicles to
get to the city centre. Getting off near the Garden Guest House on Sule
Pagoda Road, they commenced to shout oppositional slogans and carry out
rowdy demonstrations in front of the City Hall and to march…. In addition,
some young students gathered in Insein and Hlaing areas, commandeered
passenger route buses, forced the passengers out and used the buses to get
into Rangoon. At the corner of Bogyoke and Shwebontha Streets near the
Ramanya bus terminal some members of the mob beat up a by-stander
claiming that he had a camera. When another by-stander by the name of U
Soe Thein tried to intervene the mob became suspicious and began to search
and interrogate him. While this was going on someone from the mob
stabbed U Soe Thein with a knife. U Soe Thein was seriously wounded and
96
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had to be warded at the Rangoon General Hospital. Another mob which had
gone along Insein Road was seen at the Thamaing Road junction at about
6.30 pm sitting right in the middle of the ground shouting, demonstrating
and creating disturbances.99
The language used therein (“unsavoury elements”, “rowdy crowd,” “disturbance-makers”) as
well as assertions that a mob “commandeered” buses and cars and beat-up or stabbed by-standers
was undoubtedly intended to further the SLORC’s and Tatmadaw’s claims that protests during
this time were not really students and citizens calling for political change, but rather
opportunistic criminals goading students into criminal activity.
Throughout the 1990s, most of the articles in this category were focused on insurgent
attacks and conflict between the Tatmadaw and armed ethnic groups, reflecting the regime’s
fears about the threats of domestic unrest. In the late 1990s, however, the tone of
insurgency/protest/ceasefire articles shifted drastically. No longer were these articles using
language to undermine or dismiss the goals of protestors or insurgent groups. Instead, similar to
the political party articles which reported on the numbers of NLD members renouncing their
membership, the New Light of Myanmar began reporting on armed groups giving up arms or
coming to peace agreements. 100 During this time, the headlines in the New Light of Myanmar
were glowing with optimism (e.g. “Entire nation winning unprecedented peace, stability, leading
toward progress of all regions including border areas” 101) and the newspaper even published
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statements by the leaders of some armed ethnic groups who described their willingness to work
with the government and reach peace agreements. 102
At the same time that the government-backed newspaper was humanizing some of the
armed ethnic groups who had arrived at or were close to ceasefire agreements with the
Tatmadaw, protest-related articles in the New Light of Myanmar were still demonizing the
National League for Democracy. Headlines such as “NLD race-destruction group unleashing
scheme of chaos, uncertainty [in] Pyay mass rally Bogadaw be deported, her party be declared
unlawful association” 103 and “Press Conference held to further expose subversive activities of
some NLD members and anti-Government organizations” 104 show this tendency. During this
period, these articles appear to be aimed at a two-fold goal – minimizing the perceived threats of
insurgency and the federalism issue in the border areas of Myanmar and continuing to cast the
National League for Democracy in a negative light. First, by publishing articles celebrating the
insurgents who have laid down arms, as well as interviews with leaders of armed groups who
claim they are working with SPDC, the Burmese government was addressing one of the biggest
security threats that threatened the stability of the nation. If leaders within the SPDC and
Tatmadaw genuinely felt that these articles accurately reflected the state of affairs with regard to
the possible threat of internal disruptions or insurgency, this may indicate increasing stability
confidence in the later part of this time period. Second, articles that describe disruptive protests
led by NLD members, paired with the articles that list the numbers of members leaving the NLD,
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are clearly signs that the SPDC was trying to lessen the influence of the NLD as a political force.
Whether or not the NLD was still perceived by government leaders as a legitimate political threat
during this later time period is unclear. There were certainly efforts to make the NLD appear to
be weakening in the New Light of Myanmar throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. Figure 12
shows business, development, and construction articles.
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Figure 12: Business, industry, development, and construction articles, 1988-2002.

Finally, the articles on business, industry, development and construction experienced the
biggest change of all the categories with regard to frequency and number of articles. Early on in
this time period, the majority of these articles described construction or infrastructure projects.
The spike of articles in 1995 can most likely be attributed, similarly to the spike in articles
relating to the diplomacy at the same time, to the “Visit Myanmar Year 1996,” as there were a
large number of articles related to tourism during that time. Throughout the late 1990s and early
2000s, the number of articles related to business and industry increased, particularly articles
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related to foreign investment into businesses such as hotels and banking. 105 During this period,
the scope of projects seemed to grow as well – rather than simple road or bridge construction,
now articles described “the five-year short-term national plan [and] the 30-year long-term
national plan,” which include “river-pumping projects”, “sluice gates,” “oil mills and rice mills,”
“greening projects”, “regeneration of forests,” “extended production of oil and natural gas [and
the] installation of [a] natural gas pipeline” and “135 dams…constructed throughout the
country.”106 Economic development is a crucial marker of political change, and it is unsurprising
that the Myanmar government would try to show the accomplishments of their regime with
regard to the development of a robust economy. The increasing frequency with which the New
Light of Myanmar published stories related to economic successes may have contributed to the
regime’s victory confidence (i.e. their ability to win future elections) and immunity confidence
(i.e. that their economic interests would not be negatively impacted should they lose future
elections). These changes to their confidence about future economic success may well have
contributed to the changing political landscape in the next time period in question, 2003-2010.
The content analysis of articles from 1988-2002 show a regime which, early on, had
many threats with which to contend: a strong opposition party, domestic protests and
insurgencies, and limited economic progress. The changing nature, frequency, and tone of news
stories reveal that the SLORC/SPDC and Tatmadaw made considerable efforts during this time
to downplay the popularity of the NLD, to project confidence in their ability to bring armed
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groups back into the fold, and to develop the economy of the nation. It appears that as time went
on during the time period of the failed transition, the immunity, stability, and victory confidence
of the Burmese regime slowly increased. The next step would be finalizing a constitution to
provide institutional protections for the government leaders before any elections could be held.
The changes which took place over the period of 1988-2002, however, made this next stage
possible.

Conclusion

Clearly the decision-making process of the regime during the 1988-1990 period was
complex and highly dependent on catalysts and antecedent variables (such as domestic protests).
The economic struggles of the BSPP period led to frustrations that bubbled over in 1988,
resulting in domestic protests. The crackdown on the 8888 demonstrations led to external
pressure by the international community. Both the domestic and international pressure (as
revealed by the difficulties facing the National Convention as well as the myriad of U.S.
legislative actions towards Myanmar) acted as an exacerbating factor on splits within the
military, as well as a catalyst for 1) the decision to establish SLORC in place of the BSPP, 2) the
decision to abolish the 1974 constitution, and 3) the decision to announce upcoming elections.
While these pressures were sufficient for prompting the holding of elections, concerns over
stability/immunity confidence within the military overrode the international and domestic
demands that the results of the election actually be upheld. Thus, H1A is supported by archival,
interview, and content analysis evidence, all of which suggest that internal and external pressures
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on the Myanmar’s regime pushed them towards holding the elections, but that increased
perceptions of threats posed by opposition groups, insurgencies, and the international community
led to a decrease in stability and immunity confidence which made the election loss too
threatening for the military to allow.
The military’s identity as a professional organization working for the good of the country
may have come into play when they made the decision of whether to form a constitution before
the 1990 elections. The question remains; why did the SLORC not establish a constitution before
the 1990 elections? Clearly as the elections approached, the SLORC felt more vulnerable
because of a lack of institutional protections that a constitution could have provided them.
Perhaps the best explanation is that the SLORC was initially so confident in the National Unity
Party’s chances of winning (due to preferable electoral rules) that they chose to hold elections
first. Once the NUP won, the SLORC might have reasoned, they could establish a constitution
that would be seen as legitimate because they had a mandate. As Clymer describes it,
There has been some contentious disagreement about what the election was
actually for. Was it for a new government, or was it essentially for a
constituent assembly to draft a new constitution, during which time the
military government would remain in power? At first the military said it
planned to turn power over 'to whomever won the election," but in mid1989 it announced that it intended to remain in power until a new
constitution was drafted. In other words, if there was to be a transfer of
power, it would be slow and deliberate rather than immediate. The military
apparently feared that its decades-long fight against Burma's communists
would be for naught and that retribution and a possible war crimes tribunal
were real possibilities if there was a quick transfer, despite NLD assurances
to the contrary. Apparently before the election Aung San Suu Kyi and the
NLD were not insistent on an immediate transfer of power
and understood that a new constitution would be the first order of business.
If this was their view, however, it changed soon after the surprising election
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results were in. Neither side would compromise, and the NLD now expected
a quick transfer. 107
Prior to the elections, the regime also made their intentions known with regard to
prioritizing the writing of a new constitution after the elections, rather than immediately handing
off power to the winners. In a speech given on March 27, 1990, excerpts of which were
published the following day in the Working People’s Daily, General Saw Maung stated, "Some
say that the election is not important but drawing the Constitution is the primary issue. Some say
it is necessary to draft a temporary constitution, to form a provisional government to effect
transfer of power and only then to take time and draw up a proper constitution. In what ways
they want to do so is up to them."108 So while voters may have believed they were choosing a
new government, SLORC was stating publicly that the constitution had to come first. These
quotes support H1B, which posited that institutional design did not occur during this time period
because the military believed the constitution would be seen as more legitimate after they were
victorious at the ballot box.
This decision to wait until after the elections to create a constitution came back to haunt
them, however. Although the SLORC initially felt confident in the ability of the NUP to win due
to the electoral rules that were skewed in their favor (and hobbled opposition parties), it appears
that the immunity confidence and stability confidence of the regime were rocked with statements
by the NLD about future punishments, from which the SLORC would have no constitutional
protections. This lack of institutionalization paired with concerns about future punishments and
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possible domestic unrest ultimately led to the failure to observe the results of the 1990 elections,
a problem that the regime would attempt to solve in the 2003-2010 interim period.

CHAPTER 4
SEVEN STEPS AND EIGHT YEARS OF CHANGES (2003-2010)

This chapter looks to the interim period of 2003-2010, during which the Roadmap to
Democracy began to take shape and important events such as the new constitution, constitutional
referendum, and 2010 general elections occurred, as well as the crises of the 2007 Saffron
Revolution and the 2008 Cyclone Nargis, which brought Myanmar back into the international
limelight and put additional pressure on the regime. My hypotheses for this chapter are as
follows:
H2: Massive changes within the military regime and a reduction of domestic
threats during the 2003-2010 period led to efforts to develop institutional
design.
H2A: Changes during this time period were largely based on a
transition process that had been mapped out during the
earlier (1988-2002) time period but ultimately failed.
H2B: The military regime became more confident in their ability to
design institutions to protect their interests and the stability
of the nation due to improvements in relations with armed
ethnic groups as well as the promotion of more moderate
military leaders.
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H2C: The institutional design that took place during this time
period laid the groundwork for the more successful
transition process in 2011-2015.
The dependent variables are 1) democratization, which I operationalize as freely and
fairly-contested elections wherein opposition parties are able to contest with the militarybacked parties on equal playing ground and wherein the results of elections are respected
and upheld,1 and 2) political liberalization, which consists of the opening of other civil
and political liberties such as freedom of the press, the release of political prisoners, and
the legalization of civil society associations and activities. 2

Analysis

It is evident from the historical background of this period that there were many changes,
both positive and negative, taking place within Myanmar between 2003-2010. As in the
previous chapter, this section looks at several important variables which greatly
influenced the changing politics during this period. Those factors include

I am aware of the issues with defining Myanmar’s elections as “free and fair,” as there continue
to be disenfranchisement of certain populations (such as ethnic minorities, members of the
Sangha, and prisoners) and inaccurate voter lists, as well as concerns over voter intimidation and
electoral fraud. My definition of “freely and fairly contested elections” focuses more on
institutional barriers to opposition parties and particularly to whether those opposition parties are
able to win (and hold) seats in the Hluttaw. For more detailed information about defining free
and fair elections, see Goodwin-Gill 2006.
1

2

See Table 3 for operationalization of independent variables.
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external/international pressure, splits/cohesion within the Tatmadaw, threat perception,
and institutional design.

External/International Pressure

The period of 2003-2010 was very active with regards to U.S. foreign policy towards
Myanmar. International pressure is operationalized as economic/arms sanctions and diplomatic
measures, such as statements and visits by foreign diplomats.3 The second Bush administration
started with a hands-off policy with regards to Myanmar, but that changed after the 2003
Depayin incident;
Depayin resulted in immediate condemnation in much of the world. The US
government was reportedly 'mad as hell and isn't going to put up with the
outrages perpetuated by Burma's military rulers any more.' Secretary of
State Colin Powell denounced the 'contemptible' actions and demanded
Aung San Suu Kyi's release. Most important of all, however, Senator
McConnell introduced the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act, cosponsored by senators across the political spectrum from Edward Kennedy
(D-MA) to Sam Brownback (R-KS). The bill ended imports from Burma,
placed further visa restrictions on Burma's leaders, and required the United
States to oppose loans to Burma by international financial institutions. 4
The Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act was introduced on June 4 and signed into law
on July 28, 2003. The new hardline stance that the Bush administration took towards Myanmar
was not popular with everyone; “David I. Steinberg…opposed sanction on the grounds that they
would not change the junta members’ minds or actions and that quiet, careful diplomacy was

3
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4

Clymer 2015, 291.

180
more effective…As [Robert] Taylor wrote, it was ‘unseemly’ for [Secretary of State] Colin
Powell to refer to the Burmese government as ‘a bunch of thugs.’”5 The Bush administration’s
strict policy was reinforced even more a few years later in the wake of the 2007 Saffron
Revolution. President Bush gave press briefings where he discussed the tightening U.S. sanctions
and called on other nations to pressure Myanmar,6 and First Lady Laura Bush took up the
Burmese cause, drafting a letter to United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon with 16
women senators calling for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and authoring editorials about the
Burmese struggle for democracy.7 Ultimately, President Bush gave executive orders to freeze the
assets of senior members of the Burmese government, as well as individuals and corporations
who supported the Burmese government.8
The United States Congress also made important moves toward tightening sanctions
under the George W. Bush administration. In response to the 2008 constitutional referendum,
Congress passed the Tom Lantos Burmese JADE (Junta’s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act, which
was enacted into law on July 24, 2008. The bill “extended the ban on imports to include jadeite,
rubies, and other gems of Burmese origin. It also incorporated the presidential executive orders
placing financial and travel restrictions on certain Burmese individuals….It was the last
sanctions bill passed by Congress.”9 While the second Bush administration was more willing to
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engage in sanctions against Myanmar, mainly due to the important developments during this
period (such as Depayin, the Saffron Revolution, Cyclone Nargis, and the undemocratic
constitutional referendum), sanctions did not appear to have swayed the Burmese junta. Instead,
they were largely driven towards China. Clymer also makes the point that “perhaps Bush's
foreign policy had alienated much of the world on grounds unrelated to Burma, and getting the
needed international consensus proved difficult.”10 President Obama, on the other hand, would
take a much different approach than his predecessors. His foreign policy strategy towards
Myanmar was neither heavy-handed nor neglectful, but rather focused on diplomacy and what
the administration referred to as “pragmatic engagement”. 11
That is not to say that the Obama administration immediately reversed the existing
sanctions against Myanmar. Relations with Myanmar were strained in May 2009 when an
American man by the name of John Yettaw swam across Inya Lake to Aung San Suu Kyi’s
home, two weeks before she was scheduled to be released from house arrest. Yettaw was
detained by Burmese officials and remained in Burmese custody until he was released to Senator
Jim Webb in August 2009.12 During this visit, Senator Webb also visited with Aung San Suu
Kyi, although she would remain under house arrest for an additional eighteen months and would
miss the opportunity to contest the 2010 general elections as a result of the American
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interloper.13 Certainly, concern for Aung San Suu Kyi’s wellbeing, as well as paternalistic and
exoticized reverence for her as a “living Statue of Liberty” 14 contributed greatly to the efforts of
the U.S. legislative branch to “protect” her from harm. This narrative played out in coverage on
Myanmar and Aung San Suu Kyi in American newspapers;
In the case of media representations of Aung San Suu Kyi and Burma, the
invoking of a protection scenario functions in tandem with a highly
gendered Orientalist framework (Said 1978) to position the United States as
a protector, characterized by the strength and willingness to help its less
mature democratic siblings worldwide, but also as a victim, threatened by
external dangers to its own democracy. Media representations function to
feminize and depoliticize Burma’s democratic movement while
simultaneously representing the military regime as a bumbling group of
uneducated military men. This in turn positions the United States as a more
mature, masculine form of democracy run by highly competent yet
compassionate leaders working to promote freedom and democracy
worldwide.15
Indeed, interest in Aung San Suu Kyi shaped U.S. policy, and she was often mentioned by name
in legislative discussions about U.S. policy towards Myanmar - according to the Congressional
Record, between 1989 and 2010, her name was mentioned on the floor of Congress some 1,598
times. 16
In July 2009, the U.S. Congress reauthorized the sanctions that were already in place, and
President Obama signed the legislation into law. 17 During that same month, however, Secretary
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of State Hillary Clinton attended the ASEAN Regional Forum and signed the ASEAN amity
treaty. 18 Although the Yettaw incident created some conflict between the two nations at the start
of President Obama’s tenure, “the Obama administration was paying more attention to Asia in
general than its predecessor, a policy move later described as a ‘pivot’ to Asia.”19 President
Obama’s foreign policy strategy towards Myanmar was quite different than previous
administrations – although the administration allowed existing sanctions to remain in place, “it
would engage with the regime and consider moderating or removing sanctions, depending on the
progress made….In effect, the administration was now calling for regime modification rather
than regime change.”20 It was this more nuanced and flexible foreign policy that was in place
during the crucial interim time period of 2003-2010, wherein many of the political changes
began to take hold in Myanmar.
While the United States was perhaps the most vocal country pressuring the Burmese
regime, it was by no means the only one pushing for change within Myanmar. Most notably,
China, which had long been a friend of the Burmese government, began putting “quiet pressure
on the junta for some kind of positive change” 21 during this period. According to Steinberg, “it
seems likely that it would be in Chinese interests to see a modestly successful government that
could moderate its regime and control the populace to prevent spontaneous outbursts of
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agitation.”22 Additionally, the Chinese approach to negotiating with the regime, with “quiet,
private suggestion” 23 rather than the outraged language of the Americans, may have been better
received by the Burmese government.
According to observers in Myanmar, the external pressure and changing international
landscape contributed greatly to policy shifts in 2003-2010. Okka Oo believes that economic
sanctions made a difference. “The Generals said they [sanctions] would not play a part.
However, as the pressure increased, our country was not going anywhere, like stagnant water. I
believe the generals were also worried about the role that international pressure could play on
domestic politics…Perhaps there would be more demonstrations….The country was being left
behind.”24 In his estimation, the increased international attention during this time period not only
put an economic strain on the regime, but also risked being the catalyst for domestic unrest or
political demonstrations. Not all Burmese citizens, however, feel that the SPDC was particularly
concerned about domestic protests. According to Tharawon (Pyay), “International relations is
very important for changes in Myanmar. Our government doesn’t care about domestic pressure –
they only care about pressure from the outside world. Sanctions had two effects: They directly
affected the generals, which was the intended effect. However, they also affected lower level
workers in factories.”25 Wai Phyo Myint recounted her experience working in Washington D.C.
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during the Saffron Revolution, when a number of new legislative items focused on Myanmar
were being developed. “Everyone in DC during this time was interested in Burma. U.S.
policymakers were reaching out to think tanks asking how their policy [towards Burma] should
be changed. Suddenly, Washington focused on Myanmar – I was very surprised.”26
In addition to direct influence through the leverage of sanctions, multiple interview
subjects also pointed to the inspiration of other protests around the world during that time. Dr.
Carole Ann Chit Tha, a member of the Myanmar Institute for Strategic and International Studies
and Executive Committee Member at the Academy of Arts and Sciences at the University of
Yangon, stated, “The world situation influenced the transition [during the 2003-2010 period] –
we saw the Arab Spring.” 27 Likewise, Tharawon (Pyay) cited the Arab Spring;
I also think the Arab Spring had an important effect on the Burmese
military. They realized they cannot control power forever. In 2007 there was
a very big push for democratization…Some military members were
pressured by their families and wives to change because the Buddhist monks
were protesting them. So, there were two major events that pushed the
change – the Arab Spring and the Saffron Revolution. There was a chance
for the 8888 Demonstrations to be that push – but it was not good enough
for a real transition to take place [at that time]. Part of the reason the 1988
demonstrations did not effect change was the lack of modernization and
technology in Myanmar…. In the Saffron Revolution, everyone had cell
phones, government can’t control them leaking what was going on. In 1988,
there were only a few BBC reporters, only a few still photos. 28
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While the opinions of Burmese citizens vary over what factors were most important for
influencing changes from 2003-2010, international relations were certainly a factor, both
directly (e.g. sanctions) and indirectly (e.g. the encouraging signs of the Arab Spring).

Splits/Cohesion

During this critical period, it was inevitable that changes in institutional design, the state
security apparatus, and the international community would also mean changes within the
Tatmadaw itself. This project operationalizes splits within the military as the firing or dismissing
of military members, replacing generals or party leaders, and reports of disagreements of clashes
between different factions. In the early part of the period, observers noted an “aversion of the
army hard-liners to any more political compromises, inside the country as well as outside.”29
There were a number of indications of splits and lack of cohesiveness within the Tatmadaw
during this time, including a renewal of isolationist policies and the ouster of a major figure from
the regime.
In the early 2000s, hard-liners within the regime believed that Burmese policy had given
too many concessions to the NLD and their supporters. This reactionary response, coupled with
the retirements of Senior-General Than Shwe and Vice-Senior General Maung Aye during this
period, led to a
…growing reluctance among many Burmese army hardliners to support a
policy of more political openness, more uncontrolled economic
liberalization…. Senior-General Than Shwe himself was reported to have
gradually dragged his feet until the SPDC structural organization was,
29
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almost 15 years after the 1988-1990 crackdown, in a far better and more
confident political position. Reverting to a more isolationist stance also
suited the Tatmadaw’s top brass, which knew it soon had to face a massive
generational change in its own ranks. 30
The split within the regime at this time took place between the hard-liners, who were controlling
the post-2003 transition process and Roadmap to Democracy very closely, and the pragmatists,
“who aimed at diffusing international pressure after the Depayin incident.”31 Despite the efforts
of the pragmatists to resist isolationism, and the efforts of the international community to push
them into “rapid progress toward political liberalization,”32 the hard-liners still held the upper
hand in the early 2000s.
A shocking event in 2004 revealed that even the highest-ranked government officials
would not be safe from purges. On October 19, 2004, prime minister General Khin Nyunt, who
had announced the Roadmap just one year prior, was removed from office and detained in house
arrest by regime hardliners.33 Reports from diplomats suggested the Khin Nyunt had been in a
power struggle with General Than Shwe and lost. 34 State news reports announced that the 64year-old prime minister had been “permitted to retire for health reasons.”35 Earlier that month,
General Than Shwe had also fired Myanmar’s civilian foreign minister, an ally of Khin Nyunt.

30

Egreteau and Jagan 2013, 186.

31

Egreteau and Jagan 2013, 202.

32

Egreteau and Jagan 2013, 202.

33

The Guardian 2004; Mydans 2004.

34

The Guardian 2004.

35

Mydans 2004.

188
According to Josef Silverstein, this housecleaning by General Than Shwe and his hardliners was
an attempt “to move and remove the alternative point of view…. This guy was going in a
different direction than the hard-liners want to go, which is, you just keep digging in. Khin
Nyunt has for some time looked for ways to gradually close the gap between the civilian
opposition and the military.”36 After his departure, large-scale purges of Khin Nyunt loyalists
continued inside the Military Intelligence Services, which he had previously led, as well as
several Cabinet ministers and bureaucrats.37 Although the Roadmap to Democracy had been
roundly criticized by pro-democracy activists and the international community, the effort to
engage with citizens and to start a process of transitioning towards civilian rule, however flawed,
gave Khin Nyunt the reputation as a moderate. This was threatening to the hardliners,
particularly General Than Shwe.
The eviction of Khin Nyunt therefore marked the end of an era of
sophisticated cordiality and moderate policy toward the outside world,
while paradoxically reinforcing the Burmese military’s domestic strength.
The hardliners in the Burmese military elite were firmly back at the
forefront of domestic and foreign policymaking after 2004, preparing for a
return to a calculated isolationism. Curiously, the ‘Road Map to
Democracy’ unveiled by Khin Nyunt a year before, remained in place and
survived its own creator. Than Shwe’s entourage, though less prone to make
any political compromise, had however realized that the Road Map
remained an important and useful card to play. This allowed the army to
keep on deflecting international criticism, while preparing a needed
generational transition. It was a political instrument that would not only get
the support of Burma’s strategic allies and neighbors, but also counter the
civil opposition led by Aung San Suu Kyi by proposing a credible path to
transition from absolute military rule to a form of civil-led government –
something the Tatmadaw leadership promised in its discourse ever since
36
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General Saw Maung took over in September 1988. Although it seems that
Than Shwe may have been anxious to exert more direct personal control
over the whole transitional process, it was also clearly a return to keeping
control within the country.38
Reshuffles and purges did not stop in 2004. Challenges throughout the 2003-2010 period
continued to prompt occasional reshuffles based on splits within the regime. As Tharawon
(Pyay) put it, “In 2007 the softliners were very weak at that time – more and more hardliners
came to power.”39 In the wake of the 2004 sacking of General Khin Nyunt and his supporters,
power within the SPDC was “concentrated in the hands of the two top generals, who are
hardliners in dealing with the international community.”40 These two generals, Than Shwe and
Maung Aye, fought for control of the Tatmadaw during this period.
After the constitutional referendum, in June 2008, General Than Shwe prompted another
reshuffle, this time in an attempt to reduce Maung Aye’s power within the regime. 41 Rather than
purging officers, this shift was achieved by replacing retiring regional commanders with ones
“who were closer to Than Shwe than to Maung Aye” and moving ministers who were close to
Maung Aye to less powerful posts.42 When Maung Aye, who had a reputation as being “a
relatively less corrupt and more professional soldier than Than Shwe,”43 tried to pursue
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corruption cases against supporters of his rival, the Than Shwe loyalists were able to escape
prosecution because of Than Shwe’s protection. For his part, Than Shwe reportedly wanted his
own pick, General Shwe Mann, who ranked third in the Tatmadaw’s hierarchy, to succeed him,
rather than second-ranked Maung Aye. During the Saffron Revolution, Shwe Mann chaired
many of the National Security Council meetings without either of the higher-ranked generals in
attendance.44 Even the decision to hold the constitutional referendum was seen by some as an
attempt by Than Shwe “to reduce Maung Aye’s power by giving more authority to the USDA
and transforming the USDA into a political party to contest the 2010 elections.”45 Despite the
reported rivalry between the regime’s two top generals, however, such conflicts could have been
more rumor than fact. A 2008 confidential memo from the departing politics and economics
chief at the U.S. Embassy in Yangon suggests that
Rumors of splits at the top of the regime are the result of uninformed
analysis and wishful thinking of the exiles and outside observers. While the
senior generals may disagree from time-to-time amongst themselves (as
witnessed after Nargis), they follow the orders of Than Shwe. The senior
generals are keenly aware that if they do not stand together, they will fall
together. True democratic change will not likely happen until the top two
generals, Than Shwe and Maung Aye, are off the scene. 46
Additionally, while the memo notes that some of the regional commanders within the Tatmadaw
are interested in reform and respect Aung San Suu Kyi, “most of the military believe that
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working within Burma’s current military system is the only way to bring about this change while
maintaining stability.” 47
Further changes within the regime took place in 2007 after the death of Prime Minister
Soe Win. His replacement, General Thein Sein, was not seen as a hardliner, but was loyal to
Than Shwe.48 Importantly, despite his loyalty, “Unlike Soe Win…he will not simply take orders
from Than Shwe to implement brutal operations such as the 2003 Depayin Massacre.”49 Indeed,
Thein Sein would later be seen as crucial for leading the shift away from hardline policies in the
government. Additionally, “Regarding the generational change in the tatmadaw, a massive
personnel reshuffle (37 positions alone involved regional commanders and above) was
implemented on 27 August 2010, prior to the general election.”50 It appears that right up until the
2010 elections, the regime tried to solidify the hardliners’ hold on power in an attempt to limit
the threats facing the regime.

Threat Perception

In addition to changes in international policy towards the regime and cohesion within the
Tatmadaw, threat perception shifted dramatically during the 2003-2010 time period as well. Civil
opposition is an important independent variable for this interim period and is operationalized as
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domestic protests or difficulties getting peace agreements signed with armed ethnic militias.
Remember that in 1988-2002, the regime’s perception of threats posed by both armed ethnic
groups and opposition groups (namely the NLD) were a major factor in the SPDC’s decision to
annul the election results. During the interim time period, the SPDC made major steps to
neutralize the threats posed by armed ethnic groups and the NLD, making them less concerned
about the risks of a future transition.
In order to deal with the problems posed by armed ethnic groups, the SPDC created the
Border Guard Force (BGF). The program was started in 2009 in “an attempt to neutralize armed
ethnic ceasefire groups and consolidate the Burma Army’s control over all military units in the
country.”51 Although some ceasefire groups,52 such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the
Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) and the New Mon State Party (NMSP) refused to join,
many other powerful ethnic groups accepted the offer to join the BGF, including the Democratic
Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), National Democratic Army – Kachin (NDA-K), Kachin
Defence Army (KDA), Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF), Myanmar National Democratic
Alliance Army (MNDAA), Karenni National People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF) and the Lahu
Democratic Front (LDF).53 The ceasefire groups that agreed to join the BGF were turned into
battalions made up of 326 soldiers, with 30 soldiers from the Burma Army and three
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commanding officers.54 “Among the three commanders, two would be from the ethnic armed
groups and one from the Burma Army who would be responsible for the day-to-day
administration.”55 Table 5 shows the Border Guard Force battalions formed between 2009-2010.
Table 5: Border Guard Force Battalions, 2009-201056
BGF Battalion Controlled Area
Commander
No. 1001
Gant Gwan and Chi Maj. Deltan
Phwe
Khaung Lum
No. 1002
Lupi, Chi Phwe and Maj. Lanjaw
Pang Wah
Saung Taint
No. 1003
Sin Kyaing and Kan Maj. Wamthe
Pai Tee
Dai Khaun
No. 1004
Pan-tain and Loikaw Maj. Ree
Samar
No. 1005
Sop-pai and Loikaw Maj. Se
Moenel
No. 1006
Lauk-kai
Maj. Yang Xao
Kying
No. 1007
Ponpa-kyin and
Maj. Japi Kwe
Mong Ton
No. 1008
Mong Yu and Mong Unknown
Yawng

Date Formed
8 Nov 2009
8 Nov 2009

Former Militia
NDA-K, Kachin
state
NDA-K

8 Nov 2009

NDA-K

8 Nov 2009

KNPLF, Kayah
state
KNPLF

8 Nov 2009
4 Dec 2009
30 Mar 2010
30 Mar 2010

No. 1009

Tachilek

Maj. Sai Aung

18 May 2010

No. 1010

Makman- Kengtung

Unknown

20 May 2010

No. 1011

Pantawmi – Hlaing
bwe

Unknown

18 Aug 2010

MNDAA (Kokang
army), Shan state
Lahu militia group,
Shan state
Combined forces of
Lahu militia group,
Shan state
Lahu milita group,
Shan state
Makman militia
group, Shan state
DKBA, Karen state

(Continued on following page)

Transnational Institute 2009, 35. The number of officers seems to be somewhat in dispute –
while Transnational Institute described 30 Tatmadaw officers in each battalion, the Myanmar
Peace Monitor put the number at 18 officers. Regardless of the number of officers, the number of
soldiers and commanders is consistent between sources.
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Table 5 (continued)
BGF Battalion
No. 1012
No. 1013
No. 1014
No. 1015
No. 1016
No. 1017
No. 1018
No. 1019
No. 1020
No. 1021
No. 1022
No. 1023

Controlled Area
Kyonhtaw- Hlaing
Bwe
Kataihte - Phapun
Tanta-Oo and Pha
pun
Paikyon – Hlaing
bwe
Dawlan – Hlaing
bwe
Maepalae Myawaddy
Shwe Kokko –
Myawaddy
Taw-Oak and
Myawaddy
Htiwakalay –
Myawaddy
Hteehuthan and Kaw
kareik
Atwin-kwin-kalay
and Myawaddy
Kyeikdon and KyaInn-Seik-gyi

Commander
Maj. Saw Beh

Date Formed
18 Aug 2010

Former Militia
DKBA, Karen state

Maj. Saw Hla
Kyaing
Unknown

18 Aug 2010

DKBA, Karen state

18 Aug 2010

DKBA, Karen state

Maj. Saw Win 20 Aug 2010
Naing Sein
Maj. Saw Myat 20 Aug 2010
Khaing
Unknown
20 Aug 2010

DKBA, Karen state

Maj. Saw
Maung Win
Maj. Saw Lik
Theint
Maj. San Lin

20 Aug 2010

DKBA, Karen state

20 Aug 2010

DKBA, Karen state

21 Aug 2010

DKBA, Karen state

Maj. Saw
Beelu
Unknown

21 Aug 2010

DKBA, Karen state

21 Aug 2010

DKBA, Karen state

Maj. Saw Eh
Htoo

21 Aug 2010

DKBA, Karen state

DKBA, Karen state
DKBA, Karen state

Despite promises of salaries and other support such as housing, healthcare, and
education, in 2010 reports emerged of over one-hundred BGF recruits in Shan State fleeing their
training program because salaries and other benefits were not provided. 57 Other battalions
reported discontent and disobedience between ethnic minority recruits and the Tatmadaw
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officers, as well as drug trafficking and the abuse and forced recruitment of villagers in ethnic
minority states. 58
In addition to the domestic threats of armed militias and the shortcomings of the BGF, the
regime also dealt with perceived external threats, particularly during the uproar over the Saffron
Revolution and Cyclone Nargis. At the meeting of the UN General Assembly on October 1,
2007, the Foreign Minister of Myanmar gave a statement which highlights the Burmese regime’s
fears of neocolonialism during this time.
“We are greatly disturbed that neo-colonialism has reared its ugly head in
recent years. The strategies they employ are obvious. At a first step, they
conduct media campaigns against the targeted country and spread
disinformation that the country concerned is committing gross human rights
violations. They portray these campaigns as a fight for democracy.
Secondly, they impose sanctions that hinder economic development and
cause poverty for the people. Here, I would like to stress that economic
sanctions are counterproductive and can only delay the path to democracy.
As a third step, they provide political financial and other material support
to create unrest in the country. Finally, under the pretext that a country is
undemocratic, unstable, and that it poses a threat to international peace and
security, they intervene directly and invade the country. The current events
clearly show that such a course of action can only result in conflict and
untold sufferings for the people of the country. Mr. President, my country
is currently subjected to such courses of action.”59
In the same vein, the SPDC’s initial refusal to allow international aid workers to help in the
aftermath of Cyclone Nargis was reportedly based on the fear that international aid would bring
with it invasion.60 According to a report by ALTSEAN Burma, the SPDC was especially wary of
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“donated items that could be used to access the delta or communicate with the outside world.”61
There were also reports that aid was being used to bribe voters prior to the constitutional
referendum.62 In addition to the regime’s fears that aid workers would expose the true extent of
the natural disaster and the regime’s failure to appropriately respond, some suggested that the
regime saw humanitarian actors as a potential “Trojan Horse,” in which humanitarian efforts
which provide long-lasting post-emergency projects could “potentially entail a near permanent
presence in the country to eventually promote real grassroots democracy in Burma.”63 While
Western media often repeat the assertion that Myanmar’s leaders prevented aid workers because
they feared invasion, Taylor (2015) challenges the veracity of these rumors.64 He points to
numerous statements by government officials explaining that skilled relief workers were not yet
needed in the Delta region, not that they would be blocked forever. In a speech given to UN
officials shortly after Cyclone Nargis, then Prime Minister Thein Sein stated,
…there were rumours that we were denying international assistance and that
we were selectively accepting outside relief aids. It is absolutely untrue. On
the contrary, we have accepted with appreciation all relief goods and
financial assistance offered by any country. However, international
humanitarian assistance should not be politicized. 65
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While Western media sources provided a simple narrative about the SPDC giving in to their
paranoia about the possibility of foreign invasion, and Burmese citizens interviewed for this
project often cited their government’s inadequate response to the Nargis disaster, there is
conflicting information about whether the government’s fears of perceived external threats may
have contributed to their actions in the wake of Cyclone Nargis.
The regime’s strategy in neutralizing the threat of the NLD was simple – writing the
constitution and electoral laws in such a way that limited their power. According to some
observers, the 2010 elections would serve as a “carefully crafted exit strategy for the country’s
strongman, Senior General Than Shwe, which he has designed personally to ensure his legacy, as
well as the welfare of his family, once he is no longer the head of the military.”66 The electoral
laws established under the 2008 constitution included a number of limitations on direct
democracy. One of the most notable laws was the 25% quota of seats in all three legislatures that
are reserved for military appointees. The constitution also set an idiosyncratic method of
determining the state’s president – rather than a direct election of a presidential candidate, the
Union Assembly acts as an electoral college and selects three candidates (one chosen by the
upper house, one by the lower house, and the third by the military appointees). The Hluttaw then
votes on which of the three will become president, and the other two act as vice presidents. 67 As
Tharawon (Pyay) described it,
The procedure to appoint the president [creates] a separation between the
federal/state and local government. [Our procedure for selecting a president]
is not better than a direct election of the president – I think Myanmar is the
66
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only country that uses this system to appoint a president by three different
groups. Lots of people [in Myanmar] don’t understand this procedure – it is
too complicated. 68
The Myanmar presidential selection method adds a step of separation between elections and the
executive branch, and also ensures that the military at least gets to select one vice president.
In March 2010, five electoral laws were released which certainly helped to defang the
threat previously posed by the NLD during the 1990 elections. The Union Election Commission
Law (SPDC Law no. 01/2010) and Political Parties Registration Law (SPDC Law no. 02/2010)
were introduced a mere eight months before the general elections, giving political parties “little
time to organize and campaign. By comparison for the 1990 election, laws were released 20
months ahead of the vote.” 69 Additionally, Article 14 of the Election Commission Law
effectively nullified the results of the 1990 elections, stating “The Multi-party Democracy
General Election Commission Law (The State Law and Order Restoration Council Law No.
1/88) is hereby repealed.” 70 This move was expected and crucial for the SPDC going into the
2010 elections because it removed the claim to political office that had been held by NLD
members for two decades.
Another way the SPDC was able to limit the influence of the NLD ahead of the 2010
general elections was with the establishment of the 2010 Election Commission Law, which
required that members of the election commission are from “legal professional backgrounds” and
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gives the SPDC the right to select the members of the Commission. 71 The Commission had
tremendous power to limit political parties that were deemed to be threatening to the regime’s
power ahead of the 2010 elections, “as it had the power to de-register (or not register at all)
political parties and to censure their actions during the campaign period and following the
election.”72
Finally, the Political Parties Registration Law severely curtailed the competitiveness of
certain opposition parties, especially the NLD. Certain aspects of the law were aimed at limiting
the NLD in particular; for example, the exclusion of parties who have members “currently
serving a prison term as a result of a conviction in a court of law,”73 which forced parties such as
the NLD and the Shan NLD (SNLD) to choose between expelling their imprisoned members in
order to contest the elections, or sitting out. Both parties chose not to contest the 2010 elections,
negating the political threats that they posed to the SPDC. A number of other stipulations,
including requiring the recruitment of 1000 members for national parties and 500 members for
regional parties, deregistering parties for having ties to armed rebel groups, and registration fees
of $500 USD greatly limited the ability of smaller parties and ethnic parties to contest the
elections as well.74 In addition to limiting the NLD’s power through legislation, the SPDC was
also able to coopt the NLD by artificially creating competition for them. According to Phyu Phyu
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Zin, ahead of the 2010 elections, “the government actually gave money to the NDF [National
Democratic Front, the split-off party of NLD members who did not want to boycott the
elections]. We believed it was a real party until we found out about the money.”75 In all, the laws
laid out in the 2008 Constitution, as well as the more detailed electoral laws released ahead of the
2010 elections, ensured that the NLD would not have the same advantages going into the
elections as they did in 1990.
During the interim period of 2003-2010, the SPDC was able to successfully neutralize
two threats which had contributed to the failed transition in 1988-2002. By creating the Border
Guard Force and incorporating armed ethnic groups into a specific branch of the Tatmadaw, and
by establishing electoral laws and a constitution which curtailed the political threat of the NLD,
Myanmar’s military regime was able to address the challenges to their stability and victory
confidence. Paired with developments in institutional design, namely a new constitution, political
changes in the period after 2003-2010 became more likely.

Institutional Design

The final piece to solving the puzzle of what changed between the failed transition in
1988-2002 and the period of changes from 2011-2015 is to understand the institutional design
which took place during 2003-2010. As described previously, institutional design refers to the
practice of creating democratic institutions in states that are undergoing some type of political
transition, particularly through the development of electoral laws and/or a constitution and the
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creation of a robust party system. In the Myanmar case, the lack of institutions (particularly the
lack of a constitution) during the 1988-2002 period contributed heavily to the lack of regime
confidence76 and led to the annulment of the 1990 elections. As Przeworski describes it,
Suppose a country emerges from a long period of authoritarian rule and no
one knows what the relation of forces will be. The timing of constitution
writing is then important. If the constitution is put off until after
elections....The focus may turn out to be unequal and institutions will be
designed to ratify the current advantage, or they may turn out to be
balanced….Hence, constitutions that are written when the relation of forces
are still unclear are unlikely to counteract increasing returns to power,
provide insurance to the eventual losers, and reduce the stakes of
competition. They are more likely to induce the losers to comply with the
outcomes and more likely to induce them to participate. They are more
likely, therefore, to be stable across a wide range of historical conditions. 77
Comparative politics scholarship has given some suggestions for how military regimes
can improve their institutional design. Some of the barriers facing militaries which wish to build
up democratic institutions is overcoming their self-image as the only institution which can
protect the nation, developing some role for themselves to help accomplish national goals, and to
make themselves “impervious to the enticements of civilian politicians who turn to them when
frustrated in the advancement of their interests by democratic means.”78 Many also look to the
stability of the party system, whether political parties have strong roots to society, the legitimacy
of the electoral process, and the cohesion and discipline of political parties in order to measure
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the level of a regime’s institutional design.79 Thus, the constitution is an important, but by no
means the only, institution that matters in the development of institutional design in Myanmar.
Despite the flawed National Convention, exclusive constitution writing process, and the
tragic events of Cyclone Nargis and the referendum which soured the release of the constitution,
the 2008 constitution was in some ways an improvement over the previous two constitutions of
Myanmar.
Unlike the first constitution, which was a hastily drafted set of incompatible
political compromises designed to ensure that independence was achieved
speedily, and the second, an essay in one-party socialist statecraft, the third
confirms the political compromises made and administrative structures
created after the army took power in 1988….The major promise for the
future is the possibility of the army sharing some power with civilian
political parties.80
Indeed, the widespread criticism of the 2008 constitution was also tempered by the possibility for
power-sharing with civilian parties. As Priscilla Clapp, former U.S. diplomat to Myanmar, noted
in 2010, the new constitution essentially guaranteed political changes would come to Myanmar
in the near future. For instance, the terms of the constitution would eventually disburse political
authority from the SPDC to civilian-led ministries and legislative bodies; that despite the severe
curtailment of electoral competition, the reintroduction of multi-party elections, however,
flawed, still promises to introduce “a more diverse group of people into the government than has
been the practice under predominantly Burman male-chauvinistic military regime”,81 which
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would produce further challenges to the political supremacy of the Tatmadaw; the potential for
improved economic development; that later multi-party elections would “produce new,
competing centres of power in Burma, diminishing the military’s totalitarian grip on the
country”82 – she specifically points out that, despite the fact that the military retains the authority
to declare martial law, the elected parliamentarians would have to initiate and approve
suspending the government; that future economic development is likely to create a free market
and a business class which pushes for political change; and finally, “the constitution makes
amendment of its provisions so difficult that the government is likely to be the first victim of this
ruse.”83
Did the 2008 constitution help to improve the regime’s victory and stability confidence,
or were the weaknesses that Clapp points out in the institutional design enough to cause doubt
within the Tatmadaw? Despite the possible weak points of the constitutional protections
guaranteed to the Tatmadaw, opinion pieces in the government-mouthpiece newspaper The New
Light of Myanmar in the wake of the 2008 constitutional referendum indicate that the regime felt
protected by the newly ratified constitution. A column by Pauk Se on July 6, 2008 trumpets
“Goodbye, 1990 election results!” and asserts that “The political trick [the NLD] have made
repeatedly that they have gained the public mandate with the intention of seizing power under
the pretext of 1990 election results has gone down the drain due to the desire of the people.”84
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The author goes on to warn, “Nowadays, the result of the 1990 election is no longer legal as it
has been ditched by the entire people….the NLD’d better join hands with the people and then
stand for the 2010 election in line with the laws instead of longing for the result of the 1990
election.”85 Another op-ed authored by Kaytu Nilar on July 29, 2008 argues that “the public
approval of the constitution (2008) means the people are opposing and abhorring the internal and
external destructive elements. It also amounts to supporting the government. So, those antinational elements have reached the situation in which their future looks dim as they are
politically attacked by the people.”86 On June 17, 2008, a column by Aung Ze Min asserted that
in the 1990 elections, the “NLD won the majority of the seats, but it did not represent the public”
because only seven million out of 20 million eligible voters supported them.87 The column goes
on to state that, based on the government’s figures that 98.12 percent of eligible voters
participated in the constitutional referendum and 92.48 percent of votes supported the
constitution, this new constitution is more representative than the 1990 election results. 88
These opinion pieces, and the myriad other ones published in the New Light of Myanmar
at this time, certainly project an air of confidence with regards to the constitutional referendum
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result. Of course, one could argue that the frequency and tone of these op-ed articles might
indicate that the regime was still insecure about the political threats posed by the NLD. Perhaps
by publishing ghost-written articles needling the NLD about the 1990s elections, the regime was
redirecting public attention away from their own failures and, as was common practice by the
SPDC at this time, using the NLD and armed ethnic groups as a scapegoat for the country’s
problems. It seems likely that both of these possibilities are true. After establishing a new
constitution which guaranteed certain institutional rights, particularly the military quota in
parliament, the presidential and vice-presidential rules, and control over the electoral process of
upcoming elections, the military and SPDC felt emboldened, while at the same time being wary
of their long-time political rivals. The new constitution, while a powerful tool in the institutional
apparatus available to the regime, was still untested in the face of political pressures and
challenges such as elections. Thus, the regime would brag about its successes while
simultaneously clinging to as many institutional advantages as possible going into the 2010
elections, having learned from their painful lesson in 1990. As Tharawon (Pyay) described it,
“The big difference between 1990 and 2010 [was that] there was no constitution for the 1990
elections. The 1974 constitution was terminated in 1988 after the 8888 Demonstrations. That
meant there were no constitutional guidelines in 1990. In 2010, at least there was a constitution
for the elections.” 89 Only after the 2010 elections were in the books, and the regime had won
some political victories on their own terms, did they become more confident in their ability to

89

Tharawon (Pyay). Interview with Nicole Loring. Personal Interview. Yangon, June 13, 2016.

206
combat the political threat posed by the NLD. This created the possibility for a very different
political landscape in 2011-2015.
What prompted the institutional changes in this period? Some believe that the Tatmadaw
initiated institutional design, and thus political, changes at this time because their position was
strong and thus the outcomes were largely guaranteed. According to Egreteau, “each time the
Tatmadaw has initiated a disengagement from politics in its recent history, it has been in a
position of political strength.”90 Institutional design would certainly provide that strength, in the
form of quotas for military members or electoral rules that limited the competitiveness of the
military’s competition. Others, however, believe that the decision to initiate a process of
institutional design, and eventual elections, was based on more long-term thinking. When asked
why he thought the military decided to allow elections in 2010, Tharawon (Pyay) stated, “I think
the military started thinking about the future. They are very rich. They want a peaceful transition
to secure selves and family. They want to protect their rule. The military is the only institution in
Myanmar – they have a Plan A, Plan B, even a Plan C. Plan A was to control forever. Plan B is a
peaceful transition.”91
Clearly, the Tatmadaw and the SPDC learned important lessons about regime survival in
the aftermath of the 1990 elections. No longer would they leave their fate in the hands of
democratic processes without institutional guarantees. After retaining political control in the
wake of a political disaster, they began a painstaking process of institutional design, starting with
Khin Nyunt’s announcement about the Roadmap to Democracy in 2003. Writing a constitution
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with strict control over who could join the parliament or become president meant that their
interests would be protected in a new elected government. Running multi-party elections
lessened the cries from the international community about authoritarianism, while electoral laws
limiting the competitiveness of opposition parties meant that the regime could be confident that,
unlike in 1990, their preferred parties would beat the NLD. By designing new institutions to
address problems from the past such as threats from the NLD and armed ethnic groups, splits
within the military, and international pressure for democracy, the SPDC was able to engineer a
new political landscape with some trappings of democracy without risking the immunity of the
Tatmadaw as an organization. This set the stage for confidence building which, in later years,
would allow more robust changes to take hold.

CHAPTER 5
THE NEW LIGHT OF MYANMAR CONTENT ANALYSIS (2003-2010)

As in previous chapters, I conducted a content analysis of 100 editions of the New Light
of Myanmar, using a random date generator to randomly select 100 dates. Due to the generator’s
limit of 25 dates, I ran the randomizer 4 times to find separate dates in each of these four
different time periods: Jan 1, 2003 to Dec 31, 2004; Jan 1, 2005 to Dec 31, 2006; Jan 1, 2007 to
Dec 31, 2008; and Jan 1, 2009 to Dec 31, 2010. This also ensured that the randomly selected
dates were not too heavily grouped in one year of the 2003-2010 time period. If there was no
publication on the date chosen, I used the randomizer to select another random date.
For the first thirteen dates, I relied on the Burma Press Summary, 1 as the full-text
versions of the New Light of Myanmar were not online. Starting in August 2003, however, fulltext editions of the New Light of Myanmar are available on the Online Burma Library. 2 Once I
gathered the NLM edition from each randomly-selected date, I read them and coded each article
based on ten different subjects: diplomacy (which includes diplomatic calls, ambassadors,
delegations, travel of high ranking officials, funerals of high-ranking officials, foreign aid, etc.);
elections, political parties, and the National Convention; full-texts of speeches and notifications
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or laws; insurgency, protests, and ceasefires; business, industry, and construction (which
includes development, agriculture and visits from foreign businesspeople and tourists); editorials
and letters to the editor; non-political crimes; religion (including building new temples, visits by
foreigners related to religion, and donations to monks/nuns/temples); and miscellaneous
(including sports, history, holidays, education, culture, arts, health, obituaries, ads, engagements,
etc.). I also added a new category for this chapter – propaganda/slogans. These were not coded in
Chapter 3 because they were omitted from the Burma Press Summary but can be seen in the fulltext versions of the New Light of Myanmar.
There are seven subjects which were particularly relevant for this chapter - diplomacy,
elections/party news, speeches and laws, insurgencies/protests, business, propaganda/slogans,
and editorials/opinion articles. Diplomacy is important for gauging any increases/decreases in
international pressure on the regime, as well as whether military leaders during this period
adopted more moderate stances and better relationships with the international community (H2B).
Articles related to election/party news and speeches/laws are valuable for establishing how many
institutional changes that took place during this period are related to the transition process that
was mapped out in the 1988-2002 period (H2A), as well as any possible reductions in the
perceived threats posed by opposition parties. Insurgency/protest/ceasefire articles are again used
to determine whether the regime perceived an improvement in relations with armed ethnic
groups (H2B). As in Chapter 3, business and development articles may represent the regime’s
growing confidence and willingness to allow democratization and liberalization. Propaganda and
slogans are new for this chapter and were included as a more direct proxy measure for gauging
threat perceptions and confidence about the variables which were crucial for the failure of the
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transition in 1988-2002 (namely, international and domestic pressure and a lack of
immunity/stability confidence). Finally, opinion articles were included in the analysis for this
chapter because they had been largely left out of the Burma Press Summary from the earlier
period, but the topics covered and the tone of the writing can be very useful as a qualitative
measure of the regime’s messaging and view point towards the independent variables in
question.
For this time period, I coded a total of 6,381 articles.3 I then counted the number of
articles on each subject for each randomly-selected date and entered those numbers into an Excel
table. This then allowed me to create graphs of the number of articles on each subject by date
from 2003-2010, to get a feel for trends in how often the government newspaper mentioned
certain topics. I created graphs for these seven pertinent subjects. Figure 13 shows diplomacy
articles.
There was a total of 261 articles in this period related to diplomacy, compared to 227
diplomacy articles in the previous time period. As in the previous chapter, the majority of these
articles refer to felicitations and visits with diplomats from other nations. There were more
articles during this time period about meetings with international organizations as well as
positive interactions with countries and international institutions that had previously censured
Myanmar. For instance, a 2003 article entitled “UN Secretary General sends felicitations to
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Senior General Than Shwe” includes a message from then Secretary General of the United
Nations Kofi Annan. 4
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Figure 13: Diplomacy articles 2003-2010.

The year 2008 saw a number of articles with positive spins on international interactions,
including foreign aid in the wake of Cyclone Nargis. One article, “Japan provides US$1.79
million grant aid”,5 notes that the foreign aid “is expected to contribute to further improvement
of the situation of maternal and child health in Myanmar through supporting the work of
UNICEF, and to strengthen the friendship between Japan and Myanmar.”6 In March 2008, an
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article entitled “Spoke Authoritative Team meets Special Adviser to UN Secretary-General”7
includes statements made by Brigadier-General Kyaw Hsan at the meeting. He asserted that
…the efforts of the Government today are meant for the realization of the
wishes and desires of the majority of Myanmar people comprehensively.
Though we are exerting efforts for realization of the wishes of the majority,
we do not ignore the wishes of the minority at all. In accordance with the
essence of democracy, we provide opportunities for the minority to
participate in the national political process…. With the cooperation and
assistance of Your Excellency, our democratization process as desired by
the UN, international community, the entire Myanmar people as well as
supporters, and those opposing the Government, will certainly meet
success. Then, the entire people can participate extensively with democratic
practices. 8
Such an article shows the types of interactions that were taking place between the United Nations
and Myanmar at this time, as well as the moderate tone and openness that regime leaders were
demonstrating towards the idea of democratization. During the latter part of this period, articles
also described positive interactions with the United States (“Vice-Senior General Maung Aye
receives US military attaches”)9 and ASEAN (“ASEAN stands ready to assist Myanmar:
ASEAN Chairman issues statement on Myanmar General Elections”). 10 The spikes in diplomacy
articles can be attributed to a bump in efforts to smooth foreign relations after the Saffron
Revolution (2007), the John Yettaw incident (2009), and the 2010 general elections. In addition,
opinion pieces which discuss the international community were quite common during this
period. The tone of these opinion articles, as well as full-text speeches denouncing foreign
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interference, will be discussed later in this section. Figure 14 shows articles relating to elections,
political parties, and the National Convention.
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Figure 14: Elections/party/National Convention articles 2003-2010.

During the 2003-2010 period there were 98 articles related to elections, political parties,
and the National Convention, compared to a total of 49 articles between 1988-2002. Similar to
trends in the earlier period, many of the early stories focused on reporting popular support and
rallies for the government-supported party the USDA/USDP. Such articles had headlines such as
“Entire people of Salingyi and Yinmabin submit USDA membership applications”, 11 “Chin State
USDA Annual General Meeting 2004 Held”,12 and “USDA to serve the interest of local people
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for improvement of socio-economic life of national brethren and rural development in
cooperation with social organizations”,13 and often contained threatening tones toward those who
did not support the party. For instance,
No internal and external destructionist participated in the organizational and
development tasks of the country. They even destroyed the existing stability
and development of the country. They were trying to instigate the 17 peace
groups and the people to cause misunderstanding between the government
and people and destroy the stability and development of the country.
External destructionists, using various kinds of media to fabricate false
accusations including human rights, democracy, narcotic drugs, forced
labour, and sexual abuse against of Myanmar Tatmadaw on Shan national
girls, were instigating the people to destroy the stability and development of
the country. Without unity, there could be no stability and nation-building
tasks could be put into a standstill.14
Interestingly, while there were a number of pro-USDA stories between 2003-2006, it was not
until mid-2006 that the New Light of Myanmar again started publishing anti-NLD stories like the
ones utilized in the 1988-2002 period. These articles echoed the tones of those published
previously, with headlines such as “Nine member of Wakema Township NLD quit: They lose
trust and interest in NLD due to anti-government acts”,15 “No interest and trust in the acts of
NLD: One member resigns from Myingyan Township NLD”,16 “NLD courting patronage and
lackey within party, while handful of NLD leaders prospering by the outside help, the rank and
file of the party impoverished: Two members of Hlinethaya Township NLD quit”,17 and “Self-
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seeking acts of NLD let down party members, party relies on some big western nations, commits
itself to acts harmful to the State and people: Two of Sagaing Township NLD quit”. 18 These
articles were most common from mid-2006 until mid-2007, when a different type of NLD-story
emerged.
Beginning in mid-2007, around the beginning of the Saffron Revolution, articles related
to the NLD stopped focusing on the numbers of members leaving the NLD, and instead reported
the number of meetings between NLD officials and foreign diplomats. The first such article from
August 3, 2007, entitled “NLD committing destructive acts after receiving instructions from big
countries through embassies: US Embassy officials visited NLD Headquarters 11 times in July,”
stated that
National League for Democracy (Central) is attempting to push the nation
to a life of servitude and to become a minion of the imperialists without
serving the interests of the nation and the people. The acts of the party have
proved that the party relies too much on big countries by contacting with
their embassies in Yangon. Now, the party is committing destructive acts
after receiving the instructions of the big countries through embassies. 19
Such stories continued into 2009, with frequent headlines such as “US and British diplomats
visited NLD HQ 28 times in August” 20 and “US, British embassy staff visit NLD Headquarters
26 times in November”.21 The focus on reporting the number of interactions between foreign
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diplomats and the NLD was clearly a reaction by the regime to diminish the appeal of the NLD
and also criticize what they saw as excessive foreign influence during events such as the Saffron
Revolution and the constitutional referendum.
Another trend in the election/party news was related to the National Convention
proceedings. As in the earlier time period, news of the ongoing National Convention talks was
reported frequently, and unsurprisingly, the tone in these articles was glowingly positive towards
the National Convention and the Roadmap to Democracy. Such articles would often contain the
full-text of sections of the constitution in progress, or specific policies regarding the Roadmap,
while also highlighting specific numbers of improved production or development (such as crop
yields or infrastructure projects) in certain areas as a way of pointing to the success of the SPDC
and Tatmadaw government. From 2003-2005, National Convention stories would mainly detail
rallies in support of the National Convention or describe who attended the meetings. Beginning
in 2006, however, these articles began to focus on the specifics of the parliament (Hluttaw) and
the constitutional rules being established.
In early 2006, the first spike in election/National Convention articles was due to a
number of articles describing the new parliamentary laws in detail. One such article, “The form
of legislation and essence of future State part-2”, 22 was the continuation of an article from a
previous day’s edition and contained a conversation about the number of representatives in the
parliament, how representation is decided, and asserts that “the ratio of Tatmadaw member
delegates in the Amyotha Hluttaw is one fourth of all the delegates and only one third of all the
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elected delegates. This shows that the Tatmadaw can play the leadership role of national politics
without affecting the essence of democracy.”23 This article continues on throughout the month,
reaching at least nine parts.24 Such detailed articles (some would span 5-6 full pages of the 16page newspaper)25 were clearly an attempt by the SPDC and Tatmadaw to drum up support for
the National Convention, as well as appearing to be more transparent in the development of the
new constitution.
The second, and largest, spike of election/political party related articles occurred on
November 20, 2007, when 12 articles were published on one day. The large number of articles
were responses to a statement that Aung San Suu Kyi had given to Mr. Gambari, the special
advisor to the UN Secretary-General, on November 8. The New Light of Myanmar published
announcements from different delegates to the National Convention (“National race delegates to
National Convention from Mandalay, Sagaing, Magway Divs and Shan State (South) and
(North) issue announcements concerning Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s statement”) 26 condemning
her statement and highlighting their support for the government and the National Convention. In
addition to statements by delegates and political parties, the New Light of Myanmar also
increased the number of articles supporting the Tatmadaw (“Any difficulties can be overcome
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through cooperation among government, people and Tatmadaw”), 27 the Roadmap to Democracy
(“USDA committed to implementation of seven-step Road Map together with the people”), 28 and
the USDA (“USDA members actively participate in national development drives with
nationalistic spirit”).29 As seen in the articles regarding the NLD and their meetings with foreign
diplomats in 2006-2007, this peak in articles reacting to Aung San Suu Kyi’s statement to the
United Nations are indicative of the major concerns Myanmar’s regime had about foreign
interference during this interim period.
The final spike in election news during this time can be seen in mid-late 2010. These
articles are, of course, related to the 2010 general elections, and mainly contained
straightforward descriptions of Union Election Commission meetings, 30 applications of different
political parties to contest the elections, 31 and later, announcements of the election results. 32 The
tone in these articles was neutral and mentions of the NLD or Aung San Suu Kyi largely stopped
during this time.
The number of speeches and notifications published during the interim period increased
from 28 published in 1988-2002 to 37 published in 2003-2010. This increase could be largely
attributed to the introduction of the much longer full-text editions of the New Light of Myanmar
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during this period. There are a number of themes that emerged in the speeches and notifications
being published during this time. These themes include opposing foreign interference or political
pressure from other nations, beginning to publish speeches and statements by groups other than
the government, and detailing efforts to handle the recovery efforts after Cyclone Nargis. Figure
15 shows these speeches and notifications.

Speeches and Notifications
6

Number of Articles

5
4
3
2
1
0
1/8/2003

1/8/2004

1/8/2005

1/8/2006

1/8/2007

1/8/2008

1/8/2009

1/8/2010

Date

Figure 15: Speeches and Notifications 2003-201033

Early on, the full-texts of speeches about foreign interference echoed the threatening tone
of the previous period. In a speech given at the opening ceremony of a Special Refresher Course
for Basic Education Teachers in June 2003, General Khin Nyunt stated
… recently, the internal and external destructive elements have been
stepping up their attempts to commit destructive acts and atrocities such as
33

It is worth noting that the number of speeches published each day was quite small, so this
figure is not particularly helpful for understanding trends in this regard. The length of speeches,
however, was often quite significant, as some speeches took up multiple pages and made up a
significant proportion of the newspaper for that day. The tone and message of the speeches,
therefore, is more important for my purposes than the actual number of speeches.
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detonating mines, violation of laws and instigating the people to cause
disorder and commotion and to undermine peace and stability of the State.
At the same time, with the assistance of foreign nations, they are committing
sabotage acts such as driving a wedge among national races and
manufacturing accusations to tarnish the image of the State. Actually, a
study of today's international events will show that those opposed to the
State fabricated news and false reports with every intention of tarnishing the
image of the government. They are committing such acts to the liking of the
organizations which provide assistance to them. This being so, it is obvious
that there are many people who have run into troubles in the world today as
there occur incidents that are far from the truth…. The Union of Myanmar,
with or without foreign assistance, will continue to strive for the emergence
of a peaceful, modern, developed, and democratic nation. 34
These types of nationalistic speeches were not uncommon at this time, even at events like
courses for elementary teachers, and the publication of them in their entirety was a clear message
to both domestic and international readers that the regime was pushing on with their Roadmap
regardless of any opposition. A speech given at another course by Senior-General Than Shwe
was detailed in an article titled “Those with noble and deep political convictions could bring
genuine development to the State: Narrow-minded lackeys of colonialists could not create the
development of national history….no place for bigoted henchmen of colonialists in history of
national development.” 35 Similar speeches given by Senior General Than Shwe were often
published in abbreviated form on the front page (Headlines include “Safeguard national
solidarity”;36 “Protect the nation and its people”;37 “Document victories of the Tatmadaw, State
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service personnel and entire national races”; 38 “Standing tall with glory as a Union among the
world nations”;39 and “Strength, improvement of capabilities, modernization of Myanmar
Tatmadaw rely on patriotism, abilities, diligence of new generation technicians: Collaboration of
three main factors, namely, the State, the People and the Tatmadaw, can overcome all obstacles
and achieve the destiny”).40
Later on, speeches criticizing foreign interference are still published, but are more often
from spokespeople of groups other than the Tatmadaw or the SPDC. For example, in July 2005,
a speech given by members of the Myanmar Women’s Affairs Federation (MWAF) and the
Organization for Women’s Affairs are published in two articles article titled “MWAF absolutely
oppposes [sic] political pressure, unjust accusations and sanctions put on Myanmar: Economic
sanctions are harmful to progress of living standard of Myanmar women” and “Some big nations
putting pressure and using ILO as political forum to install puppet government in Myanmar:
Entire women to make combined endeavours hand in hand with congenial organizations in
interests of the nation and the people.”41 While some of the language used in the speech are
identical to language used by the regime (“Internal and external destructionists”), the attribution
of speeches like this to groups other than the government may be an attempt by the SPDC and
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Tatmadaw to present themselves as more moderate, or that their views are mainstream within
Myanmar. Another example of this can be seen in a cluster of articles published in 2007.
Unlike in the 1988-2002 period, there is a clear spike in speeches and notifications
published on January 18, 2007. The spike in announcements that day can be explained as
responses to a draft resolution co-sponsored by the U.S. and Britain that was being considered at
the UN Security Council “with the intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Myanmar.” 42
The articles include “MWAF denounces resolution co-sponsored by US, Britain”; “PNO issues
declaration condemning draft resolution of US, Britain: Attempts of US, Britain aim at using
UNSC to meddle in Myanmar’s affairs”; “Announcement of Military and Regional
Administration Committee of Shan State (East) Special Region-4”; Political Economy Study
Group of new generation students condemns US and allies attempts to hamper Myanmar’s
democracy transition”; and “Double veto kills US draft resolution; Manpan People’s Militia
issues declaration.”43 The strategy of publishing multiple related statements from different
groups was utilized a number of times during this period, and can be seen as an attempt by the
Myanmar government to present the Myanmar citizenry as united behind their efforts of
implementing the Roadmap to Democracy. By showing that civil society groups (MWAF),
ethnic groups (PNO and Manpan People’s Militia), the military (Military and Regional
Administration Committee of Shan State), and even former opponents of the regime (new
generation students) all agree that the UN resolution would somehow cause issues for

42

New Light of Myanmar January 18, 2007.

43

New Light of Myanmar January 18, 2007.

223
democratization efforts in Myanmar, the regime could leverage this criticism from the
international community to increase the perception of unity around the Roadmap, thereby
relieving their concerns about the threats posed by such groups to the country’s stability and the
military’s immunity. Interestingly, in 2007, the New Light of Myanmar also published a short
statement from Aung San Suu Kyi,44 in what was one of the first mentions of her by name in the
New Light of Myanmar articles that were coded.
The second overriding theme of speeches published during this period are related to relief
efforts after Cyclone Nargis. Following the storm, there were many articles about relief efforts,
and full-text announcements from the National Disaster Preparedness Central Committee, which
was headed by then-Prime Minister Thein Sein. While some of these speeches had a positive
tone about the help that was being provided by foreign donors (“we heartily thank the countries,
governments, and their people for contributing to the health care of the victims to the storm
‘Nargis’45; “Relief, reconstruction work in storm-hit areas completed in short period – thanks to
strength of human resources” 46), others inevitably criticized foreign interference (“International
humanitarian assistance should not be politicized” 47). Clearly, while there were some new voices
were published in the New Light of Myanmar during the 2003-2010 period, the Myanmar
government was still highly reactive to perceived threats posed by foreign countries.
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Notably, the interim 2003-2010 period saw just 33 articles related to protests and
insurgencies, compared to 43 articles in the 1988-2002 period. This is especially significant
considering that the content analysis for the later time period contained over seven times more
articles than the earlier period, thanks to the availability of full-text editions of the NLM. Thus,
this represents a huge reduction in the number of articles related to domestic unrest, which may
indicate a reduction in the regime’s perception of threats posed by armed ethnic groups or
opposition groups in the 2003-2010 period. Figure 16 shows articles relating to protests and
insurgencies.
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Figure 16: Insurgency/protest/ceasefire articles 2003-2010.
As noted in Chapter 3, the tone of insurgency-related articles shifted towards more
positive stories about armed group members surrendering to the Tatmadaw, and this tone
continued into the early part of the 2003-2010 period with articles such as “Armed group
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members exchange arms for peace.”48 A peak of 11 insurgency-related articles on April 21, 2005
occurred as a number of groups published statements condemning Sao Hkam Hpa, a Shan
expatriate who declared the independence of Shan State and the establishment of a Shan State
government on April 17, 2005.49 This posed a threat to the government’s progress towards their
goal of unifying the entire country and combating the push for federalism in the ethnic states,
and the New Light of Myanmar published stories such as “Aims and acts of the renegade Sao
Hkam Hpa and cohorts endangering interest of Union of Myanmar and the entire people”, 50 as
well as declarations by groups such as the Shan State Army (SSA), the Shan State Nationalities
People’s Liberation Organization, the Pa-O National Organization (PNO), the Kokang
Nationalities Peace Group of Shan State, the Karenni National Peace and Development Party, the
Myanmar Women’s Affairs Federation, and the Karenni Nationalities People’s Liberation Front,
all of whom denounced the actions of Sao Hkam Hpa.51 Based on the number of articles focusing
on this incident, it appears to be one of the most significant threats to the regime’s goals of
domestic unity between 2003-2010.
Surprisingly, unlike the spikes of articles that took place during the 1988 demonstrations,
there are no major increases in articles about domestic protests during the 2007 Saffron
Revolution. There are some mentions of unrest during that year, as evidenced by articles such as
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“Internal, external destructionists applying various means to cause unrest, instability: People and
security forces grapple with violent protestors who attack them with weapons in Yangon”, 52 as
well as stories about counter-protests (“People of Myingyan, Kyaukpadaung, Ngazun, Natogyi
and NyaungU express their desire” 53 and “People of Magway Division, Shan State (South) and
Bago Division denounce recent protests”).54 As with the articles highlighting the numbers of
members leaving the NLD, the government used the New Light of Myanmar to claim that not all
citizens supported the Saffron Revolution.
In the years 2008-2010, there was an increase in articles describing insurgent attacks,
such as “One injured in mine blast in Kyaukkyi”,55 “KNU bomb attacks kills 7, injures 11 in
Papun”,56 and “Four time bombs defused, people urged to come forward with information over
suspect ones”. 57 While headlines like “Local people return to Kokang as stability prevails in
Shan State (North)” 58 attempted to portray improvements in state security, it appears that
insurgent activity during the 2003-2010 period was cause for some concern with the Tatmadaw.
Figure 17 shows articles relating to business, development, and construction.
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Figure 17: Business/development articles 2003-2010.

There was a total of 462 articles related to business and development between 2003-2010,
compared to 226 articles published during 1988-2002. While this is an absolute increase, it again
should be noted that there were seven times more articles coded for this chapter than the previous
one. As in the previous chapter, many of these articles are straightforward accounts of
infrastructure projects, often noting the development that is being brought to certain regions of
the country as part of the oft-mentioned three Main National Causes (e.g. “Transportation plays
vital role in regional development: Sittaung Bridge (Shwekyin-Madauk) inaugurated as 150th
facility”;59 “Regional People will enjoy rapid development only if a region has two or three main
businesses, instead of relying on only one: Senior General Than Shwe attends meeting on
progress of Rakhine State”;60 and “Blessed with impressive geographical features, Putao District
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will enjoy booming hotel, hiking and mountaineering, and eco-tourism industries” 61). In addition
to articles describing development projects, there were also photo series featured in many
editions, with headlines such as “Kachin State which has developed significantly in the time of
Tatmadaw Government”. 62 As in the previous time period, the Myanmar government was keen
to show the positive effects they had brought to the country during 2003-2010, particularly in the
lead-up to the 2010 elections.
One aspect of development articles that was different during this time compared to 19882002 was the recovery effort after Cyclone Nargis. In 2008, articles such as “Senior General
Than Shwe inspects relief and rehabilitation measures in storm-hit Mawlamyinekyun, Bogale:
Government taking relief, rehabilitation and preventive measures against natural disasters for
storm-hit regions and victims”,63 “Minister briefs on relief efforts in storm-hit areas”,64 and
“Prime Minister inspects project to reclaim new plots for storm survivors of Labutta” 65
abounded. Similar to the articles describing the building of bridges and roads, these articles
mainly focused on the government officials who traveled to a storm-hit areas and their comments
about how the government would improve the situation. The SPDC’s strategy with these
development articles seems to be, as one headline from 2009 stated, proving that the

61

New Light of Myanmar January 25, 2008.

62

New Light of Myanmar February 6, 2008.

63

New Light of Myanmar May 23, 2008.

64

New Light of Myanmar May 23, 2008.

65

New Light of Myanmar June 17, 2008.

229
“Government has practically improved all infrastructures for restoration of peace, stability, and
development”.66 By repeating this message hundreds of times, and describing the many ongoing
infrastructural projects in the country, the regime tried to show that they were doing more than
just convening National Convention meetings. If those positive messages failed to work,
however, the New Light of Myanmar contained plenty of propaganda to sway readers’ opinions.
As noted earlier, propaganda slogans were added into the content analysis in this chapter
because they had been left out of the Burma Press Summary from 1988-2002. The lack of
propaganda slogans in the early part of 2003 is due to the fact that the full text versions of the
New Light of Myanmar were only available beginning in August 2003, which is why there is
such a steep rise in number of propaganda pieces coded during 2003. This category did not
include opinion pieces, even if they were overtly pro-government. Instead, the pieces that were
coded as “propaganda” consisted of short slogans, reminders of government talking points, and
cartoons. These were reused again and again, and often were placed in the same location on
every edition of the paper, although the addition of new slogans at certain points during this time
period is notable. Figure 18 shows propaganda articles.
The most frequently published propaganda pieces, which were published in almost every
edition coded during this time period, were “Four political objectives”, “Four economic
objectives”, “Four social objectives”, “Emergence of the State Constitution”, “People’s Desire”,
and “All this needs to be known”.
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Figure 18: Propaganda 2003-2010.
The three “four objectives” slogans were most often published on the first page above or directly
next to the leading headline. Figure 19 shows this slogan.

Figure 19: Four political, four economic, and four social objectives.67
“New Light of Myanmar June 8, 2005.

67
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These slogans were most likely aimed at both Burmese citizens (in order to encourage unity and
support for the constitution) as well as the international community, due to the prominence and
frequency of these statements in English.
Another of the most frequently published slogans is “Emergence of the State Constitution
is the duty of all citizens of Myanmar Naing-Ngan [the country of Myanmar].” This slogan, like
the “objectives” slogans, was published on almost every edition in the same location – the
bottom of the first page. Figure 20 shows this slogan.
The last common slogan is the “People’s Desire”, which reads;
•
•
•
•

Oppose those relying on external elements, acting as stooges, holding
negative views
Oppose those trying to jeopardize stability of the State and progress
of the nation
Oppose foreign nations interfering in internal affairs of the state
Crush all internal and external destructive elements as the common
enemy. 68

The “People’s Desire” was aimed both at a domestic and international audience, as evidenced by
English-language billboards in tourist locations in the country. Figure 21 shows an example of
this billboard. The “People’s Desire” slogan was almost always located on the top of the second
page. Figure 22 shows an example of the People’s Desire slogan in the New Light of Myanmar.
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Figure 20: Front page of New Light of Myanmar with “Emergence” slogan at bottom.69
69
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Figure 21: People’s Desire billboard in Myanmar. 70

Figure 22: People’s Desire slogan in New Light of Myanmar.71
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While not appearing in every edition, the slogan “All this needs to be known” was
regularly published, although its location in the newspaper would change. This slogan was aimed
at Burmese citizens in an attempt to convince them to ignore the messages of domestic and
international opposition groups. Figure 23 shows this slogan.

Figure 23: All this needs to be known slogan in New Light of Myanmar.72
The peak in propaganda slogans occurred on July 6, 2004, when 17 total propaganda
pieces were published in the New Light of Myanmar. These slogans included the aforementioned
most common slogans, as well as additional Burmese-language slogans and one new slogan,
which read “With hands linked firm around the National Convention”. 73 This date also marked
the convening of another National Convention meeting, so the high number of slogans that day
may have been an attempt to drum up support for the National Convention.
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A second, and even more interesting, peak of propaganda slogans happened during 2007,
as a response to the Saffron Revolution. During this time, a new set of propaganda slogans
appeared, which targeted the media outlets Radio Free Asia (RFA), Voice of America (VOA),
and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), presumably for their coverage of the
demonstrations. These messages were clearly aimed at threatening the international community
for their involvement and influence during the protests, using language such as “RFA, VOA and
BBC saboteurs, watch your step!” 74 During this period, the New Light of the Myanmar devoted
the entire back page of the newspaper to propaganda, as seen in Figures 24 and 25. A similar
strategy was used during the 2008 post-Nargis recovery effort, with full-page propaganda pieces
claiming that international media outlets were lying about the government’s response to Nargis
and encouraging citizens to report any misappropriations of relief funds. An example of this
propaganda is seen in Figure 26.
In addition to negatively-toned slogans against foreign interference, the New Light of
Myanmar also published positively-toned propaganda in favor of the government, the Tatmadaw,
and the Roadmap to Democracy. One way in which these messages was published were in
political cartoons. Some cartoons were translated to English, such as the ones shown in Figures
27, 28, and 29.
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Figure 24: Propaganda on back page of New Light of Myanmar October 1, 2007.75
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Figure 25: Propaganda on the back page of New Light of Myanmar October 24, 2007.76
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Figure 26: Propaganda on the back page of New Light of Myanmar June 17, 2008.77

77

New Light of Myanmar June 17, 2008.

239

Figure 27: Political cartoon in New Light of Myanmar March 23, 2005.78

Figure 28: Political cartoon in New Light of Myanmar March 27, 2007.79
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Figure 29: Political cartoon in New Light of Myanmar February 6, 2008.80
One final trend in propaganda pieces took place from 2009-2010, in the lead-up to the
2010 general elections. In June 2009, a new slogan appeared: “Entire people are in favour of the
three fundamental requirements: stability and peace; development; and earning the living in the
framework of the law.”81 In August, two more new slogans were placed on the back page of the
newspaper – “Only with stability” and “Anarchy begets anarchy”. These slogans feature the most
overt mentions of democracy and democratization thus far and are clearly aimed at increasing
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support for the upcoming elections. These slogans continued to be published in the New Light of
Myanmar well into the year 2009, as seen in Figure 30.

Figure 30: Propaganda on the back page of the New Light of Myanmar August 19, 2009.82

While the tone in many of these slogans are clearly negative or positive, it can of course
be a tricky business to determine the intended audience and outcome for each and every slogan.
Some slogans name their targeted audience, such as the 2007-2008 propaganda criticizing the
RFA, VOA, and BBC. Other pieces have more nebulous goals. The prominence and tone of such
pithy statements can be useful for determining how threatened the Myanmar government felt on
a particular date, but they are a limited tool. A more detailed gauge for examining the topics that
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were at the forefront of the regime’s concerns are editorials or opinion pieces. Figure 31 shows
the trends in opinion pieces during this time.
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Figure 31: Opinion pieces 2003-2010.
I graphed opinion pieces differently than the other categories because the New Light of
Myanmar had a daily “Perspectives” section with one opinion piece, and the number of opinion
pieces in each edition stayed relatively consisted (between 1-4 pieces). Instead of coding just the
number of opinion pieces in each day’s newspaper, I also coded op-eds on a number of different
themes,83 and graphed the number of op-eds in each theme per calendar year. This gave more
useful information than graphing them per day would have, although the numbers are still
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Tatmadaw), I coded them based on the primary theme of the piece.
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relatively small.84 The four themes that I graphed were op-eds relating to: 1) Democracy, the
National Convention, and the Roadmap to Democracy; 2) Foreign interference or axe-handles
(i.e. patsies of former colonial powers); 3) Nationalism, unity, and praising the Tatmadaw; and 4)
Peace (either domestic or in the region) and insurgency.
Editorials relating to democracy, the National Convention, and the Roadmap to
Democracy start off in 2003 with Khin Nyunt’s announcement of the Roadmap. These editorials
often use the same language as the speeches given by SPDC leaders in explaining the process of
the National Convention and Roadmap, which is unsurprising considering that the New Light of
Myanmar was run by the Ministry of Information and that op-eds in the paper generally parroted
the government’s stance. Early editorials defend the Roadmap from criticism, such as Aung Moe
San’s85 opinion that opposing the Roadmap is “counter to democracy. The democratic way of
launching an opposition means the presentation of a critic or a suggestion from the positive point
of view in the interest of the nation.”86 Another 2003 editorial suggests that “Not only the people
of Myanmar but also ASEAN and international community support the seven-point roadmap of
Myanmar”,87 and praises the leaders at a recent ASEAN summit for expressing their support for
the roadmap.
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Between 2004 and 2005, editorial mentions of this theme drop to zero, but pick back up
again in 2006, steadily increasing to a peak in 2007. Op-eds in 2006 were more general
discussions of the meaning of democracy,88 rather than explaining the specifics of the transition
as earlier editorials had. The peak of editorials in 2007 can most likely be explained as a reaction
to the domestic protests and international outcry during the Saffron Revolution. The tone of these
editorials took on a more critical tone, particular with regards to the role of the NLD. For
instance, Tekkatho Myat Thu writes about his/her experience attending the National Convention
meetings, stating that “If a political party (NLD) had not attempted to disrupt the National
Convention then, a new constitution would have been drawn already.”89 Tin Tin Win, a USDA
member, writes that
…we, USDA members, are to work hard together with the people to
perform the duties ranging from successful completion of the National
Convention, the first step of the Road Map, to the drafting of the
constitution. Now, some groups outside the nation are criticizing the nation
with negative views. Moreover, they are airing distorted news stories and
exaggerated news stories to instigate protests in the nation. We, members,
understand well that their activities are not designed to serve the interests of
the nation and the people.90
Following the peak of editorials about the National Convention and Roadmap in 2007,
opinion pieces on this theme steadily decline towards zero in 2010. Certainly, part of that
decrease over time can be explained by the successful creation of a new state constitution, which
ended the National Convention proceedings. Editorials in 2008 focused mainly on the new
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constitution, with writers urging voters to approve the state constitution and detailing the reasons
for supporting it. One editorial titled “Why did Myanmar people unanimously vote for State
constitution?” compares the success of the constitutional referendum to the NLD’s victory in the
1990 elections, arguing that “the constitution won the powers bestowed by the people, and it is
the true mandate of the people.”91 Another op-ed by an unnamed author describes the hardline
and moderate stances between different factions in the NLD and states, “Let bygones be
bygones….All in all, NLD is welcomed and invited; just show a moderate attitude towards the
state.”92 Once the state constitution was approved in the referendum, it appears that the editorial
board of the government-owned New Light of Myanmar moved on to other more pressing topics.
Perhaps the most interesting editorial theme during this period was opinion pieces about
foreign interference and domestic “axe-handles.”93 There are three distinct peaks in editorials on
this theme which occurred in the years 2005, 2007, and 2009. In addition to those peaks, it
appears that the tone of these editorials softened quite a bit towards the end of this period.
Early on during the interim 2003-2010 period, the language that was used to describe
foreign powers in these op-eds was scathing. For instance, one editorial in August 2003 listed a
number of “alien organizations”, including the Burma Peace Foundation and Human Rights
Watch, which it stated, “are providing material and spiritual assistance for the expatriates
existing under the name of ‘refugees,’ and helping intensify the conspiracy to destroy Myanmar.
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As noted in the previous chapter, the term “axe handle” is a term used to connote that someone
is a tool being used by another force (in this case, the West).
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The arm of the neo-colonialist agents of the conspiracy to destroy Myanmar are very long. They
are able to lay the spy network everywhere.”94 Descriptions such as “tricksters,”95 “neocolonialists,” 96 “terrorist masters,” 97 “destructionists,”98 “propaganda media,”99”alien
intrusions,”100 and “false and fabricated news” 101 were frequently used to describe the
international community and domestic opposition in editorials between 2003-2005. Editorials
about foreign interference in 2005 often drew comparison between the U.S. interventions in Iraq
and Afghanistan and the West’s criticism of Myanmar’s government. One such op-ed stated,
“Human rights and democracy are two beautiful words the militarist bloc is widely applying to
mislead the world people about its invasion and interference in the internal affairs of other
nations under the pretext of anti-terrorism.”102 Such editorials show the Myanmar government’s
concerns during this time about the possibility for international criticism to become more direct
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intervention, as well as possibly an attempt to undermine the United States’ moralistic stance
with regards to democracy.
Unsurprisingly, the second peak of opinion pieces about foreign interference occurred
during 2007, a year which saw domestic upheaval in Myanmar. The tone of these editorials was
just as defensive as in prior years, with headlines such as “There are no political prisoners in
Myanmar”103 and “Comparison and study of slanders of the US and Britain against Myanmar
and the nation’s objective conditions.” 104 Some 2007 editorials took aim at Aung San Suu Kyi,
such as one which described her statements on the need for dialogue between the NLD and
Tatmadaw in which she compared Myanmar to the failure of dialogue and subsequent violence
in Yugoslavia. The writer stated, “Her words were very abhorrent to me. What she said meant
she would have to expend everything for her coming to power. I do not want to see any person
prepared to expend lives and property of the people for his or her coming to power.”105 Another
op-ed alleged that “she was constantly committing destructive acts” and defending the decision
to put her under house arrest thusly;
It was very considerate of the government to put only restriction on her,
instead of punishing her in accordance with law for the acts she had
committed, as she is the daughter of a national leader as well as a family
member of a Tatmadaw member. If she is sentenced to prison terms for all
the offences she has committed, she will never get out of the jail in her
life. 106
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During the 2007 Saffron Revolution and subsequent fallout, editorial discussions of
foreign influence, and the treachery of citizens who believed the former colonial powers,
continued. More than one editorial blamed foreign media companies for inciting the protests –
one such example stated,
Inciting protests in accordance with the plots hatched by alien elements and
failing to respect the image of the nation and the people is just opposing the
people. In fact, the plots are hatched by neocolonialists and spread by such
foreign radio stations as BBC, VOA and RFA in which expatriates are given
places. Local axe-handles are dancing to the tune played every night by
these stations…. They are using BBC, VOA, RFA and DVB 107 to
undermine stability and peace of Myanmar to be able to install a puppet
government. However, today’s Myanmar people have been aware of such
possible dangers according to their experiences about 8 August 1988 unrest.
A handful of axehandles are still abysmally stupid up to now.108
Such conspiracy theories were unsurprising for the Myanmar government to revert to during
times of stress such as the Saffron Revolution. The strong language that was used in these
editorials made the shift in tone that took place in 2009 even more striking.
Beginning in 2009, a number of key diplomatic events seem to have made a large impact
on the viewpoint of the Myanmar government, based on editorials during that time. One was the
visit of Mr. Quintana, special rapporteur on human rights, in February of 2009. An editorial
details the specifics of his visit, and stating that
Our country also respects and appreciates the mediating role of the UN
secretar-general [sic].…In response to his wishes, the government allowed
him to meet responsible persons, diplomats, UNDP, peace groups and
107
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NGOs and to visit Kayin State and prisons. The government’s willingness
to cooperate with Mr. Quintana depicted its cooperation with the UN
Security Council…. The release of 6313 prisoners resulted from the success
of the trip.109
This represents an astounding shift in tone compared to the unflattering descriptions of the UN
Security Council member nations from earlier editorials and is representative of the shift towards
more moderate coverage of diplomacy with the West in 2009 editorials. Another diplomatic
visit which made a positive impact during this time was Senator Jim Webb’s visit in August
2009 to retrieve the wayward American John Yettaw. One editorial about the visit described
Myanmar as “a country that is willing to fully cooperate with neighbouring nations, regional
nations, and all other nations with a constructive attitude….we hope that [Senator Webb’s] visit
will help promote constructive views on bilateral relations and hold discussions based on mutual
understanding between the US and Myanmar in the future.”110 Another stated that Senator Jim
Webb “has a lot of knowledge about ASEAN,” that he believes that “the US trade embargo
further deepens and worsens the isolation of Myanmar,” and concludes that “fortune has
somewhat smiled on Myanmar people as there are several visionary officials in the US’s top
political area like Senator Webb.” 111 Such glowing praise for a U.S. senator would be unheard of
just two years prior, and these editorials show a massive paradigm shift in the Myanmar
government’s views towards foreign diplomacy.
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While the tone of editorials about the U.S. saw more positive tones, such a shift was not
consistent towards all countries. Interestingly, one op-ed about refugee and IDP camps on the
border between Thailand and Myanmar takes an unusually harsh tone against Thailand, stating
that “Thai government’s current stand on Myanmar shows that it is not a good neighbouring
country of Myanmar.” 112 This was a particularly striking op-ed considering the positive tone
towards Myanmar’s ASEAN neighbors in earlier opinion pieces.
The third theme of editorials was nationalism, unity, and praising the Tatmadaw. This
topic was by far the most common theme from 2004-2006, but then dropped off steeply as
editorials about the National Convention and foreign interference became more common. Many
of these editorials took place on national holidays, such as Union Day or Armed Forces Day, and
contained descriptions of historical events such as the Panglong conference or the 1962 coup,
which were described in glowing terms (e.g. “The Tatmadaw therefore took over the
responsibilities of the State…so as to stabilize the country.”113) Other op-eds took the form of
poetry, such as a 2004 poem celebrating Union Day which includes the lines; “Myanmar means
equality in thought/In all States and Divisions/Mass of national as a family/Will not be enslaved
by colonialists/Repulsed and crushed and/Independence regained with unity of thought/ Even if a
trap is laid through deliberate schemes.”114 Some editorials praised the Tatmadaw government by
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focusing on development projects such as dams,115 roads,116 bridges,117 railroads,118 improving
the private sector, 119 and the building of a new capitol at Naypyidaw.120 A number of editorials in
this category also focused on national unity, particularly with concern for cooperation between
the different ethnic groups of Myanmar. One such poem read, “Myanmar is/Kachin, Kayah,
Kayin, Chin/Those who join and help/Like Mon, Bamar, Rakhine, Shan/Who are of one
mind/Never are they happy/In subjugation of others….There is cohesion in Myanmar.” 121 While
editorials about nationalism and unity were the most common opinion pieces in the early part of
the 2003-2010 period, events in the later part of the period meant that other themes began to take
precedence, and the numbers of editorials in this category decreased.
The final theme of editorials was those focused on peace and insurgency. Strikingly, the
peak of articles about insurgency and the peace process with armed ethnic groups took place in
2003, and editorials on this subject decreased throughout the time period in question, dropping to
a total of zero for the editions coded in the year 2010. This may be indicative of the
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government’s perception of the threat posed by such groups, as ceasefires and peace agreements
during this time reduced the number of active insurgent groups. Even starting in 2004, opinion
pieces with titles such as “Peaceful and tranquil border regions” were painting a picture of
development and improvements in the previously dangerous border areas. 122 While some op-eds
declared that the government would “Crush all the destructive acts of terrorists”, 123 the tone of
these editorials was largely positive about prospects for peace. One 2006 editorial stated that “the
armed groups of national races [in Kachin state] have returned to the legal fold and are working
together with the government for regional development. As the region has become more peaceful
and stable and more transport infrastructures are being built, it has remarkably developed.”124
Even op-eds denouncing the actions of some groups as terrorist activity still tried to
maintain an inclusive tone towards the Myanmar citizens. One such editorial blamed the British,
rather than the Kayins, for armed insurgency in Kayin state.
Actually, the armed insurgency of KNU is a combination of narrow-minded
racism and warlord policy based on the colonialists’ divide-and-rule policy
and privileges given by the colonialists to them. Kayin nationals by nature
are honest and loyal…. The colonialist government was responsible for the
insurgency of the KNU. The colonialists not only stuffed Kayin national
people with anti-Bamar sentiment, but also armed them.125
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Such tactics were also used to explain insurgency in Shan state and the smuggling of narcotics. 126
By blaming British colonial policies for the rise of insurgency in ethnic states, editorials such as
this one would serve a dual purpose for the Burmese government – criticizing the West in order
to downplay international pressure over the constitutional referendum, and lessening the crimes
of the KNU and the Kayin people in the eyes of the Bamar majority in an effort to increase the
chances of peace and cooperation between the two groups, particularly if the government was
seeking a ceasefire agreement with the group.
There are a number of conclusions that can be drawn from the content analysis of the
New Light of Myanmar during the 2003-2010 period. There is evidence that foreign relations
improved over this eight-year time period, based on the tone of both articles and editorials on the
subject of foreign relations. The government’s insecurity about the lack of a constitution was
assuaged in 2008 with the successful constitutional referendum, although the tone of articles and
editorials towards the NLD and its leaders remained largely negative and untrusting during this
time. Speeches which were published in the NLM during this time began to involve different
voices, such as the leaders of civil society organizations or political parties other than the USDP.
A huge reduction in the number of articles and the positive tone of editorials about armed ethnic
groups reveals that the government felt more confident about the prospects for peace with
insurgents which had previously threatened the regime’s stability confidence. Development
projects were, as in the previous period, held up as evidence of the success of the Tatmadaw
government. Spikes in the number of propaganda pieces in the New Light of Myanmar can be
seen in reaction to specific events, such as the Saffron Revolution and Cyclone Nargis. Based on
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the changing tone and frequency of articles and editorials in the government-owned newspaper,
it appears that between the years 2003-2010, the Burmese government began to feel that they had
addressed two of the three main threats to the regime which had caused the failure of the 1990
elections – bad relations with the international community and armed ethnic groups within
Myanmar. The only remaining political threat that was left to deal with was the pesky opposition
party, the National League for Democracy.

Conclusion

Between the years of 2003-2010, massive changes took place within Myanmar, opening
the door for the development of institutional design that was not possible in the earlier 19882002 period. As H2A asserts, the changes during this interim period were based on ideas that had
been developed in the earlier period but ultimately failed. The earlier failure was due in large
part to the perception of domestic and international threats, which decreased the regime’s
stability and immunity confidence. A New Light of Myanmar editorial from March 2008 details
the government’s own description of the threats facing them during the previous period, stating;
In 1988, the Tatmadaw had to save the Union that was under the threat of
collapse due to the unscrupulous activities of the leftists (various forms of
Communists), rightists (various groups relying on the West), aboveground
groups (power-craving groups, political opportunists, and various
opportunists waiting for opportune times to rob public property),
underground groups (various armed insurgent groups committing robberies,
killing the people, torching villages, and engaging in illegal drug business),
and external elements (many colonialist countries seeking ways and means
to occupy and colonize Myanmar, as soon as opportune). The colonialists
were dreaming the hopes of keeping Myanmar in their control, stationing
their military bases in the Myanmar soils, and exploiting the rich natural
resources of Myanmar. However, their dreams did not come true due to the
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Tatmadaw government…. Now is the most opportune time for the people to
achieve the goal [of passing the constitutional referendum].127
What made this period more opportune than the previous one? H2B stated that the
military regime’s confidence in the power of institutional protections grew for two reasons –
improvements in relations with armed ethnic groups and the promotion of more moderate
military leaders. I found more evidence for the former factor than the latter. While there were
some military leaders during this time, such as Khin Nyunt and Thein Sein, who were seen as
more moderate, hardliners such as Than Shwe still clung to power. This was particularly evident
in the 2004 firing of Khin Nyunt. There is limited evidence to support the hypothesis that the
moderate faction within the military was growing in its power, although this lack of information
may be due more to the classified nature of Tatmadaw internal documents than to its accuracy.
While the moderate faction hypothesis is difficult to prove, editorials and speeches from
the content analysis reveal that the Tatmadaw certainly believed that the threats posed by armed
ethnic groups were largely neutralized during this time. One NLM editorial suggests that the
Tatmadaw government “has managed to organize 17 national race armed groups and other small
groups, which rose against the successive governments, to return to the legal fold….The number
of remnant insurgents is very small and they are only active in remote border areas.”128 In their
own words, the government saw the ceasefire and Border Guard Force efforts during this period
as a success. Similarly, there is evidence in the NLM that diplomatic interactions with foreign
nations improved towards the end of the period. These perceived reductions in both domestic and

127

Khaing Myo Nyilar Aung 2008.

128

Aung Ze Min 2008.

256
international threats, in turn, improved the Tatmadaw’s conception of stability confidence, a
factor which had crippled the democratization efforts in the earlier period.
It is important to note that, while elections did take place at the end of this period, they
were not free and fair, and the dependent variables of democratization and liberalization still did
not take place during this time. Much of the reason for the electoral laws limiting the
competitiveness of the 2010 general elections is due to the regime’s continued wariness about the
political threat posed by the National League for Democracy, and the Tatmadaw’s continued
insecurity with regard to their own immunity and victory confidence. The National League for
Democracy was widely seen as the legitimate government of Myanmar long after the 1990
election results were annulled, and the content analysis of the New Light of Myanmar reveals
that, while the government’s tone softened towards both armed ethnic groups and the
international community during this period, the government-mouthpiece newspaper was utilized
to downplay or dismiss the influence and legitimacy of the NLD. Unfair elections in 2010 meant
that the Myanmar government could protect themselves from the immunity threats that still
haunted them from the 1990 elections.
Finally, as H2C states, the institutional design that took place during 2003-2010,
particularly the development of the constitution and electoral laws, would lay the groundwork for
more robust democratization and liberalization efforts in the 2011-2015 period. The next chapter,
“Letting Go of the Tiger’s Tail?” will explore how the institutional changes occurring during this
crucial interim period of 2003-2010 pushed Myanmar closer towards true political change in the
later period.

CHAPTER 6
LETTING GO OF THE TIGER’S TAIL? (2011-2015)

This chapter examines the time period of 2011-2015, during which more concrete steps
(such as the 2012 by-elections and 2015 general elections) were taken and evidence of the
transition threshold appeared. My hypotheses for this chapter are as follows:
H3: Institutional design during 2003-2010 laid the groundwork for steps
toward political liberalization from 2011-2015, which led to a
liberalization process that snowballed beyond the military’s initial intent.
H3A: The electoral results in 2011 and 2015 were upheld by the
military due to institutions (namely the constitution) which gave
them immunity confidence and stability confidence, crucial factors
which were absent during the failed transition of 1988-2002.

Analysis

The dependent variables in this chapter are 1) democratization, which I
operationalize as freely and fairly-contested elections wherein opposition parties are able
to contest with the military-backed parties on equal playing ground and wherein the
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results of elections are respected and upheld,1 and 2) political liberalization, which
consists of the opening of other civil and political liberties such as freedom of the press,
the release of political prisoners, and the legalization of civil society associations and
activities. 2

External/International Pressure 3

The Obama Administration pushed on with their policy of pragmatic engagement during
the 2011-2015 period, despite criticism from some members of Congress who believed that
engagement with the Burmese regime without requiring them to first institute tangible political
changes would be a mistake.4 In August 2011, in response to some of the moderating gestures
that President Thein Sein had taken, the United States appointed Derek Mitchell as a special
envoy to Myanmar,5 a major diplomatic milestone between the two countries. In late 2011,

I am aware of the issues with defining Myanmar’s elections as “free and fair,” as there continue
to be disenfranchisement of certain populations (such as ethnic minorities, members of the
Sangha, and prisoners) and inaccurate voter lists, as well as concerns over voter intimidation and
electoral fraud. My definition of “freely and fairly contested elections” focuses more on
institutional barriers to opposition parties and particularly to whether those opposition parties are
able to win (and hold) seats in the Hluttaw. For more detailed information about defining free
and fair elections, see Goodwin-Gill 2006.
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Secretary of State Clinton requested Myanmar end its “‘illicit ties to North Korea’”, and in 2012
Myanmar responded by announcing it would abide by the UN resolution which banned the
purchase of military supplies or military training from North Korea.6 In response to the positive
changes taking place within Myanmar, particularly the 2012 by-elections, the United States
announced a bevy of positive changes in their policies toward Myanmar, including instating a
fully-accredited ambassador; a USAID mission in Myanmar; the expansion of non-profit
programs focused on enhancing such goals as democracy, health, and education in Myanmar; the
lifting of visa bans on certain government officials; and beginning to lift bans on exports of U.S.
financial services and investments in Myanmar. 7
Such improvements in interstate relations between the United States and Myanmar did
not come without missteps. “In 2014 there were concerns that Burma was backsliding. The
military resisted any further diminution of its power, and efforts to amend the constitution so that
Aung San Suu Kyi could run for president in 2015 had not been successful.”8 The United States
also froze the financial assets and extended economic sanctions against some people who had
repressed Myanmar’s democratic movement. 9
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How much of a role did the Obama Administration’s policy shift toward pragmatic
engagement play in the political transition in Myanmar during this time? Englehart notes that, for
the decades that Myanmar was ruled by a military junta,
U.S. and E.U. sanctions were never relaxed at any point…despite the fact
that it periodically made what were, for its members, significant
concessions….Rather than acknowledging these gestures, the U.S. and E.U.
responded with new demands….This failure to respond positively was
extremely costly for the U.S. credibility in particular; it undermined the
position of intelligence chief Khin Nyunt, the primary proponent of
improving relations with the West. He was subsequently purged. 10
This strategy of never yielding or engaging with the Burmese regime did not serve U.S. national
interests particularly well. While I argue that the changing U.S. policy towards Myanmar was not
the sole or main causal variable in leading to the democratization and liberalization in the 20112015 period, it was certainly a contributing factor. As Min Zin notes, there are five interrelated
variables which led to the political change in Myanmar: 1) the internal timeline developed by the
Roadmap to Democracy; 2) concerns that Myanmar had become overly reliant on China; 3) the
threat of domestic opposition; 4) “a recognition of the need to engage the West”; and 5) the
regime’s desire to improve their country’s development.11 So while changing diplomatic
strategies from Western countries were not the sole deciding factor in the democratization and
liberalization efforts during this time period, they still had a positive effect.
In interviews, Burmese citizens did mention the importance of the international
community on political changes in Myanmar, particularly the improved relations with the U.S.
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and the influence of China. Tin Min Htut stated that the United States “still hasn’t dropped
sanctions yet on some military-affiliated companies and cronies. Once these companies take
concrete steps to divest those companies from these individuals, the U.S. may remove
sanctions.”12 Wai Phyo Myint noted that “U Thein Sein’s government needed credibility [in the
wake of] international pressure [for free and fair elections] – this is why they allowed 2012 to go
well. Both the domestic pressure and international pressure were influential. The situation is so
much different from 1990…no one knew about this country in 1990.”13 U Pe Tin agreed that
international pressure made a difference in the 2011-2015 period. “We don’t have many friends
in the past. The only friend of our government was China – China is always thinking about
themselves and not how they can help our people….As the civilian government gains more
traction, with international help coming, we gain respect from the military.”14 Dr. Carole Ann
Chit Tha suggested that “When we were first sanctioned [by the U.S.], we struggled a lot – only
the people suffered, not the government. When the U.S. lifted sanctions, it helped the transition.
China didn’t agree with our relationship with the U.S.”15 Ultimately, the combination of the
Obama Administration’s policy of pragmatic engagement combined with the Myanmar
government’s assessment that increased interaction with the West would be beneficial led to
improved foreign relations during this time.

12

Tin Min Htut. Interview with Nicole Loring. Personal Interview. Yangon, June 14, 2016.

13

Wai Phyo Myint. Interview with Nicole Loring. Personal Interview. Yangon, June 17, 2016.

14

U Pe Tin. Interview with Nicole Loring. Personal Interview. Yangon, June 21, 2016.

15

Dr. Carole Ann Chit Tha. Interview with Nicole Loring. Personal Interview. Yangon, June 23,
2016.

262

Splits/Cohesion

The 2011-2015 period saw very interesting shifts in another variable which played a role
in the military’s willingness to allow for a transition towards democratization and liberalization –
splits and/or cohesion within the military itself. While in the past, reported splits had occurred
between current military members with different allegiances (such as having attended a
particular military school), this period saw divisions take place between current military
members, some of whom serve as military appointees within the parliament, and former military
members joining as elected officials. In the 2011 election, the SPDC backed the USDP, meaning
that the NUP was, in effect, an opposition party. This represented “the institutionalization of a
major fault line within the military…. the junta is now institutionally divided between current
and former officers. These groups now have divergent interests.” 16
What are those differing interests? Military appointees to the parliament do not retire or
resign from the military, and keep receiving their salaries as members of the armed forces, as
well as the same daily stipend that civilian members of parliament receive. 17 In addition, being
appointed to parliament does not prevent an officer from also receiving internal promotions
within the military, as seen in the case of Brigadier General Thet Tun Aung who was promoted
from an army colonel to a one-star general while still serving as a military MP.18 While former
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military members who were elected to parliament must serve the constituents who voted for
them or risk losing reelection, the military-appointed MPs owe their allegiance to the Tatmadaw.
Despite the preferential treatment afforded by their military status, however, there is evidence
that the military-appointed members of parliament are cooperating with civilian MPs.
Contrary to expectations that they would vote in a bloc against opposition
motions, military legislators supported a motion in the lower house calling
on the president to grant a general amnesty for political prisoners.
Interviews with members of parliament (MPs) revealed that after some
initial mistrust, relations are improving between elected and military
representatives, and the two-groups engage in discussions on issues of
shared interest in the corridors of Parliament. 19
The willingness of military appointees to support a motion which may arguably go against the
Tatmadaw’s institutional interests is a fascinating and important indicator that democratization
attempts may indeed be extending beyond the scope that the military originally intended.
In addition to the opinions and viewpoints of military higher-ups, it is also important to
consider the cohesion of the military rank and file. The Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies
conducted a fascinating study in 2015 involving interviews with 67 Myanmar soldiers. 20
Common themes that came out from these interviews included a desire for national unity and
peace between the armed forces and armed ethnic groups, the obligation of soldiers to obey the
orders of their commanding officers, and recent improvements in development and technology
which affect people’s daily lives. Many participants stated that they viewed their role as merely a
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job – one soldier stated, “I get my salary and it’s enough to live.” 21 Many rank and file soldiers
described their experiences on the battlefield as “terrifying” 22 and also discussed the negative
treatment they experienced from civilians due to their affiliation with the Tatmadaw.
‘Villagers do not want to welcome us because we are Tatmadaw soldiers.’
Soldier’s children were discriminated against if they attended schools
outside of the military camp, and found it difficult to make friends. Soldiers
explained that the negative perceptions against them were due to the
misconduct perpetrated by some soldiers, such as looting, raping, stealing,
or taking villagers’ domestic animals.23
Interviewers also asked soldiers whether they planned to stay or leave the Tatmadaw, and
respondents were split. Most soldiers who indicated a desire to stay cited a desire to protect
Myanmar from foreign invasion as well as “the benefits that military life provides, coupled with
their lack of employable skills.”24 This study, while modest in its scope, provides valuable
insight into the often-ignored members of the Tatmadaw who nonetheless are crucial for the
success of the ongoing peace process, as well as the country’s democratization and liberalization
efforts.
Burmese citizens’ opinion of the Tatmadaw has certainly improved in recent years,
particularly after the 2015 elections. Okka Oo noted that “People are not as negative about the
military as they used to be, but they want the military out of politics. The military has its rightful

21

Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies 2015, 34.

22

Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies 2015, 35.

23

Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies 2015, 36.

24

Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies 2015, 37.

265
place, which is not the Hluttaw.”25 Tin Min Htut stated that “I think the military didn’t mean for
this [transition to the NLD government] to happen. There was a split within the USDP.”26 Dr.
Carole Ann Chit Tha suggested that “The younger military generation is better, but they are
being pressured [by the older military members].” 27 Edward Ziwa Naing had more positive
feelings towards the military than most, saying “I may be unpopular for saying this, but our
military is always changing, learning, and evolving. They know they have to change in order to
survive as an institution. In the near future, I believe they will continue to be involved. However,
they will take orders from the new government. They are taking the changes quite well.” 28
Tharawon (Pyay) described the complicated feelings many Burmese citizens feel towards the
Tatmadaw;
Everyone wants the military out of politics, but we cannot get them out
because of the constitution. They will leave when they think they can – it is
up to them. They worry about their future, and about the former generals.
When the young generals think they former generals are safe, only then will
they leave politics…. Before 1988 we had the feeling that we loved our
soldiers and our military. When they came back from war, the whole town
welcomed them back with flowers. That feeling we will never get back,
even now. There is a big wall between civilians and military, but the degree
is a little bit going down. It’s up to the military whether this fall continues
going down…. I don’t hate the military – every country needs a military to
protect the country. I want them to be professional, not sitting in parliament
doing what politicians need to do.29
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By setting up institutional protections for themselves, the Burmese military was able to start
taking steps back towards the barracks during the 2011-2015 period without having to fear
potential repercussions, which was further augmented by the reduction of threats during this
time.

Threat Perception

As discussed in the previous chapter, the regime’s perception of internal threats
decreased markedly in the 2003-2010 period, due to the success of ceasefires between armed
ethnic groups and the army. Despite this, during the 2011-2015 period, another threat rose to the
forefront, although the issues underlying the threat were not new. In 2012, violence between
Arakanese30 Buddhists and a Muslim minority group called the Rohingya 31 in Rakhine state
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Burmese citizens living in Rakhine (Arakan) State.

Pronounced ro—HIN—ja. The name Rohingya is quite controversial in Myanmar, as Burmese
citizens claim that the Rohingya are not a “legitimate” ethnic group but are instead illegal
immigrants from Bangladesh who call themselves Rohingya and are merely looking for
economic gains in Myanmar. The international community, on the other hand, has lampooned
Myanmar’s treatment of the Rohingya for being ethnic cleansing and/or genocidal. The distrust
between Burmese Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims dates back to the colonial period and is
rooted in religious, ethnic, and cultural differences, as well as fears of invasion and terrorism.
For more discussion of the roots of the conflict, see Taylor (2015a) and Calamur (2017). My
personal take on the situation is that the treatment of Rohingya certainly constitutes human rights
abuses and ethnic cleansing/genocide. I hesitate, however, to blame one particular person or
group for this situation. The conflict is deeply historical and rooted in colonial legacies that are
difficult to erase, particularly in current political climate where misinformation about the
Rohingya abounds on Facebook and other social media platforms. The solution to this issue will
not come quickly or easily.
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broke out after a Buddhist woman was raped, allegedly by Muslim men. This incident led to
religious violence against the Rohingya living in Rakhine state, leading to the internal
displacement of approximately 140,000 Rohingya people,32 the destruction of more than 1,000
homes and buildings, and the reported deaths of some 43 people.33
The background of the conflict between the Arakanese Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims
is complicated and dates back to British colonialism and the Burmese independence movement.
The British policy of ruling Burma directly and ruling other parts of the Indian subcontinent
indirectly contributed to early feelings of ethnic division and resentment towards those of Indian
heritage.34 “Burmese nationalists saw themselves as colonized twice, first by the British,
secondly by the Indians who, in particular, dominated the economy.”35 In the decades after
Burmese independence, some Muslims fought a separatist rebellion in an attempt to annex their
own territory near Pakistan and what is now Bangladesh. 36
In 1982, the BSPP passed a citizenship law that identified eight ethnicities 37 entitled to
Burmese citizenship, and the Rohingya were not included. 38 It is important to note that religion
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and ethnicity were “twin themes in the Myanmar nationalist narrative”, 39 as Buddhism became
synonymous with Burmese-ness. The Sangha play an important political role in Myanmar, as
evidenced by their leadership in protests in 1988 and 2007, and some extremists within the
Sangha more recently have used the narrative of “Buddhism in danger” as a dog whistle to stoke
religious and ethnic tensions, leading to the rise of the so-called 96940 movement, the group Ma
Ba Tha and its leader, U Wirathu, 41 who has referred to himself as the Burmese Bin Laden. 42
Many Burmese citizens believe that “The truth is that this term, Rohingya, was never widely
known, or even used by most ordinary Muslim-Bengalis…When asked, ‘What is your ethnicity
[lu myo]?’ They immediately answer ‘Bengali.’ This term ‘Rohingya’ was simply invented by
the educated upper class Muslims of this area.”43 The argument that the term Rohingya was not
used or mentioned in British colonial texts is frequently referenced to undermine the Rohingya’s
claims to citizenship.
The rise of religious extremism in response to the Rohingya issue also points to another
factor that plays a role in this quagmire – the fears of terrorism, particularly terrorist groups who
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purport to be Muslim. The ongoing conflicts in Rakhine state have led to the rise of a new
militant group, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), who may have links to groups in
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. 44 ARSA was responsible for attacks on Burmese military security
outposts and other buildings.45 “The Burmese fear a Rohingya autonomous area along the border
with Bangladesh would come at the expense of Rakhine territory. The Burmese military, which
has cracked down on Rohingya civilians, views this as a possible staging area for terrorism by
groups like ARSA.”46 This fear is reflected in the frequent use of terms in Burmese such as
“violent Bengalis” when referring to the Rohingya. 47
While Rohingya are not eligible for citizenship, and therefore do not have the right to
vote, President Thein Sein did pursue a policy of allowing those who held white temporary
registration cards to vote in the 2008 constitutional referendum and the 2010 national elections.
This legislation was opposed by both the Rakhine National Party and the National League for
Democracy, and while it was passed by the national legislature, public demonstrations led to
…. the President then promptly [announcing] that all White registration
cards would be withdrawn from 31 March 2015, thus disenfranchising more
than a million persons. In an election year, no politician, not even a Noble
[sic] prize winner, could be seen to be favouring what most Myanmar
consider to be illegal immigrants.48
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Indeed, perhaps the most important factor in the ongoing mistreatment of the Rohingya
people in Myanmar is not the role of the Tatmadaw, or the legacy of colonialism, but rather the
public opinion of Burmese citizens. It is perhaps unsurprising that militant nationalism has
developed in Myanmar due to its weak political institutions and the existence of political elites
who feel “deeply threatened by popular sovereignty.” 49 While prodemocracy activists and
international observers often cite the importance of a free press for the development of
democracy and liberalization, “rapid creation of a free press [can be] counterproductive because
open media can readily become vehicles for nationalism….a politically immature citizenry
served by a jejune media corps could feed nationalist demagogues.”50 Evidence for this can be
seen not only in the frequency of anti-Rohingya posts and false information about ARSA spread
on Facebook in Myanmar, but also in a poll of political parties’ stances on human rights that was
conducted by FIDH in Yangon in November 2015. Out of nineteen political parties who
participated in the poll, 42 percent refused to answer questions about Rohingyas altogether, 74
percent stated they would not amend the 1982 Citizenship Law to allow Rohingyas the right to
citizenship, and only 21 percent of parties agreed that the government should create laws dealing
with discrimination against religious minorities. 51 The findings of this survey reveal that while
democratization was coming to Myanmar in 2015, democratic institutions and culture were still
underdeveloped, meaning that acceptance of unpopular religious and ethnic minority groups is
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still a long way off. This perceived threat posed by the Rohingya people, even civilians who are
not associated with ARSA, is perhaps the most troubling and complicated challenge facing the
NLD government, who despite their purported support for human rights still find it difficult to
override public opinion against the Rohingya.
While the international community has widely criticized the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi
for failing to adequately deal with the Rohingya crisis or address the human rights issues
involved,52 many Burmese citizens view the issue as something that cannot be dealt with yet. Tin
Min Htut believes that Aung San Suu Kyi “is wise not to touch the race/religion topic yet,
especially the Rohingya issue. She has to consolidate power – she’s not a leader yet. If there is
no 25% military [in parliament], I think she would want to protect the Rohingya. Winning the
election is more important than anything else, then changing the constitution, then protecting
minorities.”53 Dr. Khin Maung Nyunt54 used the term “professional refugees” when describing
the Rohingya, alleging that the Rohingya are economic migrants who were prospering from
living in Myanmar and getting aid from the international community. The Rohingya people are
widely hated in Myanmar, and ARSA is seen as a domestic terrorist group, despite their lack of
power. As the conflict in Rakhine state continues, the treatment of the Rohingya people
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Some recent developments indicate that the Tatmadaw may be shifting in their response to
international pressure on the Rohingya issue. In response to sanctions levied by the European
Union on seven senior military officials in charge of operations against the Rohingya, the
Tatmadaw quickly announced that two of the generals had been fired (Reuters 2018b). Such a
quick response to international sanctions is quite striking when considering the Tatmadaw’s
resistance to pressure from foreign powers during earlier periods.
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approaches something close to diversionary use of force on the part of the Myanmar government,
who may have found a very convenient scapegoat to blame for the lack of development or peace
in the region.

Institutional Design

While the threat perception of the Rohingya crisis reveals the weakness in Myanmar’s
new democratic institutions, the time period of 2011-2015 still saw success in the development
of institutional design which had been mapped out in the Roadmap to Democracy. As Englehart
notes, while the 2010 elections were undoubtedly unfair, one should not assume that the
institutions created by the Tatmadaw will function exactly as they intended.
Even undemocratic elections and imperfect democracy may represent an
improvement in a sufficiently bad status quo and may also lead to
consequences not anticipated by the authoritarian rulers who sponsored
them…. What is most remarkable about the current moment is thus not that
the elections were seriously flawed – this was inevitable – but that they
happened at all. Prior to the election, the junta was in the strongest position
it had ever enjoyed”55
Indeed, democratic institutions and rule of law do not spring forth fully formed, but must instead
be “developed and nurtured.”56 The 2008 constitution and 2010 elections, even though they were
conceived of and developed by the regime in an attempt to “improve its international and
domestic legitimacy”,57 nevertheless forced the SPDC to allow the functioning of opposition
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parties as well as creating new divisions within the regime, particularly with the splits between
the interests of military members who serve as military representatives versus those who ran for
office.
The role of the military representatives in the Hluttaw has changed since 2011, and the
evolution of these roles is quite interesting. Very few of these military legislators were highranking, with just three colonels in the Pyithu Hluttaw and two in the Amyotha Hluttaw.58 In
2012, however, Vice Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing switched out fifty-nine low-ranking
officers in the parliament with higher-ranking senior officers, including four brigadier generals in
both the Pyithu Hluttaw and Amyotha Hluttaw.59 It appears that a culture shift may be taking
place within the Tatmadaw, wherein officers are expected “to devote a few years of their
soldiering career to non-combat and administrative functions, including as legislators. The image
of responsible officers devoted to public affairs, occupying a bureaucratic office for the good of
the nation, has long been a key element in the rhetoric of upper Burmese military circles.” 60 This
change, as well as the entrance of NLD members into government since 2012 and the willingness
of parliament to scrutinize the country’s military budget, something that would have been
unheard of just a decade ago, “has been a major factor in increasing public interest and trust
significantly…because the parliament [has] shown itself to be an institution independent of the
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government and military. The speed with which this independence was achieved has been as
much a surprise to representatives in parliament as it has been to observers.”61
Burmese citizens certainly noticed institutional changes during this period. As Okka Oo
described it,
There was more excitement for the 2012 elections because the NLD and
Aung San Suu Kyi were running. Euphoria was in full swing. There were
still some doubts if this was going the right way – the Constitution had some
issues. However, it would be very difficult to go back now, after going this
far down the democratic process. I would say the political momentum we
see now started in 2012, with the excitement that the NLD and Aung Sang
Suu Kyi were playing a part in politics now…. Before the 2015 elections,
we thought the USDP will hold on to power by hook or by crook. We
thought they might jeopardize the domestic stability or peace in order to
grab onto power if they didn’t like the results of the elections. We couldn’t
believe they would let go of power so easily.62
Tharawon (Pyay) agreed that the 2012 election results surprised citizens as well as the military
and led to fears that the government would null the results like they had in 1990. “The results of
2012 were a big surprise for the government – some people worried the government would null
the results. Some people said maybe we should let the USDP win the elections in 2010 and 2012
[to let the military feel more secure], then we can vote for the NLD in 2015.”63 Shine Zaw-Aung
believed that the Thein Sein administration expected a transition in 2020 rather than 2015, “but
now things have gotten good for them. [The transition] has lifted all boats. There were fewer
repercussions than they were expecting…. The military was too incompetent to even stuff their
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own ballot boxes. They thought they would win the elections, so they didn’t think they needed to
stuff the ballot boxes.”64 Tin Min Htut also expressed surprise that the Tatmadaw had allowed
the election results to stand in 2012 and 2015.
We have to give credit to the Thein Sein government. They were thinking
they would win – they didn’t think [a loss to the NLD] would happen now.
It’s like a sin of omission – here, people are afraid to tell the truth [that they
won’t vote for the USDP], so they lie, and the military doesn’t know. They
are afraid to tell someone their policy is bad…. There was writing on the
wall [that the military would lose the election] – the voter registry was not
done right. Now, I think the train has left the station and they can’t pull it
back anymore. Based on political polls, the USDP didn’t think they would
lose. They thought the ethnic parties and the Farmer’s Party would vote with
them. Many [ethnic people in polls] said they would vote for their ethnic
party, but they would vote for the NLD just once in 2015 to give Aung San
Suu Kyi a chance.65
Even U Shwe Mann, former head of the USDP, believed that his party would win the 2015
elections. In a government report, U Shwe Mann stated that “I told her [Daw Aung San Suu Kyi]
to hold an appropriate office and support me if I won [the election]. I said it was up to her if she
won. I am not a turncoat.”66 Critics point out, however, that such a move in supporting the NLD
leader could also be in response to the uncertainty of his future with the USDP,67 from which he
was expelled in August 2015.68
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One person who was not surprised by the 2015 election results, Edward Ziwa Naing,
suggested that the military did not fix the 2015 election results for several reasons. “1) The
international community was watching carefully; 2) The outgoing government had lots of
insurance mechanisms in place, and 3) [The USDP] was misinformed and thought they would
win.”69 He went on to note that “The downfall of the USDP was that they cannot separate the
military and the party, and the government and the party.” 70 U Pe Tin, an NLD party official in
North Okkala, also was not surprised by the NLD’s victory and the handover of power from the
military to the NLD in 2015.
The objective of the military is for the benefit of the whole country, not
selected generals – they realized this, that is why they opened their arms to
the Lady’s party. Why did the military agree to the change? The new
military generation is replacing the old generation, the whole country
supported the NLD and the military has to do according to the people’s
views, and the international community stands behind the NLD.71
Through the rules laid out in the 2008 Constitution, the military was able to protect itself from
negative consequences which may have otherwise followed their loss in the 2015 elections.
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Democratization and Liberalization

Of course, the most crucial question of this period is whether Myanmar experienced an
increase in democratization and liberalization as a result of the Roadmap to Democracy. This
section will explore whether these two dependent variables increased during the 2011-2015
period.
This project operationalizes democratization as freely and fairly-contested elections
wherein opposition parties are able to contest with the military-backed parties on equal playing
ground and wherein the results of elections are respected and upheld. I operationalize political
liberalization as the opening of other civil and political liberties such as freedom of the press, the
release of political prisoners, and the legalization of civil society associations and activities. As
noted previously, democratization and liberalization are often, although not necessarily, related,
and the advancement of one does not automatically mean that the other will also increase. It is
generally understood that the emergence of liberalization through the extension of rights during a
political transition often “triggers a number of (often unintended) consequences which play an
important role in ultimately determining the scope and extension of that process.”72 Such
unintended consequences include an observed phenomenon in many cases that “once some
individual and collective rights have been granted, it becomes increasingly difficult to justify
withholding others. Moreover, as liberalization advances so does the strength of demands for
democratization.”73 As O’Donnell and Schmitter’s seminal work on regime transitions

72

O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 7.

73

O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 10.

278
concludes, transitions to democracy are usually “nonlinear, highly uncertain, and imminently
reversible.”74 The goal of this project is to map this nonlinear process which has occurred in
Myanmar.
Many observers have noted that, due to the position of power that the Tatmadaw had
created for itself with institutional protections for its economic and political interests, “the
military leadership could finally afford to experiment with liberalization and even partial
democratization” 75 during the 2011-2015 period. There were certainly some major improvements
made on the liberalization front under the Thein Sein government, including cooperation and
reconciliation with Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD; the initiation of a peace process between the
government and multiple armed ethnic groups; the release of hundreds of political prisoners and
the creation of a commission to oversee other cases; reduction of press censorship with the
abolishment of the Press Scrutiny and Registration Division; and a general increase in civil
society and increasing numbers of nongovernmental organizations operating in Myanmar. 76
Additionally, “Private and foreign media coverage of parliamentary sessions was allowed since
October 2011”,77 contributing to an increase in governmental transparency under the new
government.
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One way to measure an increase in liberalization during this period is to use the Freedom
House “Freedom in the World” annual scores. Freedom House is an independent watchdog
organization which analyzes the level of civil liberties and political rights in all the world’s
countries each year and categorize them as Free, Partly Free, and Not Free. They measure civil
liberties through questions about freedom of expression and belief; associational and
organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights. 78 They measure
political rights using questions about the electoral process, political pluralism and participation,
and functioning of government. The countries are then given a rating between 1 and 7 for both
categories, “with 1 representing the greatest degree of freedom and 7 the smallest degree of
freedom.”79 The two scores for civil liberties and political rights are then averaged together to
create the country’s freedom rating for the year. Countries with a freedom rating of 1.0-2.5 are
considered Free, countries with a freedom rating of 3.0-5.0 are considered Partly Free, and
countries with a freedom rating of 5.5-7.0 are considered Not Free. Figure 32 shows the annual
Freedom House scores for Myanmar during the 2011-2015 period.
As this graph shows, in 2011 Myanmar started out with a score of 7 in both civil liberties and
political rights, the worst possible score. In 2012, the civil liberties score improved slightly as it
dropped to 6, and in 2013, both the civil liberties and political rights scores dropped to 5 and 6,
respectively. The political rights scores remained consistently at 6, while civil liberties worsened
slightly in 2015, rising from 5 to 6. This shows that important aspects of civil liberties and
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political rights were improving, albeit slightly, during this time, and indicates the start of
liberalization in Myanmar.

Freedom House Ratings for Myanmar 2011-2015
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Figure 32: Freedom House ratings for Myanmar 2011-2015.

Despite these improvements in many indicators of liberalization, however, there were
still some illiberal practices taking place. While the 2008 guarantees many different individual
rights, those rights are still “fully subject to security concerns. Although the reform process has
opened the door to new freedoms over the past two years, they have not been enshrined in
law.”80 In the lead-up to the 2015 elections,
…the armed forces have appeared less tolerant of criticism and dissent,
obviously no longer accepting blame as in the early months of the
transitional process. Despite the considerable easing of censorship since
2012, each time local journalists have bluntly criticized the army, as an

80

Clapp and DiMaggio 2013, 8.

281
institution or targeting only one of its members, the reporters, bloggers and
photographers were hunted down and brought to court. 81
Additionally, the continuation of abuses against the Rohingya, violence in Rakhine state, the
military seizing land owned by civilians, and crackdowns on journalists all point to areas of
needed improvement for Myanmar’s ongoing liberalization efforts. 82
Interviews with Burmese citizens revealed largely positive perceptions of the regime’s
liberalization efforts. NLD member U Maung Maung told me, “If we had this talk 20 years ago,
we three [interviewees] would go to prison and you would be deported! Now we can talk freely,
no more worries, ‘freedom from fear.’” 83 He went on to observe the difference in his life now
that liberalization efforts allowed opposition parties to operate more freely;
I gained more respect from my community since the NLD was in
government. People used to think it was a risky job to work for the NLD –
I could be detained; my life was in danger. People used to think that NLD
members should be avoided, they don’t even say hello to me. Now everyone
says hello. They were afraid to deal with the NLD. The military intelligence
was always following me, keeping tabs. Only after 2015 did the military
stop spying – that’s when I think things really changed. I’ve been wearing
shirts with Aung San Suu Kyi and Bogyoke Aung San on them since the
1990s. I was even detained. It is an honor to be detained for political
reasons. 84
Htay Htay Win was surprised by improvements in freedom of speech during the 2011-2015
period. “Politically if you wanted to criticize the regime, you had to be careful. [Now we]

81

Egreteau 2016, 88.

82

Morrison, Hiebert, Cullison, Summers, and Angelo 2014.

83

U Maung Maung. Interview with Nicole Loring. Personal Interview. Yangon, June 21, 2016.
“Freedom from fear” is a reference to Aung Sau Suu Kyi’s 1990 speech of the same title.
84

U Maung Maung. Interview with Nicole Loring. Personal Interview. Yangon, June 21, 2016.

282
encourage people to stand up for their own rights. If they government doesn’t help you, they
won’t have your vote in five years. This is the fruit of democracy. In the past we never dreamed
of this.”85
Another topic that came up when discussing liberalization in interviews was censorship
and press freedom. Journalist and editor Okka Oo spoke about the massive shift in what
journalists can write now compared to in previous periods;
The people of Myanmar are funny. When they love a group, they love it and
every member of it without exception. For some people, the [NLD]
government is like their own baby – you can’t say anything bad about them.
As a journalist, it’s a little like the old days – you couldn’t criticize the old
regime for fear of going to jail. Now you have to be careful of criticizing
the new regime because people will stop buying your newspaper if you are
too critical of them. 86
Tin Min Htut suggested that the NLD was still a safer target for criticism than the old regime – “I
see discontent on Facebook towards the NLD. You can still be charged for posting about the
military – it is safer to criticize the NLD.”87
As with liberalization, it appears that Myanmar’s progress towards democratization is
largely positive with some caveats. While there were still issues with the 2012 by-elections,
many feel that “Given the military government’s complete freedom from accountability before
the constitutional referendum of 2008, any change is an improvement. Even a rigged election
may represent progress if what it went through before was bad enough.”88 Steady improvements
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in electoral practices from 2010 to 2012 and then to 2015 show that democratization is slowly
taking place, as defined by free and fair elections which can be contested by opposition parties
and have their results upheld. As Pederson observed prior to the 2015 elections,
By legalizing the NLD and granting it a national political platform, the
government has all but guaranteed that its own party, the USDP, will lose
the 2015 elections. At the same time, broader society has been mobilized in
unprecedented ways that significantly increase the risk of a popular
backlash to any future regressive steps. The genie is out of the bottle, and
the current leadership has released it both knowingly and willingly. 89
(Pederson 2014, 30).
Since my measurement for democratization depends on electoral practices and outcomes,
comparing Myanmar’s elections will help to establish any changes in democratization during the
time periods covered by this project. Table 6 shows how the different aspects of the
democratization variable changed in the 1990, 2010, 2012, and 2015 elections.
Table 6: Democratization Factors in Myanmar’s Elections
Year
Freely and fairly
Opposition parties able
contested?
to contest equally?

Results of elections are
respected and upheld

1990

Yes

Yes

No

2010

No

No

Yes

2012

Somewhat

Yes

Yes

2015

Somewhat

Yes

Yes

One of the most convincing pieces of evidence that Myanmar’s nascent democracy is
strengthening can be seen in the political process within parliament. Between 2011 and 2016, the
Pyidaungsu Hluttaw enacted 232 pieces of legislation, and with more experience came optimism
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on the part of MPs. “Questions began to be raised on topics once deemed too sensitive to
address, including abuses of power by local military authorities and the fate of political
prisoners. Lawmakers started to openly challenge most proposals for new legislation put forward
by the executive.”90 Another example in the maturation of Myanmar’s new system of checks and
balances can be seen when an overwhelming number of MPs voted to impeach all nine judges on
the Constitutional Tribunal for “curtailing the parliamentary committees’ reach on the issues
raised by Parliament.” 91
While there is evidence that democratization is occurring within Myanmar’s recent
elections, and that democratic practices may also be strengthening, there are still some
weaknesses that must be addressed in the future. Arguably the most important threat to
democratization in Myanmar’s new political landscape is the 25 percent quota for military
members in the Hluttaw. Despite the undemocratic practice of reserving seats for unelected MPs,
however,
For the most part, the military has been a benign presence, its
representatives introducing no bills and submitting few proposals or
questions. Occasionally the Tatmadaw representatives have participated in
discussions. However, when called upon to vote on a bill or proposal that is
not contrary to the military’s interests, their involvement has been
unpredictable, and it remains unclear exactly whether their loyalties lie
more with the government, the parliament, or with neither. 92
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Another way democratization could improve in the future would be to appeal Article 59(f) of the
constitution, the clause aimed at barring Aung San Suu Kyi from the presidency, as well as
Article 436 which requires a 75% majority of Parliament to pass a constitutional amendment, 93
both of which remain in Myanmar’s constitution despite the NLD’s control of parliament. Until
such barriers to the presidency and amending the constitution no longer exist, democratization in
Myanmar must still be considered ongoing and not fully realized, as they prevent opposition
parties from overriding the will of the Tatmadaw.94
In addition to measuring changes in political rights and civil liberties during this time, it
is also worth examining the democratic maturity or democratic culture that is developing.
Democratic culture takes a long time to mature, as a citizenry which is unaccustomed to new
rights and liberties must learn about and understand the new political environment in which they
live. What does democracy mean? Why are the roles of the different branches of government?
What do citizens think about their democracy? How informed are they about their own political
system? These are the sorts of questions with which a society must grapple as democratization
develops further.
Certainly, in Myanmar, while democracy has been welcomed with open arms, the new
political system is not yet fully understood by many citizens, including even government
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In future research, I hope to expand on this measurement of democratization by looking at the
votes taken by Hluttaw members. As Kramer (2012) writes, “A good indication of democratic
progress would be for military representatives to vote independently, rather than as a block under
instruction from the army leadership. A further indication of the success of the longer-term
democratization process (after the 2015 elections) would be for the army to give up its right to
reserved seats” (11). It may be some time before this data is available, however.

286
officials. In a press conference on January 31, 2013, Shwe Mann addressed “members of the
executive and judicial branches who complain of parliamentary interference, [saying] that they
did not understand the role of a multiparty parliament in a democratic system, where it was
expected by the electorate to monitor and check the executive branch.”95 In 2014, the Asia
Foundation carried out a nationwide survey to measure public knowledge and awareness of the
new government and political system in Myanmar, interviewing over 3,000 respondents across
Myanmar.96 The results of this valuable survey showed that while the people of Myanmar are
generally very optimistic about the country’s transition to democracy, they still have quite
limited knowledge about the structure and functions of their government. 97 While respondents
expressed “a strong preference for democracy in the abstract and a high level of expectation that
voting will bring about positive change”, 98 there are also challenges in the form of low social
trust, polarizing political disagreements, and gender inequality.
Some results to specific questions are worth noting. When asked to name any branches of
government, a significant 82% of respondents were unable to name even one, and only 14%
could correctly name the executive, 3% the legislative and 2% the judicial branch. 99
Additionally, while over 95% of respondents reported that they voted in the 2010 elections,
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many respondents incorrectly believed that certain key government officials, such as the
president and chief minister, were directly elected by citizens. 100 When asked what percentage of
seats in parliament were reserved for military members, 68% of respondents said they did not
know and only 15% knew the correct figure.101
In addition to questions about the government branches and functions, the survey also
asked Myanmar citizens an open-ended question to define what they thought “democracy”
means. 53% of respondents cited “freedom,” 15% referred to “rights and law,” 11% mentioned
“peace” and 8% stated “equal rights for groups.” Notably, over one third of respondents (35%)
stated they did not know what constituted a democracy. 102 While many respondents (66%) stated
they felt free to express their political opinions, 51% of respondents in Rakhine State said they
did not feel free to do so,103 clearly in response to the ongoing difficulties in that region.
Additionally, levels of social trust in Myanmar are very low, as an “astounding 77% of all
respondents believed that, generally, most people cannot be trusted.”104 Similarly to the general
lack of knowledge about what democracy means, understanding of the term “federalism” is also
very low, with only 14% of all respondents having heard the term before. 105 Despite some
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growing pains and areas for improvement, however, a majority of Myanmar citizens (62%)
expressed optimism that Myanmar was headed in the right direction. 106
Some of these sentiments were echoed in my interviews. Okko Oo has noticed that
“People are not talking about politics as much anymore, now that the elections are over and the
new government is in place. People are more concerned about day-to-day concerns. People are
very optimistic about the new government – still enthusiastic about the change. The government
and people of Myanmar used to be on different sides…now we are on the same side.”107 Wai
Phyo Myint referred to the lack of democratic maturity as an issue during the 2015 elections,
stating, “I don’t think it was intentional [that the voter lists were flawed]. We have a lack of
experience and a lack of capacity.”108 U Pe Tin discussed the importance of establishing law and
order under the new civilian government in addition to relying on the international community,
because
Democracy in developed countries have restrictions and order. But
democracy is very transitional in Myanmar. People are not used to
democracy yet – we have to be careful. Myanmar’s democracy is just like a
kid, Western democracy is like a grandparent – they are holding our hand
and helping us walk the right way. The international community is very
important – they can encounter the military’s strength, they are strong. We
used to have two forces pushing against each other – the military and
democracy. We are very weak, but we are pushing together now. We need
someone pushing behind us.109

106

Asia Foundation 2014, 18.

107

Okka Oo. Interview with Nicole Loring. Personal Interview. Yangon, June 6, 2016.

108

Wai Phyo Myint. Interview with Nicole Loring. Personal Interview. Yangon, June 17, 2016.

109

U Pe Tin. Interview with Nicole Loring. Personal Interview. Yangon, June 21, 2016.

289
Indeed, while Myanmar has seen astounding changes in its efforts towards democratization and
liberalization in a short period of time, the country’s democracy is still very new and
underdeveloped. The following chapter will explore the findings of the content analysis for this
time period, and the conclusion chapter will discuss some of the most pressing issues with which
Myanmar must contend as it strives towards becoming a mature, liberal democracy.

CHAPTER 7
THE NEW LIGHT OF MYANMAR CONTENT ANALYSIS (2011-2015)

As in previous chapters, I conducted a content analysis of 100 editions of the New Light
of Myanmar, using a random date generator to randomly select 100 dates. Due to the generator’s
limit of 25 dates, I ran the randomizer 4 times to find separate dates in each of these four
different time periods: Jan 1, 2011 to March 31, 2012; April 1, 2012 to June 30, 2013; July 1,
2013 to September 30, 2014; and October 1, 2014 to December 31, 2015. This also ensured that
the randomly selected dates were not too heavily grouped in one year of the 2011-2015 time
period. If there was no publication on the date chosen, I used the randomizer to select another
random date.
Once I gathered the NLM edition from each randomly-selected date, I read them and
coded each article based on ten different subjects: diplomacy (which includes diplomatic calls,
ambassadors, delegations, travel of high ranking officials, funerals of high-ranking officials,
foreign aid, etc.); elections, political parties, and the National Convention; full-texts of speeches
and notifications or laws; insurgency or protests; business, industry, and construction (which
includes development, agriculture and visits from foreign businesspeople and tourists); editorials
and letters to the editor; non-political crimes; religion (including building new temples, visits by
foreigners related to religion, and donations to monks/nuns/temples); propaganda and slogans;
and miscellaneous (including sports, history, holidays, education, culture, arts, health, obituaries,
ads, engagements, etc.).
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There are seven subjects which were relevant for this chapter - diplomacy, elections/party
news, speeches and laws, insurgencies/protests, business, propaganda/slogans, and
editorials/opinion articles. Diplomacy is important for gauging changes in international pressure
on the regime, which is particularly important for gauging the military’s immunity and stability
confidence with regards to the risks of foreign interference (H3A). Articles related to
election/party news and speeches/laws are useful to gauge steps toward democratization and
political liberalization during this period (H3), as well as any possible reductions in the perceived
threats posed by opposition parties. Insurgency/protest articles can help determine whether the
regime perceived an improvement in relations with armed ethnic groups and therefore
experienced more stability confidence (H3A). As in previous chapters, business and
development articles may represent the economic benefits of continued steps toward
democratization and liberalization. Propaganda and slogans are used as a proxy measure for
gauging threat perceptions and confidence of the regime (H3A). Finally, opinion articles are
utilized as a qualitative measure of the regime’s messaging and shifting attitudes towards the
independent variables in question.
For this time period, I coded a total of 7,241 articles. I then counted the number of
articles on each subject for each randomly-selected date and entered those numbers into an Excel
table. This then allowed me to create graphs of the number of articles on each subject by date
from 2011-2015, to get a feel for trends in how often the government newspaper mentioned
certain topics. I created graphs for these seven pertinent subjects. Figure 33 charts diplomacy
articles during this time.
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Figure 33: Diplomacy articles 2011-2015.

There was a total of 363 articles in this period related to diplomacy, compared to 261
articles in 2003-2010 and 227 diplomacy articles from 1988-2002. There are two spikes in the
number of diplomacy articles worth noting. The first is around January 2012, when a number of
diplomatic visits took place, most notably the Executive Director of the ILO, who met with the
Democracy and Human Rights Committee Chairman of the Pyithu Hluttaw.1 The second spike in
articles took place in February 2014, when a delegation from the Human Rights Watch visited
and met with President Thein Sein. 2
The nature of articles about diplomacy stayed relatively constant from previous periods,
with many articles detailing the salutations and meetings between Myanmar officials and
diplomats from other states. Such headlines included “Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Speaker U Khin

1

New Light of Myanmar January 26, 2012.

2

New Light of Myanmar February 6, 2014.
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Aung Myint meets Cambodian Prime Minister” 3; “Union Foreign Affairs Minister U Wunna
Maung Lwin attends ASEAN-Summit and related meetings” 4; “Pyithu Hluttaw Speaker Thura U
Shwe Mann visits India” 5; “Malaysian PM’s visit, trip in recognition of Myanmar’s political,
economic and social reforms and its bid for democracy”6; “Foreign Heads of State/Government
send felicitations to President U Thein Sein” 7; “President U Thein Sein receives UN Resident
Representative, ASEAN Secretary-General”8; and “UEC chairman, Chinese ambassador discuss
general election.” 9
In a shift from the diplomacy articles in previous periods, many of these articles
highlighted Myanmar’s new democracy and highlighted the need for Myanmar to cultivate
relationships with other democratic states. In a 2011 article about Thura U Shwe Mann’s visit to
India, the NLM described the purpose of the trip thus;
The main intention of the visit is to foster the existing amity and observe
the parliamentary experiences and practices of India. Myanmar’s
democracy is in its infancy and thus needs experiences and practical
knowledge in democracy and parliamentary affairs and the visit intends to
study parliamentary experiences and practices of India and implementation

3
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4
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for national socioeconomic development through democracy system to
apply suitably in Myanmar for its development. 10
Another article about Thein Sein’s trip to meet with business executives in Turin, Italy, stated
that supporting the “social economic lives of Myanmar means encouraging democratization
process of the country” and that the “transitional process of the country took place nearly the
same time with Arab Spring, but the latter was stained with blood and anarchism while Myanmar
could pass through transitional period with peace and stability.” 11 The tone of articles on the
subject of diplomacy in previous periods have generally focused on positive interactions with
other countries as a strategy of legitimizing the Myanmar government, but this shift towards
discussing the democratic practices that still need to be improved in Myanmar reveals further
opening up towards the international community, as well as a willingness of the Thein Sein
administration to recognize that the democratization process was indeed just beginning.
There are two additional interesting developments in the diplomatic articles during the
2011-2015 period. The first is the regularity with which the newspaper mentioned diplomatic
interactions with the United States, a clear reflection of the increase and improvement of contact
between the two countries during this time. A number of U.S. delegations visited as part of the
Obama Administration’s policy of pragmatic engagement (e.g. “Deputy Pyithu Hluttaw Speaker
receives US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State”12; “Union FM receives US Deputy Assistant

10

“Pyithu Hluttaw Speaker Thura U Shwe Mann visits India” 2011.
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“President U Thein Sein meets leading business executives in Turin” 2014.
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New Light of Myanmar May 19, 2011.

295
Secretary of State”13; and “Union Religious Affairs Minister Meets US Charge d’Affaires” 14). In
addition to simply describing which officials met with American diplomats, however, some of
these articles detailed the conversations which took place. An article titled “Discussion on further
cementing of Myanmar-US relations” described a meeting between Pyithu Hluttaw Deputy
Speaker U Nanda Kyaw Swa and US Charge d’Affaires Michael Thurston, in which they
“discussed improvement in objective political affairs of the State, nation-building tasks of
Hluttaw, further strengthening of Myanmar-US relations in a cordial manner.”15 A 2012 article
described the ceremony award Aung San Suu Kyi with the Congressional Gold Medal, the
highest civilian award in the United States. The article also detailed her acceptance speech in
which she said “Under the leadership of the President [Thein Sein]…the legislative body which
is young but rapidly maturing and the entire Myanmar people who adore the democracy values
will join hands in full swing to march towards the deserved position in the modern world.”16
Finally, a 2014 article titled “Myanmar, US discuss rights to electioneering and constitution”
detailed a meeting between the Union Election Commission Chairman U Tin Aye and an
American delegation led by Tom Malinowski, in which they discussed the upcoming general
elections and best democratic electoral practices. 17 It is clear based on the tone of these articles
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“Nation-building task of Myanmar made possible by the reform measures instituted by
President U Thein Sein” 2012.
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that the Myanmar government had begun to embrace diplomatic interaction with the United
States more than in previous periods.
The last notable trend in NLM articles related to diplomacy was the frequency of
mentions of human rights, ever a contentious topic in Myanmar. A number of articles report on
meetings with international human rights commissions (e.g. “Union Minister receives German
human rights commissioner and ICRC rep”18; “ASEAN human rights declaration (draft)
completed”19; “Union FM discusses human rights with American expert” 20; and “UNHCR’s
regional coordinator visits Pyithu Hluttaw” 21). Certainly, part of the reason for this increase in
mentions of human rights can be attributed to the ongoing crisis in Rakhine State, as well as
refugee issues in other parts of Myanmar. The New Light of Myanmar recounted international
efforts in response to these crises, such as “Operations of UN agencies and INGOs in Rakhine
State….working on development undertakings related to the sectors of education, health,
vocational training, emergency patient transport, social affairs, transportation and drinking water
supply.”22 In a 2014 article titled “Myanmar expresses willingness to cooperate with Human
Rights Watch” 23 President Thein Sein pledged to work with representatives of Human Rights
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Watch, who likewise praised the improvements in civil liberties and political rights within
Myanmar in recent years. Another 2014 meeting between the Union Minister for Defence and
UNHCR representatives discussed the “matter of resettling Myanmar refugees in Thailand in
Myanmar, stressing the need to ensure security and stability, sustainable livelihoods for them and
clearance of landmines in the region where refugees will be resettled.” 24
Although the majority of these articles were focused on improvements in the Myanmar
government’s dedication to human rights and civil liberties, such beliefs still did not extend to
the Rohingya people. A 2013 article titled “Rohingya never been included among national races
of Myanmar”, Myanmar representative to the United Nations U Kyaw Tin objected to a
resolution about Rakhine State at the UN, asserting that while the Myanmar government will
“put an end to all acts of violence…protect the civilian population, and…ensure full respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms”, he also “reiterated the Myanmar delegation’s long
standing position against the use of the word, ‘Rohingya minority’ in the text.”25 Thus, while a
notable increase in positive stories about diplomatic interactions with the United States and
human rights improvements demonstrate shifts towards liberalization in Myanmar during this
time, it is also apparent that the simmering issues in Rakhine State continued unabated.
During the 2011-2015 period there were 143 articles relating to elections, political
parties, and matters relating to the Hluttaw, compared to 98 articles in 2003-2010 and 49 articles
between 1988-2002. The spike in articles in 2011 took place on March 24 and consisted of

“Union defence minister holds talks with UNHCR representatives on resettlement of refugees”
2014.
24
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“Rohingya never been included among national races of Myanmar” 2013.
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summaries from the first regular session of the Pyithu Hluttaw and the Amyotha Hluttaw. The
spike of articles in 2015, unsurprisingly, were related to the lead-up and results of the 2015
general elections. Figure 34 shows articles related to elections, political parties, and the Hluttaw.
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Figure 34: Elections/party/Hluttaw articles 2011-2015.

It was quite common during this period for the New Light of Myanmar to publish
descriptions of the votes and issues that had come up for votes in the Hluttaw in great detail.
Such articles were often spanned a number of pages, consisting of headlines such as “First
regular session of Pyithu Hluttaw continues for fifth day”26; “Undertakings of Hluttaw
concerning questions and proposals of Hluttaw representatives explained” 27; “Pyidaungsu

26

New Light of Myanmar March 8, 2011.

27
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Hluttaw approves to fund establishment of ASEAN Humanitarian Aid Center” 28; “Pyidaungsu
Hluttaw approves Bill Amending the Constitutional Tribunal Law”29; “Myanmar Special
Economic Zone Bill passed at Pyithu Hluttaw”30; “Pyidaungsu Hluttaw budget hearing starts” 31;
“Pyidaungsu Hluttaw forms implementation committee for constitutional amendment” 32; “VicePresident U Nyan Tun calls for participation of local people in ensuring rule of law”33;
“Myanmar Parliament reconvenes with talks on anti-terrorism bill, writ petition bill” 34;
“Reconstitution of election sub-committees coordinated” 35; “Pyithu Hluttaw discuss electricity,
electoral systems” 36; and “Speaker warns recall bill could have unwanted consequences” 37.
These articles all included the subjects discussed during the parliamentary meetings in great
detail.
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Many of these articles were, unsurprisingly, written with a positive tone towards the
Hluttaw. One such article, titled “It is vital important [sic] for country that representatives put
forward people’s desires to Hluttaw as questions, proposals, bills and laws,”38 elaborates on the
activities of a number of Hluttaw committees and states, “The Hluttaws play a key role in
Myanmar’s political transition which could be completed only through legislation not by
orders.”39 Another article titled “Hluttaw and its committees devote to social Hluttaw and its
committees devote to social contract for democracy promotion” 40 included the statements of one
Hluttaw member who stated, “Pyithu Hluttaw focuses on equal rights of the nation and its people
without party attachment, dogmatism, regionalism, racism and sectarianism. This is what
Hluttaw, Hluttaw representatives and Hluttaw committees are doing for democratic reforms.” 41
Some articles even delved into political debates within the Hluttaw. A fascinating article
titled “Constitutional tribunal will have to settle many disputes in the future: Lack of power to
pass final resolution may cause more problems” 42 appeared to contain an actual critique of
Myanmar’s political system, detailing the debate within the Hluttaw over how to deal with
amendments related to the Constitutional Tribunal. An article with the headline “Government
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needs to draw multiple strategies for Rakhine State” 43 included the controversial debate within
the Central Committee for Implementation of Peace and Stability and Development of Rakhine
State. The article even included statements by foreign diplomats who warned that the “internal
dispute could be turned into regional conflict due to matters related to freedom to worship and
freedom to travel.” 44 Such Hluttaw-related articles were clearly intended both to provide some
measure of transparency to the Hluttaw as well as to praise the new body for their efforts in
furthering Myanmar’s democratic transition. This was one of many notable efforts in the New
Light of Myanmar during the 2011-2015 period to ingratiate the new political order with
Burmese citizens.
In addition to portraying the new parliamentary system in a positive light, these articles
also revealed how the Myanmar government strove to use the New Light of Myanmar to
positively represent the new electoral process, particularly as the 2012 by-elections and 2015
general elections approached. Articles in 2011 and 2012 tended to focus on the establishment or
approval of new political parties to run in the by-elections (e.g. “Establishment of political
parties scrutinized, permitted” 45; “Formation of political party allowed”46). In early 2015, in
addition to party registration news, many of the articles highlighted the free and fair nature of the
upcoming elections (e.g. “Mass participation imperative for ensuring free, fair, transparent
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elections”47; “Nomination for Hluttaw candidates continues” 48; “UEC, UNDP discuss measures
for free and fair election” 49). As the 2015 elections approached, news articles began to include
information about the party platforms of the parties contesting the elections as well as publishing
when they would be appearing on television or radio (e.g. “Political parties launch TV
campaigns”50; “Media slots for three political parties announced” 51; “State media broadcast
campaign speeches” 52; “What they stand for: campaigns aired” 53; “Four party speeches to be
broadcast today”54). This is notable because it is the first time the state-run media helped to
advertise the messaging of opposition and minority parties. Interestingly, a number of front-page
articles with headlines such as “Myanmar president reshuffles cabinet” 55 and “NO ELECTION
DELAY: Union Election Commission makes a U-turn”56, which could be seen as yet more
attempts to show the transparency of the Thein Sein administration.
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As the 2015 elections neared, the NLM trumpeted the announcement of electoral lists
with the front page headline “32 mil eligible voters: Nationwide electoral registers to be
publicized in September.”57 A number of articles discussed the training that was being given to
poll workers (“Pyawbwe poll officers receive training” 58; UEC takes measures to prevent
multiple casting of votes” 59) as well as the presence of electoral observers (“EU mission
reinforced with third deployment of election observers” 60; EU’s election observer’s briefed on
election logistics in Pyawbwe Township” 61; “International observers visit polling stations in
Tatkon”62), which highlighted the improved electoral practices of the 2015 general elections.
Finally, the day of the general elections came, and with it came articles trumpeting the
great success of Myanmar’s electoral process. Headlines read “VOTES SWIFTLY TALLIED:
NLD dominates the first round of election results” 63; “UEC hails election a success, announces
first results”64; “ELECTIONS FREE & FAIR: EU observers praise Myanmar’s polls, but note
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some flaws”65; “NLD wins majority of seats in two days results”66; “Election results announced
by UEC”67; and “Asian election foundation applauds Myanmar’s readiness to embrace
democracy.”68 These articles contained effusive praise for the electoral results, containing
statements such as “It was the first held inclusive election in Myanmar in a quarter of a
century,”69 although some of the articles also contained quotes by electoral observers who
mentioned weaknesses in the electoral practices. The newspapers also included full lists of the
winning representatives which took up several pages, as shown in Figure 35.

Figure 35: 2015 Example of general election results published in NLM.70
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For the Thein Sein administration, although the 2015 general elections represented a loss in
parliament, the self-congratulatory articles published during this time reveal that the government
still saw the elections as a success in their efforts to bring about a more moderate, transparent,
and legitimate political system. This messaging came across in the speeches and notifications
published during this time as well.
The number of speeches and notifications published during the 2011-2015 period
increased to 46 articles, up from 37 in 2002-2010 and 28 in 1988-2002. It is not surprising that
there was an absolute increase in the number of speeches published during this time, since the
number of articles analyzed also increased. The peak in 2015 can be attributed to New Year’s
speeches as well as notifications about the upcoming 2015 elections. The other peaks in 2013 are
related to announcements of Hluttaw meetings, and the peak in 2014 is related to New Year’s
speeches. The themes that emerged in the speeches published during this period included
promoting and discussing the development of democracy in Myanmar; announcements by the
Union Election Commission and notices related to the Hluttaw or political parties; peace
between the government and insurgent groups; and international relations and diplomacy. Figure
36 shows these speeches and notifications.
Unsurprisingly, a large number of speeches and announcements published during this
time were related to the transition to democracy. In 2011, many of these speeches involved
praising the Tatmadaw’s efforts and warning that democracy was still developing. A speech by
Senior General Than Shwe stated that “The democracy system introduced to the Union of
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Myanmar is still in its infancy….In the process, it is mandatory for all national brethren to tackle
any forms of disruptions to the system.”71
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Figure 36: Speeches and notifications 2011-2015.72

One example of a notification praising democratic development in 2011 was Order No. 28/2011
which “commute[d] death sentences to life sentences and other prison terms by one
year…Thanks to the order, 14,758 inmates from jails and labour camps were discharged.” 73
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figure is not particularly helpful for understanding trends in this regard. The length of speeches,
however, was often quite significant, as some speeches took up multiple pages and made up a
significant proportion of the newspaper for that day. The tone and message of the speeches,
therefore, is more important for my purposes than the actual number of speeches.
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Initial speeches and notifications during this period were quick to praise the political changes,
but also careful to note that further efforts were required.
One interesting trend which began in the notifications published during this period were
announcements of cabinet reshufflings. It seems unlikely that the Myanmar government would
have published information about internal personnel changes in previous time periods. For
example, in 2012, Order No. 35/2012 described that a number of Deputy Ministers were
reshuffled and transferred to the Ministry of Electric Power.74 In 2013, Order No. 2/2013
announced that “Union ministers have been allowed to resign of their own volition.” 75 These
orders may be indicative of the government’s first tentative steps towards greater transparency.
One fascinating speech by U Thein Sein, published in full in 2014, reveals much about
how the Tatmadaw and former junta leaders viewed the current status of politics in Myanmar. He
describes the development of
a new political culture where different political groups avoided direct
confrontation and instead overcame challenges through negotiation and
dialogue…. the country’s main political group, the National League for
Democracy [NLD], led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and other political
parties have also actively organized forums and meetings to discuss
constitutional amendments. Just the fact that these activities have been held
in a free and open manner shows that the level of political maturity in our
country has risen…. We are now witnessing the emergence of the most
important indicator of a modern democratic society – the freedom to openly
discuss and debate politics.76
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It is striking how Thein Sein refers to the NLD as “the country’s main political group,” and the
emphasis he puts on free and open discussion of politics reveals how much more moderate the
government’s stance had become in the last decade of political changes. He also notes the
mounting pressure for constitutional amendments and cautions that national reconciliation,
“democratic attitudes and values,” and “national interests and sovereignty” 77 must be considered
if amendments are to be pursued. While this speech is notable for its emphasis on political
openness, Thein Sein still is playing the moderator role between the interests and concerns of the
military and the political demands of the populace.
The following year, U Thein Sein gave another New Year’s speech in which he stated,
We will hold the 2015 general elections in the coming year which will serve
as one of the most critical steps in our democratic transition process. If we
look back at our post-independence political history, we will notice our
inability to create an environment where all political stakeholders can
participate freely in an electoral process to shape the country’s destiny.
Instead we will see elections that are either protested or boycotted by one
or the other major political factions. Today…a new political culture where
we value finding solutions through dialogue is taking root in place of
unconstructive confrontational tactics. Because of this new political culture,
the 2015 elections will mark the first time since our independence where
elections will be contested by all the political stakeholders freely and
fairly. 78
This speech is notable because Thein Sein mentions the political environment from the previous
failed transition period (1988-2002) in which free participation in the electoral process was
unsuccessful. In his view, this was due to protests or boycotts by political factions, which is
reflective of how the junta had previously blamed the NLD, domestic protests, and insurgent
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groups for their failure to uphold the electoral results. Even the fact that he is admitting failures
of the previous regime, however, points to an improvement in regime transparency similar to the
announcements of cabinet reshuffles. In the 2011-2015 period, Thein Sein is openly pointing to
changes in the political environment which allow all political stakeholders to contest elections
freely and fairly.
In addition to speeches about democracy, another trend that appeared in the speeches and
notifications published during the 2011-2015 period were related to the Union Election
Commission and Hluttaw matters. Many of these announcements coming from the Union
Election Commission discussed various violations of electoral laws by Hluttaw candidates or
various party members. Examples of these announcements include titles such as, “Hluttaw
candidates and their election agents failed to submit election expenses in the prescribed period
declared as persons of distorted qualification.” 79
Other Union Election Commission announcements included changes or registration of
political parties, such as “Chin National Party allowed to change its name as Chin National
Democratic Party” 80; ”National Democratic Force…submitted its seal to be used”81; “The Chin
League for Democracy Party…applied for registration as a political party” 82; “the Kachin
Nationals Democracy Congress Party…submitted an application to change its seal” 83; and “All

79

New Light of Myanmar March 24, 2011.

80

New Light of Myanmar February 6, 2014.

81

New Light of Myanmar April 23, 2014.

82

New Light of Myanmar June 17, 2014.

83

New Light of Myanmar September 9, 2014.

310
Myanmar Kaman National League for Democracy Party…has submitted its application for the
registration as a political party” 84. The Hluttaw related announcements include notifications for
Hluttaw member replacements as well as announcements of the upcoming Hluttaw meetings.
Such notifications include “Two Defence Services Personnel Pyithu Hluttaw Representatives
substituted”85; “Ninth Regular Session of First Pyithu Hluttaw has been summoned to hold in
Nay Pyi Taw at 10 am on 13th Waxing of Pyatho”86; “Invitation letters have been sent to
Amyotha Hluttaw representatives”87; and “10 Defence Services Personnel Representatives from
Region and State Hluttaw substituted”88. Perhaps the most important Union Election
Commission announcement, however, is the statement on New Year’s Day 2015 about the
upcoming general elections. It reads,
Republic of the Union of Myanmar Union Election Commission
Announcement for 2015 general elections
1. The general elections will be held in late October/early November 2015.
2. A correct and accurate voter list needs to successfully hold the elections.
3. The Union Election Commission compiles the basic voter list for the 2015
general elections. 4. Every citizen has rights to cast vote for elections. Not to
lose the rights, they have to be included in the voter list. Citizens should
check voter lists for casting votes. 5. Citizens may request the respective subcommission to insert their names into the voter list through form No 3 if their
names are not included in the voter list. They may request to correct the
wrong facts through form No 4-C. They may object participation of those
who do not have rights to cast votes, through form No 4. 6. When you settled
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from one township to another, if you do not change household form 66/6,
your name will include in voter list of previous township. 89
Throughout 2015, the Union Election Commission continued to publish information about the
upcoming elections in the New Light of Myanmar.
The third trend in speeches and notifications was the discussion of peace and ceasefires
with insurgent groups. A speech by General Than Shwe published in 2011 echoes the anticolonial tone of previous periods – “The root causes that underlay the rise of fractious
sectarianism and the proliferation of splits are found to be the incentives that the colonialists
provided to expand their sphere of influence, the wedges of instigation and incitement that they
drove in a well-planned manner among colleagues, the arrogance born of overestimating oneself,
personal rivalries and underestimating others, jealousies, suspicions, and grudges.”90 In 2012, in
the wake of violence in Rakhine state, Notification No. 43/2012 announced the formation of an
investigation committee “was formed to expose the truth and take legal actions…[against]
organized lawless and anarchic acts that can harm peace, stability, and rule of law in Rakhine
State.”91 Soon, however, the tone of announcements related to peace efforts changed, perhaps in
an attempt to curry favor with involved groups or the international community. In 2013, the NLM
published a speech by President Thein Sein in preparation for cyclone season with the title
“Without racial, religious discrimination, relief works are to be carried out. Life-saving is a
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must.”92 In a 2014 speech, Thein Sein again took a more moderate tone about the insurgent issue,
stating, “If we are able to achieve the NCA [Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement], we will be able
to establish a code of conduct that will have to be followed for both sides which in turn will help
lower the number of clashes and reduce hostilities….NCA presents an unyielding foundation to
begin the political dialogue process which will allow us to find broad political solutions to our
political disagreements.”93 In addition to discussing the NCA, Thein Sein also mentioned the
ongoing crisis in Rakhine state, stating “Not only in Rakhine state but throughout the country, it
is important that each individual enjoys basic human rights and is treated with dignity regardless
of ethnicity, religion or even citizenship status….We have to handle it very delicately, owing
especially to the heightened tensions and emotions between the two communities.” 94 In a 2015
speech related to the NCA, Thein Sein said, “I am aware that some ethnic armed organizations
are currently not ready to sign or they require more time to make their decision. Our government
has no desire to leave anyone behind in the peace process…. the door is open for organizations
currently not ready to sign to participate in the peace process when they are ready.”95 These
quotes demonstrate the softening in tone that the Thein Sein administration took in speeches
about issues with national reconciliation and the peace process during the 2011-2015 period.
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The final trend in speeches and notifications was related to international relations and
diplomacy. One such announcement was a joint press release between Myanmar and the
European Union (EU) in the wake of a bilateral human rights dialogue. Representatives
discussed a number of human rights issues, including political prisoners and improving the
prisons in Myanmar, land and labor rights, the rights of migrants, non-discrimination, and the
protection of minorities.96 The open discussion of human rights issues and possible
improvements in Myanmar’s government-run newspaper is striking considering the denial of
such issues in previous time periods. This is not to say that discussion of human rights had
become completely open in Myanmar – another press release in 2015 was a defensive rebuttal
against Ms. Yanghee Lee, the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar
who criticized the treatment of the Rohingya people. The press release states, “As a principle,
Myanmar rejects country-specific mandates…as they do not create a conducive environment for
constructive engagement and genuine dialogue for promotion and protecting of human rights.”97
The press release also notes that “Myanmar continues to reject use of ‘Rohingya’ since the
people of Myanmar do not recognize that invented terminology.”98 While the Thein Sein
administration was certainly paying lip service to issues related to human rights and equal
treatment of minorities for an international audience during this period, these statements also
reveal that these beliefs were still quite limited in their scope, indicative of a democratic culture
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that has yet to mature. There were 58 articles related to insurgency and protests in 2011-2015, up
from 33 articles in 2003-2010 and 43 articles in 1988-2002. There are two spikes in these articles
during this period – the first was in January 2013 and the second took place in October 2015.
The spike in 2013 can be attributed to a clash between the KIA and the Tatmadaw in Kachin
State,99 while the jump in 2015 is due to a number of meetings between the government and
representatives of armed ethnic groups to discuss the potential ceasefire. 100 There were a few
noticeable trends in stories related to insurgencies and protests during this time, including the
reporting of terrorist attacks, events taking place in Rakhine state, a handful of stories related to
domestic protests, and ceasefire talks between the government and armed ethnic groups. Figure
37 shows articles relating to insurgency and protests.
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Figure 37: Insurgency/Protest/Ceasefire Articles 2011-2015
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While there was a decrease in stories about unrest due to insurgent groups in the latter
part of 2003-2010, the New Light of Myanmar published quite a few stories about attacks,
bombings, and kidnappings 101 perpetuated by these groups. Many of these reported attacks
targeted infrastructure such as railroads, bridges, and mines (e.g. “KIA blows up rail tracks
between Hopin and Nankhwin of Mandalay-Myitkyina railroad” 102; “Insurgents’ mine blast
destroys machinery of Public Works”103; and “Mine blast destroys bridge, railroad, causes traffic
delays”104), and the articles detailed the value of items destroyed in the attacks. As one article
stated, “Although KIA group is making pious sounding noises that they have only attacked
military targets, the incidents show that they are destroying railroads and bridges with mines
again and again.” 105 Indeed, the detailed reporting of such attacks certainly is aimed at portraying
these armed groups as a continued source of instability in the country, despite the relative
improvements in domestic politics during this period.
Some of these attacks did have human casualties (e.g. “KNU insurgents’ mine claims live
of one civilian”106; “Innocent civilian hit by KIA insurgents’ landmine” 107; “KIA mine blast
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leaves three dead and one injured in Phakant Township” 108; and “Landmines threaten lives in
Kachin State”109). A few articles even described direct clashes between the Tatmadaw and armed
ethnic groups (e.g. “KIA attacks military column, police outpost”110; “SSA [Wanhaing Group]
attacks Tatmadaw camp in Shan State” 111; and “Tatmadaw arrests three Kokang insurgents,
seizes arms and ammunition, narcotic drug” 112). Unsurprisingly, the tone of these articles is
decidedly negative towards the groups responsible. One article stated, “KIA (Kachin) Group has
been committing subversive acts using every trick in the book to undermine peace and stability
and rule of law of the State, to kill, harm and panic the innocent civilians.”113 In all, these stories
about attacks and skirmishes were most common in 2011 and 2012. As the period went on,
stories about the ceasefire became more common, although in later years the newspaper’s focus
also shifted away from unrest Kachin and Shan state and towards Rakhine state due to the
Rohingya crisis.
During the 2012 clashes in Rakhine State, the New Light of Myanmar reported on the
events with regularity. One article titled “Lawless acts occurred in Rakhine State in May, June
exposed” describes the findings of a 16-member government group who investigated “the attack
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of No.1 Police Station of Sittway by a mob that occurred on 3 June and [took] action against
those involved in the incidents that harmed community peace and prevalence of law and order in
accordance with the laws.”114 Another promises that the “Union government to prevent
confrontations between locals and INGOs in Rakhine State.”115 A 2015 article describes a
meeting between Myanmar and Bangladeshi ambassadors in which they “agree on repatriation of
boat people”116 (meaning Rohingya refugees). This article asserts that “Investigations by the
Myanmar government found that some of the boat people had fallen victim to human trafficking
rings and crime syndicates after receiving offers of work in Thailand and Malaysia from illegal
job brokers”117 and quoted one of the men saying he wanted to return home. While these articles
do not mention the Rohingya by name (which is to be expected, considering that it was the
Myanmar government’s policy not to use the term), the publishing of stories about this specific
conflict reveals its growing importance in the 2011-2015 period.
One type of article in this category which saw a marked decrease compared to the 20032010 period were those related to domestic protests. Only two such articles appeared in the New
Light of Myanmar editions that were coded, and both were published in 2015. The first, titled
“Government sought peaceful protest resolution”, 118 laments that “The forced dispersal of
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student protestors by police was ‘a sorrowful incident,’ but the government tried as hard as it
could to achieve a peaceful settlement in line with its policy.”119 This article still blamed the
protestors for the unfortunate incident, alleging that “the student protestors’ decision to march to
Yangon instead of choosing democratic or parliamentary processes was the cause of the
conflict.”120 A second article described how Yangon was put on “Orange Alert”, meaning a high
security presence in the city, from the start of November until the 2015 general elections were
held. 121 The low number of articles about domestic protests during this 5-year period show how
the Thein Sein administration faced fewer protests than in previous periods.
Finally, throughout 2011-2015, the New Light of Myanmar detailed the government’s
efforts toward reaching a ceasefire agreement with many of the armed ethnic groups. The
newspaper often described the details of peace talks with specific groups (e.g. “Six points agreed
in Union level peace talk with Klo Htoo Baw [former DKBA]”122; “Peace agreement signed
between Union level peace-making group and Shan State Progressive Party [SSPP]/Shan State
Army peace-making group” 123; “Union Peace-Making Work Committee, KIO sign agreement
after three-day peace talks” 124; and “Union Peace-Making Word Committee, ABSDF reach four-
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point agreement” 125). Most of these agreements included a clause promising that the armed group
would not secede from the Union in order to “ensure non-disintegration of the Union,
nondisintegration of national solidarity and perpetuation of sovereignty at all times based on
Panglong spirit.”126 Similar to trends in 2003-2010, there were also stories detailing armed group
members surrendering or giving up arms (e.g. “42 KIA members exchange arms for peace”127;
“KIA group returns to legal fold” 128). These stories undoubtedly were aimed at persuading other
group members to follow suit.
KIA members have suffered a great loss and casualties in engagement with
the military columns with their heath [sic] deteriorating because of terrible
weather and poor conditions…. The situation was worse as many were also
injured or killed themselves in mine attacks. Many regretted fighting
meaningless wars, killing innocent civilians, damaging communication
links, and roads and bridges. So many a number of KIA members have
left…Kachin people are much overjoyed to see KIA members returning to
legal fold en masse. 129
The message that people should not support these groups was also reinforced with the statements
of government officials, such as the Union Border Affairs Minister asserting that “People should
never ever be swayed by instigations of any armed group and political organizations.” 130
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As the 2011-2015 period went on, efforts to reach a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement
(NCA) ramped up. An article titled “Gov’t, ethnic armed groups optimistic of ceasefire deal after
Day 2” by Ye Myint detailed the daily ceasefire discussions between the government and
participating armed groups.131 In September 2015, an article trumpeted “PEACE DRAWS
NEARER: Tentative agreement to sign ceasefire in October.”132 Soon thereafter, it was reported
that “International and local observers will witness the signing of the nationwide ceasefire
accord, which is scheduled to take place on Thursday [October 15, 2015] in Nay Pyi Taw.”133
Such discussions continued through the end of the year (e.g. “Pyidaungsu Hluttaw discusses
NCA”134; “Civil society organisations urge armed groups to hold talks with govt” 135). Those
groups who signed the NCA were rewarded by being “removed from the government’s list of
unlawful associations and terrorist groups.”136 Achieving the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement
was one of the Thein Sein administration’s most pressing goals, so it is unsurprising that the
government-run newspaper put so much emphasis on every step forward towards that goal. The
more groups who signed on to the NCA, the more stability confidence the government gained.
There was a total of 454 articles related to business and development during the 20112015 period, compared to 462 articles in 2003-2010 and 226 articles during 1988-2002. As in

131

Ye Myint 2015a.

132

New Light of Myanmar September 10, 2015.

133

Ye Myint 2015b.

134

New Light of Myanmar December 8, 2015.

135

New Light of Myanmar December 8, 2015.

136

“Five more ethnic groups removed from unlawful list” 2015.

321
previous periods, there is no noticeable trend or particular date that experienced notable spikes in
the number of articles about business dealings or national development. Many of the days that
had lower numbers of stories in this category were heavier news days (e.g. SEA Games being
held in Myanmar), meaning that there was less space to publish stories about business deals or
development projects. Figure 38 shows these articles.

Business/Development
12

Number of Articles

10
8
6
4
2
0
1/7/2011

1/7/2012

1/7/2013

1/7/2014

1/7/2015

Date

Figure 38: Business/development articles 2011-2015.

Many of the stories in this category emphasized the importance of industrialization and
other development projects in tandem with democratic efforts. One such article read,
As each and every nation is trying their utmost for their national
development, Myanmar also needs to strive for development in order not to
fall behind others. Despite having natural resources both on land and in
water, the country for various reasons lagged behind others in development
in the past. It is therefore necessary to implement nation-building tasks with
added momentum so as to catch up with the neighbouring nations by
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tapping human resources and natural resources in an effective way. Only
then will the nation develop speedily. 137
Many of the articles which equate national development projects with the positive democratic
changes in Myanmar are also careful to note the improved developed in rural areas, particularly
areas affected by insurgency or unrest in the past. For example, an article titled “Uplifting
livelihoods of rural people undertaken” 138 discussed regional development projects in Kayah
state; another article with the headline “Plan for development of rural areas, improvement of
socio-economy launched for farmers in Shan State” 139 likewise focused on projects in Shan
State, while “Union Minister fulfills requirements of local people in Rakhine State” 140 discussed
donations and rehabilitation efforts in conflict-ridden Rakhine State. Such articles were certainly
strategic in their attempts to ingratiate the Thein Sein administration with people in rural areas
who might be predisposed to dislike the central government and were published regularly in the
lead-up to the 2015 elections.
A number of business-related stories highlighted improvements in the tourism industry in
Myanmar, as well as business deals with other states. One article claimed that “Myanmar [is]
poised to join top ten countries of highest tourist arrival….Thanks to reform process, warm and
transparent relations with international community, the international community is interested in
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Myanmar issues and globetrotters chose Myanmar as their tourist destinations.”141 Another
article published after the 2015 general elections likewise stated that “Myanmar tourism [is]
expected to increase in post-election period.” 142 The increase in tourism in light of the
democratic reforms is certainly unsurprising, and would be yet another economic success that the
government-run newspaper would want to make known.
The increase in stories about business dealings with other states was certainly a new trend
compared to the time periods examined in previous chapters. For example, an article titled
“Myanmar welcomes State-owned and private-owned enterprises from Indonesia” 143 detailed a
meeting between President Thein Sein of Myanmar and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
in which the two discussed a number of issues, including the ongoing Rakhine crisis. Another
article, “Labour issues for Myanmar migrant workers in Thailand discussed,”144 described the
meeting between ministers from both countries about the thorny issue of labor migration from
Myanmar to Thailand. These articles are interesting due to the mention, however, brief, of some
controversial issues that would have previously been unmentioned, or at most only alluded to, in
previous years.
One final business-related article is worth mentioning for its unusual coverage of
citizens’ actions against the government. An article published in 2014 titled “Myanmar Lawyers’
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Network to sue gov’t and private company for turning historic building into hotel” 145 struck quite
a sympathetic tone with the citizens who were protesting and criticizing Myanmar’s government.
In fact, the article included quotes only from the members of the Myanmar Lawyers’ Network
who were taking action against the government and included no direct quotes from a government
representative. While press freedom and journalistic practices certainly still had limitations
during the 2011-2015 period, it is notable that the New Light of Myanmar, which was still the
government-run newspaper, published such an article about opposition to a business deal
between the government and a private company.
There were 205 propaganda pieces and slogans published in 2011-2015, compared to 811
published between 2003-2010. The most striking trend in propaganda published during this
period is the dramatic drop in propaganda in the New Light of Myanmar starting in mid-2011.
Figure 39 shows these pieces.
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Before the drop in the number of propaganda pieces, the tone of these messages stayed
consistent with those in the prior 2003-2010 period. As in earlier publications, these slogans
were often alarmist, blaming domestic protests and international media for the slow speed of
democratic development. Propaganda also still filled almost half the page on the back of each
daily edition, as seen on the January 7, 2011 edition. Figure 40 shows an example of this.

Figure 40: Back page of the New Light of Myanmar, January 7, 2011.146
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Other common propaganda slogans that continued into 2011 were the “Objectives of the - Anniversary Union Day”147; “True patriotism” 148; and “Our Three Main National Causes.”149
The continuation of these nationalist slogans is unsurprising considering that the Myanmar
government still faced widespread criticism for the USDP victory and military presence in the
Hluttaw after the 2010 general elections.
Both the tone, nature, and quantity of propaganda slogans decreased precipitously in
August 2011. The average number of propaganda pieces before this date was 9 per day –
suddenly, the New Light of Myanmar was publishing an average of just 1 piece per day. In
addition to the massive drop in the number and conspicuousness of propaganda, the tone of such
pieces also changed drastically. Rather than threatening messages about the machinations of
foreign media or domestic troublemakers, such slogans changed to sayings and idioms such as

The objectives read as such; “1. For all national races to safeguard the national policy— Nondisintegration of the Union, Non-disintegration of national solidarity, and Perpetuation of
sovereignty 2. For all national races to keep Union Spirit ever alive and dynamic among national
people 3. For all national races to wipe out, through national solidarity, disruptions caused to
peace, stability and development of the nation by internal and external subversives 4. For all
national races to make efforts with might and main to build a modern, developed disciplineflourishing democratic nation in accordance with the State Constitution approved by the great
majority of the people 5. For all national races to work in concert with national unity for
perpetuation of the Union that has existed for thousands of years.” New Light of Myanmar
January 31, 2011.
147
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safeguard.” New Light of Myanmar September 22, 2011.
148

“* Non-disintegration of the Union * Non-disintegration of National Solidarity * Perpetuation
of Sovereignty.” New Light of Myanmar November 24, 2011.
149

327
“No Pain, No Gain,”150 “Donate Blood,”151 “Make hay while the sun shines,”152 and “Pay your
tax.”153 Additionally, in 2015, the New Light of Myanmar began publishing a daily countdown
until the 2015 general elections, clearly a sign that the Myanmar government was embracing the
promise of free and fair elections in 2015. Figure 41 shows these countdowns.

Figure 41: Election countdowns. 154155

Finally, the tone of political cartoons also changed drastically in newspapers published between
2011-2015. The cartoons published between 2003-2010 focused mainly on praising the
Tatmadaw; however, the cartoons during this period covered issues related to corruption in
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Myanmar (Figure 42), improvements in international relations and tourism (Figures 43, 44, and
45), and the responsibilities of citizens (Figure 46).

Figure 42: Political cartoon in New Light of Myanmar August 7, 2012.156

Figure 43: Political cartoon in New Light of Myanmar October 8, 2012.157
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Figure 44: Political cartoon in New Light of Myanmar November 21, 2012.158

Figure 45: Political cartoon below “No Pain, No Gain” slogan in NLM Dec. 18, 2012.159
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Figure 46: Political cartoon in New Light of Myanmar September 10, 2015.160

Clearly, the massive shift in both the quantity and the content of propaganda and political
cartoons in the New Light of Myanmar between 2011-2015 reflect the changes in the confidence
of the Myanmar government as well as the steps the country was taking towards democratization
and liberalization during this time. Similarly, opinion pieces and editorials changed dramatically
as well.
The New Light of Myanmar published 173 editorials and opinion pieces between 20112015, compared to 165 in 2003-2010. As in earlier chapters, I coded each editorial based on its
primary theme and graphed the number of op-eds on each theme per calendar year. The four
themes included in this graph were editorials related to 1) Democracy/Elections; 2) Nationalism,
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unity, and praising the Tatmadaw; 3) Foreign Relations; 4) Peace (either domestic or regional)
and insurgency). Figure 47 shows opinion pieces during this time.
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Editorials related to democracy and elections stayed relatively consistent between 2011
and 2012, increasing in number in 2013 and then, unsurprisingly, increasing again in 2015 due to
the general elections. Most of these op-eds treated democracy in Myanmar as a given, with
statements such as “In Myanmar, democratization is well underway according to the four
political objectives and the State’s seven-step Road Map. Democratization process is now
gathering momentum” 161 and “The country comes into the new era for building a modern and
developed democratic new nation.”162 Interestingly, one 2014 editorial suggests that “Myanmar
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will be free from military coup is all levels pursue democratic practices”, since “The countries
that have not fully developed democratic practices cannot be granted ‘no military takeover’.” 163
This particular piece was published directly after the coup in Thailand, and was apparently aimed
at assuring readers that a similar coup would not happen in Myanmar due to the new democratic
practices in place.
Of course, op-eds of this nature were aimed at drumming up support for the new political
system that was now in place, and like in the previous period, the tone of editorials about
elections in 2011 still carried a threatening tone aimed at critics of the process, particularly
foreign media and the National League for Democracy. According to this editorial, when the
Union Election Commission announced the results of the 2010 general elections,
All candidates were satisfied with the announcement when they learnt the
numbers of the votes they won in the elections and results. However,
internal and external stooges presented their personal views through certain
foreign radio stations to deal a serious blow to public trust in election
results. The commission and the voters are well convinced that there is not
any grain of truth in what they have presented about election results. In
democracy, practice of freedom shall not have any detrimental effects on
that of others. If it has, it is an anarchic act, not democracy. A certain
political party, that has been revoked, decided not to stand for election.
However, it launched ‘No Vote’ campaign to disrupt the elections to disrupt
the elections that were being held with political parties and the people. It
claims itself to be a democratic organization, but its acts were totally
undemocratic, thus provoking widespread criticism from inside and outside
the country. In the post-election period, it conspired with other destructive
elements to make election results null and void…. In the previous elections,
a political party won a landslide victory. Then, some power-craving people
thought that the victory had led to transformation from military dictatorship
into oneparty dictatorship, and the entire people would come under
complete control of the winning party. 164
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The author goes on to list the foreign countries which praised the 2010 general elections and
describes the democratic practices which the 2008 constitution guarantees, promising that
“Before long, democratic administration will be practised in place of military rule.”165 Another
op-ed blamed the Rohingya for the government’s troubles, stating “Recent Rakhine violence was
a threat to Myanmar’s democratization process at a time when Myanmar gets a lot of supports in
international arena….Even officials from the US State Department have praised Myanmar
government’s gentle handling of the crisis. Nobody expected Myanmar government’s democratic
handling of the crisis.”166 Clearly, in the wake of criticism against the unfair and unfree practices
of the 2010 elections, the Myanmar government continued to see the NLD, the foreign press, and
ethnic minority groups as troublemakers as they had in the past.
One interesting practice in editorials about democratization was an increase in mentions
of freedom of the press in Myanmar. One op-ed asserted that
The media sector known as the fourth estate has the duty to ensue [sic] the
uprightness of those three pillars [judicial, legislative, and executive
branches of government] …. The more knowledge the people have, the
more progress the nation will make. With the permission granted to…relax
the journalism rules and enable journals to make interviews with authorities,
there have been more freedom and transparency. 167
Another editorial detailed the changes taking place with the state-run newspapers, suggesting
that “the three newspapers will keep on changing in form and substance in accordance with the
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ongoing democratic reforms.” 168 An op-ed by Banya Aung details potential printing and
publishing laws, suggesting that “A country which is carrying out democratic reforms must draw
a media policy which can ensure media development.” 169 Importantly, an editorial published in
December 2013 describes the transition of the New Light of Myanmar into a joint-venture
newspaper between the Myanmar government and the newly formed Public Service Media as
part of a media reform process.170 The increase in mentions of media freedom and transparency
indicates that the Myanmar government was becoming more aware of domestic and international
pressure for liberalization during this time.
Along similar lines as the editorials about media transparency, some of the editorials
about democratization during this time openly discuss the treatment of ethnic minorities. One
such article asserts that
For Myanmar to be truly inclusive, all ethnic nationalities must come
together and heal the wounds of the past in order to response [sic] to the
challenges the country is experiencing….although the country has ended up
with the worst of the world, it is now on a path towards something better –
a society that is open, inclusive, tolerant, and respectful of individual dignity
under the new administration. And this era is a real bonanza for all citizens
who can participate in the political process…. But democracy is more than
an idea. We need to construct its institutions and culture to be based on
further burgeoning of the noblest and worthiest of worldly virtues such as
liberty, justice, and equality. Otherwise, it will severely undermine the
country’s stance that it is an upholder of human rights and weaken its
position when addressing human rights violation…. We are to be mindful
that the practice of democratic reforms that we hold dear must not infringe
on the civil liberties of others.171
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A separate editorial echoed these sentiments, stating that “Democracy cannot just be about
elections, basic freedoms, and constitutions. It must also include a culture of democracy and a
new understanding of citizenship.” 172 The author praises the Myanmar government for “aiming
for nothing less than a transition from half a century of military rule and authoritarianism to
democracy.”173 These op-eds are worth noting because they highlight an increase in awareness
about democratic culture and civic virtue amongst Myanmar citizens, as well as the
government’s increased willingness to allow discussions of such issues in the NLM.
The final trend in editorials about democracy and elections took place in 2015, when the
tone of editorials shifted towards encouraging voters to take part in the upcoming elections.
These op-eds were aimed at assuring citizens that they should vote, and that the democratic
progress in Myanmar would continue. One such piece emphasized “the importance of the
electorate to weigh and measure candidates against one another and vote for those who carry out
their promised measures” 174 and suggested that voters were responsible for making sure that
Myanmar’s democratic experiment did not fail, stating “Cheated once, we are not to blame for
our wrong actions. Cheated twice, we will only have ourselves to blame.”175 Another editorial
noted that “The silent electorate…should keep in mind that the future of the country is nowhere
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but in their own hands. Most important of all, our trust should be put on candidates who are
national healers and unifiers rather than national orators.” 176 This was clearly an attempt by the
author to suggest that voters support moderates such as Thein Sein, rather than more progressive
candidates.
Many of the editorials in the lead-up to the 2015 elections mentioned weaknesses in
Myanmar’s democratic culture or improvements that still needed to be made, presumably in an
effort to indicate that the Thein Sein administration was aware of these issues and would
continue to try to address them. These op-eds made statements such as “As a nascent democracy,
Myanmar still has much to learn about democratic norms.”177 In a letter to the editor, a citizen
wrote that “The political parties of Myanmar should learn from Nepal’s experience and must
cooperate with one another during the crucial pre- and post-national election phases for
facilitating the establishment of a stable, peaceful and progressive democracy in Myanmar.”178
Another cautions voters to make “wise decisions” at the polls, stating that “The problems that
have plagued Myanmar’s political system have stemmed from the exclusion of the wishes of a
significant number of stakeholders. It is therefore important for some stakeholders to retreat and
for some to take a few steps forward.”179 While it is unclear which specific stakeholders to whom
this editorial is referring, the tone of these pieces indicates that the government-sponsored

176

Kyaw Thura 2015a.

177

Kyaw Thura 2015b.

178

Saikat Kumar Basu 2015.

179

Myint Win Thein 2015b.

337
newspaper was embracing a more open discussion of the democratization and liberalization
efforts yet to be done.
While editorials about democracy and elections increased in the 2011-2015 period, those
which referenced nationalism, unity, and the role of the Tatmadaw began to steadily decline. In
2011, these op-eds were still relatively common. They praised “the efforts the Tatmadaw
government has made with great tenacity, [which led to] executive, legislative and judicial
bodies that will rule the Union democratically.” 180 Editorials about the Tatmadaw during the
2011-2015 period still used language such as “British colonialists,” “Japanese Fascists,” “alien
troops,” and “stooges”181 when describing the enemies the Tatmadaw faced, much like those
from previous periods. Unlike in the earlier editorials, however, these ones made a point to
mention that “the State Peace and Development Council or the Tatmadaw government or
Tatmadaw members are dedicating themselves to democratization.”182
In addition to op-eds praising the Tatmadaw, others during this period heralded the
traditional Myanmar way of life and encouraged nationalistic sentiment. One such editorial
claimed that “Only two or three major uprisings have taken place in Myanmar since she regained
her independence in 1948. This has proved that Myanmar people are gentle and courageous but
by no means brutal.” 183 Another such editorial published on Independence Day proclaimed,
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“Like a curry without salt is tasteless, a nation without independence is meaningless.”184 Many of
these op-eds used stories of Myanmar’s struggles against colonial powers to encourage national
unity between the different races in the country, making claims such as “The national races are
firmly joining hands together with the spirit of living forever in harmony.”185 Some even thanked
politicians by name, such as one editorial titled “Billion Thanks, Mr. President”, which described
how “The newly formed Democratic Government led by our hardworking upright President U
Thein Sein, came to our rescue timely.”186 Although these editorials were less common in 20112015 than in 2003-2010, the tendency of praising the Tatmadaw and the Thein Sein government
continued relatively unchanged when such articles were published.
Editorials about foreign relations saw the biggest change in tone from 2003-2010 to
2011-2015. Quite unlike the mentions of “foreign ax handles” in the previous period, editorials
about Myanmar’s foreign relations in 2011-2015 were overwhelmingly positive in tone. For
instance, a 2012 op-ed proclaimed that “With reforms going on well in various sectors, we are
more than ready to promote business, trade and friendly relations with any global country.
Thanks to our geographical position, many countries including our two giant neighbors are eager
to enhance trade and diplomatic relations with us.”187 One incredibly blunt editorial actually
criticized the isolationist policies of previous periods, asserting that “Myanmar, once a lesser-

184

Ko Tin Maung Oo (Ahlon) 2012.

185

Tin Maung Oo (Ahlon) 2013.

186

Aye Pe (Padaung) 2015a.

187

“Geographical opportunity” 2012.

339
known and xenophobic nation, has become renown to the rest of the world since its new
government made dramatic changes in its policy.”188 Many of these editorials focused on trade
with other Asian nations, such as a 2012 op-ed which suggested “we must learn and imitate the
ways of means and the spirit of our counterparts that are now the integral part of the rising
Asia.”189 A 2015 op-ed by Daw Shwe Shwe from the Ministry of Culture detailed the
possibilities for improved relations with other ASEAN nations in the coming years. 190 Such
articles highlighted the major changes that had taken place for Myanmar in just a few years, and
the opportunities that had opened up for improved trade and diplomacy in the region.
In addition to increased relations with Myanmar’s ASEAN neighbors, these editorials
also lauded trends such as increased tourism191 and foreign aid 192 in the wake of the new political
changes. Note the positive tone towards tourism and foreign donations in this passage;
A constellation of factors and events have converged to affect a glorious
boom: the multi-party election resulting in the opening of democracy and
civil society, resurged interest of the Western hemisphere towards the
country overlooked through passage of decades….Only now the situation
[after Cyclone Nargis] had somewhat calmed due to the efforts of the State
and the sympathetic public, NGOs and many generous donors who came to
the rescue of the afflicted, out of sublime compassion. 193
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Clearly, based on editorials about foreign relations in 2011-2015, the Myanmar government had
fewer concerns about foreign interference than in previous periods. Indeed, op-eds in the New
Light of Myanmar suggested that the “prospects are brighter than ever for close and
comprehensive collaboration among government, private organizations, civil societies and
international development partners through transparency.”194 Clearly, the Myanmar government
felt secure enough in the institutions it developed as part of the Roadmap to Democracy to
welcome engagement with the international community, a drastic shift from the previous period.
The final trend in NLM editorials during this period were those focused on the peace
process. As the articles about insurgency and domestic protests during this period revealed, the
ongoing pursuit of a ceasefire agreement with armed ethnic groups continued to be a major goal
for the Myanmar government between 2011-2015, and a number of editorials reflected this
priority. Although there were no editorials about peace and insurgency in the newspapers coded
during 2011 and 2012, op-eds on this theme became more common as the period continued.
Many of them linked the achievement of peace to the continuation of the country’s other goals,
such as development. One wrote,
Only when the peace prevails, will the country develop…. It can be said
that peaceful protest is a democratic right. But world nations have kept a
watchful eye on the country because it is something strange about a country
with immature democratic practice…. Only when peace prevails, will more
visitors come and visit Myanmar. If not so, it is impossible for job creation
and generating more incomes…Only with peace and stability, will each and
every citizen be prosperous. 195
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Another editorial also equated the achievement of peace with “affluent socio-economic
conditions,”196 asserting that “There can be no controversy or dispute on the impossibility of
development work without stability and peace….While we are building a new democratic nation,
it is vital to show restraint and avoid adversarial conflicts.” 197 Unsurprisingly, the Myanmar
government used the allure of democratization and economic development to incentivize the
signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement.
Some editorials about the peace process directly mention the importance of identity, such
as one from 2013 which argued that “For the peace process to be successful, it must be
connected to the emergence of a more and inclusive nation-identity. Myanmar people of all
ethnic backgrounds and all faiths – Buddhist, Christian, Muslim, Hindu, and others, must feel
part of this new national identity….We cannot let ethnic or religious differences become an
excuse to revert to authoritarianism.” 198 Yet another calls for Myanmar citizens to “stand in
solidarity with the civilians and traumatized families whose homes and futures have been
shattered by catastrophic effects armed conflicts have had on them,” 199 a notable proclamation in
a government-sponsored newspaper considering the continued role that the Tatmadaw played in
perpetuating these conflicts. While some editorials refer to “troublemakers”200 (i.e. armed ethnic

196

Pyay Oo (Ayeyarwady) 2013.

197

Pyay Oo (Ayeyarwady) 2013.

198

“The first step” 2013.

199

Kyaw Thura 2014.

200

Myint Win Thein 2015a.

342
group leaders) who refuse to sign the ceasefire, the tone in many of them was relatively
sympathetic to the plight of ethnic minorities. After the signing of the NCA in 2015, the New
Light of Myanmar even published an editorial by Hervé Ladsous, the Under-Secretary-General
for the U.N. Peacekeeping Operations about the importance of investing in peacekeeping
efforts. 201 Publishing the opinion of a Western diplomat in the New Light of Myanmar would
have been unheard of just a few years prior and demonstrates the major shift in tone that took
place from 2011-2015.
This content analysis of the New Light of Myanmar between 2011-2015 gives us many
insights into the important political changes that took place during this time, largely as a result of
the groundwork laid in the 2003-2010 period. Diplomacy articles during this period emphasized
frequent and cordial relations between the U.S. and Myanmar, and an increased awareness of the
importance of human rights, both trends pointing to an increase in the military’s confidence as
well as an increase in liberalization during this time. The high number of articles related to
elections and detailed descriptions of votes taken in the Hluttaw show increased levels of
democratization and liberalization, with an emphasis given to transparency of the legislative
branch. Full text speeches published during this time were much more positive in tone towards
the development of democracy, peace with insurgent groups, and international relations, a further
sign of democratization and liberalization over this period. Articles relating to insurgency and
protests during this time were a mixed bag, as the positive steps taken towards reaching the
Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement were overshadowed by the serious issues in Rakhine State.
Business and development articles tended to equate increase development projects with the
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ongoing democratization within Myanmar, showing how the Myanmar government was
embracing political changes for economic gain. The sharp decrease in propaganda pieces is
perhaps the most striking example of tone change during this time, with xenophobic and
nationalistic messages being replaced by countdowns until the next elections. Finally, editorials
and op-eds praised the new political changes sweeping across Myanmar. Ultimately, the 20112015 period reaped the results of the myriad changes that had been put into place by the military
during the interim 2003-2010 period. The Roadmap to Democracy had indeed led the country
towards the military’s purported goal of democratization, although there remain quite a few
political issues that remain for the country as it approaches the 2020 elections.

Conclusion

During the 2011-2015 period, Myanmar experienced an increase in democratization and
liberalization that came as a surprise to many, including the military which had set these changes
into motion. The institutional design established in the interim 2003-2010 period made it
possible for the military to protect itself from foreign and domestic threats. Thus, the political
environment in 2011-2015 was significantly different than the environment in 1988-2002, which
allowed for the upholding of election results even when the National League for Democracy
won. H3 stated that the institutional design which took place between 2003-2010 ultimately led
to steps toward liberalization beyond the Myanmar government’s original intent. This chapter
found evidence in interviews with Burmese citizens as well as in speeches and statements given
by government officials that the results of the 2015 elections were not expected. Indeed, just a
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few years earlier, the Burmese government would not have had the stability confidence or
immunity confidence to allow an electoral loss to stand. While the Tatmadaw may not have
intended for the political changes to extend this far, the groundwork laid by the Roadmap to
Democracy ultimately changed the game and the stakes.
H3A posited that these institutions gave the Myanmar government the immunity
confidence and stability confidence which were lacking during the 1988-2002 period. Interviews,
government documents, and a content analysis of the government-sponsored newspaper
ultimately showed that from 2011-2015, a number of variables combined to push the country
past the threshold necessary for these political changes to take hold. Improvements in relations
with the West, the role of a more moderate leader, and the neutralization of threats from both
numerous armed ethnic groups and the NLD meant that as time went on, the political transition
in Myanmar became both more difficult and less tempting to reverse. Evidence from polls and
ratings of civil rights and political liberties by multiple NGOs also indicate that increased
democratization and liberalization did indeed occur in Myanmar during this time.
This is not to say that Myanmar is a developed, mature, liberal democracy. While this
chapter showed evidence that Myanmar is experiencing democratization and liberalization, it
also found numerous ongoing issues which will challenge the political gains made by prodemocracy forces. The final chapter will summarize the findings and limitations of this project
and will also discuss the issues facing Myanmar as the 2020 general elections draw near.

CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION

Project Summary

This project sought to answer the question, “How did Myanmar’s military embrace
liberalization more during 2011-2015 than in the 1988-2002 period?” It examined three distinct
time periods in modern Myanmar political history: the failed transition of 1988-2002, the interim
period of institutional changes from 2003-2010, and the period of increased democratization and
liberalization from 2011-2015. Table 7 summarizes the hypotheses of this project and whether
they were upheld by the evidence.

Table 7: Hypotheses and Findings
Hypothesis
Assertion
H1
International and domestic pressure for elections
during 1988-1990 were not sufficient to compel
the military to respect election results due to
perceived domestic threats and lack of institutional
design which can protect the military’s interests
H1A
The military held elections because of
domestic/international pressure and their
confidence in their chances of victory; however,
they did not uphold the results of elections because
the military lost stability and immunity
confidence.

Findings
Upheld – found evidence
of concerns about
insurgency and
international threats, no
constitution in place.
Upheld – speeches and
content analysis showed
evidence that military was
concerned about country’s
stability and possible
retribution.

(Continued on following page)
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Table 7 (continued)
H1B

H2

H2A

Institutional design (in the form of developing a
new constitution) did not occur during this time
period because the military believed a constitution
would be seen as more legitimate after an electoral
victory.
Massive changes within the military regime and a
reduction of domestic threats during the 2003-2010
period led to efforts to develop institutional design.
Changes during this time period were largely
based on a transition process that had been mapped
out during the earlier (1988-2002) time period but
ultimately failed.

H2B

The military regime became more confident in their
ability to design institutions to protect their interests
and the stability of the nation due to improvements
in relations with armed ethnic groups as well as the
promotion of more moderate military leaders.

H2C

The institutional design that took place during this
time period laid the groundwork for the more
successful transition process in 2011-2015.

H3

Institutional design during 2003-2010 laid the
groundwork for steps toward political liberalization
from 2011-2015, which led to a liberalization
process that snowballed beyond the military’s
initial intent.
The electoral results in 2011 and 2015 were upheld
by the military due to institutions (namely the
constitution) which gave them immunity
confidence and stability confidence, crucial factors
which were absent during the failed transition of
1988-2002.

H3A

Upheld – quotes from
military members
suggested they were
waiting for after elections
to write constitution.
Upheld – institutional
changes and ceasefire
agreements were crucial.
Upheld – military
pursued National
Convention originally
proposed in 1990 to draft
the new constitution.
Partially upheld – found
evidence for better
relations with armed
ethnic groups, but mixed
evidence of promoting
moderates in military.
Upheld – constitution
and electoral laws from
2003-2010 were used in
2011-2015 period.
Upheld – Evidence that
results of 2015 elections
was unexpected by
military and civilians,
and results were upheld.
Upheld – improved
relations with West,
moderate leader,
neutralization of NLD
and ethnic groups made
transition more difficult
to reverse. Evidence that
democratization and
liberalization occurred.

I hypothesized that the transition which might have taken place in the 1990 elections
failed to do so because of a lack of institutionalization, but that once the Myanmar government
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began the process of steps toward liberalization, it eventually became too difficult, costly, and
politically risky to revert back to authoritarianism. Through the use of first-person interviews,
media content analysis, and process tracing, I tested this hypothesis.
In the 1988-2002 time period, I found evidence that domestic unrest due to economic
struggles and international pressure led to the development of SLORC, the abolishment of the
1974 constitution, and the decision to hold elections in 1990. While these pressures were
sufficient to push the military towards the holding of election, they could not override the
Tatmadaw’s fears of stability and immunity confidence, thus leading to the annulment of the
election results. In particular, I found statements that the government planned to establish a new
constitution after the 1990 elections, which explains why the elections were held in a
constitutional vacuum. The lack of institutional protections which would have been provided by
a constitution meant that the military felt deeply threatened when the NLD made statements
implying that the military might face repercussions for its crimes under a civilian government.
Because of these factors, the 1990 elections ultimately failed.
The chapters on the period of 2003-2010 shows that the Burmese military and
government sought to correct the failings of the previous era, particularly with regards to
establishing institutional protections for themselves under the guise of the Roadmap to
Democracy. The establishment of a new constitution was a major priority for the regime during
this time. I found evidence that the military regime’s stability confidence grew during this period
due to perceived improvements in relations with armed ethnic groups, largely due to efforts to
establish a nationwide ceasefire and the establishment of the Border Guard Force program.
Additionally, I found statements and changing tone in the government-mouthpiece newspaper
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which indicate that, while the government’s tone was softening towards the ethnic minorities and
the international community, it was still concerned about the threat of the NLD as an opposition
party. This helps to explain the institutional limitations on the fairness and freedom of the 2010
general elections.
Finally, in the 2011-2015 period, this project shows how the institutional design which
took place under the Roadmap to Democracy led to more robust democratization and
liberalization efforts later. Through interviews with Burmese citizens and speeches given by
government officials, I found confirmation that the outcome of the 2015 general elections, in
which the NLD won in a landslide, was largely unexpected, much like the results of the 1990
elections. Unlike the elections in the previous time, however, those chapters assert that
improvements in international relations, a more moderate cabinet, and a reduction of perceived
threats posed by armed ethnic groups and the NLD allowed for the barriers to democratization
and liberalization which existed in the earlier time period were no longer enough to prevent
further progress towards democratization and liberalization. I also found evidence from polls and
studies done by NGOs that democratization and liberalization did indeed increase in this period.
Ultimately, this project shows that, while numerous factors such as domestic unrest,
international pressure, and the confidence of Myanmar’s military contributed to the different
political outcomes between 1988-2003 and 2011-2015, the change can be largely attributed to
institutional design which occurred during the crucial interim period. Without these protections,
the military would not have allowed political changes to take place. While the Roadmap to
Democracy was derided as a disingenuous public relations strategy by the military regime,
ultimately it led to the civilian government we see in Myanmar now.
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Limitations of this Study

This is an ambitious project, and naturally its findings are tempered by some limitations.
Financial and time limitations meant that I was only able to conduct thirteen interviews with
Burmese citizens in Yangon in June 2016. While these interviews were in-depth and represented
people with a variety of views and backgrounds, these interviews were conducted in Yangon and
only represent these views at a certain snapshot in time. This study would be strengthened with
follow-up interviews to see if my informants’ views have changed, as well as additional
interviews or surveys with citizens living in more rural areas or Burmese diaspora members in
order to get more of a variety of voices.
While the media content analysis of the New Light of Myanmar was extremely valuable
and provided a huge amount of data, my analysis of the English-language version of this
publication does lead to concern about differences in translation. Future iterations of this project
would be improved by including comparisons between the Burmese-language and Englishlanguage versions of the same day’s newspaper, to ensure that there are not significant
translation differences. If differences did exist, it might suggest that the government was using
the English-language version to project a different tone or message toward the international
community than that which was aimed towards Burmese citizens in the Burmese-language
edition.
Finally, while my content analysis covered a total of 14,508 articles, the findings from
the content analysis could be strengthened by the addition of more data. In particular, gaining
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access to the full text editions of the early editions of the New Light of Myanmar during the
1988-2002 period would bolster the findings from that chapter, rather than relying on the
abridged versions from the Burma Press Summary. While online repositories do not include such
early versions of this newspaper, with more funding and time it may be possible to track down
full texts from that time period in archives at the University of Yangon or elsewhere in
Myanmar. Additionally, while I specifically chose to analyze the New Light of Myanmar as a
proxy measure for the government’s point of view, I am aware that it is a problematic
publication with questionable journalistic practices and a very specific perspective. Future
iterations of this project might be improved by also conducting content analyses of dissident or
diaspora media sources such as Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) or Radio Free America
(RFA), in order to measure the kinds of competing messages that were being produced by other
sources during these periods.

Future Issues Facing Myanmar

While this project has detailed astounding progress towards democratization and
liberalization in Myanmar in recent years, the country still faces numerous quandaries. The great
strides towards increased political rights and civil liberties in Myanmar are not guaranteed to
continue, and the country’s nascent democracy must deal with some pressing issues if it does not
want a detour on the road to democracy. In particular, the success of the NLD government; the
2018 by-elections and 2020 general elections; press freedom; the Rohingya crisis and other
ethnic issues; and the possibility of stalling democratization are all issues with which Myanmar
must grapple in the coming years.
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Success of the NLD Government

One of the most pressing issues in Myanmar’s new post-2015 political landscape is the
new role of the NLD. No longer an opposition party, the NLD faced a brand-new challenge of
governing Myanmar. When asked about their hopes and expectations for the future, almost every
person I interviewed mentioned the NLD government. Most expressed concerns about the
challenges facing the new civilian-led government. Okka Oo suggested that “In order for things
to continue the change, the NLD needs to win the trust of the army. After that happens, maybe
they will repeal [constitutional section] 59f. They still have differences they need to reconcile.
NLD must make sure the army is not left out.”1 Tharawon (Pyay) cautioned that
The new NLD government has a lot of things to do. They have to form a
new election committee. There are only two groups of people who support
NLD or USDP. Most people vote for the NLD not because they like the
NLD but because they hate the military. A lot of people vote for NLD with
closed eyes. After 5 years [of the NLD government], it is human nature, you
find things you don’t like. NLD is outlawing things like chewing betel nut,
gambling, alcohol shops. It is a good thing they are outlawing it, but
uneducated people don’t like it. 2
Edward Ziwa Naing agreed, saying “In Myanmar politics, we do not have the luxury of many
choices – we have either/or. That is how the NLD became the majority in government. In a
purely democratic sense, that’s dangerous.”3 Likewise, Ma Thway (Sagaing) listed a number of
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disadvantages facing the NLD: “They wholly depend on Aung San Suu Kyi; The ability of
members without her is low; the NLD can’t organize their member or create changes for youth.
We will see and wait how they work for our people.”4
Tin Min Htut also expressed doubts about the NLD’s power as the governing party.
I feel sorry for the NLD. People’s expectations of them are very high. There
is not much they can do – symbolic changes. They can’t yet change the
constitution or remove military members…. I think there is a talent shortage
in the NLD right now. Repats coming back will help the NLD…. I wish
people would give the NLD more time to make changes. People in the
media will say that the NLD is no different than the former government –
no transparency. 5
Edward Ziwa Naing was concerned that “the honeymoon period on the NLD government as a
limit. People have been patient so far, but for how long? So far, we have had very slow, steady,
safe changes. [The new NLD government] has their heart in the right place. However, their
efficiency and capacity are lacking.”6 NLD member U Pe Tin agreed that the NLD lacked
capacity, suggesting that “The main challenge facing the NLD is a constitutional amendment –
there are so many limitations on their capacity. We can’t lead the country the way we want. The
clause we want to amend is 436 [amending the constitution]. We want to replace it with easier
steps. 436 is the key section – after we can amend it, we can amend other clauses.”7 He went on
to express how the NLD has been challenged by its new role.
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As an opposition party, it was easier to point out weakness and make
suggestions. Now, as a ruling party, things are different. Now we make an
announcement [of proposed law changes], but if people don’t like it, they
consider it…. This is the main difference between being an opposition party
and a ruling party. An opposition party is just saying what needs to be
changed. A ruling party must say what needs to be changed, but then must
listen and be flexible.8
Htay Htay Win described the situation thusly; “The big challenge for NLD is to run a marathon
in 5 years’ time. They [the military] are just allowing the NLD to take their move. ‘Kaun win ko
san’ – that is a Burmese saying, it means ‘if your head can enter, your body can follow.’”9 In her
view, despite the limitations on the NLD, their decision to shoulder their way into the national
government means that political changes will follow.
When asked whether they thought the military would fully retreat from politics,
interviewees tended to express cautious optimism. Okka Oo believes that “the military will
gradually retreat – they may have their own time frame. But the NLD must win the trust of the
military – make sure the army is not left out. They need to make it clear that this change is for
all.”10 Tin Min Htut discussed the possibility of future constitutional amendments to remove the
quota for military members within the Hluttaw. “The biggest obstacle to a constitutional
amendment happening is the Commander-in-Chief [Min Aung Hlaing]. They [the NLD] need to
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get the military in their back pocket. Tell someone, hey, if you vote with us [to remove the
military quota], we will make you commander in chief.”11
NLD member U Pe Tin asserted that “The military is protecting the constitution because
it provides them with many protections. Even soldiers and generals are civil servants – they
should understand people don’t want them in politics.” 12 When asked whether he thought the
military would fully step down from politics, he stated that “It all depends on stability – is there
are clashes, conflicts, this may lead to coups. A coup is possible if we make the situation very
difficult for the military – if we put a lot of pressure on them or make decisions without them.
We cannot get them out of politics by force – then bad results will come.”13 Fellow NLD
member U Maung Maung concurred, saying that “I don’t think the military will stay long in
politics. It depends on changing the constitution.”14 Htay Htay Win expressed concern that “It’s
very hard to shake this military branch out of the administration because they have taken very
deep root and enjoyed all the privileges – it’s natural that they will want to stay in.” 15 Dr. Carole
Ann Chit Tha stated, “Only if we have peace, I think the military will draw back slowly. We
need civilian/military relations…. we can’t ignore the military point of view…. I think, slowly,
slowly, the military will back out. If we achieve the peace process with ethnic groups, they will
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step out of politics.”16 Every interviewee to whom I spoke expressed views such as these – that
the political changes which began in this period would continue, and the military would
eventually leave politics for good.

2020 Elections

A crucial test for both the NLD party and for Myanmar’s new democracy are the 2020
general elections. NLD members are confident about their chances of victory. U Pe Tin asserted,
“Absolutely we [the NLD] will win in 2020. We want newcomers and young people with good
educations to participate in upper level offices in the NLD.”17 In spite of this confidence,
however, recent by-election results indicate that the NLD may not have the same appeal to voters
by the 2020 elections.18
Other interviewees expressed concerns about the possibility that the NLD would lose
seats in 2020. Shine Zaw-Aung stated, “Next time, the NLD will not get 80% of the votes
[because of people’s dissatisfaction with the NLD government].” 19 Tharawon predicted, “More
and more people are looking for a 3rd party that doesn’t represent the NLD or USDP. I think they
will come out in 2020 – may be led by the 1988 generation. [This party is] not be as big as the
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NLD or USDP – the 8888 generation are very influential group in Myanmar. I think the NLD’s
popularity will still be very big leading up to the 2020 elections, but not as big as 2015.”20
Edward Ziwa Naing agreed that
…in the near future, smaller parties will emerge. The NLD is Aung San Suu
Kyi – using the popularity of one person is very risky. They need to use 2nd
tier leadership as well. Other former NLD members may form a new party.
In 2020 I do not believe the NLD will have such a big majority. It depends
on Aung San Suu Kyi, and the NLD needs to be more inclusive of people
Aung San Suu Kyi does not control, such as member of the 88 Generation.
We have a saying – ‘Whoever you leave behind is likely to cause trouble.’ 21

Who might cause trouble for the current NLD government? Many ethnic minority groups
have largely felt excluded by the NLD and may be organizing new political parties to better
represent the interests of their people. “Homegrown political parties in Myanmar’s ethnic areas
have been merging together in the hope of winning a majority of seats in both national and
regional parliaments in the upcoming 2020 general elections, a victory that would grant them
more authority to improve their rights.” 22 Already, political parties have been formed by five out
of the eight major ethnic groups23 in Myanmar, most likely as a response to the 2015 elections in
which “disunity among [ethnic minority parties] and the stunning NLD victory resulted in their
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holding a mere 11 percent of seats in the national legislature.”24 Now, rather than splitting into
disparate parties as they did in 2015, many of these smaller parties are joining up in an attempt to
win more seats in 2020. It is possible that more cohesiveness between ethnic parties in 2020 will
lead to less vote splitting, as ethnic minority people will not need to decide between scores of
similarly named ethnic political parties competing against the Leviathan that is the NLD.
Another group which may pose a threat to the NLD’s majority in the 2020 elections is the
Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). In campaign events leading up to the 2018 byelections, USDP chairman U Than Htay asserted that changing the cabinet, rather than the
constitution, will be sufficient to achieve political changes that the Burmese people seek.25
According to political commentator Zarni Soe Htut, “It is because of the 2008 [Constitution] that
U Than Shwe stepped down, and U Thein Sein came to office. [The NLD] should gradually
march toward their goal and move closer and closer to it over time. The army and the USDP
won’t like it if [the NLD] says the 2008 Constitution is not good. So rather than saying 2008
Constitution is not good, [NLD] should work for the betterment of all.”26 The USDP’s campaign
message is that they are more qualified to govern than the NLD. “We are not inexperienced
people. We have proper experience of running the government, so we understand how to manage
the country.”27 Some voters, disappointed by the NLD’s performance as the governing party,
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may be swayed by this argument in the 2020 general elections. Indeed, the results of the 2017
and 2018 by-elections show that the NLD may be losing its appeal to voters who are
disappointed in the party’s failure to end ongoing civil wars and deliver on its campaign
promises of amending the 2008 Constitution. 28 29

Press Freedom

While an increase in the number of media outlets allowed to operate in the country and
purported improvements in press freedom accompanied the new NLD government, there remain
significant issues facing freedom of the press and journalists in Myanmar. Reporters Without
Borders ranked Myanmar #137 out of 180 countries in its 2018 World Press Freedom Index,
having slid down from its spot at #131 in 2017.30 While there were no journalists or media
assistants killed in 2018, there were 3 journalists and 2 media assistants imprisoned in 2018. 31
Reuters journalists Kyaw Soe Oo and Wa Lone were imprisoned on December 12, 2017 and Htet
Zaw Moe was imprisoned on August 30, 2017, while TRT World media assistants U Hla Tin and
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Ko Aung Naing Soe were imprisoned on October 27, 2017.32 In total, “Around 20 journalists
were prosecuted in 2017, many of them under article 66(d) of the Telecommunications Act,
which criminalizes online defamation. Self-censorship is the rule with any story that might upset
the authorities, especially the military.” 33 Many of the journalists and assistants who were
imprisoned or punished were investigating the situation with the Rohingya refugees in Rakhine
State, as well as conflicts with the Shan and Kachin armed groups. 34
While many expected the NLD government to be open and welcoming to journalists,
leaders such as Aung San Suu Kyi have defended the decision to keep the two Reuters
journalists, Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo, in prison. According to her, “They were not jailed
because they were journalists, they were jailed because…the court has decided that they have
broken the Official Secrets Act….If we believe in the rule of law, they have every right to appeal
the judgment and to point out why the judgment was wrong.”35 The two journalists were
investigating the murder of Rohingya people by security forces in Rakhine State when they were
arrested. Press freedom is a crucial aspect to liberalization, and Myanmar’s continued
punishments of journalists reporting on conflict with ethnic minorities is a crucial and troubling
issue facing Myanmar as it seeks further moves towards becoming a more liberal democracy.
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Rohingya Crisis and Ethnic Minority Issues

Another long-running issue which continues to plague the civilian government of
Myanmar is the issue of armed ethnic groups, the push for federalism, and in particular the
Rohingya crisis. While efforts to finalize the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) have
continued into 2018, the NLD-led government has not been able to convince leaders of ethnic
minority groups to take secession off the table. Leaders of armed ethnic groups who attended a
2018 summit in Chiang Mai stated that they cannot promise to never secede from the state of
Myanmar. Nai Hong Sar, vice-chairman of the New Mon State Party, stated that the armed
ethnic groups must be cautious of the promises they make to the government because
…we have not yet seen what type of rights the government will give our
ethnic people, and we don’t even know yet what type of federalism our
government would establish. Also, the current democracy doesn’t appear to
be a real one yet. If we have to agree whenever the [army] pressures us, our
future movements may be restricted. Therefore, we all agreed to take a stand
and not give them the promise.36
As long as the leaders of ethnic minority groups do not trust the promises of the Myanmar
government, conflict and campaigns for a new federal system will undoubtedly continue.
An even more critical issue than the distrust between ethnic minorities and the central
government of Myanmar is the Rohingya crisis. As detailed in the previous chapter, the ongoing
violence in Rakhine state is entrenched in historical legacies and will be extremely difficult to
resolve. Many international observers have expressed shock and dismay that the NLD
government has not intervened or spoken out against the military’s use of force in Rakhine state,
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and groups such as Amnesty International are running campaigns “intended to ratchet up
international pressure on Myanmar’s top general [Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing] for his
troops’ alleged atrocities against Rohingya in northern Rakhine State.” 37
In a 2018 fact-finding mission, the UNHCR investigated human rights abuses in Kachin,
Rakhine, and Shan states. The 21-page report resulting from this effort found “consistent patterns
of serious human rights violations and abuses…[which] are principally committed by the
Myanmar security forces, particularly the military…Many violations amount to the gravest
crimes under international law.”38 The report concludes that, “In the light of the pervasive culture
of impunity at the domestic level…the impetus for accountability must come from the
international community.”39 In particular, the Human Rights Council report recommends that the
senior generals of the Tatmadaw40 should be investigated and tried in an “international criminal
tribunal for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.”41 This view, however, is not
widely held in Myanmar. Misinformation about the Rohingya is widespread on social media, and
many Burmese citizens believe the Rohingya are illegal immigrants who support ISIS or other
terrorist organizations. This hostile view toward the Rohingya is therefore not solely racially or
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religiously based but can also be traced back to colonial-era xenophobia, nationalism, and
modern fears of terrorism and extremism.
Likely due to the long-running racial, religious, and cultural tensions between the
Burmese Buddhists and the Muslim Rohingyas, popular opinion in Myanmar is not wholly
convinced by international proclamations. As Kyaw Phyo Tha writes,
…the international community appears to be trying to exploit the issue to
oust the military from Myanmar’s politics….It’s taken for granted that not
everyone in Myanmar is pleased with the military’s involvement in the
country’s politics….Is it therefore realistic for the international community
to treat the Rohingya crisis – probably the country’s most controversial and
militarily sensitive issue – as an opportunity to try to force the military out
of politics using harsh measures? … [T]rying to exploit the Rohingya crisis
to oust the military from politics would be counterproductive, as most
people in Myanmar stand with the military on the issue. 42
This helps to explain the NLD’s lack of action on the Rohingya issue as well. With many
Myanmar citizens actually supporting the military’s actions in Rakhine state, taking the side of
the Rohingya minority would be an unpopular and politically dangerous position for the NLD to
take, even for such leaders as Aung San Suu Kyi, who made a name for herself as a supporter of
human rights. In truth, the political realities of a ruling party seeking reelection in a country new
to democracy, with an electorate that largely supports the repression of a maligned ethnic
minority group and the specter of elections looming in the not-too-distant future, limits the
political capital and willingness of the NLD to take the side of the Rohingya in this situation. It is
also important to keep in mind the limitations of Aung San Suu Kyi’s power, the ever-present
reality of the military in politics, and the fact that Myanmar has not had time for democratic
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culture and liberal ideas to develop deeply. While many observers in the West are disappointed
with Aung San Suu Kyi’s lukewarm response to the abuse against the Rohingya, her reaction is a
symptom, not a root cause of the issue.43 Without political motivation to stop these acts, it is
likely that the violence and mistreatment of the Rohingya people will continue.

Stalling Democratization?

In light of these myriad issues facing Myanmar, is the process of democratization still
ongoing, or has it stalled? It is certainly troubling that the quota for military members, the
imprisonment of journalists, and the mistreatment of ethnic minorities has continued even under
a civilian government, as well as recent news that the Myanmar government may push forward
with the hugely unpopular and environmentally damaging Myitsone Dam in spite of protests
from citizens.44 According to Marzuki Darusman, chair of the aforementioned UN Fact-Finding
Mission on Myanmar, “no law and no institution in Myanmar…is above the Tatmadaw. In this
regard, the democratic transition in Myanmar has barely begun and now it has come to a
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standstill.”45 While it is still too early to determine whether the democratization process is
ongoing or interrupted, it remains true that Myanmar’s political system has more democratic
practices and liberal protections for its citizens than just a decade ago. As this project has shown,
these developments are mainly due to the institutional changes and increased confidence of the
Myanmar military to weather the storms of international and domestic threats. Such changes are
not so established that democratic backsliding is impossible, however. The country of Myanmar
faces many political challenges if it hopes to stay on the road toward liberalization and
democratization.

Future Research

I intend to continue with this research, with the plans to ultimately convert it into a book
manuscript. My future plans include addressing many of the limitations of this study that I note
earlier in this chapter, including analyzing full texts of the WPD and NLM for the 1988-2002
period, expanding my interview subjects, holding follow-up interviews, and conducting survey
research in different parts of Myanmar. I would like to expand the media content analysis from
this project to include the voices of dissidents from sources such as DVB and RFA and may also
include social media content analysis.46 Studying such recent events means that this project may
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Yoshihiro Nakanishi recently conducted a content analysis of Senior-General Min Aung
Hlaing’s Facebook posts to determine his public relations strategy for the Tatmadaw, coding all
his posts between 2013-2017 and categorizing them based on topic. See Nyein Nyein 2018.
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morph and change with current events, and I intend to include the 2020 general elections in
future iterations of this research agenda.

BIBLIOGRAPHY1

“42 KIA members exchange arms for peace.” 2012. New Light of Myanmar, April 21 pp. 8.
Accessed online January 28, 2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs13/NLM2012-0421.pdf
Albertus, Michael and Victor Menaldo. 2012. "Coercive Capacity and the Prospects for
Democratization." Comparative Politics 44, no 2: 151-169.
ALTSEAN Burma. 2008. “SPDC Turns Disaster into Catastrophe.” Alternative ASEAN
Network on Burma. May 23. Accessed online February 16, 2018 at
http://www.altsean.org/Docs/PDF%20Format/Thematic%20Briefers/SPDC%20turns%20
disaster%20into%20catastrophe.pdf
“Amnesty order frees 14,758 prisoners.” 2011. New Light of Myanmar, May 19 pp. 16. Accessed
online January 24, 2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs11/NLM2011-05-19.pdf
Angell, Robert C. 1964. “Content Analysis of Elite Media.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution,
8, no. 4 330-385.
An Observer. 2008. “Please accept an invitation with affection.” New Light of Myanmar, June 27
pp. 6-7. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/NLM2008-06-27.pdf
AP Archive. 1996. “Burma: Tourism Encouraged with Launch of ‘Visit Myanmar Year 1996.’”
November 19. Accessed online January 22, 2018 at
http://www.aparchive.com/metadata/BURMA-TOURISM-ENCOURAGED-WITHLAUNCH-OF-VISIT-MYANMAR-YEAR-1996/dbcddb079702c1d52a9c223254932545
1

While most citation styles require that authors be listed by their last names first, Burmese
names do not have a first and last name like Western names do. For this reason, I have cited
Burmese sources with their names intact (e.g. “Ne Win” rather than Win, Ne). The only
exceptions are for non-Burman authors who do have last names and cite themselves in this way.

367
Approving the renewal of import restrictions contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy
Act of 2003, and for other purposes, H.R. 56, 111th U.S. Congress. (2009). Accessed
online March 20, 2018 at https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/house-jointresolution/56
A Reader. 2007. “Comparison and study of slanders of the US and Britain against Myanmar and
the nation’s objective conditions-2.” New Light of Myanmar, January 18 pp. 10. Accessed
online January 23, 2019 at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs2/NLM2007-01-18.pdf
Arnott, David. 2004. “Burma/Myanmar: How to read the generals’ ‘roadmap.’” Accessed online
February 19, 2019 at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/how10.htm#_ftn1
The Asia Foundation. 2014. “Myanmar 2014: Civic Knowledge and Values in a Changing
Society.” Accessed online May 1, 2018 at
https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/MyanmarSurvey20141.pdf
Aspinall, Edward. 2005. Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in
Indonesia. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Associated Press. 2005. “Junta Hands Khin Nyunt 44-year Suspended Jail Term.” The
Irrawaddy, July 23. Accessed online February 16, 2018 at
http://www2.irrawaddy.com/article.php?art_id=4836
“Attitude of nationalities peace groups.” 1998. New Light of Myanmar, September 27. Accessed
online January 22, 2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/NLM/archives/199809/msg00000.html
Aung Hla Tun. 2012. “Myanmar president promotes reformers in cabinet shake-up.” Reuters,
August 27. Accessed online May 7, 2018 at https://www.reuters.com/article/oukwd-ukmyanmar-politics-idAFBRE87Q0Q220120827
Aung Khin. 2014. “Democratic practices can prevent military coups.” New Light of Myanmar,
May 29 pp. 8. Accessed online January 28, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs17/NLM2014-05-29.pdf
Aung Moe San. 2003. “The future policies and programmes.” New Light of Myanmar,
September 17 pp. 8. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs6/NLM2003-09-17.pdf
Aung Theinga. 2012. “Cooperation with understanding of genuine goodwill needed.” New Light
of Myanmar, December 26 pp. 1 and 9. Accessed online January 28, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/NLM2012-12-26.pdf
Aung-Thwin, Maitrii. 2010. Return of the Galon King. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press.

368
Aung-Thwin, Michael. 2001. "Parochial Universalism, Democracy Jihad and the Orientalist
Image of Burma: The New Evangelism." Pacific Affairs. 74, no. 4: 483-505.
Aung-Thwin, Michael and Maitrii Aung-Thwin. 2012. A History of Myanmar Since Ancient
Times: Traditions and Transformations. London: Reaktion Books.
Aung Zaw. 1997. “A Junta by Any Other Name.” The Irrawaddy Magazine 5, no 7 (December).
Accessed online December 3, 2017 at
http://www2.irrawaddy.com/article.php?art_id=943
Aung Zaw. 2003a. “Internal Clash in the Tatmadaw.” The Irrawaddy Magazine, Accessed online
April 5, 2017 at http://www2.irrawaddy.com/opinion_story.php?art_id=355
Aung Zaw. 2003b. “Than Shwe: Burma’s Strongman?” The Irrawaddy Magazine. Accessed
online November 26, 2017 at http://www2.irrawaddy.com/article.php?art_id=2818
Aung Zaw. 2004. “Sein Lwin ‘The Butcher of Rangoon’ Dies in Poverty.” The Irrawaddy
Magazine, Aug 24. Accessed online at
http://www2.irrawaddy.com/opinion_story.php?art_id=3825
Aung Ze Min. 2008. “Why did Myanmar people unanimously vote for State constitution?” New
Light of Myanmar, June 17 pp. 7. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/NLM2008-06-17.pdf
Aye Aye Win. 2011. “Aung San Suu Kyi’s party to run in Burma elections.” The Independent,
November 18. Accessed online May 4, 2018 at
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/aung-san-suu-kyis-party-to-run-inburma-elections-6264220.html
Aye Pe (Padaung). 2015a. “Billion Thanks, Mr. President.” Global New Light of Myanmar, May
26 pp. 8. Accessed online January 30, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/GNLM2015-05-26-red.pdf
Aye Pe (Padaung) 2015b. “The World of beauty.” Global New Light of Myanmar, August 13 pp.
9. Accessed online January 30, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/GNLM2015-08-13-red.pdf
Bahan Aye Min. 2015. “People say they want democracy…” Global New Light of Myanmar,
September 10 pp. 9. Accessed online January 28, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/GNLM2015-09-10-red.pdf
“Bangladesh, Myanmar agree on repatriation of boat people.” 2015. Global New Light of
Myanmar, May 25 pp 1 and 3. Accessed online January 28, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/GNLM2015-05-26-red.pdf

369
Banya Aung. 2013. “Media development and Printing and Publishing.” New Light of Myanmar,
July 11 pp. 8. Accessed online January 28, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/NLM-2013-07-11-red.pdf
Basu, Moni. 2011. “Change in Myanmar? Prisoner amnesty begins.” CNN, October 12. Accessed
online May 4, 2018 at https://www.cnn.com/2011/10/12/world/asia/myanmar-prisonerrelease/index.html
Ba Than. 2012. “HELLO TOURISM.” New Light of Myanmar, July 23 pp. 7. Accessed online
January 30, 2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs13/NLM2012-07-23.pdf
BBC News. 2010. “Burma frees NLD leader Tin Oo.” February 13. Accessed online February 8,
2018 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8514159.stm
BBC. 2011. “Aung San Suu Kyi meets Burma president.” August 19. Accessed online May 4,
2018 at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-14585995
BBC. 2012a. “EU chief Barroso offers new development aid to Burma.” November 3. Accessed
online May 7, 2018 at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-20189448
BBC. 2012b. “India PM Manmohan Singh in historic Burma visit.” May 28. Accessed online
May 7, 2018 at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-18225010
BBC. 2015a. “Myanmar revokes Rohingya voting rights after protests.” February 11. Accessed
online May 8, 2018 at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-31421179
BBC. 2015b. “Myanmar ruling party chairman Shwe Mann ousted.” August 13. Accessed online
June 29, 2018 at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33902059
BBC. 2015c. “Myanmar’s 2015 Landmark Elections Explained. December 3.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33547036
BBC. 2017. “Myanmar profile: Timeline.” May 2. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific12992883
Beech, Hannah. 2007. “Laura Bush’s Burmese Crusade.” Time Magazine, September 5.
Accessed online March 20, 2018 at
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1659170,00.html
Bellin, Eva. 2004. “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in
Comparative Perspective.” Comparative Politics 36, no. 2: 139-157.
Bratton, Michael and Nicolas Van De Walle. 1994. “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political
Transitions in Africa.” World Politics 46, no. 4: 453-489.

370
Broom, L., & Reece, S. (1955). “Political and Racial Interest: A Study in Content Analysis.” The
Public Opinion Quarterly, 19, no. 1: 5-19.
Brooten, Lisa. 2005. “The Feminization of Democracy Under Siege: The Media, “the Lady” of
Burma, and U.S. Foreign Policy.” NWSA Journal 17, no. 3: 134-156.
Brownlee, Jason. 2008. “Bound to Rule: Party Institutions and Regime Trajectories in Malaysia
and the Philippines.” Journal of East Asian Studies 8: 89-118.
Brownlee, Jason. 2009. “Portents of Pluralism: How Hybrid Regimes Affect Democratic
Transitions.” American Journal of Political Science 53, no. 3: 515-532.
Brynen, Rex, Bahgat Korany and Paul Noble. 1995. Political Liberalization & Democratization
in the Arab World. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Burma Fund UN Office. 2011. “Burma’s 2010 Elections: A Comprehensive Report.” January 31.
Accessed online February 8, 2018 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs11/BurmaFundElection_Report-text.pdf
Burma Press Summary. Full text of the Working People’s Daily and the New Light of Myanmar
from 1987-1996. Accessed online January 28, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/show.php?cat=1455&lo=d&sl=0
Burma Press Summary. n.d. “Statements.” Accessed online January 22, 2019 at
http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/Statements.htm
Bush, George Walker. 2007a. “Executive Order: Blocking Property and Prohibiting Certain
Transactions Related to Burma.” October 19. Accessed online March 20, 2018 at
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/10/20071019-12.html
Bush, George Walker. 2007b. “President Bush Discusses Sanctions on Burma.” October 19.
Accessed online March 20, 2018 at https://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/10/text/20071019-11.html
Bush, George Walker. 2008. “Executive Order: Blocking Property and Prohibiting Certain
Transactions Related to Burma.” May 1. Accessed online March 20, 2018 at
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/05/20080501-17.html
Calamur, Krishnadev. 2017. “The Misunderstood Roots of Burma’s Rohingya Crisis.” The
Atlantic, September 25. Accessed online June 22, 2018 at
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/rohingyas-burma/540513/
Callahan, Mary. 1996. “Burma in 1995: Looking Beyond the Release of Aung San Suu Kyi.”
Asian Survey 36, no. 2: 158-164.

371
Callahan, Mary. 2005. Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
Campbell, Kurt M. 2010. “Purposes and Principles of U.S. Engagement in Burma.” U.S.
Department of State. May 10. Accessed online March 20, 2018 at
https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/purposes-and-principles-us-engagement-burma
Case, William. 2011. “Electoral Authoritarianism and backlash: Hardening Malaysia, oscillating
Thailand. International Political Science Review 32, no. 4: 438-457.
Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies. 2011. “Observation Report: 2010 Myanmar General
Elections.” Accessed online February 8, 2018 at
http://www.centrepeaceconflictstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2010-Myanmar-Observerreport.pdf
Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies. 2015. “Listening to Voices: Perspectives from the
Tatmadaw’s Rank and File.” Accessed online May 1, 2018 at
http://www.centrepeaceconflictstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/Tatmadaw-layout30.6.15.pdf
Channel News Asia. 2018. “Myanmar by-election results ‘a lesson’ for Aung San Suu Kyi’s
party.” Channel News Asia, November 4. Accessed online November 4, 2018 at
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/myanmar-by-election-results-a-lesson-foraung-san-suu-kyi-s-10896544
Cheesman, Nick, Monique Skidmore and Trevor Wilson. 2010. Ruling Myanmar: From Cyclone
Nargis to National Elections. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Cheesman, Nick, Nicholas Farrelly and Trevor Wilson, eds. 2014. Debating Democratization in
Myanmar. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Chivoin, Peou, Manika Pin, and Say Sok. 2013. “Reporting Governance: A Content Analysis of
Cambodian Media Outlets.” Australian Broadcasting Corporation International
Development. Available online at
http://www.abcinternationaldevelopment.net.au/sites/default/files/ABC_Cambodian_Gov
_Report.pdf
Chow, Jonathan T. and Lief-Eric Easley. 2016. “Persuading Pariahs: Myanmar’s Strategic
Decision to Pursue Reform and Opening.” Pacific Affairs 89, no. 3: 521-542.
Clapp, Priscilla. 2007. “Burma’s Long Road to Democracy.” United States Institute of Peace
Special Report 193. November. Accessed online February 2, 2018 at
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/sr193_0.pdf

372
Clapp, Priscilla. 2010. “Burma’s Political Transition: Implications for U.S. Policy.” In
Cheesman, Nick, Monique Skidmore and Trevor Wilson. 2010. Ruling Myanmar: From
Cyclone Nargis to National Elections. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Clapp, Priscilla and Suzanne DiMaggio. 2012. “Advancing Myanmar’s Transition: A Way
Forward for U.S. Policy.” Asia Society. Accessed online May 1, 2018 at
http://asiasociety.org/files/pdf/120216_us_policy_myanmar_report.pdf
Clapp, Priscilla and Suzanne DiMaggio. 2013. “Sustaining Myanmar’s Transition: Ten Critical
Challenges.” Asia Society, June 24. Accessed online May 1, 2018 at
http://asiasociety.org/files/pdf/Sustaining_Myanmars_Transition.pdf
Clinton, Hillary Rodham. 2009. “Remarks at the ASEAN Regional Forum.” U.S. Department of
State. July 23. Accessed online March 20, 2018 at https://20092017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/july/126373.htm
Clinton, William J. 1996. “Proclamation 6925 – Suspension of Entry as Immigrants and
Nonimmigrants of Persons Who Formulate or Implement Policies That Are Impeding the
Transition to Democracy in Burma or Who Benefit From Such Policies.” Accessed
online March 19, 2018 at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=52042
Clymer, Kenton. 2015. A Delicate Relationship: The United States and Burma/Myanmar Since
1945. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Coclanis, Peter. 2018. “Aung San Suu Kyi Is A Politician, Not A Monster.” Foreign Policy, May
14. Accessed online February 9, 2019 at https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/14/aung-sansuu-kyi-is-a-politician-not-a-monster/
Congressional Record – Senate S4449. May 25, 2000. Accessed online March 19, 2018 at
https://www.congress.gov/crec/2000/05/25/CREC-2000-05-25-pt1-PgS4449-2.pdf
“Constitutional tribunal will have to settle many disputes in the future.” 2013. New Light of
Myanmar, January 15 pp. 16. Accessed online January 24, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/NLM2013-01-15.pdf
“Constructive attitude in the area of international relations.” 2009. New Light of Myanmar,
August 19 pp. 2. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs07/NLM2009-08-19.pdf
Cottey, Andrew, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster. 2002. “The Second Generation
Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations.” Armed Forces and
Society 29, no. 1: 31-56.
Croissant, Aurel. 2002. “Electoral Politics in Southeast and East Asia: A Comparative
Perspective.” Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Office for Regional Co-operation in Southeast
Asia: 321-362. Available online at http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/01361011.pdf

373
Croissant, Aurel. 2004. "Riding the Tiger: Civilian Control and the Military in Democratizing
Korea." Armed Forces and Society 30, no. 3: 357-381.
Croissant, Aurel and Jil Kamerling. 2013. “Why Do Military Regimes Institutionalize?
Constitution-making and Elections as Political Survival Strategy in Myanmar.” Asian
Journal of Political Science 21, no. 2: 105-125.
“Crush all the destructive acts of terrorists.” 2005. New Light of Myanmar, August 30 pp. 2.
Accessed online January 23, 2019 at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs2/NLM2005-0830.pdf
Cummings-Bruce, Nick. 1988. “Burma’s new leader imposes martial law.” The Guardian,
August 4. Accessed online at
https://www.theguardian.com/world/1988/aug/04/burma.fromthearchive#article_continue
D’Souza, Frances. 1991. XIX Article 19 Country Report. State of Fear: Censorship in Burma.
1991. ISBN 1870798716. Accessed online January 22, 2019 at
http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/State-of-Fear-minus.pdf
Davies, Jack. 2010. “Aung San Suu Kyi release brings joy, tears – and new hope for Burma.”
The Guardian, November 13. Accessed online February 8, 2018 at
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/13/burma-aung-san-suu-kyi-released
Daw Shwe Shwe (Ministry of Culture). 2015. “ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community 2015: Where
Are We.” Global New Light of Myanmar, December 31 pp. 8. Accessed online January
30, 2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/GNLM2015-12-31-red.pdf
“Detailed basic principles that should be adopted for Chapter ‘Provisions on State of Emergency’
clarified.” 2007. New Light of Myanmar, August 3 pp. 16 and 4-8. Accessed online
January 23, 2019 at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs4/NLM2007-08-03.pdf
“Development partners.” 2013. New Light of Myanmar, February 11 pp. 8. Accessed online
January 30, 2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docsMA2013/NLM2013-02-11.pdf
Diamond, Larry. 1999. Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Diamond, Larry and Marc F. Plattner. 1996. Civil-Military Relations and Democracy. Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins University Press.
“Discussion on further cementing of Myanmar-US relations.” 2011. New Light of Myanmar,
November 24 pp. 16. Accessed online January 24, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs12/NLM2011-11-24.pdf

374
“Disorders in Taunggyi.” 1988. Working People’s Daily, July 15. Accessed online January 22,
2019 at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/88-07.txt
“Disturbances and Trouble-making.” 1989. Working People’s Daily, August 19. Accessed online
January 22, 2019 at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/BPS90-08.pdf
“Disturbances in Prome.” 1988. Working People’s Daily, July 21. Accessed online January 22,
2019 at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/BPS88-07.pdf
“Disturbances in Rangoon.” 1988. Working People’s Daily, August 9. Accessed online January
22, 2019 at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/BPS88-08A.pdf
“Disturbances outside Rangoon.” 1988. Working People’s Daily, September 22. Accessed online
January 22, 2019 at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/BPS88-09.pdf
The Economist. 2015. “An Election in Myanmar: Change in the Air.” October 31. Available
online at http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21677255-first-proper-electiongeneration-stepping-stone-uncertain-future-change
“Effective tool.” 2013. New Light of Myanmar, December 24 pp. 8. Accessed online January 30,
2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs16/NLM2013-12-24-red.pdf
Egreteau, Renaud and Larry Jagan. 2013. Soldiers and Diplomacy in Burma. Singapore: National
University of Singapore Press.
Egreteau, Renaud. 2016. Caretaking Democratization: The Military and Political Change in
Myanmar. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Elmasry, Mohamad Hamas. 2012. “Journalism with Restraint: A Comparative Content Analysis
of Independent, Government, and Opposition Newspapers in pre-Revolution Egypt.”
Journal of Middle East Media 8, no. 1: 1-34.
Englehart, Neil. 2012. “Two Cheers for Burma’s Rigged Election.” Asian Survey 52, no. 4: 666686.
“Entire people of Salingyi and Yinmabin submit USDA membership applications.” 2003. New
Light of Myanmar, February 14. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/NLM/archives/2003-02/msg00013.html
European Union. 2012. “Burma/Myanmar: EU sanctions suspended.” Council of the European
Union. Brussels, May 14. Accessed online May 7, 2018 at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/130188.pdf
Ezrow, Natasha M. and Erica Frantz. 2011. Dictators and Dictatorships: Understanding
Authoritarian Regimes and their Leaders. New York: Bloomsbury Academic.

375
“Faithful students.” 2012. New Light of Myanmar, December 18 pp. 8. Accessed online January
28, 2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/NLM2012-12-18.pdf
FBIS-EAS-89-111. “SLORC Press Conference (extract), 9 June 1989.” in Weller 1993.
Available online at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/SLORC_Press_conf-1989-06-09.htm
Feliciano, Gloria. 1967. “Some Uses of Content Analysis in Social Research.” Philippine
Sociological Review, 15 no. 1/2: 16-21.
“The first step.” 2013. New Light of Myanmar, August 13 pp. 8. Accessed online January 30,
2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/NLM-2013-08-13-red.pdf
“Five more ethnic groups removed from unlawful list.” 2015. Global New Light of Myanmar,
October 14 pp. 2. Accessed online January 28, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/GNLM2015-10-14-red.pdf
Ford, John B., Patricia Kramer Voli, Earl D. Honeycutt, Jr., & Susan L. Casey. 1998. “Gender
Role Portrayals in Japanese Advertising: A Magazine Content Analysis.” Journal of
Advertising, 27, no. 1: 113-124.
“Four-member armed group exchanges arms for peace.” 1998. New Light of Myanmar, April 28.
Accessed online January 22, 2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/NLM/archives/199804/msg00003.html
“The fourth estate, infallible and reliable.” 2011. New Light of Myanmar, December 19 pp. 2.
Accessed online January 28, 2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs12/NLM2011-1219.pdf
Freedom House. 2016. “Methodology: Freedom in the World 2016.” Available online at
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2016/methodology
Freedom House. 2018. “Freedom in the World 2018: Methodology.” Accessed online July 6,
2018 at https://freedomhouse.org/report/methodology-freedom-world-2018
“Fulfill expectation of people.” 2011. New Light of Myanmar, April 8 pp. 2. Accessed online
January 28, 2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs11/NLM2011-04-08.pdf
Fuller, Thomas. 2010. “Main Opposition to Boycott Myanmar Election.” The New York Times,
March 29. Accessed online February 8, 2018 at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/30/world/asia/30myanmar.html
Fuller, Thomas. 2011. “Myanmar Backs Down, Suspending Dam Project.” The New York Times,
September 30. Accessed online May 4, 2018 at
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/asia/myanmar-suspends-construction-ofcontroversial-dam.html

376
Furnivall, J.S. 1948. Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and
Netherlands India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
“GAD staff, civilian abducted by KIA.” 2014. New Light of Myanmar, May 6 pp. 1. Accessed
online January 28, 2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs17/NLM2014-05-06.pdf
Geddes, Barbara. 1999. “Authoritarian Breakdown: Empirical Test of a Game Theoretic
Argument.” Paper presented at the 95th Annual Conference of the American Political
Science Association, September, Atlanta, GA.
Geddes, Barbara. 2006. “Why Parties and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes?” Revised version
of a paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the American Political
Science Association, Washington DC, 2005. Available online at
http://www.daniellazar.com/wp-content/uploads/authoritarian-elections.doc
Geddes, Barbara and John Zaller. 1989. “Sources of Popular Support for Authoritarian
Regimes.” American Journal of Political Science 33, no. 2: 319-347.
Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. 2014. “Autocratic Regimes and Transitions.”
Perspectives on Politics 12, no. 2: 313-331.
“General Khin Nyunt meets executives, officials of travel agencies and hoteliers” 2002. New
Light of Myanmar, October 29. Accessed online January 22, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/NLM/archives/2002-10/msg00034.html
“Geographical opportunity.” 2012. New Light of Myanmar, May 21 pp. 2. Accessed online
January 30, 2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs13/NLM2012-05-21.pdf
George, Alexander and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the
Social Sciences. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Goodwin-Gill, Guy S. 2006. Free and Fair Elections: New Expanded Edition. Geneva: The
Inter-Parliamentary Union. Available online at
http://www.ipu.org/pdf/publications/free&fair06-e.pdf
Government of Myanmar. 2005. “Myanmar: Insurgent terrorists are committing well-planned
terrorist acts with evil intention of endangering lives and properties of the people.” May
15. Accessed online April 23, 2018 at https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmarinsurgent-terrorists-are-committing-well-planned-terrorist-acts-evil
“Government needs to draw multiple strategies for Rakhine State.” 2013. New Light of
Myanmar, July 18 pp. 16. Accessed online January 24, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/NLM-2013-07-18-op-red.pdf

377
“Government sought peaceful protest resolution: Union Information Minister.” 2015. Global
New Light of Myanmar March 12 pp. 9. Accessed online January 28, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/GNLM2015-03-12-red.pdf
GovTrack.us. n.d. “Burma Bills.” GovTrack. Accessed online November 18, 2017 at
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/subjects/burma/6433#congress=__ALL__
GovTrack.us. n.d. “H.R. 2330 (108th): Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003.”
GovTrack. Accessed online January 29, 2018 at
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/108/hr2330
Graham-Harrison, Emma. 2015. “Burma’s boatpeople ‘faced choice of annihilation or risking
their lives at sea.’” The Guardian, May 16. Accessed online May 8, 2018 at
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/17/rohingya-burma-refugees-boatmigrants
Greene, Kenneth F. 2007. Why dominant parties lose: Mexico's democratization in comparative
perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
The Guardian. 2004. “Burmese PM ‘removed from office.’” October 19. Accessed online
February 16, 2018 at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/oct/19/burma
Hadenius, Axel and Jan Teorell. 2007. “Pathways from Authoritarianism.” Journal of
Democracy 18, no. 1: 143-157.
Haggard, Stephen and Robert R. Kaufman. 1995. The Political Economy of Democratic
Transitions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Haque, Nadeem UI., & Arif Sheikh. 1994. “Concerns of Intelligentsia in Pakistan: Content
Analysis of Newspapers.” Economic and Political Weekly, 29, no. 24: 1482-1486.
Hays, Constance. 1988. “For Burma Now, It’s All Speculation.” The New York Times, July 25.
Accessed online January 19, 2018 at http://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/25/world/forburma-now-it-s-all-speculation.html
Hedman, Eva-Lotta E. 2001. “Contesting State and Civil Society: Southeast Asian Trajectories.”
Modern Asian Studies 35: 921-951.
Hicken, Allen and Erik Martinez Kuhonta. 2015. Party System Institutionalization in Asia:
Democracies, Autocracies, and the Shadows of the Past. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
“Higher socio-economic status, results of peace and stability.” 2006. New Light of Myanmar,
August 24 pp. 2. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at
http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs2/NLM2006-08-24.pdf

378
Hla Thein Htay. 2005. “False and fabricated stories.” New Light of Myanmar, September 19 pp.
6. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs2/NLM2005-0919.pdf
“Hluttaw and its committees devote to social contract for democracy promotion.” 2012. New
Light of Myanmar, July 2 pp. 16. Accessed online January 24, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs13/NLM2012-07-02.pdf
Hodal, Kate. 2013a. “Burmese snap up first private newspapers in 50 years.” The Guardian,
April 1. Accessed online May 7, 2018 at
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/01/burmese-private-newspapers
Hodal, Kate. 2013b. “Ethnic violence erupts in Burma leaving scores dead.” The Guardian,
March 22. Accessed online May 7, 2018 at
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/22/burma-ethnic-violence-dead-meikhtila
Holliday, Ian. 2008. “Voting and Violence in Myanmar: Nation Building for a Transition to
Democracy.” Asian Survey 48, no. 6: 1038-1058.
Htet Naing Zaw. 2016. “Parliamentary Committee Introduces Changes to Controversial Article
66(d).” The Irrawaddy Magazine, November 18. Available online at
http://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/parliamentary-committee-introduces-changes-tocontroversial-article-66d.html
Htet Naing Zaw. 2018a. “Change the Cabinet, Not the Constitution: USDP.” The Irrawaddy
Magazine, October 4. Accessed online October 4, 2018 at
https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/change-cabinet-not-constitution-usdp.html
Htet Naing Zaw. 2018b. “‘I Am Not a Turncoat’: Thura Shwe Mann.” The Irrawaddy Magazine,
June 15. Accessed online June 29, 2018 at https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/notturncoat-thura-shwe-mann.html
Huhmann, B., and Timothy P. Brotherton. 1997. “A Content Analysis of Guilt Appeals in
Popular Magazine Advertisements.” Journal of Advertising, 26, no. 2: 35-46.
Human Rights Council. 2018. “Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on
Myanmar.” September 12. Accessed online at
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/FFMMyanmar/A_HRC_39_64.pdf
Human Rights Watch. 1996. “Human Rights Watch World Report 1996 – Burma.” January 1.
Accessed online March 19, 2018 at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a8a98.html

379
Human Rights Watch. 2007a. “Crackdown: Repression of the 2007 Popular Protests in Burma.”
Volume 19, No. 18. December. Accessed online February 2, 2018 at
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/burma1207/burma1207webwcover.pdf
Human Rights Watch. 2007b. “Myanmar: Chronology of the National Convention.” July 18.
Accessed online December 10, 2017 at https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmarchronology-national-convention
Human Rights Watch. 2008. “Vote to Nowhere: The May 2008 Constitutional Referendum in
Burma.” April 30. Accessed online February 5, 2018 at
https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/04/30/vote-nowhere/may-2008-constitutionalreferendum-burma
Human Rights Watch. 2010. “Burma: Events of 2009.” World Report 2010. Accessed online
February 6, 2018 at https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2010/country-chapters/burma
Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.
Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1996. “Reforming Civil-Military Relations.” In Civil Military Relations
and Democracy. Diamond, Larry and Plattner, Marc, eds. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press.
“Infrastructures for national development reflect unity and strength.” 2005. New Light of
Myanmar, September 19 pp. 2. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at
http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs2/NLM2005-09-19.pdf
Institute for Security and Development Policy. 2015a. “Myanmar’s 2015 General Elections:
Structure, Process, and Issues.” November. Accessed online May 8, 2018 at
http://isdp.eu/content/uploads/publications/2015-isdp-backgrounder-myanmarelection.pdf
Institute for Security and Development Policy. 2015b. “Myanmar’s Nationwide Ceasefire
Agreement.” October. Accessed online May 8, 2018 at
http://isdp.eu/content/uploads/publications/2015-isdp-backgrounder-myanmar-nca.pdf
International Crisis Group. 2015. “The Myanmar Elections: Results and Implications.” Crisis
Group Asia Briefing No. 147. December 9. Accessed online May 8, 2018 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/ICG-2015-12-09-the-myanmar-elections-resultsand-implications-en-red.pdf
International Foundation for Electoral Systems. 2015. “Myanmar 2015 General Elections Fact
Sheet.” September 15. Accessed online May 8, 2018 at
http://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/ifes_2015_myanmar_election_fact_sheet_final.pdf

380
International Trade Centre. 2014. “Myanmar – Infrastructure.” Available online at
http://www.intracen.org/country/Myanmar/Infrastructure/
The Irrawaddy Magazine. 1997a. “Burma’s Power Play.” The Irrawaddy Magazine, December.
Accessed online December 3, 2017 at
http://www2.irrawaddy.com/article.php?art_id=929
The Irrawaddy Magazine. 1997b. “Time will tell whether name change is real.” The Irrawaddy
Magazine, December. Accessed online December 3, 2017 at
http://www2.irrawaddy.com/article.php?art_id=948
The Irrawaddy Magazine. 1998. “The junta purges one of its own.” The Irrawaddy Magazine,
December. Accessed online December 3, 2017 at
http://www2.irrawaddy.com/article.php?art_id=1528
The Irrawaddy Magazine. 2007. “2007: The Year in Review.” The Irrawaddy Magazine 15, no.
12. December. Accessed online February 2, 2018 at
http://www2.irrawaddy.com/article.php?art_id=9485&page=1
The Irrawaddy Magazine. 2018. “Early Hours of By-Election See Modest Voter Turnout.” The
Irrawaddy Magazine, November 4. Accessed online November 4, 2018 at
https://www.irrawaddy.com/elections/early-hours-election-see-modest-voter-turnout.html
The Irrawaddy Magazine. 2019a. “Gov’t Working on Final Decision for Myitsone Dam,
Minister Says.” The Irrawaddy Magazine, January 29. Accessed online January 30, 2019
at https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/govt-working-final-decision-myitsone-damminister-says.html
The Irrawaddy Magazine. 2019b. “Parliament OKs Debate on Charter-Amendment Panel over
Military’s Strong Objection.” The Irrawaddy Magazine, January 29. Accessed online
January 30, 2019 at https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/parliament-oks-debate-charteramendment-panel-militarys-strong-objection.html
The Irrawaddy Magazine. n.d. “Chronology of the Kachin Conflict.” Accessed online May 7,
2018 at https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/military/chronology-kachin-conflict.html
“It is vital important for country that representatives put forward people’s desires to Hluttaw as
questions, proposals, bills and laws.” 2012. New Light of Myanmar, March 29 pp. 10.
Accessed online January 24, 2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs13/NLM2012-0329.pdf
Ives, Mike. 2017. “A Chinese-Backed Dam Project Leaves Myanmar in a Bind.” The New York
Times, March 31. Accessed online February 12, 2018 at
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/world/asia/myanmar-china-myitsone-damproject.html

381
“Joint Press Release: Myanmar and the European Union (EU) hold second bilateral Human
Rights Dialogue.” 2015. Global New Light of Myanmar, June 22 pp. 1. Accessed online
January 28, 2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/GNLM2015-06-22-red.pdf
Jones, Lee. 2014. "Explaining Myanmar's Regime Transition: the Periphery is Central."
Democratization 21, no. 5: 780-802. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2013.863878
Kappiya Kankaung. 2003. “Earning a living at the expense of the nation.” New Light of
Myanmar, August 12 pp. 8. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs6/NLM2003-08-12.pdf
Ka Tun Byi Tun. 2005. “Seven-step policy programme of State.” New Light of Myanmar, March
23 pp. 7. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at
http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs2/NLM2005-03-23.pdf
Kaung Kaung. 2008. “Union Spirit.” New Light of Myanmar, February 6 pp. 9. Accessed online
January 23, 2019 at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs4/NLM2008-02-06.pdf
Kaytu Nilar. 2008. “People’s goal must be brought to fruition.” New Light of Myanmar, July 29
pp. 6. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/NLM2008-07-29.pdf
Kean, Thomas. 2014. “Myanmar’s Parliament: From Scorn to Significance.” In Cheesman, Nick,
Nicholas Farrelly and Trevor Wilson, eds. 2014. Debating Democratization in Myanmar.
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Keenan, Paul. 2012. “Burma’s Ethnic Ceasefire Agreements.” Burma Centre for Ethnic Studies
Peace and Reconciliation. Briefing Paper No. 1 (January). Accessed online January 30,
2018 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs13/BCES-BP-01-ceasefires(en).pdf
Keenan, Paul. 2013. “The Border Guard Force: The Need to Reassess the Policy.” Burma Centre
for Ethnic Studies Peace and Reconciliation. Briefing Paper No. 15 (July). Accessed
online February 13, 2018 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/BCES-BP-15-BGFred.pdf
“Keep the environment safe and sound.” 2012. New Light of Myanmar, June 7 pp. 2. Accessed
online January 30, 2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs13/NLM2012-06-07.pdf
Kennedy, Merrit. 2016. “U.S. Lifts Economic Sanctions Against Myanmar.” National Public
Radio, October 7. Available online at http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2016/10/07/497070188/u-s-lifts-economic-sanctions-against-myanmar
Ketu Nila. 2007. “There are no political prisoners in Myanmar.” New Light of Myanmar,
January 18. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at
http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs2/NLM2007-01-18.pdf

382
Khaing Myo Nyilar Aung. 2008. “Let’s approve State Constitution (draft) to shape prosperous
future (1).” New Light of Myanmar, March 11 pp. 7. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at
http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs4/NLM2008-03-11.pdf
Khin Chin Dwin. 2013. “Peace and stability, key ingredient for development.” New Light of
Myanmar, February 26 pp. 8. Accessed online January 30, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docsMA2013/NLM2013-02-26.pdf
Khin Nyunt. 1990. Address given to Yangon officials on April 12, 1990. Accessed online March
6, 2018 at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/Statements.htm
Khin Nyunt. 1991. Excerpts from speech given to the Coordination Meeting No. 2/91 of the
Higher Education Department. Published in the Working People’s Daily, April 1.
Accessed online January 22, 2019 at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/91-04.txt
Khin Nyunt. 1992. Speech given at the opening of the coordination meeting for the convening of
the National Convention. Published in the Working People’s Daily Vol. VI No. 6, June
1992. Accessed online December 10, 2017 at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/BPS-NC1992-06.htm
Khin Nyunt. 2001. Speech given to the 10th Annual General Meeting of the Union of Myanmar
Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry. Published in the New Light of
Myanmar, April 1. Accessed online January 22, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/NLM/archives/2001-04/msg00000.html
Khin Nyunt. 2003a. “Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt clarifies future policies and
programmes of State.” Address given on August 30. Accessed online January 29, 2018 at
http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/Roadmap-KN.htm
Khin Nyunt. 2003b. “Special Refresher Course No 18 for Basic Education Teachers opens.” New
Light of Myanmar, June 8. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/NLM/archives/2003-06/msg00005.html
Ko Myanmar. 2009a. “Let’s open golden door in unison.” New Light of Myanmar, August 20 pp.
8-9. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs07/NLM2009-08-20.pdf
Ko Myanmar. 2009b. “Reflected glory to the government.” New Light of Myanmar, September 8
pp. 8. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs07/NLM2009-09-08.pdf
Ko Tin Maung Oo (Ahlon). 2012. “Independence Day, simply unforgettable.” New Light of
Myanmar, December 26 pp. 8. Accessed online January 30, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/NLM2012-12-26.pdf

383
Kramer, Tom. 2012. “Ending 50 years of military rule? Prospects for peace, democracy and
development in Burma.” NOREF Report – Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre.
November. Accessed online April 7, 2016 at
https://www.tni.org/files/download/noref_burma_kramer_november_2012.pdf
Kuok, Lynn. 2014. “Promoting Peace in Myanmar: U.S. Interests and Role.” Center for Strategic
& International Studies. Accessed online May 1, 2018 at https://csisprod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/legacy_files/files/publication/140428_Kuok_PeaceMyanmar_Web.pdf
Kyai Phyu. 2004. “Our national brethren, our own might.” New Light of Myanmar, January 2 pp.
8. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/NLM2004-0202.pdf
Kyaw Hsan. 2008. “In accordance with essence of democracy, opportunities provided for
minority to participate in national political process.” New Light of Myanmar, March 11,
pp. 16 and 8. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at
http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs4/NLM2008-03-11.pdf
Kyaw Lat. 2018. “Buddha’s Teaching and the Problems in Rakhine State.” The Irrawaddy
Magazine, June 25. Accessed online June 29, 2018 at
https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/guest-column/buddhas-teaching-problems-rakhinestate.html
Kyaw Min Lu (Shwepyitha). 2009. “Positive results of trips to Myanmar.” New Light of
Myanmar, February 23 pp. 7. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs6/NLM2009-02-23.pdf
Kyaw Phyo Tha. 2018. “Analysis: History Suggests Int’l Targeting of Tatmadaw over Rohingya
Is Misguided.” September 28. Accessed online October 11, 2018 at
https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/history-suggests-intl-targeting-tatmadawrohingya-misguided.html
Kyaw Thura. 2014. “Peace and security are fundamental to social progress and sustainable
development.” New Light of Myanmar, September 19 pp. 8. Accessed online January 30,
2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs19/19.Sept%2014_nlm.pdf
Kyaw Thura. 2015a. “An art of listening to the silent majority with care.” Global New Light of
Myanmar, June 22 pp. 8. Accessed online January 30, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/GNLM2015-06-22-red.pdf
Kyaw Thura. 2015b. “Country cannot afford to waste another 5 years.” Global New Light of
Myanmar, August 13 pp. 8. Accessed online January 30, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/GNLM2015-08-13-red.pdf

384
Kyaw Thura. 2015c. “There is a first time for everything.” Global New Light of Myanmar, May
8 pp. 8. Accessed online January 30, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/GNLM2015-05-08.pdf
Kyaw Ye Min. 2009. “If good neighbourly relations are maintained.” New Light of Myanmar,
June 11 pp. 8. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs07/NLM2009-06-11.pdf
Kyaw Yin Hlaing. 2007. “Aung San Suu Kyi of Myanmar: A Review of the Lady’s
Biographies.” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International & Strategic
Affairs. 29, no. 2: 365
Kyaw Yin Hlaing. 2014. Prisms on the Golden Pagoda: Perspectives on National Reconciliation
in Myanmar. Singapore: NUS Press.
Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Robert H. Taylor, Tin Maung Maung Than. 2005. Myanmar: Beyond Politics
to Societal Imperatives. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Ladsos, Hervé. 2015. “Investing in Peacekeeping For Today and Beyond.” Global New Light of
Myanmar, November 6 pp. 8. Accessed online January 30, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/GNLM2015-11-06-red.pdf
Lai, Brian and Dan Slater. 2006. “Institutions of the Offensive: Domestic Sources of Dispute
Initiation in Authoritarian Regimes, 1950-1992.” American Journal of Political Science
50, no. 1: 113-126.
Larkin, Emma. 2006. Finding George Orwell in Burma. New York: Penguin Books.
Latt, Sai. 2016. “How Ultra-Nationalism Undermines Democratization and Reconciliation.” The
Irrawaddy Magazine, September 2. http://www.irrawaddy.com/contributor/how-ultranationalism-undermines-democratization-and-reconciliation.html
Lawi Weng. 2018. “No Guarantee Not to Secede: Ethnic Armed Group Leaders.” The Irrawaddy
Magazine, September 13. Accessed online October 11, 2018 at
https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/no-guarantee-not-secede-ethnic-armed-groupleaders.html
“Lawless acts occurred in Rakhine State in May, June exposed.” 2012. New Light of Myanmar,
July 2 pp. 9. Accessed online January 28, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs13/NLM2012-07-02.pdf
Lee, Terence. 2015. Defect or Defend: Military Responses to Popular Protests in Authoritarian
Asia. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

385
Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes
After the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lintner, Bertil. 1990. Outrage: Burma's Struggle for Democracy. London: White Lotus.
Linz, Juan and Alfred Stepan. 1996. Problems of democratic transition and consolidation.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
“Long live the Republic of the Union of Myanmar!” 2012. New Light of Myanmar, December 26
pp. 8. Accessed online January 30, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/NLM2012-12-26.pdf
Lu Thit. 2008. “Prevent terrorist acts through the strength of the people (1).” New Light of
Myanmar, September 22 pp. 6-7. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs6/NLM2008-09-22.pdf
MacAskill, Ewen. 2013. “Thein Sein becomes first Burmese president to visit US since 1966.”
The Guardian, May 20. Accessed online May 7, 2018 at
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/20/thein-sein-burma-visit-us-obama
Malesky, Edmund and Paul Schuler. 2011. “The Single-Party Dictator’s Dilemma: Information
in Elections without Opposition.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 36, no. 4: 491-530.
Malinowski, Tom. 2003. “Burma: Statement by Tom Malinowski to the Congressional Human
Rights Caucus.” Human Rights Watch, June 19. Accessed online January 29, 2018 at
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/asia/burma-testimony061903.htm
Markowski, Radoslaw. 2006. “Political Accountability and Institutional Design in New
Democracies.” International Journal of Sociology, 36, no. 2: 45-75.
Martin, Michael F. 2012a. “Burma’s April Parliamentary By-Elections.” Congressional
Research Service, March 28. Accessed online May 7, 2018 at
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42438.pdf
Martin, Michael F. 2012b. “U.S. Sanctions on Burma.” Congressional Research Service,
October 19. Accessed online May 1, 2018 at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41336.pdf
Martin, Michael F. 2013. “U.S. Sanctions on Burma: Issues for the 113th Congress.”
Congressional Research Service, January 11. Accessed online February 19, 2019 at
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42939.pdf
Martin, Michael F. 2016. “Burma’s 2015 Parliamentary Elections: Issues for Congress.”
Congressional Research Service, March 28. Accessed online June 15, 2018 at
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44436.pdf

386
Martin, Michael F. and Rhoda Margesson. 2008. “Cyclone Nargis and Burma’s Constitutional
Referendum.” Congressional Research Service, June 30. Accessed online February 5,
2018 at
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20080630_RL34481_f475346b0b8ef40dfe351797d
46f368822a844ef.pdf
Maung Aung Myoe. 2009. Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forces Since 1948.
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Maung Aye Chan. 2012. “Constitution and pillars’ duties.” New Light of Myanmar, August 17
pp. 8. Accessed online January 28, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/NLM2012-08-17.pdf
Maung Ka Lu. 2005. “‘Is that so, Maung Ka Lu?’ ‘It’s more than that.’” New Light of Myanmar,
January 14 pp. 7. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at
http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs2/NLM2005-01-14.pdf
Maung Maung. 1988. Speech given to the nation on September 1, 1988. Accessed online March
6, 2018 at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/Statements.htm
Maung Maung Gyi. 1981. "Foreign Policy of Burma Since 1962: Negative Neutralism for Group
Survival." in Lehman, F.K. ed. Military Rule in Burma Since 1962. Singapore: ISEAS
Maruzen Asia.
Maung Maung Hnyet. 2012. “Bribery is no more allowed.” New Light of Myanmar, August 7 pp.
2. Accessed online January 28, 2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs13/NLM201208-07.pdf
Maung Sedanar. 2011. “Myanmar’s political affairs at present and in future.” New Light of
Myanmar, January 7 pp. 8. Accessed online January 28, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs11/NLM2011-01-07.pdf
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2002. “Press release regarding the US Department of State’s
International Religious Freedom Report.” New Light of Myanmar, October 14. Accessed
online January 22, 2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/NLM/archives/200210/msg00018.html
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2015. “Press Release.” Global New Light of Myanmar, August 13
pp. 2. Accessed online January 28, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/GNLM2015-08-13-red.pdf
Min Zin and Brian Joseph. 2012. “The Opening in Burma: The Democrats’ Opportunity.”
Journal of Democracy 23, no. 4: 104-119.
Mitchell, Robert Edward. 1967. “The Use of Content Analysis for Explanatory Studies.” The
Public Opinion Quarterly, 31, no. 2: 230-241.

387
“Mobs Join Rowdy Students.” 1988. Working People’s Daily, August 3. Accessed online
January 22, 2019 at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/BPS88-08.pdf
Moe Myint. 2018. “Analysis: Sacking of Senior Army Officers Unlikely to Reduce International
Pressure over Rakhine.” The Irrawaddy Magazine, June 26. Accessed online June 29,
2018 at https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/analysis-sacking-senior-army-officersunlikely-reduce-international-pressure-rakhine.html
Moe Thuzar. 2012. “Myanmar: No Turning Back.” Southeast Asian Affairs: 203-219. Accessed
online May 7, 2018 at http://www.jstor.org/stable/41713995
Moe Thuzar. 2013. “The Role of Parliament in Myanmar’s Reforms and Transition to
Democracy. Yusof Ishak Institute. Accessed online May 7, 2018 at
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259630630_The_Role_of_Parliament_in_Myan
mar's_Reforms_and_Transition_to_Democracy
Moe Thuzar. 2015. “Myanmar’s 2015 Elections: New Hope on the Horizon?” ISEAS Perspective
– Yusof Ishak Institute. Accessed online May 7, 2018 at
https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2015_70.pdf
Moore, Barrington. 1966. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in
the Making of the Modern World. Boston: Beacon Press.
Morland, Martine. 1996. “Obituary: San Yu.” The Independent, February 2. Accessed online
November 26, 2017 at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-u-san-yu1316872.html
Morrison, J. Stephen, Murray Hiebert, RADM Thomas Cullison, Todd Summers, and Sahil
Angelo. 2014. “Myanmar: Regressed, Stalled, or Moving Forward?” Center for Strategic
& International Studies. Accessed online May 1, 2018 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs19/CSIS-2014-10-Morrison.pdf
Myanmar Constitution. 2008. Official Burmese and English version. Accessed online February
5, 2018 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs09/Myanmar_Constitution-2008(en&bu)red.pdf
“Myanmar expresses willingness to cooperate with Human Rights Watch.” 2014. New Light of
Myanmar, February 6 pp. 1. Accessed online January 24, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs17/NLM2014-02-06.pdf
Myanmar Peace Monitor. n.d. “Border Guard Force Scheme.” Accessed online February 13,
2018 at http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/background/border-guard-force
“Myanmar poised to join top ten countries of highest tourist arrival.” 2013. New Light of
Myanmar, January 17 pp. 7. Accessed online January 28, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/NLM2013-01-17.pdf

388
“Myanmar, US discuss rights to electioneering and constitution.” 2014. New Light of Myanmar,
June 27 pp. 2. Accessed online January 24, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs18/NLM2014-06-27-red.pdf
Myay Zar. 2012. “Mutual understanding.” New Light of Myanmar, November 21 pp. 8. Accessed
online January 28, 2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/NLM2012-11-21.pdf
Mydans, Seth. 2004. “Myanmar Removes its Liberal-Leaning Premier.” The New York Times,
October 20. Accessed online February 16, 2018 at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/20/world/asia/myanmar-removes-its-liberalleaningpremier.html
Myers, Steven Lee. 2011. “Clinton’s Visit to Myanmar Raises Hopes and Concerns.” The New
York Times, November 29. Accessed online May 4, 2018 at
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/world/asia/clintons-visit-to-myanmar-raises-hopesand-concerns.html
Myint Maung (Phil Q). 2011. “Tatmadaw introducing democracy to the nation.” New Light of
Myanmar, March 24 pp. 13. Accessed online January 30, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs11/NLM2011-03-24.pdf
Myint Soe (Natala). 2004. “Peaceful and tranquil border regions.” New Light of Myanmar,
September 21 pp. 10. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at
http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/NLM2004-09-21.pdf
Myint Win Thein. 2015a. “What true leaders are for.” Global New Light of Myanmar, January 23
pp. 8. Accessed online January 30, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs20/GNLM2015-01-23-red.pdf
Myint Win Thein. 2015b. “Wise decisions matter.” Global New Light of Myanmar, November
10 pp. 8. Accessed online January 30, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/GNLM2015-11-10-red.pdf
Myo Myint. 2013. “Final Report of Inquiry Commission on Sectarian Violence in Rakhine
State.” Republic of the Union of Myanmar, July 8. Accessed online May 7, 2018 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/Rakhine_Commission_Report-en-red.pdf
Myo Nyunt. 1992a. Speech given at the second day coordination session of the National
Convention. Published in the Working People’s Daily Vol. VI No. 7, July 1992. Accessed
online December 12, 2017 at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/BPS-NC-1992-07.htm
Myo Nyunt. 1992b. “Warning from Yangon Commander.” Published in the Working People’s
Daily Vol. V, No. 12, December 1992. Accessed online December 12, 2017 at
http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/BPS-NC-1992-12.htm

389
Myo Nyunt. 1993. Speech given at the opening of the National Convention, Published in the
Working People’s Daily Vol. VII, No. 1, January 1993. Accessed online December 12,
2017 at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/BPS-NC-1993-01.htm
Nakanishi, Yoshihiro. 2013. Strong Soldiers, Failed Revolution. Singapore: NUS Press.
Nan Lwin. 2018. “Ethnic Political Parties Merge to Seek Stronger Representation in 2020
Election.” The Irrawaddy Magazine, September 11. Accessed online October 4, 2018 at
https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/politics/ethnic-political-parties-merge-to-seekstronger-representation-in-2020-election.html
National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma. 2008. “Bullets in the Alms Bowl: An
Analysis of the Brutal SPDC Suppression of the September 2007 Saffron Revolution.”
Human Rights Documentation Unit. March. Accessed online February 2, 2018 at
http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs4/BulletsInTheAlmsBowl.pdf
National League for Democracy. 2009. “National League for Democracy Statement on April 29,
2009.” April 29. Accessed online February 6, 2018 at
http://burmacampaign.org.uk/national-league-for-democracy-statement-on-april-29-2009/
“Nation-building task of Myanmar made possible by the reform measures instituted by President
U Thein Sein; Daw Aung San Suu Kyi delivers an address at ceremony to accept
Congressional Gold Medal.” 2012. New Light of Myanmar, September 21 pp. 16.
Accessed online January 24, 2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/NLM2012-0921.pdf
Nelson, Dean. 2012. “Burma releases 650 political prisoners in move to end isolation.”
Telegraph, January 13. Accessed online May 7, 2018 at
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/burmamyanmar/9013254/MyanmarBurma-releases-650-political-prisoners-in-move-to-end-isolation.html
Ne Win. 1988. Statement given to the Extraordinary Party Congress of the Burma Socialist
Programme Party (BSPP) on July 23, 1988. Accessed online March 6, 2018 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/reg.burma/archives/199911/msg00331.html
New Light of Myanmar. Full text from August 2003-present. Available online at
http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/show.php?cat=1450&lo=&sl= 2
New Light of Myanmar. 1996a. “Detailed Basic Principles of the Formation of the Executive.”
March 31. Accessed online December 17, 2017 at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/DBPEXECUTIVE.htm

2

In the event that full texts of the New Light of Myanmar are removed from the Online Burma
Library website, the author has retained PDFs of each edition of the NLM used in this project.

390
New Light of Myanmar. 1996b. “Detailed Basic Principles of the Formation of the Judiciary.”
April 1. Accessed online December 17, 2017 at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/DBPJUDICIARY.htm
New Light of Myanmar. 1996c. “The Detailed Basic Principles for Formation of the Legislature
to be Included in the State Constitution as Laid Down by the National Convention
Plenary Session Held from 28 to 30 March 1996.” March 29. Accessed online December
17, 2017 at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/DBP-LEGISLATURE.htm
New York Times. 1992. “Burmese Leaders Free 19 Political Prisoners.” The New York Times,
April 27. Accessed online November 26, 2017 at
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/27/world/burmese-leaders-free-19-politicalprisoners.html
“Nine armed group members exchange arms for peace.” 2002. New Light of Myanmar,
December 31. Accessed online January 22, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/NLM/archives/2002-12/msg00030.html
“Nine SURAs exchange arms for peace in Mongphyat.” 2002. New Light of Myanmar, July 24.
Accessed online January 22, 2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/NLM/archives/200207/msg00021.html
“NLD committing destructive acts after receiving instructions from big countries through
embassies.” 2007. New Light of Myanmar, August 3 pp. 2. Accessed online January 23,
2019 at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs4/NLM2007-08-03.pdf
Nobel Peace Prize. 1991. “Nobel Prizes and Laureates.” Nobelprize.org. Accessed online March
19, 2018 at https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1991/
Nordlinger, Eric. 1977. Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments. Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Notification No. 43/2012. 2012. “Investigation Committee Formed.” New Light of Myanmar,
June 7 pp. 1. Accessed online January 28, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs13/NLM2012-06-07.pdf
NPR. 2013. “As Myanmar Opens Up, A Look Back on a 1988 Uprising.” National Public Radio,
August 8. Available online at http://www.npr.org/2013/08/08/209919791/as-myanmaropens-up-a-look-back-on-a-1988-uprising
Nyein Nyein. 2018. “The Tatmadaw’s Political Might.” The Irrawaddy Magazine, August 29.
Accessed online October 4, 2018 at https://www.irrawaddy.com/in-person/tatmadawspolitical-might.html

391
O'Donnell, Guillermo A., and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1986. Transitions from authoritarian rule:
Tentative conclusions about uncertain democracies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press.
Olarn, Kocha. 2012. “Myanmar removes names from blacklist.” CNN, August 31. Accessed
online May 7, 2018 at https://www.cnn.com/2012/08/30/world/asia/myanmar-blacklistnames/index.html
Olsen, Johan P. 1997. “Institutional Design in Democratic Contexts.” The Journal of Political
Philosophy, 5, no. 3: 203-229.
“One civilian killed in KIA attack.” 2011. New Light of Myanmar, November 23 pp. 11.
Accessed online January 28, 2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs12/NLM2011-1123.pdf
“One of the best ways.” 2012. New Light of Myanmar, October 8 pp. 8. Accessed online January
30, 2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/NLM2012-10-08.pdf
Ottaway, Marina. 2003. Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism.
Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Padaung Than Kywe. 2011. “Tatmadaw puts national cause at the forefront.” New Light of
Myanmar, March 25 pp. 4. Accessed online January 30, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs11/NLM2011-03-25.pdf
Panda, Ankit. 2014. “Myanmar Government Releases 3,000 Prisoners.” The Diplomat, October
8. Accessed online May 7, 2018 at https://thediplomat.com/2014/10/myanmargovernment-releases-3000-prisoners/
Pauk Se. 2008. “Goodbye, 1990 election results!” New Light of Myanmar, July 6 pp. 7. Accessed
online January 23, 2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/NLM2008-07-06.pdf
“Peace agreement signed between Union level peace-making group and Shan State Progressive
Party (SSPP)/Shan State Army peace-making group.” 2012. New Light of Myanmar,
January 30 pp. 16. Accessed online January 28, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs13/NLM2012-01-30.pdf
Pederson, Morton B. 2014. “Myanmar’s Democratic Opening: The Process and Prospect of
Reform.” In Cheesman, Nick, Nicholas Farrelly and Trevor Wilson, eds. Debating
Democratization in Myanmar. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Pederson, Rena. 2015. The Burma Spring: Aung San Suu Kyi and the New Struggle for the Soul
of a Nation. New York: Pegasus Books.

392
Pepinsky, Thomas B. 2009. Economic crises and the breakdown of authoritarian regimes:
Indonesia and Malaysia in comparative perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
“People should never ever be swayed by instigations of any armed group and political
organizations: Union Border Affairs Minister.” 2012. New Light of Myanmar, October 30
pp. 1. Accessed online January 28, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/NLM2012-10-30.pdf
“President U Thein Sein meets leading business executives in Turn.” 2014. Global New Light of
Myanmar, October 20 pp. 3. Accessed online January 24, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs19/GNLM2014-10-20-red.pdf
“Projects will achieve success only through cooperation and coordination between Union
Government and State and Region governments.” 2011. New Light of Myanmar, April 23
pp. 1. Accessed online January 28, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs11/NLM2011-04-23.pdf
Przeworski, Adam. 1991. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in
Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Public Library of US Diplomacy. 2008. “Continuing the Pursuit of Democracy in Burma.”
Wikileaks. Confidential Memo July 14. Accessed online February 20, 2018 at
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08RANGOON557_a.html
“Push ahead with democratization process.” 2013. New Light of Myanmar, May 15 pp. 8.
Accessed online January 30, 2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/NLM-201305-15.pdf
Pyay Oo (Ayeyarwady). 2013. “On Conflicts.” New Light of Myanmar, August 6 pp. 9. Accessed
online January 30, 2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/NLM-2013-08-06red.pdf
“Pyithu Hluttaw Speaker Thura U Shwe Mann visits India.” 2011. New Light of Myanmar,
December 19 pp. 16. Accessed online January 24, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs12/NLM2011-12-19.pdf
Radio Free Asia. 2015a. “Myanmar President Thein Sein Ousts Ruling Party Chairman Ahead of
Elections.” August 13. Available online at
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/ouster-08132015110509.html
Radio Free Asia. 2015b. “Kokang Rebels and Military Troops Clash in Myanmar’s Shan State.”
February 10. Accessed online May 8, 2018 at
https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/clash-02102015181545.html

393
“Raising industrial development momentum.” 2006. New Light of Myanmar, July 24 pp. 2.
Accessed online January 23, 2019 at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs2/NLM2006-0724.pdf
Reporters Without Borders. 2018. “Myanmar: Aung San Suu Kyi’s broken promises.” Accessed
online October 11, 2018 at https://rsf.org/en/myanmar
“Republic of the Union of Myanmar Union Election Commission Announcement for 2015
General Elections.” 2015. Global New Light of Myanmar, January 1 pp. 3. Accessed
online January 28, 2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs20/GNLM2015-01-01red.pdf
Reuters. 2018a. “Democratic Transition in Myanmar ‘at Standstill’: UN Rights Panel.” The
Irrawaddy Magazine, September 19. Accessed online October 11, 2018 at
https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/democratic-transition-myanmar-standstill-unrights-panel.html
Reuters. 2018b. “EU Sanctions Myanmar Generals Over Rohingya; Myanmar Says Two Are
Fired.” The Irrawaddy Magazine, June 26. Accessed online June 29, 2018 at
https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/eu-sanctions-myanmar-generals-rohingya-myanmarsays-two-fired.html
Reuters. 2018c. “Myanmar’s Suu Kyi Defends Court Decision to Jail Reuters Journalists.” The
Irrawaddy Magazine, September 13. Accessed online October 11, 2018 at
https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmars-suu-kyi-defends-court-decision-jailreuters-journalists.html
Rice, Marshall D. and Zaiming Lu. 1988. “A Content Analysis of Chinese Magazine
Advertisements.” Journal of Advertising, 17, no. 4: 43-48.
“Rising Asia.” 2012. New Light of Myanmar, July 23 pp. 2. Accessed online January 30, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs13/NLM2012-07-23.pdf
“Rohingya never been included among national races of Myanmar.” 2013. New Light of
Myanmar, November 25 pp. 16. Accessed online January 24, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs16/NLM-2013-11-25-red.pdf
S.Res. 234 – 103rd Congress. 1994. “A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate concerning
the fifth year of imprisonment of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi by Burma’s military
dictatorship and for other purposes.” www.GovTrack.us. Accessed online May 1, 2018 at
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/103/sres234
Saikat Kumar Basu. 2015. “Letter to the editor.” Global New Light of Myanmar, September 23
pp. 8. Accessed online January 30, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/GNLM2015-09-23-red.pdf

394
Saimon, Mahn. 2011. “Shan Army ‘to sign ceasefire’ with govt.” Democratic Voice of Burma,
November 22. Accessed online May 4, 2018 at http://www.dvb.no/news/shan-army%E2%80%98to-sign-ceasefire%E2%80%99-with-govt/18857
“Salute our martyrs.” 2013. New Light of Myanmar, July 18 pp. 8. Accessed online January 30,
2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/NLM-2013-07-18-op-red.pdf
San Yamin Aung. 2018. “Analysis: NLD Faces Crucial Test of Support in By-Election.” The
Irrawaddy Magazine, November 2. Accessed online November 4, 2018 at
https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/analysis-nld-faces-crucial-test-supportelection.html
Saw Maung. 1989. Statement given on July 5, 1989. Published in the Working People’s Daily,
July 1989. Accessed online January 19, 2018 at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/BPS8907-SM's_speech.pdf
Saw Maung. 1990. Address given on Armed Forces Day, March 27. Published in the Working
People’s Daily Vol. IV, No. 3, March 1990. Accessed online January 19, 2018 at
http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/90-03.txt
Saw Nandar (Manaung). 2006. “Favouritism democracy and benefiting democracy.” New Light
of Myanmar, December 12 pp. 7. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at
http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs2/NLM2006-12-12.pdf
Saya Phone. 2007. “They are dutiful.” New Light of Myanmar, May 25 pp. 7. Accessed online
January 23, 2019 at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs2/NLM2007-05-25.pdf
Schedler, Andreas. 1998. “What is Democratic Consolidation?” Journal of Democracy, 9, no. 2:
91-105.
Sebald, Hans. 1962. “Studying National Character Through Comparative Content
Analysis.” Social Forces, 40, no. 4: 318-322.
Seekins, Donald M. 2017. Historical Dictionary of Burma (Myanmar): Second Edition. New
York: Roman & Littlefield.
Selcher, Wayne. 1986. Political Liberalization in Brazil: Dynamics, Dilemmas, and Future
Prospects. Boulder and London: Westview Press.
Selth, Andrew. 1996. Transforming the Tatmadaw. Canberra: Canberra Papers on Strategy and
Defense.
Selth, Andrew. 2002. Burma’s Armed Forces: Power Without Glory. Norwalk, CT: EastBridge.

395
Selway, Joel. 2015. “Ethnic Accommodation and Electoral Rules in Ethno-Geographically
Segregated Societies: PR Outcomes Under FPTP in Myanmar Elections.” Journal of East
Asian Studies 15: 321-360.
Siavelis, Peter and Valenzuela, Arturo. 1996. “Electoral Engineering and Democratic Stability:
The Legacy of Authoritarian Rule in Chile.” In Institutional Design in New Democracies:
Eastern Europe and Latin America. Lijphart, Arend and Waisman, Carlos, eds.
Michigan: Westview Press.
Silva, Patricio. 2002. "Searching for Civilian Supremacy: The Concertación Governments and
the Military in Chile." Bulletin of Latin American Research 21, no. 3: 375-395.
Silverstein, Josef. 1977. Burma: Military Rule and the Politics of Stagnation. Ithaca and London:
Cornell University Press.
Silverstein, Josef. 1981. "Minority Problems in Burma Since 1962." in Lehman, F.K.
ed. Military Rule in Burma Since 1962. Singapore: ISEAS Maruzen Asia.
Skidmore, Monique. 2008. “Contemporary medical pluralism in Burma.” In Skidmore, Monique
and Trevor Wilson, eds. 2008. Dictatorship, Disorder and Decline in Myanmar.
Canberra, Australia: ANU E Press.
Skidmore, Monique and Trevor Wilson, eds. 2008. Dictatorship, Disorder and Decline in
Myanmar. Canberra, Australia: ANU E Press.
Skocpol, Theda. 1979. States and Social Revolutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Slater, Dan. 2003. “Iron Cage in an Iron Fist: Authoritarian Institutions and the Personalization
of Power in Malaysia.” Comparative Politics, 36, no. 1: 81-101.
Slater, Dan. 2006. “The Architecture of Authoritarianism: Southeast Asia and the Regeneration
of Democratization Theory.” Taiwan Journal of Democracy 2, no. 2: 1-22.
Slater, Dan. 2008. “Can Leviathan be Democratic? Competitive Elections, Robust Mass Politics,
and State Infrastructural Power.” Studies in Comparative International Development, 43:
252-272.
Slater, Dan. 2010. Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in
Southeast Asia. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Slater, Dan. 2014. “The elements of surprise: assessing Burma’s double-edged détente.” South
East Asia Research 22, no. 2: 171-182.
Slater, Dan and Joseph Wong. 2013. “The Strength to Concede: Ruling Parties and
Democratization in Developmental Asia.” Perspectives on Politics 11, no. 2: 717-733.

396
Slater, Dan and Sofia Fenner. 2011. “State Power and Staying Power: Infrastructural
Mechanisms and Authoritarian Durability.” Journal of International Affairs 65, no. 1: 1529.
SLORC Declaration No. 1/90, July 27, 1990. Published in the Working People’s Daily on July
29, 1990 and available online at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/Declaration_1-90.htm
SLORC Declaration No. 11/92, April 24, 1992. Published in the Working People’s Daily Vol.
VI, No. 4 on April 24, 1992 and available online at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/BPSNC-1992-04.htm
SLORC Declaration No. 13/92, October 1992. Accessed online December 12, 2017 at
http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/13-92.htm
SLORC Law No. 5/96, June 7, 1996. “The Law Protecting the Peaceful and Systematic Transfer
of State Responsibility and the Successful Performance of the Functions of the National
Convention against Disturbances and Oppositions.” Accessed online December 17, 2017
at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/1996-SLORC_Law1996-05-antisubversion_Law-en.pdf
Smith, Benjamin. 2005. “Life of the Party: The origins of regime breakdown and persistence
under single-party rule.” World Politics 57, no. 3: 421-451.
Snyder, Jack L. 2000. From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict. New
York: Norton.
Soe Moe (Pathein) (Trs.). 2006. “Poem: Vigour of Independence.” New Light of Myanmar,
January 3 pp. 5. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at
http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs2/NLM2006-01-03.pdf
Soe Mya Kyaw. 2006. “The form of legislation and essence of future State part-2.” New Light of
Myanmar, January 3 pp. 8. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at
http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs2/NLM2006-01-03.pdf
Soe Zeya Tun. 2012. “Myanmar signs ceasefire to end 62-year ethnic conflict.” Reuters, January
12. Accessed online May 7, 2018 at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmarethnic/myanmar-signs-ceasefire-to-end-62-year-ethnic-conflictidUSTRE80B0EX20120112
South China Morning Post. 2016. “Former junta powerbroker Shwe Mann appointed to key
advisory role as Suu Kyi and NLD embrace spirit of cooperation.” February 5. Available
online at http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/1909849/former-juntapowerbroker-shwe-mann-appointed-key-advisory

397
SPDC Law No. 1/2010. 2010. “The Union Election Commission Law.” March 8. Accessed
online February 20, 2018 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs18/2010-03-08SPDC_Law2010-01_Union_Election_Commission_Law-oag-en.pdf
Srinivas, Ashwini. 2014. “Sino-Myanmar Oil & Gas Pipelines and their Implications for India.”
Global Journal of Finance and Management 6, no. 9: 951-956.
Stanig, Piero. 2015. “Regulation of Speech and Media Coverage of Corruption: An Empirical
Analysis of the Mexican Press.” American Journal of Political Science 59, no. 1: 175193.
“State of Emergency in Rangoon.” Working People’s Daily August 3. Accessed online January
22, 2019 at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/BPS88-08.pdf
“State's participation needed in implementing enormous projects greatly benefiting nation
Collective participation in nation-building projects approved by SPIC stressed.” 2002.
New Light of Myanmar July 24. Accessed online January 22, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/NLM/archives/2002-07/msg00021.html
Steinberg, David I. 1990. The Future of Burma: Crisis and Choice in Myanmar. Asian Agenda
Report 14. New York: The Asia Society, University Press of America.
Steinberg, David. 2010a. “Aung San Suu Kyi and U.S. Policy Toward Burma/Myanmar.”
Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 29, no. 3: 35-59.
Steinberg, David. 2010b. “The United States and Myanmar: a ‘boutique issue’?” International
Affairs 86, no. 1: 175-194.
Stepan, Alfred C. 1988. Rethinking military politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
“Strive for successful implementation of development projects.” 2005. New Light of Myanmar,
April 21 pp. 2. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at
http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/NLM2005-04-21.pdf
“Student Disturbances.” Working People’s Daily, March 28. Accessed online January 22, 2019
at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/BPS89-03.pdf
Sullivan, Michael. 2009. “Senator Wins Release of U.S. Prisoner in Myanmar.” National Public
Radio, August 15. Accessed online March 20, 2018 at
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=111917927
Tachau, Frank and Metin Heper. 1983. “The State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey.”
Comparative Politics 16, no. 1: 17-33.
Taylor, Robert H. 2009. The State in Myanmar. Singapore: NUS Press.

398
Taylor, Robert. 2014. “The Third Constitution of the Union of Myanmar.” In Kyaw Yin Hlaing,
ed. Prisms on the Golden Pagoda: Perspectives on National Reconciliation in Myanmar.
NUS Press: Singapore.
Taylor, Robert H. 2015a. “Refighting Old Battles, Compounding Misconceptions: The Politics
of Ethnicity in Myanmar Today.” Institute of Southeast Asian Studies #12. March 2.
Taylor, Robert H. 2015b. “Responding to Nargis: Political Storm or Humanitarian Rage?”
Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia 30, no. 3: 911-932.
Tekkatho Myat Thu. 2003a. “Not only the people of Myanmar but also ASEAN and international
community support the seven-point roadmap of Myanmar.” New Light of Myanmar,
October 22 pp. 7. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at
http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/NLM2003-10-20.pdf
Tekkatho Myat Thu. 2003b. “The world does not accept any form of foreign interference.” New
Light of Myanmar, August 22 pp. 8. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs6/NLM2003-08-22.pdf
Tekkatho Myat Thu. 2007. “Accomplishment of National Convention delegates at
Nyaunghnapin Camp.” New Light of Myanmar, July 18 pp. 8-9. Accessed online January
23, 2019 at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs4/NLM2007-07-18.pdf
Than Shwe. 2011a. “The Root Cause of Splits.” New Light of Myanmar, March 25, pp. 1.
Accessed online December 1, 2017 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs11/NLM201103-25.PDF
Than Shwe. 2011b. “To tackle all forms of disruptions.” New Light of Myanmar, March 24 pp. 1.
Accessed online January 24, 2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs11/NLM2011-0324.pdf
Thawnghmung, Ardeth Maung. 2003. “Preconditions and Prospects for Democratic Transition in
Burma.” Asian Survey 43, no. 3: 443-460
Thein Sein. 2012. “Order No. 35/2012; Deputy Ministers reshuffled.” New Light of Myanmar,
September 13 pp. 1. Accessed online January 24, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/NLM2012-09-13.pdf
Thein Sein. 2013a. “Order No. 2/2013; Union ministers allowed to resign.” New Light of
Myanmar, January 17 pp. 16. Accessed online January 24, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/NLM2013-01-17.pdf
Thein Sein. 2013b. “Without racial, religious discrimination, relief works are to be carried out.”
New Light of Myanmar, May 15 pp. 1. Accessed online January 28, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/NLM-2013-05-15.pdf

399
Thein Sein 2014a. “Healthy Constitution must be amended from time to time to address national,
economic, social needs of society.” New Light of Myanmar, January 2 pp. 1 and 8.
Accessed online January 24, 2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs17/NLM2014-0102.pdf
Thein Sein. 2014b. “We talk to each other and find common solutions together to overcome
challenges.” Global New Light of Myanmar, November 5 pp. 1. Accessed online January
28, 2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs19/GNLM2014-11-05-red.pdf
Thein Sein. 2015a. “NCA is more than a document.” Global New Light of Myanmar, October 7
pp. 2. Accessed online January 28, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/GNLM2015-10-07-red.pdf
Thein Sein 2015b. “We will be able to establish a Federal Union on the basis of agreements we
will reach at political dialogue My Fellow Citizens.” Global New Light of Myanmar,
January 1 pp. 1 and 4. Accessed online January 24, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs20/GNLM2015-01-01-red.pdf
Thiha Aung (Trs). 2004. “Poem: To the New Golden Nation.” New Light of Myanmar, January 2
pp. 9. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/NLM200402-02.pdf
Tilly, Charles. 1992. Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990-1992. Cambridge, MA:
Blackwell Publishing.
Tin Maung Maung Than. 2007. State Dominance in Myanmar: The Political Economy of
Industrialization. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Tin Maung Maung Than. 2013. “Myanmar’s 2012 By-Elections: The Return of NLD.” Southeast
Asian Affairs: 204-219. Accessed online May 7, 2018 at
https://www.jstor.org/stable/23471145?seq=4#page_scan_tab_contents
Tin Maung Oo (Ahlon). 2013. “National races joining hands together with the sense of urgency.”
New Light of Myanmar, February 11 pp. 9. Accessed online January 30, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docsMA2013/NLM2013-02-11.pdf
Tin Tin Win. 2007. “From the first step to the set goal.” New Light of Myanmar, November 16
pp. 7. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs4/NLM200711-16.pdf
Tonkin, Derek. 2007. “The 1990 Elections in Myanmar: Broken Promises or a Failure of
Communication?” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and
Strategic Affairs, 29, no. 1: 33-54.

400
Transnational Institute. 2009. “Neither War Nor Peace” The Future of the Cease-Fire
Agreements in Burma.” July. Accessed online February 13, 2018 at
https://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/ceasefire.pdf
Turnell, Sean. 2008. “Burma’s Insatiable State.” Asian Survey 48, no. 6: 958-976.
Turnell, Sean. 2011. “Myanmar in 2010: Doors Open, Doors Close.” Asian Survey 51, no. 1:
148-154.
Turnell, Sean and Alison Vicary. 2003. “Burma’s Banking Crisis: A Commentary.” Burma
Economic Watch, March 6. Accessed online January 29, 2018 at
http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/BEW2003-03.htm
U.S. Department of State. 2006. “Conditions in Burma and U.S. Policy Toward Burma for the
Period September 28, 2005 – March 27, 2008.” Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
April 17. Accessed online January 30, 2018 at https://20012009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rpt/66449.htm
U.S. Department of State. 2012. “Burma Elections 2010 and 2012.” US Department of State
Humanitarian Information Unit, March 26. Accessed online June 15, 2018.
U.S. Treasury Department. 2003. “Public Law 108-61: 108th Congress.” U.S. Treasury
Department. Accessed online January 29, 2018 at https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Documents/bfda_2003.pdf
U Aung Toe. 1994. Speech given by Chairman of the National Convention Convening Work
Committee. New Light of Myanmar, January 19. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at
http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/BPS-NC-1994-01.htm
Ulfelder, Jay. 2005. “Contentious Collective Action and the Breakdown of Authoritarian
Regimes.” International Political Science Association 26, no. 3: 311-334.
“UN agencies, INGOs getting back to work in Rakhine State.” 2014. New Light of Myanmar,
April 23 pp. 2. Accessed online January 24, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs17/NLM2014-04-23.pdf
“Union defence minister holds talks with UNHCR representatives on resettlement of refugees.”
2014. Global New Light of Myanmar, October 29 pp. 9. Accessed online January 24,
2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs19/GNLM2014-10-29-red.pdf
United Nations. 2004. “Release of Prisoners in Myanmar Important Step Towards Creating
Environment for Genuine National Reconciliation, Says Secretary-General.” United
Nations, November 19. Accessed online January 30, 2018 at
http://www.un.org/press/en/2004/sgsm9608.doc.htm

401
U Ohn Gyaw. 1991. “Statement by His Excellency U Ohn Gyaw, Minister for Foreign Affairs
and Chairman of the Delegation of the Union of Myanmar in the General Debate at the
Forty-Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly.” New York, October 4.
Accessed online November 26, 2017 at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/Ohn-GyawGA91.htm
U Pyay Kyaw. 2007. “Innate nature of foreign radio stations.” New Light of Myanmar, October 1
pp. 4-5. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at
http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs4/NLM2007-10-01.pdf
U Pyinnya. 2005. “Be pragmatic instead of talking big.” New Light of Myanmar, October 27 pp.
7. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs2/NLM2005-1027.pdf
U Win Aung. 2000. Press Conference given by Minister for Foreign Affairs at the 13th
Ministerial Conference of Non-Aligned Movements. Published in the New Light of
Myanmar, May 4. Accessed online January 22, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/NLM/archives/2000-05/msg00005.html
“Votes Swiftly Tallied; NLD dominates the first round of election results.” 2015. Global New
Light of Myanmar, November 10 pp. 1. Accessed online January 24, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/GNLM2015-11-10-red.pdf
Wahman, Michael, Jan Teorell and Axel Hadenius. 2013. “Authoritarian regime types revisited:
updated data in comparative perspective.” Contemporary Politics 19, no. 1: 19-34.
Walton, Matthew J. 2013. “Buddhism turns violent in Myanmar.” Asia Times, April 2. Accessed
online June 22, 2018 at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/SEA-01020413.html
“We cannot allow transformation to fail.” 2013. New Light of Myanmar, August 6 pp. 8.
Accessed online January 30, 2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/NLM-201308-06-red.pdf
Weller, Marc. 1993. Democracy and Politics in Burma. Yangon: Government Print Office of the
National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma. Accessed online January 22,
2019 at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/SLORC_Press_conf-1989-06-09.htm
Whiteman, Hilary. 2013. “Why Kachin conflict threatens Myanmar peace.” CNN, January 24.
Accessed online May 7, 2018 at https://www.cnn.com/2013/01/23/world/asia/myanmarburma-kachin-conflict/index.html
Wilson, Trevor. 2010. “The Significance of Myanmar’s 2010 Election.” New Mandala, Dec 15.
http://www.newmandala.org/the-significance-of-myanmar%E2%80%99s-2010-election/

402
Wilson, Trevor. 2014. “Debating Democratization in Myanmar.” in Cheesman, Nick, Nicholas
Farrelly and Trevor Wilson, eds. 2014. Debating Democratization in Myanmar.
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Win Min. 2008. “Internal dynamics of the Burmese military: before, during and after the 2007
demonstrations.” In Skidmore, Monique and Trevor Wilson, eds. 2008. Dictatorship,
Disorder and Decline in Myanmar. Canberra, Australia: ANU E Press.
Win Myint Aung. 2012a. “It’s lovely to see foreigners in Myanmar costumes.” New Light of
Myanmar, December 18 pp. 8. Accessed online January 28, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/NLM2012-12-18.pdf
Win Myint Aung. 2012b. “You used to be a jack of all trade.” New Light of Myanmar, October 8
pp. 8. Accessed online January 28, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/NLM2012-10-08.pdf
Winn, Patrick. 2012. “Myanmar: ending the world’s longest-running civil war.” Global Post,
May 13. http://www.post-gazette.com/world/2012/05/13/Myanmar-ending-the-world-slongest-running-civil-war/stories/201205130149
“Work for regional and national development by making the most of development foundations.”
2005. New Light of Myanmar, June 8 pp. 2. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at
http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs2/NLM2005-06-08.pdf
“Work together for discipline-flourishing democratic state.” 2006. New Light of Myanmar,
January 3 pp. 2. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at
http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs2/NLM2006-01-03.pdf
Wright, Joseph. 2008. “Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect
Economic Growth and Investment.” American Journal of Political Science 52, no, 2:
322-343.
“Yangon on Orange Alert.” 2015. Global New Light of Myanmar, November 6 pp. 1. Accessed
online January 28, 2019 at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/GNLM2015-11-06red.pdf
Ye Min Htet. 2007. “In the service of the nation and the people.” New Light of Myanmar, March
27 pp. 8. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at
http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs2/NLM2007-03-27.pdf
Ye Myint. 2015a. “Gov’t, ethnic armed groups optimistic of ceasefire deal after Day 2.” Global
New Light of Myanmar, July 24 pp. 1. Accessed online January 28, 2019 at
www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/GNLM2015-07-24-red.pdf

403
Ye Myint. 2015b. “International and local representatives to witness ceasefire inking.” Global
New Light of Myanmar, October 14 pp. 1. Accessed online January 28, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/GNLM2015-10-14-red.pdf
Yen Snaing. 2013. “Rangoon University: A History of Protest.” The Irrawaddy Magazine,
Accessed online April 7, 2017 at https://www.irrawaddy.com/multimedia-burma/photoessay/rangoon-university-history-protest.html
Zaw Min Min Oo. 2010. “Poem: Nay Pyi Taw in all its glory.” New Light of Myanmar,
December 29 pp. 10. Accessed online January 23, 2019 at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs11/NLM2010-12-29.pdf
Zeldin, Wendy. 2011. “Burma: Peaceful Protest Law.” Global Legal Monitor, December 30.
Accessed online May 4, 2018 at http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/burmapeaceful-protest-law/

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
TIMELINE OF EVENTS IN MYANMAR, 1948-20151

1

BBC 2017
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Color Coding Key for Variables
•

Features inherent to military regimes

•

Professionalization

•

Splits within the military

•

Civil society opposition

•

Institutional design

•

Regime confidence/role of military

•

Political liberalization

Post-Independence Period – 1948-1987
1948 – Myanmar gets its independence from Britain
1958-1960 – A split in the AFPFL government (led by Prime Minister U Nu) leads to a
Caretaker government, led by General Ne Win
1960 – Elections are held and U Nu’s AFPFL wins – however, his promotion of Buddhism as the
state religion and his tolerance of talk of separatism by the ethnic minority groups is
cause for concern with the military.
1962 – Military coup led by General Ne Win ousts the U Nu government and establishes the
“Burmese Way to Socialism” which nationalizes the economy, bans independent
newspaper and creates a single-party system led by the Burma Socialist Programme Party
1974 - BSPP establishes a new constitution, transferring power from the military to a People’s
Assembly headed by Ne Win and other military leaders
1981 – Ne Win hands the presidency to retired general San Yu but stays on as the chairman of
the Burma Socialist Programme Party
1982 – A law is established designating people of non-indigenous backgrounds as “associate
citizens” and barring them from public office
1987 - Currency devaluations lead to financial distress for many people and prompts antigovernment riots
Failed Transition Period – 1988-2002
1988 – Widespread protests take place in what is eventually known as the 8888 Demonstrations.
Thousands of people are killed, and the State Law and Order Restoration Council is
created.
1989 – SLORC declares martial law and arrests thousands of people, including NLD leader
Aung San Suu Kyi, who is put under house arrest
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1990 – Elections are held – National League for Democracy wins landslide, but the results are
not upheld by the military and SLORC
1991 – Aung San Suu Kyi wins Nobel Peace Prize for her commitment to peaceful political
change
1992 – Than Shwe replaces Saw Maung as SLORC chairman, prime minister and defense
minister. Some political prisoners are freed in an attempt to improve Myanmar’s
international image
1995 – Aung San Suu Kyi is released from house arrest
1996 – Aung San Suu Kyi attends her first NLD congress since her release from house arrest –
SLORC arrests over 200 delegates who are attending the conference
1997 – Myanmar joins the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). SLORC is
renamed State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)
1998 – 300 NLD members released from prison; student demonstrations broken up
2000 – Ruling council lifts restrictions on the movements of NLD senior members, including
Aung San Suu Kyi, who begins secret talks with the ruling council
2001 – Ruling council releases about 200 pro-democracy activists, citing progress in their recent
talks with Aung San Suu Kyi
2001 – Burmese army clashes with Shan rebels on the Thai border. Diplomatic visits with Thai
Prime Minister and Chinese President.
2002 – Aung San Suu Kyi released from house arrest after 20 months – she is taken under
protective custody soon after due to clashes between government supporters and NLD
supporters
Interim Period – 2003-2010
2003 – Khin Nyunt becomes prime minister and proposes a convention to be held in 2004 in
order to draft a new constitution as part of a “Roadmap to Democracy”
2004 – The government and the Karen National Union, an armed ethnic group, agree to end
hostilities. Constitutional convention starts and is boycotted by the NLD because Aung
San Suu Kyi remains under house arrest. There are rumors of splits/power struggles
within the government and Khin Nyunt is replaced as prime minister. Thousands of
political prisoners are released.
2005 – Government announces that it will move the capitol to the center of the country. The new
city is later named Naypyidaw.
2007 – Many changes in the international system. The UN Security Council discusses passing a
resolution pushing Myanmar to stop persecuting minority groups and opposition parties,
but China and Russia veto the Resolution. Myanmar and North Korea restore diplomatic
ties. The International Committee of the Red Cross accuses the government of abusing
human rights. In August, fuel price hikes incite protests and dozens of activists are
arrested. In September, Buddhist monks hold a series of protests, and Aung San Suu Kyi
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makes her first public appearance since 2003, leaving her house to greet the monks
demonstrating on University Avenue. UN envoy Ibrahim Gambari is allowed to meet
with Aung San Suu Kyi. In October, the military cracks down on protests and stations
soldiers around Yangon. Thousands of monks are rounded up and arrested. The UN
Security Council denounces the crackdown on the protests. In January, state media blame
“insurgent destructionists” (implying ethnic rebel groups) for a series of bomb blasts
around the country. In April, the government publishes the new constitution, which
allocates 25% of parliamentary seats to military members and includes a clause which
effectively bars Aung San Suu Kyi from the presidency.
2008 – Cyclone Nargis hits Myanmar in May, and the death toll is reportedly as high as 134,000.
The government prevents international aid groups from distributing help to victims.
Despite the devastation from the Cyclone, the government insists on holding the planned
referendum on the new constitution, reporting impossibly high turnout rates and a 92%
approval vote. Aung San Suu Kyi’s house arrest is renewed. In December, the Myanmar
government signs a deal with foreign firms to pipe natural gas into China, amid protests
by human rights groups.
2009 – In January, Thailand forces out hundreds of Muslim Rohingya refugees fleeing from
Myanmar. Myanmar’s government denies this group re-entry, resulting in them being
stranded and subsequently rescued from their boats near Indonesia. In April, the NLD
states they will participate in the upcoming election if the government frees political
prisoners, changes the constitution and allows international observers to watch the
elections. In May, the EU extends its sanctions against Myanmar (which began in 2006)
but notes that they will be reviewed if the country moves towards democracy. In August,
an American man named John Yettaw swims across Inya Lake to get to Aung San Suu
Kyi’s house and she is convicted of breaching the conditions of her house arrest for
having an uninvited visitor, extending her house arrest by an additional 18 months. In
September, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announces her plans to engage with
military leaders, and in October, Aung San Suu Kyi begins talks with military leaders and
is permitted to meet with Western diplomats.
2010 – In February, NLD vice-chairman Tin Oo, who had spent over a decade in prison or under
house arrest, is released. In March, the government announces that election laws have
been passed in preparation for the upcoming general elections. The electoral commission
is chosen by the junta. The NLD votes to boycott the elections due to the provision
barring Aung San Suu Kyi from the presidency, as well as the unfair electoral laws and
the continued detention of political prisoners. A splinter group of NLD members who
wish to contest the elections forms a new political party, National Democratic Front
(NDF). In October, the government changes the country’s flag, national anthem, and
official name from the Union of Burma to the Republic of the Union of Myanmar1.
1

International organizations and foreign governments criticized this name change as a dramatic
shift being made by a government that was not democratically elected. However, in Burmese, the
two names (“Bama byi” or “Burma country” and “Myanma naing-nga” or “Myanmar nation”)
have been used interchangeably long before the British adopted the name “Burma”. Additionally,
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General elections are held in November and the Union Solidarity and Development Party,
the military-backed party, wins a massive victory. Opposition groups report there was
widespread fraud and the election is condemned by the international community as a
sham. The junta claims that this election marked the transition from a military regime to a
civilian-led democracy. Aung San Suu Kyi is released the week after the election.
Transition Period – 2011-2015
2011 – In March, Thein Sein, a retired general known for his moderate views, is sworn in as the
new president of the new USDP-led government of Myanmar. In August, President Thein
Sein meets with Aung San Suu Kyi in Naypyidaw, and in September, he suspends the
construction of a controversial hydroelectric dam (Myitsone) which was being funded by
China. These shifts were seen as shifts towards greater governmental openness and
respect for public opinion. In October, a general amnesty frees some political prisoners,
and new labor laws allow for unions. In November, Aung San Suu Kyi announces that
she will stand for election and the NLD will contest the upcoming by-elections. In
December, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visits the country, meeting Aung San
Suu Kyi and President Thein Sein. The US offers to improve foreign relations with
Myanmar if the ongoing democratic reforms continue, a major step after decades of nonengagement. President Thein Sein signs a law allowing for peaceful demonstrations and
the NLD re-registers as a political party in preparation of the 2012 by-elections. A truce
deal is reached between the government and Shan ethnic rebel groups.
2012 – In January, the Myanmar government signs a ceasefire with Karen ethnic rebel groups. In
April, by-elections are held and NLD candidates, including Aung San Suu Kyi, win in a
landslide. The EU suspends all non-military sanctions against Myanmar for one year. In
2012, Manmohan Singh visits Myanmar in the first official visit by an Indian prime
minister since 1987. In August, President Thein Sein establishes a commission to
investigate violence which has broken out between Arakanese Buddhists and Rohingya
Muslims in Rakhine state in the west of the country. Thein Sein’s government abolishes
pre-publication media censorship, a common practice during the military regime.
President Thein Sein also replaces hardliner Information Minister Kyaw Hsan with more
moderate Aung Kyi in a cabinet reshuffle, perhaps due to disagreements or splits between
hardliners and soft-liners. Former prime minister Khin Nyunt is released from prisoner.
In September, Myanmar removes over 2,000 people (both citizens and foreign nationals)
from its blacklist of those not allowed into the country. In November, Jose Manuel
Barroso, the European Commission Chief, offers more than $100 million in development
aid to Myanmar. Dozens of people are killed in more violence between Buddhists and
Muslims in Rakhine state. US President Barack Obama visits Myanmar and offers “the
hand of friendship” with the US if Myanmar continues with its democratic reforms.
2013 – In January and February, a standoff occurs between Kachin rebels and the army in Laiza,
and eventually China helps to start talks between the groups. In March, riots between
the name Myanmar is considered to be a more inclusive name for ethnic minority groups,
because the name Burma shares a name with the majority Bama ethnic group.
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Muslims and Buddhists take place in Meiktila and result in the death of at least 10
people. In April, four private daily newspapers appear, breaking a state media monopoly
of almost 50 years. In May, President Thein Sein visits Washington.
2014 – In April, 22 people are killed in clashes between the army and ethnic Kachin rebels. In
May, the US extends sanctions for a year despite the recent reforms, citing human rights
abuses and the army’s continued political and economic influence. In October, 3,000
prisoners are released.
2015 – In February, fighting between the army and Kokang separatists in Shan state results in 50
dead soldiers, leading the government to put Kokang under temporary martial law. The
government withdraws temporary voting rights from Muslim Rohingyas in response to
protests by Buddhists. In March, a draft ceasefire agreement is signed by the government
and sixteen different ethnic rebel groups. In May, more Rohingyas flee the country in
flimsy boats and get stranded, leading the UN to criticize ASEAN states who fail to
rescue them. In November, general elections are held and the NLD, led by Aung San Suu
Kyi, win enough seats to lead the new government. This is widely agreed to be the first
true civilian-led government, as these elections were seen as much more free and
legitimate than the general elections in 2010.

APPENDIX B:
LIST OF SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
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-

Can you speak a little bit about the Roadmap to Democracy that was announced in 2003?
Specifically, I'm interested in how Burmese citizens felt about the Roadmap. Were
people hopeful about it leading to real change in Myanmar, or did most people think it
was a sham? How successful do you feel the Roadmap was?

-

What was the political climate like before the Constitutional Referendum in 2008? How
did people feel about the new Constitution?

-

Related to the Constitution, how did the SPDC develop the Constitution? Were there
groups involved in its development other than the SPDC? Did they use constitutions from
other countries as a guide for the development of the current constitution? Were there any
notable changes made to the Constitution before the Referendum?

-

How did you feel about the 2010 elections?

-

How has international pressure affected politics in Myanmar? Are there any specific
policies (e.g. US sanctions or Chinese business investments) that had a notable effect
during the last ten years?

-

How did the 2012 by-elections differ from the 2010 elections? Did the by-elections affect
the political climate in Myanmar and the way the Burmese people viewed their
government?

-

Were there any significant political changes that you think affected the 2012 byelections?

-

What was the political climate leading up to the 2015 elections? Were people optimistic
or pessimistic about the outcome?

-

Why do you think the outcome of the 1990 elections was so different from the outcome
of the 2015 elections (i.e. the regime allowing the results to stand in 2015 but not in
1990)?

-

Do you think the role of the military will continue in Burmese politics under the new
government? Why or why not? What factors do you think will be important for the
military to consider leaving politics? Do you think the military will ever fully leave
Burmese politics?

-

How do you think the new government (the one that came into office on Feb 1) is doing?
Are there any positive or negative changes that people are talking about?

-

Is it more difficult for women in Myanmar to run for office and get elected than men?
What are the barriers facing women in Myanmar who would like to get involved in
politics?

-

Which political changes have surprised you the most? Why?

-

Do you think the political change in Myanmar is genuine? If so, at what point did you
feel that change was really happening?

-

Do you expect to see any changes to electoral laws or constitutional amendments soon?
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-

Are there any political changes you hope will happen? If so, what?

-

Do you have any predictions for the 2020 general elections?

APPENDIX C
NOTABLE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS ON MYANMAR, 1988-2002

-2002

Table 8: Notable American Legislative Efforts on Myanmar 1
Name
H.R. 1594 (101st): Customs
and Trade Act of 1990
H.R. 2655 (101st):
International Cooperation
Act of 1989

H.Con.Res. 185 (101st): In
support of basic human
rights and democracy in
Burma

Date
Sponsor
Introduced
Rep. Sam
Mar 23, 1989 Gibbons (DFL)
Introduced
Rep. Dante
Jun 15, 1989 Fascell (DFL)

Introduced
Aug 2, 1989

Rep.
Stephen
Solarz (DNY)

Details
Requires president to impose economic
sanctions against Burma is specified
conditions not met
Directs President to consider whether the
government of Burma “has held free and fair
elections and a civilian government has
assumed power” when determining whether
to provide Burma with assistance and/or
funds
Calls upon the Government of Burma to 1)
remove all house arrest orders; 2) end martial
law; 3) investigate reports of torture; 4)
permit opposition parties to freely operate; 5)
continue plans to hold elections in 1990.
Calls upon 1) all nations to withhold foreign
assistance until democratic government takes
office and 2) the President, Sec. of States,
US Permanent Ambassador to UN and the
US Ambassador to Burma to public condemn
repression in Burma and encourage free and
fair elections

Result
Signed by
President, Enacted
Aug 20, 1990
Passed House June
29, 1989

Ordered reported
Oct 12, 1989

(Continued on following page)
1

GovTrack.us. There was a total of 90 bills introduced between 1988-2002, compared to 86 bills introduced between 2003-2010 and
62 bills between 2011-2015. The selection in this table did not include annual bills (such as regularly-occurring appropriations or
foreign operations bills), most of which contained earmarks for refugee assistance and scholarships for Burmese citizens.
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Table 8 (continued)
Name
H.Con.Res. 324 (101st):
Concerning human rights,
democracy, and illicit
narcotics production and
trafficking in Burma

Date
Introduced
May 8, 1990

Sponsor
Rep.
Stephen
Solarz (DNY)

H.R. 2508 (102nd):
International Cooperation
Act of 1991

Introduced
Jun 3, 1991

Rep. Dante
Fascell (DFL)

S. 1467 (103rd): Foreign
Assistance Act of 1993

Introduced
Sep 16, 1993

S. 422 (104th): International
Partnership and Prosperity
Act of 1995

Introduced
Feb 15, 1995

Sen.
Claiborne
Pell (D-RI)
Sen. Mitch
McConnell
(R-KY)

Details
Calls upon the Government of Burma to 1)
create conditions necessary for free and fair
elections in Burma on May 27, 1990 and 2)
abandon martial law. Calls upon
international community to withhold foreign
assistance and end military cooperation and
on the President to encourage international
observation of the 1990 elections. Denounces
Burmese Government’s cooperation with
drug traffickers
Requires the President to consider whether
the Government of Burma has 1) ceded
control to civilian government as mandated
by the 1990 elections; 2) released political
prisoners; 3) ceased harassing individuals
and parties for political expression when
making decisions about assistance or military
deals

Adds Myanmar to list of countries for which
funding is prohibited
Prohibits funds from providing economic
assistance to Burma

Result
Passed House May
21, 1990; Never
passed in the Senate

Passed House Jun
20, 1991, Passed
Senate with
changes Jul 26,
1991 and sent back
to House.
Conference Report
was agreed to by
Senate Oct 8, 1991,
but never enacted.
Ordered Reported
Sep 16, 1993
Was not enacted

(Continued on following page)
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Table 8 (continued)
Name
H.R. 3610 (104th): Omnibus
Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 1997

Date
Introduced
Jun 11, 1996

Sponsor
Rep. W. Bill
Young (RFL)

H.R. 4036 (104th): Human
Rights, Refugee, and Other
Foreign Relations
Provisions Act of 1996

Introduced
Sep 5, 1996

Rep.
Christopher
Smith (RNJ)

Details
Imposes certain economic sanctions against
Burma until the President certifies that
Burma is improving human rights and
implementing democracy. Appropriates
funds for democracy and humanitarian
activities in Burma
Requires Director of the United States
Information Agency (USIA) to provide
educational and cultural exchange programs
to human rights and democracy leaders in
countries such as Burma

Result
Enacted – signed by
the President Sep
30, 1996

Enacted – signed by
the President Oct
19, 1996
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APPENDIX D
NOTABLE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS ON MYANMAR, 2003-2010

Table 9: Notable American Legislative Efforts on Myanmar, 2003-20101
Name
H.Res. 84 (108th): Calling for
the immediate intervention in
the conflict in Burma, and for
other purposes

Date
Introduced
Feb 13,
2003

Sponsor
Rep. Joseph
Pitts (R-PA)

H.R. 2330 (108th): Burmese
Freedom and Democracy Act
of 2003

Introduced
Jun 4, 2003

Rep. Tom
Lantos (DCA)

H. Res 768 (108th): Calling on
the United Nations Security
Council to immediately
consider and take appropriate
action to respond to the
growing threat…

Introduced
Sep 13,
2004

Rep. Elton
Gallegly (RCA)

Details
Calls on the executive branch of the US
government and international community to
intervene in conflict and protect refugees; to
send peacekeepers to Burma to prevent
ethnic cleansing; calls on SPDC to allow
government based on 1990 election results
to form and to release political prisoners
Introduces a ban on imports that support
Burma’s military regime; freezing US assets
of the Burmese regime; preventing loans or
assistance to Burma; expanding the visa
ban; condemning the military regime and
spreading information about the NLD and
ethnic minority groups; supporting
democracy activists in Burma
The U.N. Security Council should
“immediately consider and take appropriate
action to respond to the growing threat that
the ruling State Peace and Development
Council in Burma poses to the Southeast
Asia region and to the people of Burma.”

Result
Was not enacted

Senate version
was S. 1215
sponsored by
Mitch McConnell
(R-KY). H.R.
2330 was signed
by President,
enacted July 28,
2003
Agreed to
(Simple
Resolution) on
October 7, 2004

(Continued on following page)
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GovTrack.us. There was a total of 86 bills introduced between 2003-2010, compared to 90 bills introduced between 1988-2002 and
62 bills between 2011-2015. The selection in this table did not include annual bills (such as regularly-occurring appropriations or
foreign operations bills), most of which contained earmarks for refugee assistance and scholarships for Burmese citizens.

Table 9 (continued)
Name
S. 3016 (108th): Asia Freedom
Act of 2004

Date
Introduced
Nov. 19,
2004

Sponsor
Sen. Mitch
McConnell (RKY)

S. Res. 174 (109th): A
resolution recognizing
Burmese democracy activist
and Nobel Peace Laureate
Aung San Suu Kyi as a symbol
of the struggle for freedom in
Burma
S.Res. 484 (109th): A
resolution expressing the sense
of the Senate condemning the
military junta in Burma for its
recent campaign of terror
against ethnic minorities and
calling on the United Nations
Security Council to adopt
immediately a binding nonpunitive resolution on Burma

Introduced
Jun 16,
2005

Sen. Mitch
McConnell (RKY)

Introduced
May 18,
2006

Sen. Mitch
McConnell (RKY)

Details
To promote regional peace and stability in
North and Southeast Asia by 1) improving
living standards and economic wellbeing of
the people, 2) supporting freedom and
human rights, 3) countering terrorism and
narcotics, and 3) expanding free markets
Recognizes Aung San Suu Kyi as a symbol
for freedom in Burma; calls for the
immediate and unconditional release of her
and other political prisoners; calls on
Secretary of State Rice to bring up issues in
Burma at upcoming ASEAN forum

Result
Was not
enacted

1) condemns military regime for terror
against ethnic minorities, 2) calls on
democracies to work with ASEAN to
promote democracy and human rights in
Burma; and 3) call on US to pass a
resolution in UN Security Council calling
for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and
other prisoners and supporting democracy in
Burma

Agreed to
(Simple
Resolution) on
May 18, 2006

Agreed to
(Simple
Resolution) on
June 16, 2005

(Continued on following page)
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Table 9 (continued)
Name
H.Con.Res. 200 (110th): A
concurrent resolution
expressing the sense of
Congress regarding the
immediate and unconditional
release of Daw Aung San Suu
Kyi and the severely
deteriorating human rights
situation in Burma
S.Res. 339 (110th): A
resolution expressing the sense
of the Senate on the situation
in Burma

Date
Introduced
Aug 2, 2007

S. 2172 (110th): Saffron
Revolution Support Act of
2007

Introduced
Oct 16,
2007

Introduced
Oct 1, 2007

Sponsor
Details
Rep Peter King In light of Saffron Revolution, condemns
(R-NY)
the crackdown, calls on other countries to
stop supporting the Burmese regime,
demands political dialogue between
parties and the release of prisoners, calls
on other nations to tighten sanctions, calls
on UN Security Council to pass
multilateral sanctions, calls on ASEAN to
remove Burma’s membership
Sen. John
Condemning violence against protestors;
Kerry (D-MA) calls on PRC and other nations to
condemn Myanmar’s actions and stop
military assistance; calls for peaceful
dialogue between leaders; welcomes
ASEAN’s statement on Burma situation;
encourages PRC, India, and Russia to
modify their policy towards Burma;
supports UN mission led by Ibrahim
Gambari; calls on government of Burma
to lift restrictions on humanitarian aid
Sen. John
Imposes sanctions on SPDC members,
McCain (Rprohibits the importation of gems and
AZ)
hardwoods from Burma, and supports
democracy

Result
Passed House Oct
2, 2007

Agreed to
(Simple
Resolution) on
Oct 1, 2007

Was not enacted

(Continued on following page)
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Table 9 (continued)
Name
H.R. 3890: (110th): Tom
Lantos Block Burmese JADE
(Junta’s Anti-Democratic
Efforts) Act of 2008

Date
Introduced
Oct 18,
2007

Sponsor
Rep. Tom
Lantos (D-CA)

S.2257 (110th): Burma
Democracy Promotion Act of
2007

Introduced
Oct 29,
2007

Vice President
Joseph Biden
(D)

S.Con.Res. 56 (110th): A
Introduced
concurrent resolution
Nov 16,
encouraging the Association of 2007
Southeast Asian Nations to
take action to ensure a peaceful
transition to democracy in
Burma

Sen. Barbara
Boxer (D-CA)

Details
Increased sanctions on Burma, including a
visa ban, financial sanctions, and banking
sanctions; makes amendments to the
Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of
2003; appoints a Special Representative
and Policy Coordinator for Burma;
supports a constitutional democracy and
NGOs working towards human rights in
Burma; calls for a report on who provides
military intelligence and arm sales to
Burma; reducing SPDC revenue from
timber; report on financial assets held by
members of the SPDC
Imposes sanctions on SPDC officials,
amends Burmese Freedom and
Democracy Act of 2003 to prohibit
imports of gems and hardwoods, promotes
coordinated international effort to restore
civilian democratic rule
Urges ASEAN to push for peaceful
transition to democracy in Burma and to
possibly review Burma’s membership

Was not enacted

Passed Senate
Nov 16, 2007

422

(Continued on following page)

Result
Enacted – signed
by the President
July 29, 2008

Table 9 (continued)
Name
H.R. 4286 (110th): To award a
congressional gold medal to
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in
recognition of her courageous
and unwavering commitment
to peace, nonviolence, human
rights, and democracy in
Burma
H.Con.Res. 317 (110th):
Condemning the Burmese
regime’s undemocratic draft
constitution and scheduled
referendum

Date
Introduced
Dec 5, 2007

Sponsor
Details
Rep. Joseph Moves to award a congressional gold medal
Crowley (D- to Aung San Suu Kyi
NY)

Result
Enacted – signed
by the President
May 6, 2008

Introduced
Mar 14,
2008

Rep. Rush
Holt (D-NJ)

Passed House
May 6, 2008

Denounces SPDC, urges dialogue, demands
release of prisoners, urges for President to
call UN Security Council to condemn the
referendum and to pass a binding resolution
for dialogue, urges President to push for
arms embargo, urges ASEAN to get involved
S. Res. 554 (110th): A
Introduced
Sen John.
Expresses sympathy and support for
resolution expressing the
May 7, 2008 Kerry (DBurmese people for Cyclone Nargis,
Sense of the Senate on
MA)
supports President Bush’s decision to
humanitarian assistance to
provide immediate emergency humanitarian
Burma after Cyclone Nargis
assistance, offers additional funds if
necessary, calls on SPDC to lift restrictions
on humanitarian assistance
H. Res. 1181 (110th):
Introduced
Rep. Joseph Extends condolences to people of Burma for
Expressing condolences and
May 8, 2008 Crowley (D- Cyclone Nargis and vows support, calls on
sympathy to the people of
NY)
Americans to provide emergency assistance
Burma for the grave loss of life
through humanitarian agencies, calls for
and vast destruction caused by
junta to accept assistance and “demands that
Cyclone Nargis
the referendum to entrench military rule be
called off”

Agreed to
(Simple
Resolution) May
13, 2008
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(Continued on following page)

Agreed to
(Simple
Resolution) on
May 7, 2008

Table 9 (continued)
Name
S.Res. 160 (111th): A resolution
condemning the continued
detention of Burmese democracy
leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and
calling on the military regime in
Burma to permit a credible and fair
election process and the transition
to civilian, democratic rule
H.Res. 1710 (111th): Calling on the
military regime in Burma, the State
Peace and Development Council, to
immediately recognize the
Rohingya people as full and equal
citizens of Burma

Date
Introduced
Apr 14,
2010

Sponsor
Sen. Judd
Gregg (RNH)

H.Res. 1677 (111th): Condemning
the Burmese regime’s
undemocratic elections on
November 7, 2010

Introduced Rep.
Sep 29,
Donald
2010
Manzullo
(R-IL)

H.Res. 1768 (111th): Welcoming
the release of Burmese democracy
leader and Nobel Peace Prize
Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi on
November 13, 2010 and calling for
a continued focus on securing the
release of all political prisoners and
prisoners of conscience in Burma

Introduced Rep. Alcee
Dec 15,
Hastings
2010
(D-FL)

Introduced Rep.
Sep 29,
Christopher
2010
Smith (RNJ)

Details
Condemns detention of all political prisoners,
calls on regime to engage in dialogue, calls on
Secretary of State to consider strengthening
sanctions and to engage with other nations and
organization to encourage democratic transition
and significant constitutional and electoral
changes in Burma

Result
Agreed to
(Simple
Resolution)
on May 7,
2010

Calls on SPDC to recognize the Rohingya
people as full citizens of Burma and to lift their
restrictions on movement, marriage, and access
to education; also calls on Governments of
Bangladesh and Thailand to stop forcing
Rohingya refugees back to Burma and to address
living conditions
Resolution “denounces the one-sided,
undemocratic, and illegitimate actions of the
State Peace and Development Council that seek
to legitimize military rule through a flawed
election process”
Welcomes the release of Aung San Suu Kyi
from house arrest and calls for the release to be
unconditional and final and for the regime to
guarantee her security; calls on other
governments to strength sanctions against
Burma; calls for administration to fully
implement the Tom Lantos Block Burmese
JADE Act.

Was not
enacted

Agreed to
(Simple
Resolution)
on Nov 18,
2010
Was not
enacted
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APPENDIX E
NOTABLE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS ON MYANMAR 2011-2015

Table 10: Notable American Legislative Efforts on Myanmar 2011-20151
Name
S.Res. 139 (112th): A resolution
expressing the sense of the Senate
that the President should take certain
actions with respect to the
Government of Burma

Date
Sponsor
Introduced Sen. Richard
April 8,
Lugar (R-IN)
2011

H.R. 6431 (112th): To provide
flexibility with respect to United
States support for assistance
provided by international financial
institutions for Burma
S.Res. 227 (112th): A resolution
calling for the protection of the
Mekong River Basin and increased
United States support for delaying
the construction of mainstream dams
along the Mekong River

Introduced Rep. Edward
September “Ed” Royce
19, 2021
(R-CA)

Introduced Sen. Jim
July 7,
Webb (D2011
VA)

Details
Calls on the President to provide Congress
with a report of the volume of ships and
planes from North Korea to Burma; call for
an international investigation of crimes
against civilians in Burma; and encourage
neighboring countries to establish safe
havens for fleeing child soldiers
Since “it is in the national interest of the
United States to support assistance for
Burma,” the Secretary of the Treasury may
provide assistance to Burma
Calls on the US members at development
banks to support adherence to international
environmental standards before allowing
financial assistance for hydropower dams on
the Mekong River

Result
Was not
enacted

Enacted,
signed by the
president on
October 5,
2012
Ordered
Reported
November
29, 2011

(Continued on following page)

1

GovTrack.us. There was a total of 62 bills between 2011-2015, compared to 90 bills introduced between 1988-2002 and 86 bills
introduced between 2003-2010. The selection in this table did not include annual bills (such as regularly-occurring appropriations or
foreign operations bills), most of which contained earmarks for refugee assistance and scholarships for Burmese citizens.
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Table 10 (continued)
Name
H.Con.Res. 135 (112th):
Authorizing the use of the
rotunda of the Capitol for the
presentation of the
Congressional Gold Medal to
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
S.1885 (113th): Burma Human
Rights and Democracy Act of
2013

Date
Introduced
August 2,
2012

Sponsor
Rep. Joseph
“Joe”
Crowley (DNY)

Details
Authorizes the use of the Rotunda to be
used on September 19, 2012 for the
presentation of the Congressional Gold
Medal to Aung San Suu Kyi

Result
Passed Senate
August 2, 2012

Introduced
December
20, 2013

Sen. Robert
“Bob”
Menéndez (DNJ)

Died in a
previous
Congress

H.R.3889 (113th) and H.R.
4377 (113th): Burma Human
Rights and Democracy Act of
2014

Introduced
January 15,
2014 and
April 2,
2014
respectively

Rep. Joseph
“Joe”
Crowley (DNY) and Rep.
Steve Chabot
(R-OH)

Praises the Burmese government for taking
concrete steps for setting up civilian
oversight, addressing human rights abuses,
ending military relations with North Korea,
amending the Constitution, promoting peace
with ethnic groups, etc.
Same language as S.1885 Burma Human
Rights and Democracy Act of 2013 – “to
place conditions on assistance to the
Government of Burma”

H.R.3979 (113th): Carl Levin
and Howard P. “Buck”
McKeon National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2015

Introduced
January 31,
2014

Rep. Lou
Barletta (RPA)

Authorizes the Department of Defense to
provide the Burmese government with
training on human rights, international laws
of conflict, aid in event of humanitarian
crisis or natural disaster, etc.

H.R.3889 - Died
in a previous
Congress
H.R. 4377 Considered by
Asia and the
Pacific
Committee
Enacted – Signed
by President
December 19,
2014

(Continued on following page)
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Table 10 (continued)
Name
H.Res.418 (113th): Urging the
Government of Burma to end
the persecution of the
Rohingya2 people and respect
internationally recognized
human rights for all ethnic and
religious minority groups
within Burma
S.Res.586 (113th): A resolution
calling on the Government of
Burma to develop a nondiscriminatory and
comprehensive solution that
addresses Rakhine State’s
needs for peace, security,
harmony, and development
under equitable and just
application of the rule of law

Date
Introduced
November
18, 2013

Sponsor
Rep. James
“Jim”
McGovern (DMA)

Introduced
November
20, 2014

Sen. Robert
“Bob”
Menéndez (DNJ)

Details
Recognizes the positive Burma has taken
“in transitioning from a military
dictatorship to a quasi-civilian
government” and calls on the Burmese
government to end persecution of the
Rohingya and to recognize them as an
indigenous ethnic groups and as citizens
of the country
Calls for the Burmese government to
create a solution to the conflict in Rakhine
state, allows Doctors without Borders to
work in the state, end persecution against
the Rohingya, redraft the Citizenship Law
of 1982 to allow Rohingya’s right to selfidentification, allow an international
investigation into the violence occurring
in Rakhine state in 2012, call on regional
governments to respect non-refoulement

Result
Agreed to
(Simple
Resolution) on
May 7, 2014

Ordered Reported
December 3,
2014

(Continued on following page)
22

This bill is not the first U.S. bill to mention the Rohingya people. The first bill listed on GovTrack.us which refers to the Rohingya
is S.Res.234 from the 103rd Congress in 1994. This simple resolution states that, among other human rights violations, “reports have
indicated that some Rohingya refugees located in Bangladesh have been returned to Burma against their will” and calls on the U.S.
government to “investigate claims of forced repatriation of Rohingya refugees and encourage adequate monitoring to prevent Burmese
refugees from being repatriated against their will.” There has been a total of 41 U.S. bills mentioning the Rohingya, and 38 of the 41
were introduced in 2010 and later.
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Table 10 (continued)
Name
S.Res.116 (114th): A resolution
providing for free and fair
elections in Burma

Date
Introduced
March 26,
2015

Sponsor
Sen. Lindsey
Graham (RSC)

Details
Calls on the President and Secretary of
state to support efforts to reform the 2008
Burmese Constitution, support fair and
free elections in Burma, express solidarity
with the UN mechanisms for investigating
violations of human rights, ensure that the
Union Election Commission function in a
fair and impartial manner, delay
normalizing relations if the Tatmadaw
undermines free and fair elections, and
condemns human rights abuse

Result
Died in a
previous
Congress

S.Res. 320 (114th): A
resolution congratulating the
people of Burma on their
commitment to peaceful
elections

Introduced
November
19, 2015

Sen. John
McCain (RAZ)

Congratulates the people of Burma,
recognizes the NLD’s victory as the will
of the Burmese people, calls on the USDP
to undertake a peaceful transfer of power,
recognizes Burma’s “important progress
towards democratization”

Agreed to
(Simple
Resolution) on
December 16,
2015
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